Use of Drones in Defence Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence

Use of Drones in Defence

Helen Maguire Excerpts
Wednesday 3rd September 2025

(3 days, 17 hours ago)

Westminster Hall
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Helen Maguire Portrait Helen Maguire (Epsom and Ewell) (LD)
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It is an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I thank the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) for securing this important debate; I was sorry not to be able to hear from him yesterday in the battle of Britain debate.

The integration of drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, into defence has transformed the way that nations think about security and the battlefield. Over the past decade, we have seen a steady growth in their use, and the war in Ukraine has made clear to the world just how central they have become. What was once considered cutting-edge technology is now an everyday feature of modern warfare. It is alarming that more soldiers today are being killed by drones in Ukraine than by any other form of warfare.

However, the benefits of drones are undeniable. Drones allow us to project force and gather intelligence without putting soldiers directly in harm’s way. They give commanders a real-time picture of the battlefield, overcoming traditional line-of-sight limitations and extending awareness deep into enemy territory. They have become central to surveillance, targeting, logistics and even battlefield medical support. For example, drones equipped with advanced thermal imaging can locate casualties hidden in rubble, smoke or woodland. They can deliver medical supplies, bandages, medication and even defibrillators into remote or inaccessible areas, providing rapid aid while reducing the need to send medics into danger.

In defensive operations, tethered drones are able to remain airborne for hours, providing uninterrupted surveillance and protecting bases from surprise attack. AI-enabled drones can patrol throughout the night, automatically detecting and flagging suspicious activity, which reduces the pressure on human surveillance teams and cuts the risk of fatigue.

Cost is another factor. Compared with tanks, aircraft or armoured vehicles, drones are relatively cheap to produce, quick to deploy and often expendable. Ukraine’s experience shows how even commercial drones adapted for reconnaissance or artillery targeting can deliver immense tactical advantage. Their real-time video and geolocation data have significantly improved artillery accuracy, reducing waste of ammunition and increasing strike precision. Drones have also enabled Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes deep into Russian territory, disrupting logistics and undermining morale.

However, alongside those advantages, we must acknowledge the challenges. Drones are not a silver bullet. They come with ethical concerns about remote warfare, accountability and lethal decision making, and the potential for escalation when operators can strike from thousands of miles away.

Technically, they are also highly vulnerable. Drones depend on data links—radio or satellite based—and GPS signals to navigate and communicate. Adversaries with electronic warfare capabilities can jam, spoof or hijack those links. That is not theory: as has already been mentioned, in 2009 Iraqi insurgents intercepted live US drone video feeds using cheap, commercially available software. In Ukraine, Russian jamming and interference has disrupted as many as 60% to 80% of drones before they reach their targets. That has forced Ukrainian forces to innovate using frequency-hopping communications, deploying fibre-optic cables up to 50 km long, and even experimenting with AI-based navigation when comms fail.

The lesson is clear: we must be realistic about what drones can do. Overreliance on them would be reckless. Ground forces remain indispensable for holding territory, engaging with civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief and responding to dynamic battle conditions. Drones can enhance these missions, but they cannot replace them. A balanced force of combined arms structure is essential.

I welcome the Government’s announcement of a £2 billion drone investment package and the establishment of a drone innovation centre. Those are important steps, but technology alone is not enough. A fleet of advanced drones is only as effective as the people who operate and maintain it, and all three services will need drone pilots. That should form part of basic training.

Drone warfare requires highly skilled professionals—pilots trained to control aircraft in contested environments, engineers able to maintain complex systems, data analysts capable of interpreting live feeds and AI specialists who can design resilient autonomy. Without those skills, our investment risks being underutilised or, worse, ineffective. Recruitment, training and retention must therefore be a central part of any strategy. We need a robust pipeline of talent if we are to scale drone operations responsibly and securely.

We must also recognise the speed of innovation because our adversaries are not standing still. They are rapidly working to advance their drones as well; if we are to maintain our edge, sustained research and development is a necessity. That means investment not only in next-generation drones, but in secure communications, anti-jamming technology, counter-drone systems and resilient AI. It also means collaboration, working closely with universities, private sector innovators and start-ups that can bring new technologies quickly to the table.

It is essential that the UK can quickly adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of warfare. Drones are not just another tool; they are reshaping the character of conflict. They save lives by keeping soldiers out of harm’s way, they improve precision and they provide persistent surveillance and awareness, yet they also carry risks—ethical, strategic and technological. Our task is to embrace their potential while also guarding against the vulnerabilities. We need investment in technology but also in people. The Government must work to balance technological innovation with conventional strength and ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of research and development, so that we are not only consumers of new technologies but leaders in shaping how it is used responsibly in defence.