Foreign Affairs Committee (Hong Kong Visit)

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this important debate. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I congratulate our Chairman on the measured and yet resolute manner in which he has dealt with the matter. Hon. Members on both sides of the House will acknowledge that.

I am almost tail-end Charlie, and time is beginning to press, so I will dwell on a couple of points that have not been covered in the debate. It has been said outside this place that China does not fully understand how our system works, and that the Foreign Affairs Committee is basically a part of the Government. Hon. Members know that that is clearly not the case. If anybody seriously believes that any member of the Committee is a mouthpiece for the Government, they have no idea how Parliament works. They need take only a cursory glance at what happens in Parliament to get a more accurate picture. That leads me to suggest that the situation is not a result of negligence, an accident or a simple misunderstanding, but a result of a fundamental wish to ignore the facts. A country with the size, wealth and intelligence of China cannot fail to understand that the Foreign Affairs Committee is not the mouthpiece of the Government or involved in the Government in any way. Our job is to scrutinise. Some of us take our responsibilities more seriously than others, but there is no doubt about the Committee’s role.

There are repercussions for both parties when a treaty is not respected. There is no doubt that the Sino-British joint declaration is an international agreement. It is a treaty and was lodged with the UN—if there is any doubt, the treaty number is 23391. This is therefore not about interfering or meddling in the internal affairs of China. China very willingly signed up to the agreement and is a counterparty. Let us be clear about what the agreement says. It mentions Hong Kong having a high degree of autonomy, and rights, freedoms and lifestyles remaining unchanged for 50 years. The fact that China has reneged on that treaty—there is no other way of putting it—has repercussions for both sides, because it takes two to sign a treaty.

As has been mentioned, the repercussions for the Chinese will be profound, although perhaps not immediate. What message does the situation send to the world? What message does it send to Taiwan? If China wants Taiwan to return to the fold, this is not the way to go about it. Not only reneging on the treaty but stopping us entering Hong Kong shows weakness rather than strength. China has shot itself in the foot.

There are also repercussions for the UK. I suggest that the UK has a moral responsibility to do what it can to ensure that China respects its commitments not only to the treaty and the spirit of that treaty, but to everything that follows. That includes allowing access by democratic bodies to visit Hong Kong.

The term “honourable” is an old-fashioned one, but I believe it remains a strong word, as I hope most hon. Members do. We should live our lives by it. We risk being dishonourable as a country if we do not hold China to its commitments. We know that the joint declaration lacks an arbitration clause and that, therefore, little process or recourse is allowed to check China if it transgresses, but there is little doubt what the treaty tries to achieve.

It is clear that China has reneged on the treaty, but we have that honourable responsibility to hold China to account. We must be clear that there is a danger that the term “dishonourable” could be applied if we are not careful. We need to look carefully at the UK Government’s response to events so far. Hong Kong 2020, a pro-democracy group, has described the UK as “sleeping on watch” with regard to the weakness of its response to the Chinese treaty transgressions. Human Rights Watch believes our response has been “shamefully weak” so far. I put it to my right hon. Friend the Minister of State that we need to look at how we are responding to China’s treaty transgressions. The treaty places obligations on both sides, and we must do what we can to ensure that we hold true to our end of the treaty and act in a totally honourable way.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

My son is in Hong Kong working as a banker. He tells me pretty much the same thing: that there is concern that the British Government have perhaps been slower than they might have been. I accept the sensitivities around this issue, but is it not the case that the demonstrators have behaved in the most extraordinarily restrained fashion? I believe they have put up huge notices saying, “We apologise for the inconvenience caused” and cleaned up all the litter. This is not the sort of demonstration we are accustomed to in the western world.

[Mr Baron]

Absolutely right—my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. This is not mob rule. The protests could not be described as any flagrant breach of the law. People are exercising the rights that we ourselves suggested they should have when we signed the Sino-British joint declaration. The action they have taken so far has been totally within the declaration, yet the Chinese have transgressed on that agreement. Our response has been very weak indeed. I would like to hear more from the Minister on what the British Government will do to make it clear that the Chinese entered the agreement in good faith, as did the British, and that all rights, responsibilities and freedoms under the law should be upheld by the Chinese authorities.

Just as China has shot itself in the foot by taking the action it has so far—not just with regard to banning the Committee from entering Hong Kong, but in transgressing on the agreement—we, too, have a downside risk in this affair. By not protesting enough—by not holding the Chinese Government to account and by continuing to be somewhat weak in our response in defence of the protesters who are operating within the law and the terms of the agreement—our reputation will suffer. We must not allow that to happen. This House must not allow it to happen. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the British Government intend to toughen up their response to this outrage.

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[Mr Swire]

I shall look to my hon. Friend for inspiration as we look forward to commemorating the signing in good faith of that declaration. I am sure he will be full of ideas.

As I said in the Westminster Hall debate on Hong Kong on 22 October, which my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) secured, we strongly believe that it is the “autonomy, rights and freedoms” guaranteed by the joint declaration that underpin Hong Kong’s success. He is right, by the way, to raise the regrettable incident recently when he, too, was refused a visa, this time to China itself, and when he and other members of the UK-China Leadership Forum felt they had no choice but to postpone their to visit Shanghai for talks with the Communist party. We again made it clear to the Chinese authorities our view that refusing visas is no kind of solution. It is clearly counter-productive that these talks have not now taken place. The important thing is to pursue dialogue on issues, even where we disagree.

I would equally emphasise my understanding that the FAC inquiry is focused on the promotion of economic, cultural and educational links, too. My hon. Friend the Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma) stressed the importance of the economy and trading links. Last year, Hong Kong was the UK’s second largest export market in Asia Pacific, and Hong Kong was the UK’s 12th largest investor. In addition, Hong Kong is an important factor in the UK’s dynamic relationship with mainland China—for instance, as Hong Kong and London work together to develop the financial service infrastructure for the internationalisation of the renminbi. These links are beneficial to the UK, China and Hong Kong, and absolutely deserve the attention of the FAC.

My hon. Friend the Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) raised the issue of former British servicemen in Hong Kong, and we will look into this, although it is more properly a matter for the Home Department. It is the case, however, that around 250,000 British citizens live in Hong Kong, and a further 3.4 million people—approximately half the population—hold the status of British nationals overseas, giving us a clear consular interest.

For these reasons, I can assure the House and those following this debate that the Government have been emphasising the context and importance of the inquiry at senior levels through official channels in Beijing, Hong Kong and London. I am grateful for the suggestion made in the press today by the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) that the Foreign Office should be engaging with our Chinese counterparts on this matter. I can tell her and others who raise it that that is precisely what we have been doing: our ambassador in Beijing, our consul-general in Hong Kong, myself and the Foreign Secretary have done so repeatedly.

[Mr Baron]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Swire]

I must make progress, if my hon. Friend will forgive me.

We cannot, of course, ignore the context of political protests in Hong Kong, which have now been going on for over two months. We have publicly welcomed the Hong Kong police’s stated commitment to exercise tolerance and restraint. As I have said before, it is essential that Hong Kong citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, including of assembly and demonstration, continue to be respected, as guaranteed by the Sino-British joint declaration. We have consistently called on all sides to ensure that the demonstrations are peaceful and in accordance with the law.

The issue at the centre of the protests is of course Hong Kong’s democracy, and specifically the arrangements for election of the Chief Executive in 2017. We believe that a transition to universal suffrage will safeguard Hong Kong’s future prosperity and stability, in line with the Basic Law and the aspirations of the people of Hong Kong. That is why we continue to encourage the Governments of Hong Kong and China to find a consensus that offers a genuine choice to the people of Hong Kong and gives them a real stake in the 2017 election for the Chief Executive, and then in due course for the elections to the Legislative Council in 2020.

Of course, the detailed arrangements for reform are for the people of Hong Kong, and the Governments of Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China to determine. The United Kingdom has consistently called on all parties to engage in dialogue within the parameters of the August decision by the National People’s Congress. We believe that there is scope for a consensus that will deliver a meaningful advance for democracy in Hong Kong, consistent with the commitments that have been made.

As Premier Li himself has said, we have an “indispensable” relationship with China. We have many shared interests, from our bilateral trade to our co-operation on global challenges such as Ebola. It is important for that relationship to be conducted with mutual understanding and respect based on open and honest dialogue, and we will continue our endeavours to that end.

