Draft Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019

Debate between John Glen and Oliver Heald

Wednesday 23rd October 2019 General Committees

[John Glen]

Clearly, had we left on 31 March, the EMIR REFIT regulation would not have come in in July. What happened would have depended on the conditions under which we had left at the end of March and on whether we observed the changes naturally as part of the EU through a transition period, or if, in a no-deal circumstance, we used a different mechanism to consider ongoing legislation into which we had had some input but that was not quite finished. That is a bit of a difficult question to answer fully, but that is my understanding.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

Hear, hear!

[John Glen]

I sense that there is a degree of frustration and impatience in the Committee, but I will respectfully address the point made by the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk. We clearly have disagreements over the fundamental outcome that we need to secure, but all the interventions across the 58 SIs have been designed to give as much stability as possible in the event of no deal, which is in the interests of the whole of the United Kingdom’s financial services sector.

I hope that the Committee has found this morning’s sitting informative and will join me in supporting the draft regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Capital Requirements (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 Draft Bank Recovery and Resolution and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Oliver Heald

Wednesday 12th December 2018 General Committees

[John Glen]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck. As has been said before, Her Majesty’s Treasury, as part of preparations for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, is laying statutory instruments under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to ensure that there continues to be a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in the UK in the event of a no-deal scenario. That includes the two SIs we are debating today, which will fix deficiencies in UK law relating to the UK’s prudential regime for credit institutions and for bank resolution. As with other SIs that the Treasury has laid and debated under the 2018 Act, they are designed to provide continuity at the point of exit by maintaining existing legislation, but amending it where necessary to ensure that it works effectively in a no-deal context.

The first SI being considered today concerns the prudential rules that apply to banks, investment firms and building societies under the framework set by the EU capital requirements regulation and capital requirements directive. The second SI relates to the bank recovery and resolution directive, which sets out requirements for ensuring that bank failures can be managed in an orderly way and provides a common EU framework for firm resolution. In a no-deal scenario, the UK would be outside the European economic area and the EU financial services framework. The SIs will make amendments to retained EU law so that the legislation would continue to function effectively in a no-deal scenario.

The draft capital requirements regulations will make amendments to the retained EU capital requirements regulation and the domestic secondary legislation that implemented the EU capital requirements directive. The draft regulations will make the following principal amendments. First, they will make changes to the group consolidation regime for liquidity and capital. Current EU legislation allows EU banking groups to report a single set of figures for their activities across the EU. The SI will amend those requirements, so that they operate at UK level only. That will not affect the application of consolidated capital requirements, which are already calculated and reported on a national basis, but it will introduce an additional layer of liquidity consolidation in the UK, as liquidity is currently consolidated at EU level.

Secondly, the draft capital requirements regulations will remove the preferential capital treatment available for exposures to certain EU institutions and assets, including sovereign debt. For example, the EU capital requirements regulation does not require firms to hold capital for EU sovereign debt, because it rates those exposures with a zero risk weighting. That is to incentivise investment in certain EU asset classes. In line with our general approach, we will not grant the EU unilateral preferential treatment in the absence of an assessment of equivalence after exit day. We would therefore not automatically continue with the regime of preferential capital treatment for EU assets.

The draft capital requirements regulations will also remove the requirement for UK regulators to seek approval from EU institutions for the use of macroprudential tools to deal with systemic risk, including action that may need to be taken in a financial crisis.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

My understanding is that during the implementation period, we will continue to take the EU laws in this area, so the CRR will be part of our law anyway, and we will look to maintain that position until we reach a new agreement. Is the Minister saying that if we had a no-deal exit, we would do something different and we would not want to retain the position in that way while we negotiated a Canada deal or something of that sort?

[John Glen]

I am grateful for my right hon. and learned Friend’s intervention. What we would do in a no-deal scenario in respect of CRR II, which is in flight at the moment within the EU, would be to use the Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill, which came before the House of Lords last week and will hopefully come to the Commons at some point in late January. That would give us discretion on how or whether to implement the file that would then land after our exit from the EU, or part of that file, based on what makes sense for the UK economy. We have listed in that Bill all in-flight files, and we would make a decision on the suitability of its inclusion in UK law at a future point following our exit.

To conclude on the first SI, removing the requirement to seek approval from EU institutions is necessary so that UK regulators are able to continue to exercise the macroprudential functions that Parliament has given them. Effective exercise of those functions is essential to maintaining the stability of the UK financial system.

Moving on to the second statutory instrument, the bank recovery and resolution SI will amend the Banking Act 2009 and related domestic and retained EU legislation, with the following principal amendments. First, the draft regulations will amend the scope of the UK’s third-country resolution recognition framework to include EEA-led resolutions. This will ensure that in a no-deal scenario, the same approach will be followed for EEA countries and other third countries in recognising third-country resolution actions. We have that arrangement now with the USA, for example, and we would have to treat EU countries in the same way, or similarly. The UK’s approach to recognising third-country resolution actions has been and will continue to be consistent with our G20 commitments.

The refusal of the UK to recognise a third-country resolution action is only permitted where the Bank of England and the Treasury are satisfied that one or more statutory grounds for refusal exist. Those grounds are: first, that recognition would have an adverse effect on UK financial stability; secondly, that it is necessary for the Bank of England to achieve one or more of its special resolution objectives; thirdly, that a third-country resolution action treats UK creditors less favourably; fourthly, that recognition would have material fiscal implications for the UK; or fifthly, that recognition would be unlawful under the Human Rights Act 1998.

