Reserve Forces

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) for securing the debate. When he was serving in his trench in Germany in the 1980s, I was even further east during the cold war, in Berlin, surrounded by the enemy. We were always told that quality would see us through, but some of us also knew that quantity has a quality all of its own, and that we stood very little chance. Our job was just to slow the progress of the advancing forces in time for when they met my hon. Friend, who would obviously put a stop to them.

I start by making the obvious point: the plan to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists was born out of financial pressures, not strategic logic—let us be absolutely clear about that. As was described to me and others by the then Secretary of State for Defence, the financial logic was very simple. In peacetime, reservists cost a fraction of regular forces; they are easier to maintain on the Ministry of Defence budget, but when the balloon goes up and they need to be deployed, the cost of deployment, which is far higher for reservists than it is for regulars, gets transferred to the Treasury. It was an accounting exercise designed to save money. There were no strategic grand designs with this plan. That is not to say that there are not advantages from having a more flexible reservist force available to hand, or that one does not have a deep regard for the Territorial, now reservist, forces—I served with them myself in Berlin, Germany, Cyprus and Northern Ireland back in the 1980s—but the bottom line is that the plan was born out of financial pressure, not strategic design.

The plan was criticised by some of us at the time. The criticism manifested itself most starkly when we tabled amendments to the Defence Reform Bill, later the 2014 Act, in the last Parliament. I managed to secure the support of the official Opposition and the Scottish National party for an amendment, but unfortunately I could not carry quite enough Members from my side, although I am very thankful to those who did support me in that amendment, including my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering.

For us, the problem was that replacing 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists would create capability gaps and false economies in the longer term. The original plan was to hold those 20,000 regulars in situ until we had clear evidence that the reservist plan would work—in other words, until we had geared up on the reservists’ recruitment. There were clear indications that we could plug that gap—that, by the way, was confirmed by the previous Defence Secretary, who stood up during the debate on the amendment to the Defence Reform Bill and said that that was the case and that was the original plan. However, in addition to the cack-handed plan of replacing 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reserves, simply on the grounds of financial pressure, we then compounded the problem by saying, “We’ll let the regulars walk out the door, and no doubt we won’t have any problem with reserve recruitment.” What madness that turned out to be. We let the regulars out the door and the Army is now, I think—no doubt the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—below 82,000 on our regular strength, and meanwhile we are struggling to recruit the reservists, as my hon. Friend has clearly outlined.

The problem is not just numbers. My hon. Friend rightly pointed out that we are perhaps 9,000 or 10,000 reservists short, but, as has been alluded to in this debate, it is not just the numbers that are the problem; it is the age profile of the existing reservists. Answers to written questions more than a year ago highlighted that the average age of an infantryman in the reserve forces was in the mid-30s, and that going up the ranks, whether senior NCOs or officers, it was heading into the 40s.

We all loved “Dad’s Army”—great series—and there is a place for a home reserve, but Dad’s Army was not on the Normandy beaches. In addition to the numbers being recruited into the reserve, we need to look at the age profile of the existing reservists. The figures I quoted are for infantrymen, not the other arms of the reserve. Infantrymen have to be of a certain age to be at their peak capability on deployment.

[Mr Brazier]

My hon. and gallant Friend is generous in giving way. Dad’s Army was not on the Normandy beaches as it was a home defence force, but the Territorial Army most certainly was there. A division helped to hold the line at Dunkirk and, indeed, a national guard division on its own took Omaha beach.

[Mr Baron]

I do not deny all that, and the Minister will not be able to deny that the Government have made it clear that they intend to deploy reservists much more frequently in overseas operations. He gives us only half the truth. If the plan is to deploy reservists much more regularly, not only will that be more costly than deploying regular forces, but we will have to address the demographic issue within existing reservists and the TA.

In the time remaining, let me return to false economies. No one can deny that capability gaps have occurred as a result of the change in plan, but the Minister must address the false economies resulting from that. Letting regulars go prematurely and the problems with reservist recruitment highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering have resulted in extra spending. It is not just the IT fiasco, which cost £10 million, but the extra spending on incentives for both employers and employees —£500—pension equalisation and advertising.

I have asked parliamentary questions about whether the Government can quantify those extra expenses, which were not foreseen when the original plans were put in place. We have not had answers. We keep being told that there is £1.8 billion, which should cover those expenses, but that £1.8 billion is over 10 years. We need detailed answers from the Government on what those unforeseen extra costs have been. When will we have those answers? Either the Government do not know the answers, which would be worrying, or they do know and will not disclose them. That would be equally worrying and may suggest to some that they are trying to hide something.

I look forward to answers from the Minister, and if he does not have time to provide them today, perhaps he will write to me and others who have raised the issue and say what the extra costs are. Our two central concerns are capability gaps in the short term and false economies in the longer term. At the moment, the reservist plans seem to have both problems.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

What a pleasure it is to respond to the debate under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) on securing the debate and on his remarkable, predictably thoroughly researched and self-effacing speech. The debate takes place as we remember the first world war, in which the then Territorial Force won 71 Victoria Crosses, and the Battle of Britain, in which two of the three highest-scoring squadrons were from the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

I will try to pick up as many points as I can in the short time available. My hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon), who had to leave to attend the Defence Committee, know that I am not allowed to respond to the points they made about special forces, beyond saying that my heart goes out, as I know theirs do, to the families of the three young men. I share my hon. Friend’s pride in the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross he referred to, which is the latest in a series of decorations won by the unit we both served in.

The expansion of the reserve forces is critical to our ability to deliver defence on a sustainable financial basis and to maintain the Clausewitzian trinity of the armed forces, the Government and the people. It will enable us to ensure that the armed forces are structured and resourced to meet the challenges of the 21st century. After many years of neglect, the Government are restructuring and revitalising our reserve forces and investing in new equipment and support.