Iran (Nuclear Talks)

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

As I have already told the House, we have raised and will continue to raise this case with the Iranians, but they simply do not recognise our locus. The Iranian constitution does not recognise the concept of dual nationality and therefore our protestations are received politely, but without any obvious effect.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The extension of the deadline is the second-best option, but one that is welcome all the same—going the extra mile to try to resolve the impasse could unlock so many thorny problems in the region. May I press the Foreign Secretary for absolute clarity as to the west’s position? He said that he does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or to develop nuclear weapons itself. Is it the west’s position that Iran would be allowed to harness technology and capability to the point of break-out?

[Mr Hammond]

The clear position of the E3 plus 3 is that Iran should be allowed to pursue a peaceful civil nuclear programme, but that safeguards should be in place that prevent Iran from acquiring the capability to develop a nuclear weapon.

Iran (UK Foreign Policy)

John Baron Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) and I are grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for agreeing to the debate. The hon. Gentleman and I are joint chairmen of the all-party parliamentary group on Iran. Flagged on today’s Order Paper is the report on Iran from the Foreign Affairs Committee, published in July. I know that the whole House will be grateful for that.

The debate comes at an important moment. In less than three weeks, on 24 November, the deadline for the current phase of the E3 plus 3 nuclear negotiations with Iran will be reached. Before I say more about those negotiations, let me put the debate in context. Here in the United Kingdom, too little is either known or understood about Iran. With a population of 77 million, it is second in size only to Egypt in the wider middle east, but it is much more prosperous than Egypt. It is “middle income” on the United Nations’ GDP measure, ahead of Bulgaria, which is a member of the European Union. Iran has a distinguished three-millennium civilisation, with as many connections, cultural and political, to Europe as to its southern and eastern neighbours. Its language is Indo-European. The words “Iran” and “Aryan” share the same root. Although it is Muslim, it is Muslim in its own singular way, through its practice of Shi’ism. It is a great mistake ever to suggest to an Iranian that Iranians are Arabs. It may sound counter-intuitive today, but traditionally lran’s strongest links in the region had been with the Jewish communities of the middle east.

Iran’s relationship with the United Kingdom has over many decades been close but difficult. “Behind every curtain you’ll find an Englishman,” goes one familiar saying in Farsi. From an Iranian perspective, one can appreciate why. From the late 19th century onwards we saw relations with Iran in mercantilist, neo-colonialist terms only. Iran was divided into spheres of influence by Russia under the Tsar and the United Kingdom. In the early part of the last century, highly preferential terms for the D’Arcy petroleum company, the forerunner of BP, were extorted from the then Government. Subsequently, we were instrumental in removing the Qajar dynasty, putting Reza Shah on the throne. We jointly occupied Iran with the Soviet Union for five years from 1941 to 1946. We and the United States then successfully conspired to remove the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953.

We then continued this rather dismal record by propping up the Shah even when there was every indication, if only we had recognised it, that he was heading a decadent and decaying regime which was highly likely to collapse. A year after the Islamic revolution came the Iran-Iraq war, in which by common consent Iraq was the aggressor and Iran the victim, but the west, including the UK, sided with the aggressor.

At the end of this week we have our Remembrance Sunday, when we remember the fallen who gave their lives for us in two world wars. Those wars are part of the definition of contemporary Britain. Similarly, we understand nothing about Iran if we do not understand the deep and still contemporary trauma that the Iran-Iraq war inflicted on Iranian society—the near-million killed and the sense of isolation which that war reinforced as one western nation after another, the UK included, unworthily supported Iraq. With that isolation came the sense that Iran could rely only upon itself.

Despite its complex and difficult relationship with the United Kingdom, the US and other western nations, Iran principally looks west, not east or south, for its future. Of course, there are those in the system who define themselves against the “Satans” of the west and who have a vested interest in the status quo, including in sanctions, but there are many, many more who want a normal relationship with the west. It was that demand that lay behind President Rouhani’s surprising victory in the presidential elections in June 2013, and there are, indeed, more American PhDs in President Rouhani’s Cabinet than in President Obama’s.

In the 1980s—and under the cover of mutually rebarbative, but carefully controlled, rhetoric—the one country from whom Iran gained some understanding, and very significant arms supplies, was Israel. David Menashri, of Tel Aviv university, one of Israel’s foremost experts on Iran, subsequently commented:

“Throughout the 1980s, no one in Israel said anything about an Iranian threat”

to Israel. He continued:

“The word wasn’t even uttered.”

That, however, was all in the days of the cold war.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I am listening intently and with great interest and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. However, he will perhaps agree that it was not just a question of the election of President Rouhani; there have been attempts in the past by Iran to reach out. While accepting that mistakes have been made by both sides in this difficult relationship, one only has to think of immediately after 9/11 when the Iranians reached out, and the early days of Afghanistan when they tried to help and did, indeed, help, but were rebuffed by the “axis of evil” speech by President Bush, for example.

[Mr Straw]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. I was heavily involved after President Khatami reached out to the United States in the moment of need. Iran provided significant practical help, without which it would have been far more difficult to remove the Taliban and to retake Kabul. Iran got no thanks for that, however. It was unnecessarily rebuffed by the United States at the time, as it was during the 2003-05 nuclear negotiations. It was also rebuffed when it sought a comprehensive bargain with the west. I am afraid that that prospect was greeted in parts of the United States with suspicion. In my view, there was a worry that if a deal was struck that resulted in the normalisation of relations with Iran, the part of the American system—and, indeed, the part of the Israeli system—that always likes to define itself against some kind of enemy would have had that enemy removed.

Twenty-five years after the collapse of the Berlin wall, the metrics of the middle east have all changed. The view of the Netanyahu Government in Israel, which is echoed by many in the United States Congress, is that Iran now poses an existential threat to the state of Israel because of the doubts as to whether Iran’s nuclear programmes have a military purpose. Those programmes are the subject of the intensive negotiations that will, we hope, have reached a satisfactory conclusion by 24 November.

As it was I, along with my French and German counterparts, who began the original E3 negotiations with Iran in 2003, I offer the following observations. Iran is not an easy country to negotiate with. That is partly due to cultural and linguistic problems and partly for historical reasons, but fundamentally it is a product of Iran’s complex and opaque governmental system, in which the elected President has constantly to broker decisions with unelected elements, including those in the revolutionary guards and those in the Supreme Leader’s office.

Unlike North Korea, which pulled out of the non-proliferation treaty, or India, Pakistan and Israel—all nuclear weapons states which have never accepted the treaty’s obligations—Iran has stayed within it. The treaty protects

“the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.

However, the treaty is silent on the question—critical to the outcome of the negotiations—of the enrichment of uranium. The Iranians claim a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and I hope the whole House will support them in that. The interim agreement signed last November explicitly recognised that.

The last set of negotiations, which took place between 2003 and 2005 and in which I was directly involved, ran into the ground. The Bush Administration had undermined the Khatami Administration through the “axis of evil” speech, and they did so again by refusing to offer Iran any confidence-building measures until it was too late. By that time, conservative forces in Iran had re-gathered their strength, with President Ahmadinejad the result.

When parliamentary colleagues and I met Foreign Minister Zarif in Tehran in January this year, he pointed out that when I had been negotiating with him in 2005, Iran had fewer than 200 centrifuges. After eight years of sanctions, it now has 18,800. We should be careful what we wish for. The good news about the current round of negotiations is that both sides have kept them confidential. However, it is no secret that the Iranian Government cannot do a deal unless it includes a continuation of enrichment for peaceful purposes, and unless the scale of the programme allowed does not involve the Government having to make significant numbers of its scientists redundant.

The negotiations are predicated on the basis that, because of Iran’s past failures to make full disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there remain unanswered questions about the true intent of Iran’s nuclear programmes. None of us outside the inner workings of the Iranian Government can know for certain what this is. My own instinct is that after the trauma of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran probably did begin work on a nuclear weapons system. More recently, however, a 2007 US national intelligence estimate—which has been reconfirmed by the White House in the past two years—concluded that Tehran had halted nuclear weaponisation work in 2003. If that is the case, there is no reason why, with some flexibility on both sides, a deal should not be concluded. If that happens, the gradual lifting of sanctions—which Iran so desperately needs—will help to bring Iran back fully as a partner in the international community.

