Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

John Hayes Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman has made two important points, both of which I agree with, about redaction and about the attendance of the Prime Minister. I do not think it unreasonable to expect that once a year the Prime Minister should seek to meet what is a very important cross-party Committee of this House. I should be happy to give way to the Minister should he wish to add his own views on this matter, but given the basis of my sense of where the House is and given previous debates, I think most Members will agree that it is not unreasonable to ask the Prime Minister to turn up once a year.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is made more potent by the fact that the matters the ISC considers are not typically—in fact, not at all—partisan. It operates on a non-partisan basis, although of course its members are drawn from both sides of the House, and the material that it studies is not seen through a party-political prism in any way; this Minister has engaged in sensible and meaningful discussion with members of the ISC in exactly that spirit during the passage of this legislation. Similarly, a meeting with the Prime Minister would be conducted in a way to which I think no Prime Minister could reasonably object .

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman speaks about these matters with a great deal of authority, not just as a member of the Committee but as a former Security Minister, and I think he has described the situation very well. I hope the Prime Minister is listening; I hope the Prime Minister accepts what I consider to be the reasonable and constructive invitation that has just been extended to him by the right hon. Gentleman; and I hope the Prime Minister does take the opportunity in the near future to sit down with the ISC and discuss what are, after all, very important matters.

New clause 2 would ensure that an annual report was published on measures in the Bill, and in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to defeat and disrupt technology-enabled serious organised crime and technology-enabled threats to our national security. We tabled the new clause because we must ensure that the law is always one step ahead of those who seek to harm us. The police and the security services are not best able to protect us today with the laws to counter the threats of yesterday, which is why we support this Bill to update the 2016 Act, which is now eight years old, but there is an opportunity to go further. The annual report proposed in the new clause would help to ensure that any changes required to primary legislation relating to investigatory powers were identified and implemented as quickly as possible. That would strengthen our legislative framework on national security, and weaken the capability and resolve of criminals and our adversaries.

I think that this is a genuine opportunity for the Government to work better with, and to constructively challenge, telecommunications operators and the wider communications technology industry on the requirements to use investigatory powers—a process that would be separate from the new notices regime included in part 4. A statutory requirement to produce an annual report on investigatory powers to counter threats to our security and safety would strengthen national security, as well as strengthening the oversight and safeguarding of measures to keep us safe. Those are two principles that guide this Bill and the 2016 Act, and that is why we will seek to push the new clause to a vote later this evening.

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[Sir David Davis]

I start from the perspective that we are highly likely to regret some elements of this Bill within the next 10 years, and I will come back to that in a moment. I will also start by commending the Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), for his approach. It has not always been like this. The real precursor of this Bill was the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, all stages of which was taken in one day because the Government of the day claimed it as an emergency, even though they had spent three months thinking about it and even though they took nine months to implement it afterwards, such was the emergency. As a result, I challenged it in the High Court, and it was struck down. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which this Bill amends, was in effect the replacement for that. It was not a terrific improvement, but it was an improvement. As I say, the Minister’s approach to this Bill has been much more democratic, much more open and much more valuable.

[Sir John Hayes]

I said that we are not going to be partisan in this debate, and the shadow Minister started in that vein, but my right hon. Friend has been highly contentious about the Bill that I took through the House. Bear in mind that it had pre-legislative scrutiny with a Committee of both Houses, it had at least three reports in advance of being considered by this House, and it was debated in this House at length, in the same spirit that I mentioned earlier, and many amendments were tabled, many of which were accepted by the Government. I have described the pretty full consideration and scrutiny that it received, which is why it is such an essential piece of legislation, as the Minister will confirm, and is used by the security services and the police every day.

[Sir David Davis]

I will not go over it again, but the High Court and the Court of Appeal came to a different view from that of my right hon. Friend, I am afraid, and that is why the legislation was struck down.

Some of the elements of this Bill are not very wise. The Opposition have agreed that the pre-notification of tech companies will act to drive business away from our shores. That is, as I said earlier, the opposite of what the German Government are doing, and we are going to have to modify our approach to deal with some of our allies along the way.