The programme is not—my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and I have debated this many times—about swapping regular personnel for reserves. In 2010 we did, indeed, make some very painful decisions right across Government. After that, the commission on which I served looked at the issue of the balance and recommended changing the way that we delivered defence to make the best use of our resources, better to harness the talents of the wider UK society and, above all, to help to restore links and understanding between the armed forces and the communities that they serve. The sombre events in Paris remind us of the importance of those close links. We should be in no doubt at all that, whatever the size of our armed forces, we must always have reserves.

Now, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) knows that he is not going to tempt me into anticipating the strategic defence and security review, but I can say that I am pleased to be part of a Government who are genuinely committed to 2% for defence spending, although I know I will not satisfy my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering on the legal point. Nevertheless, we are committed to it.

Our programme to grow the reserves is making good progress but, as my hon. Friend said, there is no room for complacency. In the year to 1 October, more than 8,500 people joined the volunteer reserves, an increase of more than 65% on the previous 12 months, taking their strength to more than 33,000. Most notably, 6,500 people joined the Army Reserve, an increase of 73% on the previous period. All three services are ahead of their trained strength targets, but that certainly does not mean that we can relax. We must continue to make further progress to meet our commitment of creating a force of around 35,000 trained volunteer reserves by April 2019, and to deliver the usable, motivated and capable reserve forces that the country needs. My hon. Friend is right that that means another 9,000 trained personnel in three and a half years’ time. Given that we have grown by 1,300 trained personnel in just the past six months, that seems challenging but not unattainable.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right—a number of other Members referred to this—that the biggest challenge is building the officer base. The internal study set up by the Chief of the General Staff and headed by a reserve brigadier has recommended considerable restructuring, including a marketing post manned by a volunteer reserve officer with huge marketing experience, who is now installed in Sandhurst. The numbers are going up. For example, just outside the constituency of the hon. Member for Stirling (Steven Paterson) is 71 Engineer Regiment, which I visited recently. It now has six young officers under 30—a transformation from even a couple of years ago. The same thing has happened with my local reserve unit.

A number of Members made a point about the need to get the age structure down. In fact, the largest concentration in the age structure of the Army Reserve is in the 25 to 29 category. We are working hard on it, but the averages are pulled up by the fact that we want older people—those in their 40s and even 50s—in areas such as intelligence and for some of the medical skills. A number of Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering, mentioned transfers from the regulars. Those are running above our target. In fact, that is the one part of reserve recruiting that has been consistently above target, and we are offering substantial financial incentives to those who transfer.

We are offering reservists today more challenging opportunities than before. New call-out powers enshrined in the Defence Reform Act 2014 have allowed us to use reservists in the same way as regulars, and reservists have taken up the challenge. We would only have compulsory call-out only in an emergency, but people join the reserves because they want to be used. In the past 12 months, they have been deployed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering said, in formed groups to Afghanistan and Cyprus. They have provided specialist help to deal with the Ebola crisis in west Africa, and maritime reserves have taken part in counter-terrorist and counter-piracy operations alongside their regular counterparts. As my hon. Friend said, next summer a company from 4 Para will provide the framework company for the Falkland Islands.

We are offering reserves more and better training opportunities. In the current training year, the services have planned more than 50 overseas exercises involving reserves, including a series of Army exercises in Kenya with integrated companies of regulars and reserves. A number of Members referred to the crucial importance of the specialist courses in what we call phase 2 and 3 training and to the difficulties of tailoring those to reservists in civilian employment. The fact that Chatham has managed that for an area such as bomb disposal shows that this is possible more widely across the Army.

Several people, including the hon. Member for Bridgend and my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering, referred to the importance of cyber. For quite a long time, the only cyber-unit in the armed forces was a reservist one in the then Territorial Army. Today, reserves play an important role in cyber in all three services.

We have invested in new equipment. We have given reservists access to the regular pension scheme and a paid annual leave entitlement. We are giving them full access to Defence-provided medical care and physiotherapy, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering will remember, was an issue when he and I served. We have improved civilian accreditation for training. Employers are vital and we are immensely grateful for the commitment some of them make.

[Mr Baron]

No one in this Chamber doubts the dedication, hard work and enthusiasm that the Minister is putting into the task of increasing the reserve forces, but he must also accept that key questions remain unresolved, including the age profile of the infantry. We all accept the age profile when it comes to reservists and specialisms such as cyber, but the age profile of the infantry is still far too high—mid-30s and early 40s. May I return the Minister to the central issue of extra costs? There have been extra unforeseen costs with these plans, which, despite frequent requests to the Government, he and the Government are unable or unwilling to disclose. Does he intend—if not here today, then perhaps in the immediate future—to put that right?

[Mr Brazier]

I have written to my hon. Friend and I will write to him again. The ongoing costs of the recruiting process have shown some significant savings, but it is difficult to separate regulars and reserves because they are in the same contract. If he is referring to the contingency costs of deploying reserves on operations, there is a cost associated, but it is a cost that is paid for only when there are large-scale operations. The point about reservists—as the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) said, if I heard her correctly—is that it is very much cheaper most of the time to have part of the forces in reserves.

We have established the defence relationship management service, to which 42 of the 100 FTSE companies are now signed up. I have already mentioned the extra benefits for small and medium-sized enterprises. Crucially, we have set up an annual employer notification process, so that employers know a long way in advance when reservists are being called. That is crucial for retention, which so many Members referred to.

My hon. Friend the Member for Kettering set out the progress we have already made on the employer recognition scheme, which includes many NHS trusts. We are not in a position to dictate this, although I pay tribute to the Scottish Government, who run a more unified system and are able to dictate. Many hospital trusts have won employer awards. The Cabinet Secretary has the 1% challenge; we now have 1,250 civil servants serving in the reserves. These are at the heart of the retention issues. I cannot give the exact figures for medical reserve recruiting at the moment, but I can say that over the past 12 months the Army medical services, which are the bulk, have seen a considerable surge in numbers. I will write to my hon. Friend and to the other Members who raised that issue with some more detailed figures.