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[Sir Richard Ottaway]

Yes, I am aware of that comment. However, the interpretation that my hon. Friend puts on it may be slightly unfair to Rouhani who does not necessarily control the judicial system or the sentences that are being handed down. The question is: can we trust him?

[Mr Baron]

I am listening with intent and interest to my right hon. Friend’s good speech. May I suggest to him that we should not look at this relationship just through the prism of executions and human rights? There are many of our allies in the region that have a similarly poor record, and yet that has not stopped us from calling them allies.

[Sir Richard Ottaway]

I have great regard for my hon. Friend’s views, but there are not many countries in the region that have a human rights record quite as bad as Iran’s. None the less, he makes a valid point, and it has to be taken into account. The question I was asking was: can we trust President Rouhani? The right hon. Member for Blackburn, who has known him for many years, suggests that we can, and I hope that he is right. The question is: what if he is wrong? That is the challenge we all face.

Rather worryingly, the Supreme Leader has been interfering in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with his call for industrial levels of centrifuges and nuclear material production, which caught the negotiators by surprise. When President Obama suggested enriching nuclear rods in the United States in 2009, the Supreme Leader pulled the rug from under that issue as well.

At the UN, President Rouhani suggested there should be a link between helping the west deal with the situation in Iraq and concessions in the nuclear negotiations. I have only one response to that, which is no, no, no. That cannot be the basis on which we proceed. To have a few more enrichment centrifuges for a bit of co-operation is exactly the wrong sort of deal.

Looking at the negotiations—the deadline is fast approaching—a number of deals have been suggested. Any settlement must have two main features. One is the break-out time. The Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a minimum of at least six months. The second is a verification programme that must be as robust as possible. That must be supported by a rigid inspections regime. It is critical that the International Atomic Energy Agency stays involved throughout the whole process and brings its professionalism to any verification and inspection. There is, in any settlement, a trade-off between reduction in capacity and the relaxation of trade sanctions as an incentive to encourage progress.

There is much talk about the number of centrifuges that can be used for peaceful production. I have been advised that the figure is somewhere in the region of 2,000 to 4,000, against the 18,000 currently in use. Obviously, the fewer centrifuges there are, the greater the time for break-out, and that has to be right at the centre of any negotiation settlement.

We also need to be satisfied that the objectives of the base at Arak, which is the home to the heavy water reactor, are peaceful. Iranians have yet to come up with a good explanation of those objectives. They argue that the facility is being used for medical research, but there is far too much capacity there for that, and no economic reason has been forthcoming.

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[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

First, I thank the Backbench Business Committee for allowing this debate and congratulate the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) on securing it.

To suggest that our relationship with Iran has had a chequered history would be an understatement. Both sides have attempted to demonise each other and used heavy rhetoric, sanctions and so on, and no doubt this has resulted in a lack of progress on a range of issues of mutual interest and benefit. This journey has also been punctuated by a series of missed opportunities and mistakes by both sides. The election of President Rouhani provides a fresh opportunity that we must seize, as several Members have alluded to in this useful and informed debate. The emergence of Islamic State might also provide grounds for co-operation. We must seize the moment to improve relations with Iran. If we do not, we might miss a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and slip back to where we were only a couple of years ago, when the threat of military intervention was high.

The west, especially in Washington and London, has perhaps not done enough to understand the region in general and Iran in particular. There has been a dilution of skills within the FCO, with the closure, at one stage, of the language school and the prevalence of a management tick-box mentality rather than a desire to train diplomats fundamentally to understand a region and get their hands dirty. Some of those decisions have been reversed, but I would still argue that there has been a massive dilution of skills within the FCO, and that has partly been to blame for our failure to understand the region in general.

That has led directly to a series of errors. No one can now dispute that in 2003 we went to war on a false premise, but it does not stop there. We made a fundamental mistake in allowing the Afghan mission to morph into one of nation building in 2006, which we could not properly resource, while our intervention in Libya has proved a complete and utter disaster: an almighty civil war, massive casualties and the Libyan Parliament taking refuge on a Greek car ferry outside Tobruk. If it was any further east, it would be floating into Egyptian waters. It is farcical. Our position on Syria, over the course of just 15 months, has been totally incoherent. Only last year, we were talking, in effect, about intervening on behalf of the rebels, but now we are taking on elements of that very same rebel force. London and Washington must guard against adding Iran to that long list of sorry errors.

Various Members, particularly the right hon. Member for Blackburn and my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk, alluded to the missed opportunities on both sides. We tend to forget in this place that after 9/11 Iran extended the hand of friendship to the west and showed sympathy, and it was not just words: in the early phases of the Afghanistan mission, it actually helped to identify enemy sites, and what was its reward? It was lambasted by President Bush for being part of the axis of evil.

In this debate, we have heard that there have been lots of words but very little action, but Iran tried again. In the early phases of Iraq, it tried to be supportive—there was an alignment of interests—but again it was rebuffed. And we should not forget, by the way, on Afghanistan and 9/11, that at least partly because of the west’s robust rebuttal of Iran’s overtures the moderate President Khatami was removed and the hardliners again assumed the ascendency. I could go back further, but time does not allow. I could go back to the 1953 coup and the fact that we supported Iraq despite its having attacked Iran in a vicious civil war that cost a million lives—something that is imprinted on the DNA of Iranians.

With the nuclear talks ongoing and crucial moments approaching, let us please remember that confrontation has not worked in the past. The number of centrifuges has gone through the roof, despite all the sanctions. The Iranians will not be bullied; they are a proud nation. Anyone who has studied their history, or perhaps travelled or lived there briefly, will know them to be a proud nation that will not be bullied into submission. Our decision to report Iran to the UN Security Council in 2006 led directly to its withdrawing from the enhanced inspection regime, which actually it was entitled to do.

The IAEA report in November 2011, despite all the rhetoric from the west, had no smoking gun. The US intelligence services said there was no evidence that Iran had decided to go down the road of a nuclear weapons programme or that it was doing so. The evidence suggested that it wanted to get to the point of capability—of having the option of breaking out—as has been reinforced by well-respected people such as Peter Jenkins, the former UK representative to the IAEA, and Robert Kelly, a director of the governing body of that organisation. These people are not fools; they are people who have been at the centre and said the same thing.

That is why we must choose our words carefully on the Foreign Affairs Committee. Our words have been quoted in this debate. We did not say that Iran had decided to develop nuclear weapons or that it was doing so; we said it wanted to reach the point of having the option, and there is a world of difference in that sort of terminology. One is not being an apologist for Iran; one abhors the human rights issues and various other aspects, though I made the point that some of our regional allies also have similarly poor track records in this area. However, if we look at the map from Tehran, we can understand why the Iranians are nervous: they are surrounded by nuclear powers, whether it is Israel to the west, Pakistan to the east, the Russians to the north or the American fleet to the south. Having that option is logical—we are a country that retains an independent nuclear deterrent for very similar reasons.

I raised this issue two years ago, when things almost came to a head from a military point of view. Many Members here today participated in that debate as well, at a time when we were certainly rattling the sabre. Forces were gathering in the Persian gulf and the rhetoric was getting very heavy indeed. One made the point that we needed to try to go the extra diplomatic mile, rather than succumbing to what seemed at the time to be quite a slide into military intervention. My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk was right to say that we lost in that debate—if I remember, the figures were something like 285 to six. To this day, I thank the six who joined me in the Lobby. It was another lonely experience, but at least it was shared across the House when it came to our military interventions.

Let us fast-forward two years. Where are we now? We now have a golden opportunity. We have the joint plan of action, which I hope we go the extra mile to bring to a successful conclusion. We really do need to explore the option of allowing the Iranians to enrich uranium, provided we have an enhanced inspection regime. There seems to be a dragging of feet on the embassy front. Yes, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham) is absolutely right: the storming of an embassy is almost unforgivable. That said, of the three stated enemies of Iran—Israel, the US and the UK—only the UK has diplomatic relations with Iran, stretched though they may be, and we have got to make every effort to keep that door of diplomacy open. It goes without saying—it is a cliché, but it is true all the same—that we make peace with our enemies, not with our friends. We have to keep that door of diplomacy open; otherwise, there is no hope of peace.