Secondly, the bank recovery and resolution SI will remove deficient references that require UK regulators to follow the specific operational and procedural mechanisms set out in the bank recovery and resolution directive to co-operate with EEA authorities. The removal of these references will not, however, prevent UK regulators from choosing to co-operate with their EEA counterparts after exit. UK regulators will remain able to share information with EEA authorities in the same way that they currently do with authorities in third countries, such as the United States. Additionally, the UK will continue to participate in international crisis management groups, which enhance co-operation between home and host authorities of systemically important banks. Finally, the draft regulations address deficient cross-references to the bank recovery and resolution directive in UK legislation, and ensure that delegated regulations retained by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act continue to be workable following exit.

In line with the approach the Government are taking across all files laid under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, both SIs transfer a number of functions currently within the remit of EU authorities, in particular the European Banking Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority, to the relevant UK bodies. Those functions, such as the development of detailed technical rules on certain provisions of the regulations, will now be carried out by appropriate UK authorities, namely the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Bank of England. This is appropriate, given the regulators’ expertise in prudential and resolution policy and in the supervision of global firms. The regulators are currently undertaking public consultations on the changes they propose to make to binding technical standards. The SIs further confer regulation-making powers on the Treasury to replace delegated powers that were previously conferred on the European Commission, in line with the approach taken across other Treasury legislation.

To summarise, the Government believe that both SIs are needed to ensure that the regulatory regime applying to banks, building societies and investment firms works effectively if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. I hope that colleagues across the Committee will join me in supporting the regulations, which I commend to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

The Government and regulators are clear on the imperative to work closely with industry to ensure that change is not disruptive for firms. UK regulators will be given the ability to phase changes in over the next two years. We will treat all third countries similarly, which means, to answer the point made by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, continuing to co-operate through international crisis management groups to plan and resolve issues with cross-border firms. The UK’s participation, and enthusiasm to participate, in such forums will be undiminished. Nothing in the draft regulations will change how the UK co-operates with third countries.

The hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde raised the bank recovery and resolution SI and concerns around the appearance of disengagement. There is no intention whatsoever for the UK Government or regulators to be isolated in any way. We will continue to participate. However, these steps are necessary to domesticise our regulations in the context of a no-deal scenario.

The hon. Member for Glasgow Central has on several occasions, and perfectly sensibly, mentioned the regulatory burden and additional costs. She is right to draw attention to the £1.7 million assessment for the capital requirements SI and the £400,000 for the bank recovery SI. I point out to her that those are one-off familiarisation costs. For the 1,000 companies she mentioned, they are one-off costs of around £1,700 and £1,200 for some of the very biggest institutions. I accept that it would be desirable for them to not have those costs, but it will be necessary in a situation in which we do not secure a deal.

[Sir Oliver Heald]

If we were to import all European law into our law in a form that was ineffective and hopeless, would there be costs to the City and to our financial institutions of having an ineffective system? It is all very well for the hon. Member for Glasgow Central to criticise the cost of the regulations, but without them we would not have a system that works.

[John Glen]

My right hon. and learned Friend is of course correct. We are creating as smooth as possible a scenario in a no-deal situation. The costs would be much greater if we did not do so. However, I stress that we seek to maintain close relationships with all third countries.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Glen and Oliver Heald

Tuesday 11th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[John Glen]

The Government hold a 62.3% shareholding, but we do not run the bank. Decisions on the branch network are a matter for the bank.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that one of the most successful companies in our country, Johnson Matthey in my constituency, is committed to having a fair-deal, not a no-deal Brexit because it feels that it is vital that there should be an orderly retreat, not chaos? Does he agree that the Prime Minister’s deal would achieve that?

Draft Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Claims Management Activity) Order 2018

Debate between John Glen and Oliver Heald

Monday 19th November 2018 General Committees

[John Glen]

It would be a criminal offence, but I will be happy to clarify the situation exactly in a letter to my hon. Friend subsequently. I think that I have covered the point about the SRA and regulatory arbitrage.

A point was raised about other sectors—this point came through a lot in the passage of the main legislation —by the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood. The Government are actively examining the extent of the coverage. According to my initial statistics, in 2017-18 financial products and services claims made up 79% of CMC turnover and personal injury made up all the remaining turnover. A point that has often come up is about coalminers. If they do not already come under personal injury, we will be able continually to observe, and possibly extend, coverage, based on whether a discrete additional category is needed.

In relation to the next steps on this regulation, if the Committee approves the order today, the regulation will transfer to the FCA on 1 April 2019. The FCA regularly updates its rulebook. It is a robust regulator, which I have frequent dialogue with, and is subject to scrutiny.

[Sir Oliver Heald]

Does my hon. Friend agree that since 2006 there has been a problem in finding the right regulator for CMCs? The advantage of the FCA is that it is a big regulator that already covers a lot of businesses and has a lot of capacity to tackle the area, unlike the original trading standards-type regulation that was introduced in 2006. It was always intended that what the MOJ did would be a temporary measure. Is it not to be welcomed that the area will now have a robust and substantial regulator?

[John Glen]

I entirely agree. That is the purpose of the draft order, which will enable claims management regulation to be transferred to the FCA and the Financial Ombudsman Service. Given the breadth of their existing regulatory oversight, that will satisfy the concerns of those who want a more robust regulatory regime in place. Consumers will benefit from a well-regulated and professional claims management industry. The industry can provide important services to some consumers, but there needs to be confidence in how difficulties are handled.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Glen and Oliver Heald

Tuesday 6th December 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Heald]

Yes, I can do that. When a witness needs protection, the police assess what is required to keep them safe. Witness care officers also help to ensure that the witness has any help that they need to attend court.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

14. What steps she is taking to improve rehabilitation in prisons.