We have overcome a number of challenges that were affecting Army Reserve recruitment. We are making more imaginative use of advertising media, and we have hugely reduced the delays in the pipeline under the new system and provided better mentoring and support in units for those enlisting.

I thank all Members who took part in the debate and the many other Members who support their local units. Our reserves are stronger and better equipped than they have been for years. Despite the neglect, over the past 10 years, 70 reservists won decorations for gallantry in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 31 gave their lives. There is a great deal that we can be proud of in our reserve forces. We are making the reserves proposition that we set out in the 2013 White Paper a reality.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Monday 13th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

11. What assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of the decision by the Major Projects Authority to give the Future Reserves 2020 programme a red rating.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

My hon. Friend will have heard my earlier answer.

Since the MPA report, governance has been shaken up, with each service delivering its own programme alongside a defence-level enabling structure. My hon. Friend will know from many earlier answers that our improvements in recruitment, selection and training processes are bearing fruit. We remain committed to delivering the FR20 requirement.

[Mr Baron]

The Minister will nevertheless know that the MPA declares as red projects that it believes risk being unachievable. Given the delays, cost increases and capability gaps, and given reports that superannuated reservists and those who do not regularly attend parades are remaining on strength, at what point will the Government consider scrapping their plans and increasing the size of the regular Army?

[Mr Brazier]

We recruited nearly 7,000 reservists across the three services last year. That was a rise of 65%, and the rise was even greater within the Army Reserve. As for my hon. Friend’s reference to superannuated reservists, I visited 3 Royal Welsh last weekend, and the average age of that battalion has dropped from 41 to 31 over the past three years.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Defence diplomacy is a major component of Britain’s soft power. What steps are the Government taking to foster and encourage this aspect of our international relations?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: defence engagement is of pivotal importance. We are in the process of “upgunning” the role of defence attachés worldwide, with more language training and a proper career structure to make it more attractive. That is part of a wider attempt to raise the importance of defence diplomacy. Soldiers, sailors and airmen can so often reach parts of our allies that others cannot.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

We cannot say what proportion of recruits resulted from it, but we can say that there has been a surge in recruiting, and that it was up 147% on the quarter last year, as the figures I have just given the House show. Additionally, although we are not going to publish the figures on cyber-recruiting, I can say that they are running ahead of the reserves average as a percentage.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

19. Government answers show that the average age of an existing reservist infantryman is in the mid-30s. Given that we have added only 500 reservists in the two years that this plan has been in place, and that that has led to capability gaps and false economies, has not the time come to rethink the plan and to stop trying to get our defence on the cheap?

[Mr Brazier]

Over the past 12 months, we have added more than 800 to the reserves. That followed a long period—a whole generation—of decline. We make no apologies for revising the age requirements for ex-regular soldiers to join the reserves in order to share their knowledge and expertise. We are looking for people with key skills and it is a waste to lose people with specialist skills in areas such as intelligence and medicine. Dare I say that my hon. Friend, with his years of experience, might have something to offer to the reserves?

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s admiration of those people, and I was privileged to see them off just before Christmas. I note that the senior nursing officer in the rotation—effectively the commander in the red zone on the current operation—is herself a reservist.

To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question directly, those people are entitled to a number of other allowances, and we are looking at the moment at the issue that he mentions. My right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces will write to him when it has been determined.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The latest MOD figures show that the trained strength of the Army Reserve has actually fallen over the past 18 months. Can the Minister inform the House of the extra cost that has been incurred, over and above the original estimates, to encourage recruitment? The MOD’s continued silence on that suggests either embarrassment or ignorance.

[Mr Brazier]

On my hon. and gallant Friend’s first question, by looking back 18 months he is looking back past the bottom of the trough. The past six to nine months have been much more encouraging, and the next quarter is expected to be even better.

My hon. and gallant Friend has asked his second question again and again, and we have explained that, although we acknowledge that there are some extra costs, there is no way that we can separate them from the whole picture. Some of them are one-off costs, and some of them are connected with regular recruiting as well—we have to remind people, post-Afghanistan and so on, that we are recruiting.

Defence

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Ministerial Corrections

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

25. However these figures are dressed up, the Ministry of Defence’s own figures show that the trained strength of the Army reserve has actually fallen over the last 18 months. Given that the Government have had to throw more money at the reforms, including added incentives to join up, will the Minister answer the one question that the Government have so far ducked: how much extra are these reforms costing, over and above original estimates?

[Mr Brazier]

Over the past six months, the trained strength of the volunteer reserves has increased by 400, and it is only in the last three months that most of the reforms we have introduced have bitten. The answer to my hon. Friend’s question is that we are confident that the figure that we originally offered—1.8, over the 10-year period—will be adequate for the purpose. We are still aiming to reach our targets. Numbers are growing and recruiting is increasing rapidly.

[Official Report, 24 November 2014, Vol. 588, c. 624.]

Letter of correction from Mr Brazier:

An error has been identified in the answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) during Questions to the Secretary of State for Defence.

The correct response should have been:

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I am most grateful for the service that the hon. Lady gives on the RFCA board in Scotland. The RFCAs are critical. To answer her question, we are looking at it. I do not have a comprehensive answer for her, but the four recruitment centres through which every recruit passes have a different track record. Some of them have had much tighter capacity constraints. We have taken measures to ease those. Scotland has had a number of interesting initiatives of its own, as well as leading the way on phase 1 training. We are trying to get best practice spread around the country.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

25. However these figures are dressed up, the Ministry of Defence’s own figures show that the trained strength of the Army reserve has actually fallen over the last 18 months. Given that the Government have had to throw more money at the reforms, including added incentives to join up, will the Minister answer the one question that the Government have so far ducked: how much extra are these reforms costing, over and above original estimates?