We must remind ourselves of the costs of failure. Two years ago there was serious consideration of military intervention, at least by countries in the region. Why is all this important? Because when we refer to the lack of understanding of the region and Iran and to a dilution of skills in perhaps the FCO and in London and Washington generally, we have to try to understand that there is a complex structure in Iran, with multiple centres of authority and constant power struggles. We need to try to influence that, rather than just giving credence to the hardliners by simply adopting a hard-line approach.

A military solution to this problem there cannot be, as ever. A recent US estimate suggests that any military intervention might set back the nuclear programme by only a year at most. We all know that knowledge cannot be eradicated and that if Iran is set on acquiring nuclear weapons, she will not be scared away. If she is not, perhaps any sort of military intervention would encourage her to do so. Looking at post-war history, we should also remember that interventions in countries have tended to embed hard-line views. It is no coincidence that communism, for example, survived longest in the countries where we intervened—we might think of China, Vietnam, North Korea or Cuba.

In conclusion, we have got to seize the moment. We have got to seize this opportunity to try to improve relations, because so much depends on a successful outcome. It could be the key to the resolution of so many issues in the region. We have to be realistic in how we approach this. I agree that we must be quite robust in how we negotiate with the Iranians, but there has to be an element of good will in trying to foster better relations.

I finish with this thought. When President Nixon flew to Beijing in 1972, at a time when US influence in the Pacific was on the wane, he did not deny the reality that China was in ascendancy; but despite being heavily criticised at the time, in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, it was recognised as a brilliant move. It opened up an era of better relations, at a time when things had been deteriorating fast. He was heavily criticised at the time. I would suggest to the House that we need something similar from our side to try to reach out and break the deadlock. We have a golden opportunity, with a moderate President, newly elected. We now have situations on the ground in the region that beg for mutual co-operation to our joint advantage. Let us seize the moment, because if we do not, I am afraid this will be yet another chapter in the sad history of a very poor relationship, punctuated by missed opportunities, and this time the costs of failure could be very dire indeed. That is what we have to appreciate; that is why we need to try and make it work this time.

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[Mr Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) and to participate in this debate, having had the opportunity to listen to some speeches that were extremely thoughtful and provocative in the best sense. In that regard, I pay particular tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) for his continuing considered interest in Iran, and to the debate’s other sponsor, the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon).

In its recent report on UK policy towards Iran, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee rightly said that it would be in the UK’s interest to have a mature and constructive relationship with Iran. In that context, the Government were right to take the in-principle decision to reopen the embassy in Tehran, and the Prime Minister was right to meet President Rouhani in September.

Despite these recent important steps, there are many reasons for considerable caution and care in our engagement with Iran, not least because the 24 November deadline for reaching a comprehensive deal that limits Iran’s nuclear programme is approaching fast. Scepticism about Iran’s motives and intentions for these negotiations is hardly surprising, given the country’s links to terrorist organisations, the routine failure of its politicians to recognise Israel’s right to exist, its support for the Assad regime and the widespread concern that it has in the past actively sought a nuclear weapons capability.

This debate, then, is a welcome opportunity to explore the progress that has been made in the nuclear negotiations, and to examine the progress—or the lack of it—on other aspects of our policy towards Iran, including its future role in the region and its attitude to its people and their rights.

Almost a year ago, my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary welcomed the efforts of the Government, and particularly those of Baroness Ashton, as part of the E3 plus 3 to conclude a thorough and detailed interim agreement in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. As others have said, that included a joint plan of action with a series of crucial commitments—commitments that, if implemented properly, would mean that the aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme that were thought to pose the greatest risk could not be developed further during the period of the interim agreement. In addition, some of the most disturbing parts of Iran’s nuclear programme to date would be significantly scaled back, including the eradication of around 200 kg of 20%-enriched uranium. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s assessment of the extent to which the commitments in this joint plan of action have been adhered to and can be built on.

That interim agreement also set out the elements of what a comprehensive agreement could look like: adherence to Iran’s obligations and rights under the non-proliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards; full resolution of concerns around the heavy water research reactor at Arak; agreed transparency and monitoring; and co-operation on Iran’s civilian nuclear programme. In return for confidence that Iran’s programme is solely peaceful, the plan of action suggests a mutually defined, enrichment-based programme, with agreed parameters and limits—but only as part of a comprehensive agreement. Sanctions would begin to be further lifted at that point.

Others close to the negotiations, notably in the US, have suggested that all the components of a plan for a long-term definitive agreement that should be acceptable to both sides are on the table. As my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary and, indeed, the Foreign Secretary noted, it is the pressure of sanctions, albeit coupled with a readiness to negotiate, that has helped bring Iran to the negotiating table and helped to achieve the progress that has been made.

As the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), who is the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and indeed the right hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames), pointed out, one crucial test of Iran’s willingness to engage with the profound concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme surrounds the access given to the IAEA to its nuclear sites and staff. There remain concerns that IAEA inspectors still do not have full access to every one of Iran’s nuclear sites—for example, I understand that Iran has agreed only to limited inspections by the IAEA at its main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. IAEA inspectors still do not have access to the heavy water second reactor being built at Arak or to the Parchin military base, mentioned by the hon. Member for Hendon (Dr Offord), where the IAEA and others suspect Iran has attempted to develop a nuclear explosive device in the past. Perhaps the Minister will outline how this critical issue of IAEA access for monitoring is being addressed in the negotiations.

I recognise the importance of reaching a deal, both in building a little more trust in Iran towards the west and in keeping the more reactionary forces in Iran at bay, but negotiations cannot be allowed simply to drag on and on. Can the Minister reassure us that the Iranian side is fully engaged in the negotiations and remains committed to the 24 November deadline? Also, what steps would be taken if agreement were not achieved? Would sanctions that were lifted when the interim agreement was concluded last November, for example, be re-imposed?

There has been little public discussion to date about the role Iran is playing or might play in the future in the international effort against ISIL. Some have suggested that the threat ISIL poses in the region should be a reason for more flexibility towards Iran in these nuclear negotiations. I have to say that I do not agree. If there were not a willingness by the Iranians to build the trust of the international community on the nuclear issue, we could be replacing one very difficult threat with the re-emergence of another very significant threat. I hope, instead, that these negotiations will help to build further the scope, if not for trust, at least for better communication on a wider range of issues where our interests are aligned, of which the threat ISIL poses is clearly the most significant at the moment.

There have been reports of Iranian troops on the ground in Iraq, although there has been no formal announcement. Will the Minister set out his assessment of Iran’s role in resisting ISIL both in Iraq and Syria? Iran continues to have a choice as to whether to be a force for stability in the region. Its record to date has been decidedly mixed. It has a history of supporting the Assad regime in Syria and supporting and supplying a series of highly divisive and terrorist groups in the region which pose a continued threat to our allies there, including, but not only, Israel. It would be useful to hear from the Minister about the efforts that he and other Ministers have made in encouraging Iran to take a different approach to regional stability.

Many Members have mentioned the reopening of the embassy, which is, as they have said, a potentially important step in expanding bilateral engagement with the Iranians. An embassy, and diplomatic representation, would help us to develop relationships and gather information, which is essential, over time, to the building of trust and the facilitation of constructive dialogue, and which—again, over time—could perhaps influence attitudes and events for the better. Will the Minister update the House on progress towards the reopening of the embassy? In particular, will he deal with the suggestion by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn that concerns in the Home Office are holding up the issuing of a timetable? Will he also tell us what further action has been taken, or consideration given, to ensure that staff will be safe and secure at the embassy in the future, in the light of the events in 2011 to which the hon. Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham) alluded?

As a number of Members have pointed out, Iran’s human rights record continues to be of deep concern. At the weekend it was reported that the British-Iranian women’s rights activist Ghoncheh Ghavami had been found guilty of spreading anti-regime propaganda and sentenced to a year in prison after being detained for trying to watch a men’s volleyball match. My hon. Friends the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) and for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) expressed the profound concern that I am sure we all feel about her imprisonment and sentencing. Amnesty International has described her as a prisoner of conscience, and has raised concerns that Ghoncheh and her fellow demonstrators were beaten by police officers when they were arrested.