I also have serious concerns about the bulk collection of data, which the Scottish National party has tabled an amendment on. I think it was Stalin who once said that, at a certain point, quantity has a quality all of its own. That is certainly true of information technology and bulk data. It was interesting to listen to the earlier brief debate on so-called “no expectation” and “low expectation of privacy”, by the way. Those are completely different things. They sound similar but they are completely different, as will become clear, I suspect, when the SNP spokesperson speaks to that amendment. Even today, “low expectation of privacy” data can tell a Government with quite primitive software vast amounts about our lives and about what we are doing every minute of every day, but with artificial intelligence that is going to be multiplied many times and become much more powerful than before.

To give colleagues a feel for how this might work, let us look back to the covid period, which in some senses was almost Orwellian. The Government had three different disinformation units of various sorts that looked at everybody’s comments. If someone commented on flaws in the modelling of the virus, questioned where the virus came from or quite properly stated that the vaccine did not stop transmission—it stopped deaths, but it did not stop transmission—this would lead to all their low or zero expectation of privacy documentation and all their online stuff being monitored by the Government. A number of Members of this House were monitored on that basis—in my view, entirely wrongly. That was all within the law as it stood then, so it was not massively important, but it nevertheless demonstrates the mindset of Whitehall when dealing with these things.

Today, however, nine out of 10 of us—if not more—carry a smartphone. That makes it easy to access our shopping habits, our purchase history, our bank records, our automatic number plate recognition records, and on and on and on. Do we really want the agencies of Government to be able to peer into all that data? It belongs to people who are, remember, entirely innocent of any crime. Our entire approach to law and order in this country has been to focus on people against whom there is a reasonable expectation or a reasonable suspicion, not to monitor everybody. It seems to me that this intrusive surveillance is a dangerous route to take and, as I say, I think we might regret it within 10 years, because the power of artificial intelligence will make this bulk data much more informative than we are conscious of today. I worry about it. I did not put an amendment down on it because others have done so, but it is something that we must concern ourselves with in the longer run.

One of my two principal concerns today is how the Bill relates to the expansion of powers around the surveillance of Members of this House. Until 2015, it was widely understood that the Wilson doctrine protected MPs’ communications from interception. This protection was repeated in unequivocal terms by successive Prime Ministers—even Tony Blair, who is not someone with a great reputation for worrying about Members’ civil liberties. Despite clear and unambiguous statements that MPs and peers would not be placed under surveillance, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal held in 2015 that the doctrine had been unilaterally rescinded by the Government.

In an attempt to ease concerns, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 created a regime—the one we have now—whereby a Secretary of State must first secure the approval of the Prime Minister and a judicial commissioner before authorising the interception of an MP’s communications. Frankly, I have served under nine Prime Ministers as a Member of Parliament, and I cannot say I am happy that all of them would have taken a very responsible approach to exercising this power. This is an almost judicial power that is given to a person whom it is our job to challenge and hold to account every day.

The Bill seeks to expand the list of people who can sign off on the surveillance of MPs way beyond that, from the Prime Minister to effectively five Secretaries of State. There was a long argument in the Lords and in Committee about introducing words such as “unable” or “unavailable.” I think they had in mind that Boris Johnson was sick and laid up for a month or so and perhaps could not act in that capacity. Even by that logic, we do not need five Secretaries of State to be able to deputise, unless we are imagining a mass-casualty event in the Cabinet. Frankly, this seems far more like a precursor to a general loosening of the policy than a serious and sensible protection of the ability to sign this off. I worry about that, and I do not like it at all.

I do not like the idea of the surveillance of MPs except under incredibly strict circumstances. I am not casually asking for MPs to be somehow above the law, not at all. This protection is vital to safeguarding what we do. We are here to hold the Government to account, not the other way round. The relationship between constituents and their elected representatives is sacrosanct. It is the bedrock upon which our representative democracy stands, and constituents expect that, as they should. But it is not just constituents who rely on the sanctity of their communications with Members.