[Mr Brazier]

Over the past six months, the trained strength of the volunteer reserves has increased by 400, and it is only in the last three months that most of the reforms we have introduced have bitten. The answer to my hon. Friend’s question is that we are confident that the figure that we originally offered—1.8, over the 10-year period—will be adequate for the purpose. We are still aiming to reach our targets. Numbers are growing and recruiting is increasing rapidly.[Official Report, 2 December 2014, Vol. 589, c. 1MC.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T8. In addition to Army Reserve numbers going backwards over the past 18 months, recent answers to written parliamentary questions show that there has been no improvement in the age profile of the existing Territorial Army/Reserve, with the average age of the infantryman stuck at 35 and the average age of senior non-commissioned officers and junior officers in the 40s. Why are the Government not tackling that?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his question. On his premise, I remind him that over the past six months numbers have been moving firmly in the right direction as a result of the upturn in recruiting. On his question about age, I make no apology for a reserve force recruiting some older people, especially ex-regulars, who bring much experience. Fitness is a major requirement for all those people, and it is this Government who over the past few years have re-established a common standard for fitness across regulars and reservists.

Reserve Recruitment

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Monday 17th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence to make a statement on Army Reserve recruitment.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

I am most grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for the opportunity to make this statement. Future Force 2020 represents one of the fundamental steps this Government have taken to ensure that our defence is delivered on a sustainable financial basis. The Government have ensured that the armed forces, both regular and reserve, are structured and resourced to meet the challenges of the 21st century. This is a far cry from the position we inherited, where our armed forces were run on a fundamentally unaffordable basis by the previous Government. After years of neglect, this Government are reforming and revitalising our reserve forces. We are investing £1.8 billion in better training and equipment, and reversing the decline and years of underinvestment in our reserves. We have always said that increasing the trained strength of the reserves to about 35,000 would not happen overnight; it is a five-year programme, but one year in we are making steady progress, and during the latest quarter we enlisted about twice as many people as we did in the equivalent period last year.

The expansion of the reserves is about doing defence differently. It is not about swapping regular personnel for reserves or doing defence on the cheap; it is about changing the way we deliver defence to make the best use of our resources and to harness the talents of the wider UK society. The contribution of our reserve forces will deliver, in a cost-effective way, the capable and usable armed forces that the nation needs. It will better harness the talents of the wider community and help restore the links and understanding between the armed forces and that community.

There have been a number of technical challenges affecting Army Reserve recruitment, which have been widely discussed in this House before, and we continue to introduce measures to improve recruitment. So far, those have included: improved financial incentives—much greater incentives with employers; removing delays, sometimes of many months, caused by medical documentation and security checks; increasing capacity at selection centres; and giving a key role for mentoring back to units.

The programme to grow the reserves is on track. We have reversed 18 years of decline. The Army’s latest projections indicate that the Army Reserve can reach its 30,000 trained strength target by April 2019. The Chief of the General Staff, the Secretary of State and I are all committed to achieving that target.

The future reserves programme is a bold change programme. It will make defence more flexible and able to deal with the changing demands placed upon it. I say this to the House: the plan is working.

[Mr Baron]

I thank the Minister for responding. No matter how he dresses up the figures, the latest recruitment figures for the Army Reserve show that the trained strength has fallen between April 2013 and October of this year. If one was being charitable, one would say that Government plans to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists are struggling to say the least. Those of us who have opposed those plans have questioned the resulting capability gap as 20,000 regulars have been shown the door and the false economies that will loom as the Government are forced to throw more money at failing plans.

Let us be absolutely honest about this: these plans have been in a state of flux from the beginning. The 2010 strategic defence and security review showed haste and little strategic overlay. In 2011, the then Defence Secretary stated that he would keep the regulars in order to check that the reservist plan was working and to recruit those reservists. In 2012, that plan was changed, and the regulars were allowed to leave before we had recruited any reservists. Meanwhile, the start line keeps getting changed. We talk about “one year in”, but we are actually 18 months into this plan and there has been no acknowledgement from the Government. We now have this sorry state of affairs where 20,000 experienced troops have left, including some from my own battalion the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, and we are now recruiting—even if one puts the most optimistic spin on these figures—at a rate of seven reservists a month. If we are to meet our deadline and targets, we need to be recruiting nearer 250 a month. Let us not forget that we are 18 months into the plan.

The Public Accounts Committee has condemned the plan. It said that the plan has put anticipated savings at risk

“and is not delivering value for money.”

The National Audit office was critical, saying:

“There are significant risks to value for money which are currently not well understood by the Department or the Army.”

It has even been said that these plans have been put on the Treasury’s watch list.

I have a series of questions for the Minister. There have been extra costs: £10,000 given to ex-regulars to join the reserves,£300 to the civvies, £500 to the employee reservist per calendar month, pension liabilities, and the IT fiasco. How much extra are these plans now costing over and above the original estimate?

Secondly, how big are our capability gaps? Can the Minister guarantee that there will be no operational fall-out from these plans and tell us what assessment has been made? Finally, in this increasingly uncertain world, surely the time has come for a fundamental reappraisal of the need for stronger defence. Trying to get our defence on the cheap is not the right approach. We should now start recruiting regulars to the Army to bring up the trained strength of the Regular Army to at least 100,000. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his thoughts. Let us be clear on the numbers. The Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the Army, said to the Defence Committee on 5 November:

“Already, at the six-month point, we have got to 2,100”—

he was talking about new recruits to the reserves—

“and it is my sense that we will increase the numbers beyond the target in this year…It is not something that will be solved overnight, because we have had the last 10 or 15 years when we have not invested in the Reserve in the way that we are now investing in the Reserve.”