There have been widespread reports of torture and ill treatment in Iranian prisons, including sexual violence, severe beatings, denial of medical treatment, and long periods of solitary confinement. The number of executions is up. Indeed, as we heard from the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish), Iran has the highest execution rate per capita in the world. Reyhanah Jabbari was executed on 25 October for killing a former intelligence officer after she had alleged that he had attempted to rape her. Amnesty International has said that it believes the court’s impartiality may have been affected by the victim’s connections with the Ministry of Intelligence. In addition, human rights defenders, journalists and bloggers have been arrested and their work censored.

While in theory Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism are recognised alongside Islam, religious minorities continue to face discrimination, with converts particularly affected. That point was made by the hon. Member for Portsmouth South (Mr Hancock). There have been reports of harassment, desecration of religious sites, restricted access to education and employment, and even arrest and torture. Members of the Baha’i faith, which is not recognised, have been especially discriminated against. The situation for lesbian and gay people is profoundly worrying. Homosexual acts are criminalised, gay people are executed simply for being gay, and many lesbian and gay people have reported that they have been denied access to education or dismissed from employment once their sexuality has become known. Last week, the Iranian delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Council’s periodic review of the human rights situation in Iran again appeared dismissive of concerns.

[Mr Baron]

The hon. Gentleman has given us a list of what we must all agree are abhorrent examples, but are not such crimes also being committed by our allies in the region? We should not just view Iran through that particular prism.

[Mr Thomas]

The hon. Gentleman is right, but we are focusing on the particular issue of British policy on Iran, and it is right for us to draw attention to the dismal human rights record there.

I appreciate the difficulties that are involved in bringing about an improvement in human rights in Iran. Nevertheless, Ministers must continue to take whatever opportunities do arise. I trust that the Minister will tell us what efforts he and other Ministers have made in that regard.

The date of 24 November marks a critical point in our relationship with Iran. Given the profound international concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its destabilising influence in the wider region and its human rights record, the successful completion of a comprehensive agreement could represent the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between our two countries. Labour has supported the Government’s work in building on the approach to the nuclear negotiations that was taken by the last Government, and continues to do so. I hope that Iran will take the opportunity presented by the negotiations to ease international concerns about its nuclear ambitions. It needs to.

European Union (Referendum) Bill

John Baron Excerpts

Friday 17th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Robert Neill]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding me of my advanced age; he has worn much better than I have in any event. He is entirely right: there is a whole raft of people out there, who may have raised families and who have to live with the consequences of where we currently are, and who have never had a say. That is ludicrous. I was talking to some of my step-nieces and nephews. They have got kids of their own now. They never had a chance to have a say. That is not sustainable. There are businesses and firms that are up and running now and are major components of the UK economy, yet their founders and the people who lead those companies never had a say. It is time to look afresh.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is correctly reminding everyone that only the Conservatives are willing and able to deliver a referendum. May I bring him back to the central issue of choice? What does it say about the leadership of the Labour and Liberal parties that they are unwilling to trust the British electorate on this point of seminal importance?

[Robert Neill]

A lesson I have learned, not just from my time in this House but also from my professional and earlier political life, is that if we treat people with contempt, they will treat us with contempt, and that is the risk that the Opposition run with their attitude. That is why the playing of Westminster games brings this House into disrepute.

As this is a straightforward Bill which has been rehearsed before and debated by this House before, let me just say that I believe we need to restate that we do have faith in the British people and that we should give them, entrenched in law, a piece of primary legislation that says, “In 2017 there will be a referendum.”

ISIL: Iraq and Syria

John Baron Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

We regret the outbreak of violence in domestic protests in Turkey—something we had hoped we had put behind us—and, as always, we deplore the use of violence in protests and the use of violence by the authorities in dealing with those protests. We make our views known consistently to our Turkish allies.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

May I urge caution on those who advocate increased military intervention, whether in Iraq or Syria? Our track record in understanding the nuances of the region has been poor over the past decade, whether in Iraq in 2003, the disastrous morphing of the mission in Afghanistan in 2006, Libya or, indeed, our differing positions on the Syrian civil war only recently. However, may I turn the Foreign Secretary’s attention to the politics in Baghdad? The layer below the immediate leadership has essentially remained the same, which makes the adoption of a more inclusive form of politics far less likely. That will be an uphill struggle. What are we going to do about it?

[Mr Hammond]

I made specific reference to that in my opening remarks. It is true that Prime Minister al-Abadi faces a significant challenge in persuading those on his own side, including a bloc of Shi’a representatives in Parliament led by former Prime Minister al-Maliki, to acquiesce in what will be some very difficult decisions for the Shi’a community to accept. This moment demands great leadership, and we will offer Prime Minister al-Abadi all the support we can to do that. If I wanted to identify a reason to be optimistic, it would be this: the advance of ISIL earlier this summer has shocked the political elite in Baghdad, as well as the Iranian Government, who hold significant influence over the Shi’a bloc in the Iraqi Parliament. There is awareness in Baghdad that something has to change and that if something is not done, the battle will be lost.

Government Strategy Against IS

John Baron Excerpts

Friday 12th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

(Urgent question): To ask the Minister of State to make a statement on Government policy and strategy against IS.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

The Government believe that ISIL needs to be confronted in both Iraq and Syria. The creation of an extremist so-called caliphate represents a direct threat to the national security of the United Kingdom. In seeking to establish its extremist state, ISIL is already seeking to use the territory it controls to launch attacks against the west, including this country.

As my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister have outlined to the House this week, the Government are committed to tackling the threat of ISIL using the full range of instruments at our disposal—humanitarian, diplomatic and military.

So far as humanitarian efforts are concerned, in addition to air drops carried out by UK forces, we have committed £23 million in new assistance in northern Iraq, and £12.5 million has been delivered to the International Committee of the Red Cross and £5 million to UN partners to provide life-saving assistance to 150,000 people. We have also provided more than £600 million in Syria since the crisis began.

Secondly, we are working with our American, European, Arab and other partners to ensure a united front to stem the expansion and activities of this exceptionally dangerous movement.

In Syria, we continue to support a negotiated political transition to end Assad’s brutal rule and to pave the way for a political solution to this appalling conflict. In Iraq, we are supporting the new Government and welcome Prime Minister al-Abadi’s commitment to reform and to an inclusive approach that meets the needs of all of Iraq’s diverse communities.

Thirdly, the political and humanitarian response in Iraq must be backed up by a security response that will defeat ISIL on the ground. We are delivering military equipment to Kurdish forces, providing surveillance and, as the Prime Minister set out on Monday, looking at training Kurdish battalions.

We welcomed President Obama’s statement on Wednesday. As the global resolve to tackle ISIL strengthens, we will consider carefully what role the United Kingdom should play in the international coalition.

The Government have outlined a broad and comprehensive approach to responding to ISIL, which should command the support of the entire House.

[Mr Baron]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for responding as he has. Many colleagues welcome Government assurances that there will be no intervention in Iraq or Syria without Parliament first debating and voting on the issue. Many colleagues also have questions about the feasibility and the policy of conducting air strikes in Iraq. We have questions about the fact that IS cannot be defeated by air strikes alone. We urge that regional powers and allies play their full role in this. The symbolism of the west defeating this caliphate would be too profound. We also believe that questions should be asked about the elephant in the room—the Iraqi army—and about how durable defeating IS in Iraq would be if the politics are not in place.

Many other colleagues have even graver doubts and questions about air strikes into Syria itself. It is not just the legality of the issue and the fact that Syria has robust air defence systems supplied by the Russians, but the fact that we have not yet had an answer to the question: who would take IS’s place? The morphing of one extremist group into another has been a notable feature of this civil war in Syria and many extremist groups lurk in the shadows.

The Foreign Secretary, in his address to the House on Wednesday, expressed that caution. He made it clear, in answer to me and to others, that striking into Syria would be a much higher risk strategy. President Obama’s address to the American people yesterday morning—under Greenwich mean time—seemed to go much further than the Government had hitherto been comfortable with. He talked about destroying IS, air strikes into Syria and supporting rebels, even in Syria, against IS. I ask the Minister for some clarity on the Government strategy on IS? It appears that there has been an element of discrepancy between the Foreign Secretary and No. 10. On Wednesday in this place, the Foreign Secretary expressed caution both in his address and in direct answers to questions; I do not think that anybody could go away with a message other than that. Yesterday in Berlin, he seemed to rule out British involvement in air strikes in Syria altogether, yet No. 10 seemed to row back almost immediately and said that no options must be removed from the table and that everything must remain in play. I ask my right hon. Friend where exactly Government policy is on this issue. In answering, may I remind him that this House passed resolutions last year, making it clear that there could be no lethal support for any Syrian rebels without Parliament’s express say so? Again, President Obama’s address seemed to lay open that possibility. What is the Government’s position on that?