It is truer and more obvious today than at almost any time in my 30-odd years in this House that, in doing our job, we deal with campaigners—think of the sub-postmasters—journalists, whistleblowers, victims of injustice who may be terrified of being identified and, of course, other Members of Parliament, and that is just a few. They all trust us to keep what they tell us absolutely rock solid, private and confidential.

This Bill will do nothing but further undermine people’s trust in bringing serious matters to our attention. The Horizon scandal, Mid Staffs, sweetheart tax deals with large companies, the mistreatment of prisoners by the British Army, involvement in rendition and torture, and dishonest briefings for immoral wars—every single one of them was brought to our attention by a whistleblower who, in many cases, faced criminal prosecution if they were discovered. Are people likely to continue blowing the whistle with a loosening of the Wilson doctrine? I do not think so.

If I had my way, I would amend the Investigatory Powers Act to prevent communications to and from Members of Parliament from being intercepted at all. At the very least, I would change this proposal to require that the Prime Minister secures the approval of a Supreme Court judge before signing off on any warrant permitting the interception of a Member’s communications. That would take the process completely outside the normal approach under which the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and all the machinery around it routinely says yes to requests, day in and day out. Calling for, allowing or permitting the interception of the communications of a Member of this House or the other place ought to be something clearly extraordinary in the life of a Prime Minister. A Supreme Court judge is far more likely also to have the authority required to face down poorly justified demands, which has not always happened in the past. The Executive should not wield the power to order the surveillance of Members of this House at their sole discretion. The very senior judiciary should provide a vital check on that power.

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[Mr Jones]

That would be helpful. That would give reassurance to the public and provide a test of how the system works. As I have said, I am comfortable with the process of authorisation, but the public must be comfortable with it as well.

[Sir John Hayes]

I note the right hon. Gentleman’s proper consideration of the balance between privacy and security, which lies at the heart of the Bill, but I also recognise the Minister’s concern that we must not make the process too unwieldy and bureaucratic. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman might invite the Minister to commit to a regular report going to IPCO as authorisations are made. That might be monthly, but it would at least mean that there was some iterative process of a kind that might reassure the right hon. Gentleman, me and others about that balance.

[Mr Jones]

I understand where the right hon. Gentleman is coming from. Our original idea about having an email was explained when I met the Minister and his civil servants. I think that that would really cut across some of the processes that we have in place. The suggestion that has been made would be one way of doing it, but IPCO already has the powers to look at such things. The only problem with doing that is that we would then have to set up someone in the agencies to produce another report. I do not want to do anything that holds up their work, and I think that that might do it.

Possibly the Minister’s suggestion of how Sir Brian Leveson is going to do it will give the public some reassurance. Let us not forget that Sir Brian has the power to take action if things are not being done correctly. If we read his reports, we can see that he is not fearful of doing these things. A fair compromise has been put forward. I think we have one and a half victories so far—

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[Mr Jones]

No, I would not quite say it is two. Hopefully, I might get another one on my other amendment, and then we can all go home happy.

[Sir John Hayes]

Is this an example of my being more hardline than the right hon. Gentleman? It seems like it to me, but perhaps not.

[Mr Jones]

I would not have thought that the right hon. Gentleman could be seen as hardline on anything, pussycat that he normally is. He portrays himself as hardline, but I know from working with him very closely on the ISC that he cares about this information. He has referred to the Investigatory Powers Act as his baby. It has grown up a little bit and is now being brought into the modern age. I should put on the record again his dedication and work as a Minister to bring in the original Act, which was groundbreaking for this country. It has stood the test of time. We know that we will be back here, so the measures will change. I have no problem with that. It is just that, as technology changes, things will change.