The point—I have tried to explain this to my hon. and gallant Friend a number of times—is that we had a very long period of decline and neglect. In setting up a new system that for the first time for a decade re-established proper medical checks and proper fitness checks, started to collate the numbers properly and so on, we had some glitches, which have been widely discussed. Most of the improvements we made have happened only in the past few months. In the last quarter, we recruited almost twice as many people as in the equivalent quarter last year. I am grateful to him for his continuing interest in the subject, but may I recommend that he does what almost every single unit I have visited recommends and visits some reserve units to discover the exciting things that are going on?

Defence Spending

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Thursday 19th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I share those concerns, and I shall share another one. I was not originally intending to raise it in my speech, but it is a significant concern. To get to the 30,000 reservists—or indeed 36,000 if we want 30,000 to be deployable—we will be heavily reliant on the existing Territorial Army. If we look at the age profile of the existing TA, we find that it includes regular infantry in their 30s, junior officers in their 40s and senior officers in their 50s. There is a demographic issue within the existing TA; it is not just about new numbers, so there are real concerns there.

The clear implication of the recent and critical NAO report is that the transition to 30,000 reservists may turn out to be more expensive than the steady-state costs of maintaining the 20,000 regulars they are replacing. The plan is complete and utter nonsense. We have seen not just a doubling of the ex-regular reserve bonus, the introduction of a civvy bonus of £300 and the equalisation of pensions, but the introduction of other financial incentives, bringing into severe doubt the financial logic and merits of introducing this plan. False economies loom, as acknowledged by the NAO, when it said that the plans could cost even more. We need to sit up, take note and ask questions. If this ends up costing more in the longer term, I really think heads should roll.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. I was hugely with everything he said in the early parts of his speech, particularly on the need to keep up spending on our armed forces and defence, but he is really going over the top here. Whatever one’s view of the NAO report, it did not suggest that it could be more expensive to have reservists rather than regulars. What it queried were some of the cost figures, but it could not possibly be interpreted as suggesting that, man for man, the reserves are more expensive than the regulars.

[Mr Baron]

I think that my hon. Friend should look at the report, because it concludes that there is a real risk that what I have described will happen. I understand where my hon. Friend is coming from, and I respect his enthusiasm for the reservist plan, which is clear from his contribution to the debate about it, but I think that he should look at the report extremely carefully.

The MOD went into typical “shoot the messenger” mode. It would not co-operate fully with the National Audit Office, and was not even willing to share its methodology with the NAO. Many questions need to be asked, and I am sure that the Defence Committee, for one, will ask them. I certainly hope so.

This plan has had distorting effects on the ground. As I have said, I have a vested interest: the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, which is one of my regiments, is one of the best recruited battalions in the British Army, but it is being scrapped to save less well-recruited battalions north of the border. Everyone in the Army accepts that that is a political decision that was made in the light of the Scottish referendum, and it is a complete and utter nonsense. It will cost more to try to maintain battalions that are not well recruited at the expense of those that are.

Britain needs to increase substantially the resources that it commits to its military capability. I know that my right hon. Friend the Minister will point out that we have the fourth largest defence budget in the world, but such cries ring somewhat hollow when estimates suggest that, when it comes to actually deploying force in the field, we rank closer to 20th or 25th. We seem to have a policy of hollowing out our armed forces, keeping expensive bits of kit while taking away manpower, which restricts our ability to deploy force overseas.

I believe—and I accept that there will be a keen debate on this—that a defence budget representing 2% of GDP is simply not enough, let alone a budget that will, in the view of the Financial Times, fall below that percentage. I think that our budget should be increased substantially. Given our dependence on the sea, we should, as a minimum, be funding two properly resourced battle groups centred on our aircraft carriers, and troops that we can deploy if necessary.

The military have done their best within the financial envelope that Parliament has given them. These decisions are for us. They are political decisions about who will get what, when, and how. I have no doubt that we will all have our pet subjects when it comes to the question of what could be scrapped if money were required from elsewhere. I voted against HS2 because it involved £50 billion that could be spent elsewhere over 10 years. I also believe that we still have too many quangos—and can anyone justify the fact that people in public sector management receive salaries far higher than the Prime Minister’s?

Abroad, international aid running to hundreds of millions of pounds for countries that can well afford to help themselves, or are corrupt, or both, should be stopped. If that money cannot be given to other countries that cannot help themselves, it should be channelled back to this country. Meanwhile, extravagant European Union budgets need to be cut. The EU is indeed

“too big, too bossy, too interfering”,

and it needs to be cut down to size. There is no shortage of places where money can be found if the political will is there.

We must reverse the trend, and significantly increase our defence spending. This is not a “call to arms”, but a response to the increasingly uncertain world that we inhabit, and with which we are increasingly ill-equipped to deal. Strong defence is a virtue. It does much to prevent conflict, and it can also be cheaper than the alternative: nothing is as expensive or as wasteful as war. However, if we are to change the mind of Government —any Government—Parliament must become more robust in its questioning of the Executive. It must ask more questions about what is going wrong, and about why we need to put it right.

The debate is overdue, but, as might be expected, it has been shunted to the end of a parliamentary week. It should have been in Government time, and we should perhaps have a debate in Government time on defence spending annually, if not more frequently.

The time has come for action. Opinion on the need to increase defence spending is hardening on both sides, yet we keep cutting. Talking the talk is no longer good enough; we now have to walk the walk.

Defence Reform Bill

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for his tribute. I understand how strongly he and a number of other Members feel about the timing of the decision. However, although he and I—and, I am sure, the Secretary of State in his private heart of hearts—would like more money to be spent on defence, it is a question of the cash envelope within which any Government are likely to operate. If we wound up the whole Territorial Army tomorrow, it would be possible to pay for only 6,000 or 7,000 regulars rather than 20,000, and that would mean losing most of our medical capability as well as a number of other benefits.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I accept what my hon. Friend has said about the MOD’s cash envelope, but surely this comes down to national priorities. The plan was not to wind down the regulars to such a degree without first ensuring that the reservists could take their place, but the plan has changed. None of the new clauses and amendments is asking for extra money from the MOD. It is, as I have said, a question of national priorities: it is a question of whether more money should be committed to defence, which is the first priority of Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brazier]

I will respond to my hon. Friend’s intervention, but I hope he will forgive me if I leave it for a couple of minutes. I shall deal briefly with new clause 2, and then I shall come to his new clause.