I make no apologies for tabling this urgent question on a Friday, and I apologise to those who want to get through their business, but given our errors in our interventions in the past—whether it is going to war in Iraq on a false premise, the disastrous morphing of the Afghanistan mission into one of nation-building or even our intervention in Libya—it is right that Parliament asks these questions, particularly as we are about to enter the conference recess. We must not allow events to get ahead of Parliament or Parliament to be presented with a fait accompli upon our return.

[Mr Lidington]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) said, this is a subject that quite rightly arouses great interest, concern and debate in all parts of the House. The Prime Minister’s statement and subsequent answers to questions on Monday, the Foreign Secretary’s extensive evidence session with the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which my hon. Friend is a distinguished member, on Tuesday and then the Foreign Secretary’s speech and subsequent debate in this House on Wednesday has shown that we take very seriously our responsibility both to keep Parliament informed of the Government’s developing policy and to allow ample opportunity for Members of Parliament, both in the Chamber and in Committee, to question those Ministers responsible and to express their own opinions.

On that particular question about the role of Parliament in respect of any—at the moment hypothetical—military action by British forces, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out the position in detail on Monday in answers to questions following his statement. I draw the House’s attention to his words in Hansard, column 663.

We want to see the broadest possible international coalition involving regional partners as well as European and American partners in combating ISIL, which is a threat to all of us, and not just to the United Kingdom and European countries.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made it clear in answer to questions in Berlin that we are not yet at the stage in which decisions about any putative British military action have to be taken. His precise words were:

“We have ruled nothing out. We will look carefully at our options and decide how we will make a contribution but we are clear that we will make a contribution.”

Effective political, humanitarian and possibly military action by a broad-based international coalition will be necessary to meet the very grave threat that is posed to us all by ISIL.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and security.

This summer has seen a range and scale of threats to international, and particularly European, stability. If they are not unprecedented, they certainly represent a highly unwelcome escalation from the post-cold war norm. Alongside them, there has been a sharp escalation in the level of homeland security threat. The Prime Minister has made two statements in the past nine days covering those, but the Government believe it is right and proper that Parliament has a fuller opportunity to debate those events, and that the Government have the opportunity to take the pulse of parliamentary opinion on Britain’s response to the challenges we face.

In Syria and Iraq, the advance of the barbaric Islamist terrorist organisation Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant represents not only a severe threat to the stability of the middle east but, through the presence of foreign fighters, some of them British, and the threat of a terror attack against the west, a threat to British national security. In the wider middle east, the recent eruption of violence in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, and the tragic loss of many hundreds of civilian lives, has underlined the need for a lasting settlement to that decades-long source of conflict and human suffering. In eastern Ukraine, the instability and violence fuelled initially by covert Russian sponsorship of illegal armed separatists, and more recently by the active operation of formed military units of the Russian armed forces on sovereign Ukraine territory, have underlined Russia’s rejection of the rules-based international order. In Libya, there has been a sharp deterioration of the security situation. Those multiple challenges reflect an arc of instability, extending from north Africa, through the middle east and along Europe’s eastern border to the Arctic.

Perhaps the most alarming of those developments, because of the clear and immediate risk it poses to UK homeland security, is the rise of the Islamist terror organisation ISIL in Syria and Iraq. In Syria, Assad’s brutal war against his own people has created the conditions for a Sunni extremist group to flourish, and in Iraq, the systematic sectarianism of the previous Government has created a permissive environment in the Sunni heartlands for ISIL to expand. In both countries, ISIL has seized the opportunity to impose its twisted ideology.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that supporting air strikes in Syria is a higher-risk strategy than supporting air strikes in Iraq?

[Mr Hammond]

I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a qualitative difference between any proposition of air strikes in Syria and such an activity in Iraq. The legal, technical and military differences make the proposition of air strikes an order of magnitude more complicated in Syria.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

Again, I think that the question is revealing. It is not for us in the House of Commons or in the west to persuade those people; it is for the politics of Iraq to move in the direction that we on both sides of the House wish it to move in. That places a premium on domestic, political leadership. It is deeply regrettable that Prime Minister Maliki succumbed to the forces of division, rather than showing the kind of leadership that we all wanted to see and creating unity. However, that is not a test for the Opposition or even for our Government; it is primarily a test for the Government in Baghdad. I sincerely hope that they will show themselves capable of rising to that test in the months ahead.

On Syria, no one would deny that there were differences of opinion across the House on the proposed military action to target President Assad’s chemical weapons facilities 12 months ago. However, even those who supported military action accept that the decision that was before the House a year ago in August was not a choice between ending or prolonging the conflict. It is the continuation of the conflict, rather than the form it has taken, that has allowed Syrian territory to be used as a training and recruiting base for ISIL. That is why the Opposition have argued that the priority for the international community must be to refocus attention on achieving a transitional agreement in Syria of the type that was anticipated in the Geneva II process. That is the only way to facilitate a more co-ordinated Syrian front that is dedicated to combating the threat of ISIL within the sovereign territory of Syria.

Humanitarian support for the countries affected by the turmoil in Iraq and Syria is vital. I hope that the Minister who winds up the debate will address the Opposition’s calls for a more comprehensive package of support for Jordan—a country that has one of the longest land borders with Iraqi ISIL-held territory and an even longer border with Syria in the north.

[Mr Baron]

I think all of us in the House agree that when it comes to ISIS and Iraq, the solution has to be political. On the military options, does the shadow Foreign Secretary accept that airstrikes alone will not defeat ISIS? Ground troops are required, but they should not be western troops. They should be local forces, and the elephant in the room is the Iraqi army itself.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

I must remind the hon. Gentleman, who has sat in Committee with me for many hours listening to evidence about this, that strategy is not the same as having a plan. Yes, a plan may be knocked off course by events, but that does not mean that we should relinquish all the means or methods of reformulating the plan. That is what strategic thinking is about, and I shall apply further thought to that in my speech.

Let us face it: if we sweat about whether to take military action and that dominates our entire debate, we are missing the point. I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe on that. Our debate should be about the context in which we are making that decision. The decision should flow out of that context, not be the subject of the debate itself.

The Foreign Secretary demonstrated a laudable strategic perspective after a period of reactive and short-term initiatives, such as the reversal of the policy on Syria after the vote last year, which have left our policy in disarray and, one might even say, paralysis. The period of complete neglect of the Syrian situation has resulted in the ISIS situation that we face. That has not been helped by perhaps the greatest and most silent strategic shock to hit the western world—the almost complete absence of the United States from an active role on the world stage.

The Foreign Secretary still gave us a lot of conflicts. We will consider air strikes in Iraq, but not in Syria, which is the home base of ISIS. We said that we would not provide arms to the Kurds, but now we are. We continue to expect President Assad to stand down, but we will not do anything to make that happen. That has brought about the situation that we are in. The Government’s approach is over-precious about who our friends should be and careless of the consequences of the restraints that that places on our policy. We have to treat President Putin as a pariah, but we might need to use him as an ally to defeat ISIS and stabilise the middle east.

[Mr Baron]

I am listening intently to my hon. Friend’s comments, some of which I agree with. I suggest to him that perhaps caution is the right course of action for the Government. We must not forget that only recently, in the past 10 years or so, we have been to war in the middle east on a false premise and supported the morphing of the Afghanistan mission from defeating al-Qaeda into the much wider and disastrous mission of nation building. Many would also argue that Libya is turning into a basket case. Surely caution is not a bad thing, given our past errors.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr Turner). We sit together on the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, which produced an interesting document recently on Magna Carta. One of our proposals was that this country should never go to war without a vote in both Houses of Parliament. That is an interesting proposal. Now that it is a convention, I hope that it will be accepted in statute.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the Iraq war, and of course we do not know the truth of why we went into that war. We know that we were fed lies and all kinds of scares, such as that Britain could be attacked within 45 minutes using weapons of mass destruction that did not in fact exist. We still have yet to get the Chilcot report, which the Public Administration Committee discussed with Jeremy Heywood this week. We asked whether he was the blockage, because the Prime Minister has said that he is not stopping the report. All these years later, we do not know whether Tony Blair made an agreement with Bush that committed us to war, after which the House was forced into war based on a series of untruths. Some 179 British soldiers died in Iraq, and there were huge costs and uncounted Iraqi lives were lost.