May I finish by thanking the members of our security services for the work that they do? I also thank them for the way that they have engaged with the ISC on the Bill. Hopefully, with the changes that have been brought forward, we can reach agreement on the Bill and our security services will have the ability to face up to the challenge that is coming forward: the ever growing use of larger datasets, and the more sophisticated way in which state actors and non-state actors have access to technology. That will enable the security services to do what we all want to do, which is to keep individual citizens and, just as importantly, our democracy safe.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for that intervention. He possibly makes a fair point. If I recall correctly, the wording of that proposed new subsection was borrowed from another part of the Bill. I might be wrong about that; I need to go away and have a look. I suppose the argument would simply be that if a category authorisation is to any extent being abused, it is right that the category authorisation is cancelled, and if somebody wants to come back with something similar, they can do so. However, I am not without sympathy to his point. I take it in the spirit in which it was intended, and will reflect upon it.

Let me move on from the question of oversight in relation to bulk personal datasets to the issue of “no” or “low” expectations of privacy in relation to such datasets, and how that test will operate in practice. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have been repeatedly given some very easy examples of so-called “low/no” bulk personal datasets. For example, we have spoken about phone books, academic papers, public and official records, and other data that many people would have access to routinely. It was helpful that, in relation to what is now our amendment 9, the Minister said in Committee that Facebook posts and CCTV pictures would be considered sensitive and would not be caught by these provisions. It is very helpful to have that on the record.

None the less, it would to be useful to have greater precision in the Bill. Amendment 8 would take out reference to “low” expectations of privacy altogether, so that only “no” expectations would be covered by the new provisions. To us, “low” is such a difficult question to adjudicate—low expectations in particular. That is especially the case when we are dealing with datasets of potentially huge numbers of very different people with very different reasons for having very different expectations of privacy, particularly in how that would relate to different organisations. We cannot think of a single dataset example provided during the passage of the Bill that would not be adequately covered by “no reasonable expectation of privacy”. If that is the case, if that is really all the Bill will be used for, why not just accept the amendment? It would be useful to have an understanding of what “low” expectation of privacy is designed to cover.

Amendment 15 brings us to internet connection records. In 2016, the Government emphasised the very targeted nature of the ICR powers, but here we are being asked to incrementally expand those powers so that they are slightly less targeted. To us, that means that the independent assessment of proportionality and necessity is pivotal, so we think that it should be subject to advance judicial oversight. Even the explanatory notes accept that there are difficulties in formulating sufficiently targeted queries, noting that

“such queries are highly susceptible to imprecise construction”

and that “additional safeguards” are required.

For us, the required additional safeguard is judicial oversight. We were led to believe that the powers would be used only exceptionally, so it is hard to see how a judicial authorisation requirement would cause any significant problem. The Government argue that there may be times when warrants are needed on an emergency basis, but that could be dealt with by having emergency processes or very limited exceptions—it is not an argument against a general rule of advance judicial oversight.

I turn to the impact on technology companies of the Bill’s various provisions relating to notices—although the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam probably made more sensible and eloquent points than those I am about to make. The written evidence that the Bill Committee received shows that tech companies, academics and human rights and privacy campaigners are still a million miles away from the Government in their understanding of how the provisions will work and of the impact that they will have on products and services. Apple wrote to the Committee that these provisions

“would dramatically disrupt the global market for security technologies, putting users in the UK and around the world at greater risk.”

It is frustrating and disappointing that we did not have the opportunity to explore those differences in detail through witness testimony. The Minister did his best to reassure us, and he made some important arguments about extraterritoriality and conflicts of laws, but given the serious concerns that have been raised, it is worth again asking the Minister to explain why those witnesses are wrong and he is correct. In particular, the Government’s explanation that the new pre-notification requirement in clause 21 is

“not intended as an approval mechanism”

has not dampened concerns. Apple argued in evidence to the Committee that

“Once a company is compelled to provide notice of a new security technology to the SoS, the SoS can immediately seek a Technical Capability Notice to block the technology.”