Ever since Haldane, the reserve properties of the Army, but not all those of the other two services, have been managed largely by the RFCA. The fact is that the Defence Infrastructure Organisation—or the Defence Estates, as it used to be called—has a poor track record. There are so many quotations available that I am spoilt for choice, but according to the latest report from the National Audit Office,

“Defence Estates is not well placed to weigh up and challenge Budget Holders assessments of estate requirements.”

While I am certain that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his team will sort out the problems, two quite different jobs are involved. We do not want an organisation whose job is to look after super-garrisons to be worrying about repairing the roof of a cadet hut. The vast number of locations—2,500—across which reserves and cadets are spread need to be looked after by a local organisation with local feel, which can call on local expertise, often free of charge, and which, above all, has a low overhead. As I have said, new clause 2 could not become law, but I wanted to put those points on the record.

I now come to the new clause tabled by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who has fought a very good-tempered campaign, and one that I respect although I disagree with him. It is no secret that I stepped down as a Cabinet Parliamentary Private Secretary 20 years ago because I was unhappy about “Options for Change”. I would dearly love to see more money spent on defence, and I know that my hon. Friend would as well, but the reality is that the money is not there. Despite all the Secretary of State’s battles, the fact remains that no Treasury team that is likely to take charge will give us more money. The effect of my hon. Friend’s new clause would be not to guarantee a larger Regular Army, but to devastate our attempts to rebuild the reserve forces by putting them all on hold.

My hon. Friend must be familiar with his own wording. Are we to push to one side the plans for better training and better equipment? Are reservists, many of whom have served on operations and have struggled through a difficult period with no kit and no training, suddenly to be told. “This has all been put on hold, because the House of Commons wants it all to be looked at again”? The people to look at it are the RFCAs, and the Secretary of State has generously said that he will arrange for that to happen.

[Mr Baron]

My hon. Friend is being very generous in giving way, and I appreciate the tone in which he is setting out his case, but may I address his central point by reminding him that the delay or postponement—the pause—need not be long at all because the report could be laid before Parliament the day after the Bill becomes an Act, and then it is up to the Government to decide how promptly we can scrutinise that report? The pause may not be long at all, and as for all the other comments about wrecking amendments and that this would turn the plans upside down, they are wide of the mark—they are Aunt Sallies—that do not do the Government’s cause any good.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baron]

If I could just answer the question. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) for his kind words, but let us be clear: there have been three major tranches of redundancies in the regulars already. I think a fourth one is due shortly, although I do not know the Secretary of State’s exact intention on that. The plan to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists essentially hinges on our ability to recruit those reservists, but the plan is clearly in trouble, and if we do not stop now, if only briefly, to re-examine the logic and ensure it stands up and properly scrutinise the viability and cost-effectiveness of the plan and the widening capability gap, we risk heading towards false economies and unacceptable capability gaps, which people will not thank us for. It is not unwise, therefore, to say, “Pause briefly and let Parliament properly scrutinise these plans.”

[Mr Brazier]

I have just received another text from a Royal Air Force reservist that reads, “A pause will cause widespread concern”. The problems with recruitment are not about footfall, as I set out in my speech. What message does my hon. Friend have for the officers in a reserve unit who have seen the regular recruitment apparatus block up and wreck their ability to enlist people and who are now being told to stop once more, just as things are starting to move again?

[Mr Baron]

To save my hon. Friend mentioning texts and e-mails a third time, I can assure him that I have no shortage of texts and e-mails from reservists and members of the TA saying, “Yes, you’re absolutely right. These plans are not working and it would be right to pause and examine them again.” I will happily swap those with him after the debate.

On the effect of my new clause on the morale of the TA, let us consider the present situation. The latest figures, which came out last Thursday, show TA numbers falling, not rising, despite all the expensive recruitment programmes. Then we have the figures—and they are not full figures either; some of them were actually missing—for reserve recruitment going forward. I can tell my hon. Friend that it has got to such a state that the Army Reserve and TA courses scheduled for next January and February have had to be cancelled owing to a lack of recruits. The Secretary of State may be willing to check that, because I heard it very recently in one—in fact, more than one—of the texts and e-mails that my hon. Friend keeps mentioning. That shows the current state of recruitment. I therefore suggest to my hon. Friend that there are fundamental problems with this plan and it is only right that Parliament should scrutinise it more carefully.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brazier]

My hon. Friend is of course right that anecdotally one can prove anything. Nevertheless, I will tell him a story from half an hour ago. The last reservist I dealt with before coming to the debate—he is one of the cleverest members of the TA and the kind of person who should be its future—has a brother trying to join the TA who, for 13 months, has had his paperwork lost in the hopeless regulars system. While the TA is trying to struggle with that, it is grossly unfair to tell it that we are putting all this on hold too.

[Mr Baron]

I completely disagree; it is not grossly unfair at all. In fact, my hon. Friend highlights the fact that we have fundamental problems with the way the system works. If people are having to wait 13 months for computer systems to talk to each other, then that, if anything, reinforces the case that we should be saying, “Let us pause for a moment and properly scrutinise these plans.” That is all we are asking for.

--- Later in debate ---

[Martin Horwood]

rose—

[Mr Brazier]

rose—

[Mr Baron]

I will not give way. I have given way three times to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury, and I must conclude my remarks, as I know other Members want to speak.