I believe that we need to carry out another inquiry into our decision to go into Helmand province, which is arguably the worst military decision that we have taken since the charge of the Light Brigade. At the time, in 2006, we had lost only two British soldiers in combat in Afghanistan. We went into Helmand in the hope that not a shot would be fired, and we ended up with 453 soldiers lost in combat. Why did we do it?

[Mr Baron]

May I suggest that a key reason was mission creep? We allowed the mission to morph, disastrously, from one of taking on and getting rid of al-Qaeda to one of nation building, which was a completely different ball game. That was the fundamental error that we made in Afghanistan.

[Paul Flynn]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I wrote to Tony Blair in 2003—the letter was on my blog and has been there ever since—saying, “If we go to war in Iraq without attempting to solve the Israel-Palestine problem, we will give a sense of injustice to Muslim communities from my local mosque to the far corners of the world.” At that time, we would not have thought it conceivable that young men and women educated and born here would go to the far east and take part in mediaeval barbarism. How did that happen? It is not about the imams, who have lost touch with the young people. It is about the internet and the flow of information that young people have. The sense of injustice has deepened since 2003. There was not the same division at that time. There were a few fanatics, and al-Qaeda existed, but there was minute support for it. Now it takes support from a huge percentage of the young Muslim population. That is deeply worrying, and we have to see the reason for it.

How we take decisions is an important issue. The most important decision that we have taken recently, of course, was on 29 August last year. Having watched how we go to war, I suggest that we must stop trusting the wisdom of Prime Ministers. They do not behave in a normal fashion on such matters. They are overwhelmed with hubris and talk in a different way, digging out the Churchillian rhetoric. They walk in a different way—they strut like Napoleon. I have seen it here time and again. They are not dealing with petty issues about taxes; here is their great moment. They are writing their page in history, and it is usually a bloody page. They are not rational, as Anthony Eden was not rational when he went into the Suez war. We are far better trusting the pooled wisdom of 650 MPs than listening to and following a hubristic Prime Minister.

We have had an interesting debate, and the two speeches that I have warmed to more than any others were those of the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) and the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke). We know that, incredibly, there is a fairly even spread in the House between the peace party and the “give war a chance” party. Even Labour Members have said that we should not be imprisoned by history. Of course we should be imprisoned by history—we should learn from it, because we have nothing else to go on from which to learn lessons.

I am grateful to the Government for holding the NATO summit in Newport, in my constituency. It was possible a grudging and belated acknowledgment of the wisdom of the local MP on foreign affairs matters. It was a great occasion, and I was particularly pleased by the decisions on the Baltic states. In ’89, ’90 and ’91 I had the pleasure of going to the three Baltic states and watching their struggle for independence. It was a great campaign: intelligent, courageous and restrained. It was difficult to win that independence, and they are frightened now—particularly Latvia and Estonia—because they have a large percentage of mother-tongue Russians. We owe it to them to be behind them and guarantee their independence.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

It is, as ever, a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), and I too welcome this debate. I would like more of these debates—I am sure I am not alone in that—not only because a lot is happening on the international stage that directly affects our interests, global possessions and so forth, but because it is important that those on the Front Benches are in touch with the mood of Back Benchers across the House. It is in their common interest to ensure that we minimise the chances of a vote taking place like the one that happened a year ago. More communication is good; we need more debates of this sort, and that this debate has been so oversubscribed illustrates that point well.

In the brief time available I will confine my remarks to ISIS and perhaps to what I consider to be the dilution of skills within the FCO—something that should concern us all. The Government are right to make a commitment that there will be no air strikes in Iraq unless that has been debated in this House and approved. They were also right to exhibit the cautious approach that they have shown to date, which is to be welcomed. We have heard it said many times that Iraq casts a long shadow, and the bar for military action has been raised. There is no doubt about that in the House, but I contend that it is not a bad thing, given the number of errors we have made in the region over the past 10 to 12 years.

I take issue with those who suggest—we have heard this quite a bit in the Chamber today—that by exhibiting a cautious approach and voting against action in Syria last year, Britain is somehow retreating from the world, or that we wish to bury our heads in the sand and do not want to play any more on the world stage. That is utter tosh. We are a key member of the UN Security Council and of NATO, and a prominent member of the Commonwealth. We are not retreating from the world, but if a slightly more cautious approach is needed, that is surely how it should be in this place, when the most serious decision we can make in this House is whether to send troops to war—a decision that costs lives and can result in great expense in both lives and treasure.

We have only to look back at our recent track record. There can be no denying that we went to war on a false premise in Iraq in 2003. There were no weapons of mass destruction. Fact: we went to war on a false premise. Some may dispute this, but I think that a key error—this was referred to by the hon. Member for Newport West—was in Afghanistan. We all agreed with the initial narrow objective of ridding Afghanistan of al-Qaeda. That was laudable and we supported it. It went wrong when we allowed the mission to morph into one of nation building, which was a much broader aim that we fundamentally under-resourced.

[David Tredinnick (Bosworth) (Con)]

I am listening carefully to my hon. Friend and thinking about the vote last year, when regrettably I was not able to support the Government. Listening to my hon. Friend, I would say that the problem was that chemical weapons could be moved around very easily, and so as a military objective it was not very satisfactory.

[Mr Baron]

I agree. Technically, the motion was about that, but there was also a push last year by the Government to arm rebels fighting Assad. However, because it would have been impossible to track and trace those arms, some of them would have ended up, inadvertently, in the hands of the very extremists we are now taking on in northern Iraq—a bitter irony if ever there was one.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

It was precisely for that reason that my hon. Friend and I made common cause against the folly of that intervention. On Afghanistan, does our policy not tend to be too reactive to the last thing that happened? It was said that as soon as the Soviets left, the west left Afghanistan to stew in its own juices. It was to prevent that from happening again that the west made the bad mistake, as it turned out, of engaging in nation building.

[Mr Baron]

I pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friend and others on both sides of the House in asking those difficult questions a year ago. We were right to do that. He is absolutely right about Afghanistan as well.

The litany of errors does not stop with Afghanistan. We now have the Libyan Government meeting on a Greek ferry off Tobruk; there is civil war; the number of civilian casualties is shooting up; and we have not got a proper policy. I certainly do not think our intervention helped the situation. We have now discussed Syria, and it is clear that the Government’s intentions to arm the rebels were misplaced, given that it would have been impossible to track and trace the arms. Our bigger issue is now taking on in Iraq some of the rebels who confronted Assad.

It is right to be cautious and to ask questions, and it is right that the bar has been set higher. I am pleased that Ministers realise the difference between air strikes in Iraq, which many of us could support, provided certain preconditions were in place, including a request from the Baghdad Government, and air strikes in Syria, which would be a much higher risk policy, not only because of Russian-built air defences, but because of the legalities and the fact that a common feature of the Syrian civil war has been the extremist groups lurking in the shadows and morphing into each other—al-Nusra, linked to al-Qaeda, for example—and would be difficult to say who might take ISIS’s place in Syria.

I welcome the caution. At the end of the day, the politics in Iraq must succeed. The elephant in the room is the Iraqi army. It has to be ground forces that defeat ISIS—air strikes alone will not succeed—but they must not be western. The symbolism of the west defeating this caliphate would be too great. The Iraqi army is the elephant in the room, but the politics must come through and succeed. What fomented the presence of ISIS was the very sectarian politics pursued by Maliki, the predecessor of the current Government. We must have more inclusive politics in Iraq, but at the same time we have to ensure that the army drives out ISIS.

Afghanistan

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 9th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The military, at least, regularly look at decisions that have been taken and consequences that flow from them, as part of their lessons learned process. We should be proud of what we have achieved in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding an individual who has decided that life in the UK looks more attractive than life in Afghanistan, the fact is that for ordinary Afghans life has got enormously better over the past few years.