Other provisions in the Bill around maintaining the status quo during notice review periods work in tandem with these provisions to deliver what Apple and others see as a de facto block on adoption of new technology—that is the risk that they are highlighting, and it is what the Minister must address in his speech. It is why we have tabled amendments to take out some of those provisions. It is also why we have tabled amendment 19: an alternative that would introduce advance judicial oversight and, hopefully, a degree of reassurance that the new notification notice regime under clause 21 will not deliver the unintended effects that many fear.

Finally, I put on the record our support for the amendments tabled by members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, whose work on the Bill has been as helpful as ever—I congratulate them on their one-and-a-half victories so far. As is often the case when it comes to Bills of this type, we also put on record our support for several of the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis), some of which are similar to amendments that we tabled in Committee, while others are similar to amendments that we supported during the passage of other Bills, including the National Security Act 2023. In particular, new clause 3, which is designed to place an absolute prohibition on the UK sharing intelligence with foreign Governments where there is a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, is long overdue and would close a serious gap in the law. For us, that is self-evidently the right thing to do.

[Sir John Hayes]

As you will know, Madam Deputy Speaker, and as other Members have made reference to, I was the Minister who took the original Bill, which this Bill amends, through the House—indeed, it became the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

The purpose of that legislation was both to draw together a number of the capabilities of the agencies necessary for them to keep us safe, and to put in place a series of mechanisms to ensure that there was proper scrutiny and accountability for those powers. We introduced the principle of a double lock, whereby both politicians and judicial commissioners were necessary to authorise some of those very powers. They matter because of the threats we face. Those threats are, as has been said by a number of contributors, metamorphosising. They were bound to do so, and we anticipated that when the original Act was considered in this place.

I accept the argument used by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), that that does not end here tonight. Those threats will continue to change, and it will be necessary to update the legislation to reflect those changes, for our security services and police need two things to do the job that we expect them to do on our behalf: capacity—namely, skills and resources—and capability, which includes legislative powers.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister is going to satisfy me immediately, it seems.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will satisfy my right hon. Friend immediately and, I hope, save him time in his speech. Local authority trading standards teams are responsible for a range of legislation where enforcement requires investigation and may need to draw on communications data. The idea is that the powers in this Bill will be in keeping with those powers, not for them to be expansive, so my right hon. Friend is right: it is for serious crimes, as has already been set out.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is excellent—it helps, because the schedule associated with that part of the Bill does not make that explicit. I hope that the Minister, having given that binding assurance to the House, will reinforce it in the explanatory notes associated with the Act and in the code attached to it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

indicated assent.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am seeing the Minister nodding. He might want to say a word or two more when he sums up.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

May I gently suggest that the right hon. Gentleman goes back to the Minister now, just to pin down exactly what he is agreeing to? We on the ISC have no problem with the idea of our security services having these powers, and I do not think the public would either. They would be less comfortable, as I and the right hon. Gentleman are, with other organisations having them.

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister may want to intervene on me again to do exactly what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested.

[Tom Tugendhat]

On the grounds that it will save me time when I wrap up at the end of the debate, I will make it clear now. His Majesty’s Treasury is responsible for civil enforcement of financial sanctions regulations, and some information that is essential to carrying out its civil enforcement functions is now communications data, such as the timestamp on online banking transactions. His Majesty’s Treasury cannot currently use its information powers to compel that information to be provided by a telecoms operator, so to go back to the statement I made earlier, local authority trading standards teams are responsible for a range for legislation where enforcement requires investigation and may need to draw on communications data.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is very helpful and, I think, goes a fair way towards what I want to achieve. The Minister has therefore made clear that the power will not be permissive. If he uses those very words—forgive me for putting them into his mouth, Madam Deputy Speaker—that would also help. These are going to be rarely used, particular powers associated with regulatory or legal functions of local authorities, not permissively available to those local authorities at their whim. That is clear as crystal, is it not?

[Tom Tugendhat]

If my right hon. Friend will forgive me, I will use the words I am using. Those powers will be used as infrequently as we all hope they will be, but they will be used in keeping with the law as described. If the frequency increases, it will be because of the need to act; I am very cautious about saying that these crimes will disappear, and therefore the frequency will change. I am not willing to predict that criminality now.