Defence Reforms

Debate between John Baron and Julian Brazier

Thursday 17th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I shall be dealing with the capability gap—very briefly, if my hon. Friend will forgive me—because I think that it is an important issue, but may I test the patience of the House and stick to the cost issue for the time being? There is a real risk that, if costs rise faster than anticipated, we shall create false economies that will bring the whole project into doubt. That is terribly important, and we are right to ask questions about it on behalf of the taxpayer.

The Government have not come here to present a fully costed plan, but the pieces of the jigsaw that we can see do not reveal a rosy picture. We know from the Green Paper—and the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces has confirmed this—that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. We know that those who leave the regular forces to join the reserves will be given a £5,000 bounty, payable over four years. We have some questions about the reservist award, which is the difference between reservists’ pay and what they earn in civilian life. We are told that the potential cost has been accounted for, but the assumptions have not been made clear. We also know that, because employers are reluctant to let key employees go for extended periods, the Government have come up with an incentive for prospective employers amounting to £500 per reservist per month. Those are all added costs, but we still do not know what the fully costed plan is.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

My hon. Friend referred to the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces. I serve on the commission, and I do not accept his statistic. Broadly speaking, the cost of a reservist is about a fifth of the cost of his regular counterpart. In America, it is about a quarter, and my guess is that following the changes that we are making, it will be something between a quarter and a fifth.

[Mr Baron]

I must say to my hon. Friend, with the greatest respect, that he has confused training with deployment. There is no argument in the House about the fact that reservists will be cheaper; the question is, how much cheaper will they be? When costs are rising, do we enter the terrain of false economies—which brings into doubt the whole question of value for money and whether the plan should have been instigated in the first place? I was talking about training. There has been a dispute about whether it costs more to train a regular, but my hon. Friend should know from the Green Paper that it costs more to train a reservist.

However, this is not just about the bits of the jigsaw that we have seen. We know that there are hidden costs further down the line. According to a recent report by the charity Combat Stress, reservists are twice as likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as regular troops. We may be storing up a ticking time bomb for ourselves. The necessary support structures for reservists are not in place, and I should be interested to know whether there are any proposals in that regard.

May I ask the Minister how much of the £1.8 billion—spread over 10 years—has been set aside for the Government’s plans? We are told that that money has been set aside and all is well, but there are various reports that some of it has already been eaten into. Has any of it been spent, and if so, how much?

While I am on the subject of costs, may I question the Minister about the impact assessment, which attempts to take an overall view of the costs? Again, we are dealing with assumptions and projected usage rates, and not all the figures are on the table, but I think we can all agree that the assessment is very dependent on projected usage rates. The way in which the reserve forces are used will depend on assumptions about future costs.

Artificially low rates can create false economies. The central case in the document seems to be based on an assumption of 3,000 annual deployments. I must ask the Minister whether that projection is realistic, given the original rationale of the reserve reforms. We are meant to be replacing 20,000 regular troops with 30,000 reservists. If the central projected use is 3,000, something is not adding up on the terrain. We need to examine the facts very carefully, because, again, we may be creating false economies and the taxpayer may be presented with a much larger bill than was originally envisaged.

[Mr Baron]

I am indeed very worried about the possibility that we shall not have enough troops to deploy. I refer my hon. Friend to the Green Paper, which states that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. However, he has made a valid point about the manpower gap, which I think is a central issue of concern. Will 30,000 reservists be enough, even if they can be recruited? According to figures from the Ministry of Defence, the present TA mobilisation rate is 40%. In other words, for every 100 TA soldiers on paper, 40 are deemed to be deployable at any one time. That suggests that if we are plugging a gap left by 20,000 regulars, we shall need 50,000 reservists, not 30,000.

In response to a letter sent to him a while ago by 25 Conservative Members, the Secretary of State suggested a mobilisation rate of 80%. He said:

“The total strength target for the Army Reserve in 2020 is 38,000, in order to deliver 30,000 trained reservists.

May I ask the Minister what research, what study, what evidence justifies the claim that the MOD’s budgets will double the mobilisation rate? It is one thing to recruit 30,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate as well would require an extremely large investment. Many of us would be interested to know what evidence supports the claim that the £1.8 billion that has been put aside will achieve both those objectives. It is a very, very tall order.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) raised the issue of the capability gap, and he was right to do so, because there is a fear that the Government plans risk creating such a gap. The Army reforms were put together before the strategic defence and security review, and since then a string of events have changed the international strategic dynamic. The nature of conflict is changing. Previously, it was thought of very much in binary terms—there would be one bloc against another bloc—but more fluid geopolitical forces are now at play, both state and non-state. War is becoming more asymmetrical, and we need well trained, agile, regular forces at high readiness if we are to meet the challenges that lie ahead. There is no disguising among the military their frustration about the fact that they could not have been more supportive to the French in Mali. The penny may have dropped on that side of the channel, but it has not yet dropped on this side.

I must ask the Minister whether 40 days’ training is really enough. Let us be absolutely clear about this: the Government’s plans represent a step-change in our approach. We are proposing to deploy whole units of reservists into the field. We have got to ask serious questions about this. Some would say, “Well, it happens in the US with the National Guard,” but it is, perhaps, not fully appreciated that the US National Guard has its own bases and its own equipment and training programmes. They take it very seriously in the US; they throw a lot of money at it, and even then the National Guard units are not infantry units. That is the interesting thing: the National Guard units are not infantry units, despite the investment the US puts into it.

[Mr Brazier]

My last visit to a National Guard infantry unit was in Kabul about a year and a half ago. It was doing an excellent security job, and it also had detached platoons along the Pakistani border. Some 60% of the American infantry is in the National Guard and 40% is in its regular army.