This country has been in a state of almost constant war for the past 30 or 40 years, and for the first time in most people’s living memory they have the beginnings of a functioning democracy; a rapidly growing, though still fragile, economy; human rights on a scale that they have never seen before; and access to health care, education and transport infrastructure that their parents could never have dreamed of. That is real and tangible progress, and we should be proud of the part we have played in it.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Nevertheless, I put it to the Foreign Secretary that those of us who are critical of our Afghanistan policy point to the mistake made when we allowed the original, narrowly focused objective of defeating al-Qaeda, which we succeeded in doing and could have sustained, to morph into a much broader mission of nation-building, which we have struggled to sustain and which will ultimately result in the Taliban regaining control over large chunks of Afghanistan. What lessons can the Foreign Secretary draw from this episode with regard to our policy in the region generally?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend insists on looking at this with a glass-half-full mentality. Enormous gains have been made in Afghanistan and I simply do not accept that the inevitable outcome of this process is that the Taliban, as he says, will regain control of large areas of territory. I hope that a process of genuine reconciliation between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan will begin as soon as a new Government are in place. If my hon. Friend is inviting me to recognise the risks of mission creep, I promise him that I am up for that. I recognise entirely that when we go into any exercise, political or military, we need to be clear about the objectives we are seeking to achieve and we need to be extremely resistant to the temptation to allow the mission to creep.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Given the appalling events in eastern Ukraine and the fact that our EU neighbours seem reluctant to adopt a robust line against the bully in the playground, has the time not come for the UK to lead by example and to close our financial services to Russia?

[Mr Lidington]

I think that it will be important to make sure that whatever sanctions are imposed on Russian interests are effective and do not just lead to Russian money migrating somewhere else, and to make sure that they have a sound legal basis. That is what we are working to achieve. The Prime Minister has made it clear that we regard financial services as very much on the table in such discussions.

US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (British Foreign & Commercial Policy)

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I draw to the House’s attention that the hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace) and I are co-chairmen of the all-party group on Iran and that, in January, we were members of a parliamentary delegation to Iran.

This debate is not about the sanctions against Iran themselves, which the UK Government and Parliament have agreed to on an all-party basis; it is about the impact of US extraterritorial jurisdiction on British foreign and commercial policy. Its aim is to highlight the way in which US sanctions on Iran are in practice freezing out many services of UK-based banks and financial institutions, to prevent them and others from participating in commercial and trading activities with Iran that remain entirely lawful under the sanctions regimes of the UK, the EU, the UN and indeed the United States.

Here is the heart of the problem:

“humanitarian trade with Iran has always been permitted under both US and EU sanctions”.

I quote directly from a letter of 6 March to me from the Foreign Secretary. Such trade includes food and agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and services. As the Foreign Secretary said in the same letter, however:

“many banks have been wary of processing the payments required. This has been driven in large part because of risk aversion to US banking sanctions”.

That risk aversion by banks based in the UK is entirely understandable. It is compounded by the fact that those banks cannot obtain greater certainty about the reaction of the US Government by looking at the black-letter text of the US sanctions regime. Nor, because they are non-US entities, do they enjoy any of the close connections that Washington DC offers big US corporations to obtain “comfort”, formal or informal, from the US Congress or Government. Rather, our financial institutions are subject to “guidance”, sometimes of an oral and confidential kind, from the US that, if they offer any banking services for any trades with Iran, they could find themselves in difficulties with the US authorities.

The pressure on our banks is intense. Most are so scared and so scarred that they will not provide banking services even where the trades are manifestly within the sanctions regime.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. The problem is illustrated by the fact that the Iranian chargé d’affaires, up to last month, could not even open a British bank account. May I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, while he is talking about commercial issues, that what is clearly wrong is when humanitarian aid itself is being stopped because of the inability to get bank facilities? Is he going to develop and explore that point?

[Mr Straw]

I am indeed and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I will show that, in practice, the impact of sanctions is much worse against British trading of all kinds and banks than against any other banking operations.

The impact of this unilateral extraterritorial jurisdiction of the US is especially discriminatory against UK-based financial institutions, because of their multinational nature. In contrast, for example, some German companies have banking services for their trade with Iran from a local Landesbank, which has no activity in the US. The US corporation Coca-Cola is able lawfully to sell its product in Iran and to use banking services for remittances by the Iranian franchise. A UK corporation in a similar situation would almost certainly find it far harder, if not impossible, to obtain such banking services here.

There is another example. For reasons of which the Minister is aware, I will not go into further details in public, but an Iranian entity in this country has seen all its banking services stopped, while an exactly similar Iranian entity operating in the United States has full access to the services of US banks.

The stark fact highlighted by the trade statistics is that the United Kingdom’s trade with Iran has been the hardest hit by far of any major European Union member, while, irony of ironies, US exports to Iran have scarcely been hit at all. As sanctions tightened, all EU countries saw their exports to Iran decline in the four years 2009 to 2012—in the EU as a whole, by 33.8%. But the United Kingdom’s exports in that period slumped by 73%, from $584 million to $159 million—the biggest fall by far. The US had the smallest fall, of just 11.3%, from $282 million to $250 million.

Let us go back to 2000. In contrast with the European Union as a whole and with Germany, France, Italy and the United States individually, the United Kingdom is the only nation whose exports to Iran were lower in 2012 than they were at the beginning of this century. In the United States’ case, a man from Mars might be forgiven for thinking that the United States had been on a modest export drive with Iran. Its exports in 2000 were worth $17 million; in 2012 they were worth $250 million; and they rose last year to $313 million.

The joint plan of action agreed between the E3 plus 3 and Iran, which came into force on 20 January, allows for some relaxation of the sanctions regime, but there is precious little evidence that that is making any significant difference for UK traders or banks, because of the threat, whether real or perceived, from the United States. This unacceptable situation is a direct challenge, I say to the Minister, to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. It is one that the United States Congress and Government would not tolerate for a moment were the situation reversed, yet the British Government preside over a catastrophic decline in our exports that is not required by sanctions and has not been suffered by any other nation, and then retreat into claiming that they cannot interfere in the “commercial decisions” of UK-based banks.

However, the circumstances that our banks face have been created not by the banks’ own “commercial decisions”, but by the actions of the United States Government. I say, with respect, to the Minister that it is time for the British Government to make it crystal clear to the US that, although we are four-square behind sanctions that they and we have agreed, we will not tolerate any longer the US preventing trading that is lawful under those sanctions and that it is itself carrying out. Effectively, it is preventing our traders from carrying it out.

The Government already have on the statute book clear powers to take counter-action against the United States if they cannot negotiate a satisfactory way through by getting the United States Government and their agencies to change their behaviour. I am referring to the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, passed, as I recall, with all-party support by the Government of Margaret Thatcher. Introducing the Bill, the then Secretary of State for Trade, John Nott, told the Commons that its purpose was

“to reassert and reinforce the defences of the United Kingdom”

against attempts by the United States

“to enforce their economic and commercial policies unilaterally on us”

by

“the most objectionable method”

of

“the extra-territorial application of domestic law.”—[Official Report, 15 November 1979; Vol. 973, c. 1533.]

The Bill was prompted by decisions of US anti-trust regulators against UK shipping firms. The British and all European Governments took exception to that gratuitous interference. By the Act, the British Secretary of State is given power to prohibit any United Kingdom entity from complying with any extraterritorial sanction by the United States. Indeed, the power under section 2 makes it a criminal offence here to comply with what the US is trying to impose on our banks. The Act worked. It was used again in 1992 in respect of Cuba. It was followed in 1996 by similar, EU-wide regulations, which I think the hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North will explain in more detail in a moment.

Ministers do not have to be frozen, blinking in the headlights of this unacceptable practice by the United States Government, which is inhibiting the lawful activity of British banks and hindering the step-by-step restoration of bilateral relations with Iran. The Government have strong powers, bequeathed to them by Margaret Thatcher, to deal with this situation. If Ministers make it clear that Her Majesty’s Government will be ready to use those powers if needed, their hand in negotiations will be strengthened, and with luck their use will not be necessary and we should be able to restore our trade at least to the trend set by the United States itself.