[Sir John Hayes]

I entirely understand. I used the example myself of trading standards: in Lincolnshire, we have an issue with the sale of illegal cigarettes that has become not a trivial matter, but one of organised crime. It is not restricted to my county or locality: it is a national problem, and it is of course an example of where a local authority, working closely with the police, might well need to use those powers. By the way, those local authorities will be working with other agencies too: because money laundering is involved, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs might be involved, and so on and so forth. That is a good example of where those powers might be useful in catching very serious criminals indeed, but the word I wanted the Minister to use is that these powers are not permissive. He will understand what I mean by that, and I cannot see why that would present any problem at all, given the reasonable, sensible man he is.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I apologise to my right hon. Friend. These powers are not permissive in the sense that they are expansive: they are permissive only in the sense applied to them by this law, with the restriction of the powers that local authorities already have. They are not to be used in any way other than as set out very clearly in the Bill.

[Sir John Hayes]

I think that is helpful. The Minister will remember that when we debated the original Bill that became the Investigatory Powers Act, one or two newspapers used the term “the snoopers’ charter”, and images were used of local authorities using those powers to investigate people’s rubbish to make sure they were recycling properly, for example. I do not want to add unnecessary levity to our consideration tonight, because we are dealing with very serious matters indeed, but the Minister will understand how that kind of misunderstanding—indeed, misinformation—could do far more harm than good.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Again, just to clarify for my right hon. Friend, this Bill offers no greater expansion than his own Bill did in 2016. In the same way he ensured that Bill was no snoopers’ charter, I assure him that this one is not either.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

[Sir John Hayes]

I was going to say that I have done this matter to death, but I can see that the right hon. Gentleman wants to intervene.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I think the Minister is getting another “dancing on the head of a pin” award for his explanation. What I think the right hon. Gentleman is trying to get on the record—perhaps not for the benefit of people in this House who understand this Bill, but for the wider public—is that the way the Bill will be used is that it will include, for example, a local authority when an investigation is being driven by a security issue, such as in his example of organised crime in cigarette smuggling.

[Sir John Hayes]

Yes, exactly. The right hon. Gentleman has put it very clearly, and the sense of what the Minister has said has reassured me that it is not the Government’s intention to extend those powers beyond the very strict legal limits associated with the kind of organised crime that he and I have both cited. For me, that is considerable progress. The right hon. Gentleman spoke earlier about half a win; I think that is three quarters of a win, at least. For that reason, I feel that I can move on to my next request of the Minister.

We spoke earlier about IPCO, and its role and association with Government. As the Minister will know and as the right hon. Member for North Durham referred to, this legislation provides for a report to be made available to the ISC on an annual basis. There has been some concern that that report might be rather different from the one that is made available to Ministers and others, and my anxiety is that it should not be different. All that it should exclude is current operational matters; nothing else should be excluded from what my Committee considers, and clearly, it needs to be the same as what IPCO gets. We cannot have three or four different reports.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I can give my right hon. Friend that assurance.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is a 100% win. It is not half a win or three quarters of a win; it is just a win. So we are making huge progress tonight, partly due to the diligence of the members of the ISC and other Members of this House, including the official Opposition, but largely due to the reasonableness of the Minister. He is a listening figure, and he is growing in stature and reputation as a result. I am delighted that the Minister has agreed to the fourth of my requirements.

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[Jim Shannon]

You are most kind, Madam Deputy Speaker. When you get to my age, you do not count the years, but you make the years count.

It is an absolute honour and pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers). May I put on the record my thanks to her for her time as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland? We appreciate her commitment and efforts over those years. Her intelligence about and interest in Northern Ireland have not dissipated because she is no longer the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; indeed, they have added to the occasion.

It is a pleasure to speak on the Bill, which, as the Minister will know, I have done on numerous occasions. I am aware of the complexity of the issue and of the need to give privacy its rightful place in our national security. As others have done, I put on the record my thanks to all the security and intelligence services for all that they have done and still do. We owe them a great debt.