[Mr Baron]

All I would say to my hon. Friend is that there is a general view that the National Guard is very much focused on supporting roles, and the Americans treat their National Guard very differently from what I think is being proposed here. For example, I do not know of there being any details about separate training programmes, operational programmes or equipment programmes in the Government’s plans, which we have yet to see. All we are asking is to see those plans, because £1.8 billion may sound like a lot of money but it is spread over 10 years, and we must consider the scale of what we are asking—not just raising 30,000 reservists, or, to be more accurate, adding another 12,000 or 13,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate. That is a very big ask indeed.

What research has been undertaken to ensure that the money earmarked is sufficient to bring reservist units up to the same standard as regulars upon deployment? That is especially important given that it appears that human rights legislation will require equal training and equipment. That has not been raised much in the debate thus far, but human rights legislation is a concern in the sense that it is going to say, “Any troops put into the field, reservist or regular, have to have equal training and equipment.” I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.

There is a concern that these plans are having a distorting effect on the ground. I come back to the fact that well-recruited battalions are being axed, including my own battalion, the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, yet more poorly recruited, and therefore more expensive, battalions are being saved. Such a policy reinforces failure. Can the Minister justify the decision for 2RRF to replace on the list one of the more poorly recruited battalions when it was not on the original list of five battalions to be scrapped? We know, because we have seen it in writing from the MOD, that five battalions were originally due to be axed as they had poor recruitment figures. One of those was replaced. They had to go looking for another battalion and they fell upon 2RRF, which happened to be the best-recruited battalion in the British Army. Many fusiliers and their families in swathes of constituencies across the north and the midlands of England would like an answer to that question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I welcome this debate and I congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing it. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham).

I understand my hon. and gallant Friend’s loyal defence of his fine former regiment. As the 100th anniversary of the start of the first world war is almost upon us, it is time to remember six Lancashire and Warwickshire Fusiliers who won Victoria Crosses in that war. Sir John French made the famous remark that without the Territorial units available at the very beginning of the fighting we would have lost in France before the war had really begun.

The reality is that we have a good plan that is being unevenly implemented. America’s land forces are almost exactly split 50:50 between regulars and volunteer reserves. Canada has 44% regulars and Australia has 36% regulars; in all countries there are more reserve infantry than regulars. Uniquely, Britain has a target that is much less ambitious. It is broadly the case that a reservist costs a fifth of the price of a regular. All of us who are keen on defence would like more resources to be allocated to defence. Indeed, more than 20 years ago, I stepped down from my post in government as a Cabinet Parliamentary Private Secretary over that issue. However, the reality is that we have to work within these very difficult economic times, and the alternative to 30,000 reservists is not 20,000 regulars, but somewhere between 6,000 and 7,500, and that would be if we got rid of all the specialist medics, cyber-people and so on whom the Regular Army does not have.

I therefore strongly support this plan; I have seen the work of American and Australian reservists, and I am proud that 20% of the British division that captured southern Iraq was made up of reservists. However, I am concerned about some of the details of how the plan is being implemented. From the beginning, Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff have made a strong commitment to it. Ministers have secured the support of every employers’ organisation in the country. The CGS, starting with his own pitch to employers in his excellent article in the Financial Times, immediately spotted the governance issue by appointing, for the first time since the second world war, a TA two-star—a major-general—to play a pivotal role in it. The problems largely lie within the recruiting group. At a time when the proposition has improved immeasurably as a result of changes the Army Board is making, it is deeply depressing that this department is failing to deliver.

I have before me the monthly recruiting statistics for one unit—I will not disclose which, for obvious reasons. In the 12 months before the first push on TA recruiting in autumn 2011, the unit had enlisted between three and 12 people a month. The figures after that push are: 15 for November 2011, 21 for December 2011 and 19 for January 2012. Then, for a reason not understood by anyone, the recruiting group introduced its new system for medicals and common selection, without any market testing and without talking to units, and within three or four months the figures had dropped to one or two a month. That muddle was sorted—it had nothing to do with Capita. Second time around, the arrangements with Capita—I do not blame Capita—were introduced without any market testing or discussion with units. I am sure we have all dealt with cases of soldiers who have waited six or nine months with their documents repeatedly lost in the system.

Time is extremely short, so I want to suggest three things that the Government need to do turn this around. The units I talk to tell me again and again that there is more interest in joining the reserves and that the figures for the two groups that are not under control of the recruiting group—officer applicants and ex-regulars—are both improving. So, first, we need to get more of the control over the enlistment process back with the units again.

[Mr Baron]

May I suggest that this is a clear example of where the plan is driven by costs, rather than by strategic design? The cost for Capita to take on the recruitment was derived in large part by scaling down, if not selling up completely, local recruitment offices. So to start opening those offices, although a sensible proposition, would require additional cost if we are going to reverse that recruitment loss.

[Mr Brazier]

My hon. and gallant Friend makes an interesting point. That is not what I am arguing for, although I would strongly argue that it is ridiculous that the offices we still retain are open 9 am to 5 pm Monday to Friday instead of, for example, 9 am to 9 pm Tuesday to Thursday, which would allow the people there to do both jobs rather than only regulars. I am calling for more emphasis on the units. A temporary measure has been adopted in that area, which I suggest should be more permanent—it need not be expensive.

The second major change we need is to have a senior reservist officer in the recruiting group who is tasked with talking to units and who has real power in the way in which decisions in that area are made. We have done it at Land Command at the senior level, where two highly effective successive deputy commanders at Land in that position have worked well, and the improvements in the proposition have stemmed in no small part from that. The same needs to be done in the recruiting group.

The third change we need is on a relatively small scale, as seven or eight changes among the 400-odd decisions that had to be made to the location of the reserves are not right. Seven or eight really well-recruited sub-units have been wrongly selected for disbandment, including the best-recruited squadron in the yeomanry, which is going down to troop level, the best-recruited battery in the TA gunners and three or four well-recruited infantry sub-units.

I believe that this plan is achievable and it is moving us in the direction of the allies we fight alongside. It is a good plan; it just needs an improvement in implementation.