During the previous debate, I asked the Minister for his assurances regarding whether the right balance had been struck, yet I have still been contacted by constituents who continue to express their concerns. I will not detain the House for long—about five minutes—but will highlight again the concern that my constituents continue to express, to give them one last chance to receive assurances on the Floor of the House.

My constituents’ remaining concerns relate to something that we in this place have much cognisance of and that we treasure: the freedom within a democratic society to live our lives in peace as long as we are not adversely affecting the lives of others. That is a precious right, and one that none of us in the House wants to remove. I will refer to clauses 1 and 2 and highlight four companies that have expressed concerns to get the Minister’s response. My constituents have highlighted the following:

“In addition to the concerns of civil society, I would like to draw your attention to some of the comments submitted in evidence to the Bill’s Committee from the tech industry.

Apple: ‘In addition to impacting the safety of billions of users around the world who rely on security technologies developed by Apple and other companies, the Bill in its current form would undermine fundamental human rights. In fact, just this year, the European Court of Human Rights held that requiring a company to provide a means to decrypt all encrypted communications on its platform violated the right of privacy in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.’

TechUK: ‘This could impede the ability of TechUK members to modify products and services over time to protect users from active security threats, to innovate, and enhance their services for their users.’

Information Technology Industry Council: ‘We strongly encourage greater scrutiny of these implications so that the Bill will not have a chilling effect on a company’s ability to conduct business or in current or future innovations, and that it will serve to further international efforts on shared goals around trust and security.’

Computer and Communications Industry Association: ‘Over time, this will push tech firms to refocus product development away from addressing the priorities of UK consumers, towards Government demands for access. The obstacles the new regime creates will be a drag on innovation and therefore undermine the quality of digital services on offer.’”

[Sir John Hayes]

I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s speech, not least because it is his birthday. Let me put it to him in this fashion. I think that the public have as much to fear from those corporate organisations as they do from any democratically elected Government. I am much more concerned about the way that they gather and sell data, and, dealing with the matter of expectation, the vast majority of people do not know that they are doing it. Rather than more a more permissive attitude towards those organisations, I want to see a less permissive one.

[Jim Shannon]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I share those concerns, but I wish to put on the record my concern for my constituents in relation to how the changes are interpreted and how they will affect people.

I will give the last sentence of the quotation from the Computer & Communications Industry Association:

“They could risk deterring investment in improving service for UK consumers and contribute to a sense that the UK is not a safe market in which to invest.”

Those are the four tech companies, and the questions are on the record—I put them in Hansard—so that perhaps the Minister can give me an answer. Will he outline what mitigations are in place for the matters affecting those four companies in order to secure the tech industry’s place in the fabric of our lives in the United Kingdom?

I am pleased that the Minister has accepted amendment 23, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). The Democratic Unionist party was minded to support that amendment, but, because it has been accepted, we will not need to do so.

While I am aware of valid concerns, I am also aware of the need for this Bill, which the gallant Minister will know about better than most in the House. He served in Northern Ireland, so he understands the implications for us in Northern Ireland and the lives that we have led for some years. I was a part-time soldier in the Ulster Defence Regiment and in the Territorial Army for 14 and a half years. I have been a recipient of security intelligence and know how it can save lives. I am here today because of intelligence, which found out what the IRA’s intentions were. That is a fact. That has affected not just me; over the years, the intelligence services have saved the lives of other hon. and gallant Members. I have many friends who served and who are alive today because of the intelligence service or the Security Service. I had many other friends who unfortunately are not alive today; I remember them as well, so I do.

We must remember that the whole objective of the Bill is to keep us safe, to keep us secure and to ensure that our lives with our families can continue. I do hope that a balance has been struck, as the Minister outlined, because freedom is a prize worthy of getting it right. I know that the Minister wants to get it right, and I want it to be right. Madam Deputy Speaker, you want it to be right as well. Let us do it and get it right tonight.