draft Telecommunications Restriction Orders (Custodial Institutions) (england and wales) regulations 2016

Debate between John Hayes and Simon Burns

Tuesday 12th July 2016 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Telecommunications Restriction Orders (Custodial Institutions) (England and Wales) Regulations 2016.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Owen, following the time we spent together on the Investigatory Powers Bill.

The regulations were laid before the House on 24 May, and I am satisfied that they are fully compatible with our obligations under the European convention on human rights. It is important to say just one or two things about the context. You will know, Mr Owen, that the ownership and use of mobile phones in prison is already illegal. Unfortunately, notwithstanding that, the evidence suggests that some prisoners continue to use mobile phones while behind bars and, more than that, they continue to be engaged in criminal enterprises, including offending, by means of modern communications.

There have been a number of recent convictions where prisoners have used mobile phones to commit a wide range of very serious crimes, such as importing automatic firearms and drugs. Indeed, in 2015 a prisoner received a 19-year sentence for using a mobile phone to orchestrate the supply of class A drugs. Mobile phones are also used for planning and plotting violent crimes. There are examples of their being used for intimidation and harassment. In essence, it is clear to the Government, as I think it will be to the Committee, that we need to take further steps.

As I said, the possession and use of a mobile phone in prison is already a criminal offence. The National Offender Management Service already uses a range of measures to prevent mobile phones from getting into prisons and to seize them when they do. To give hon. Members some feeling for the scale of the problem, in 2013 NOMS recovered more than 7,400 handsets and SIM cards from its estate. In 2014 the number of devices seized increased by 30% to 9,745. That is the equivalent of one seizure for every hour of the year, which it is fair to say is a truly remarkable figure.

We need to do more to ensure that we can prevent the use of mobile phones by prisoners without taking possession of the phone. A new, cost-effective approach is also needed to augment and strengthen the existing measures.

[Sir Simon Burns (Chelmsford) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is making a compelling case for the need for the regulations, and he is absolutely right that they must be effective. Can he share with the Committee how he plans to measure their effectiveness once implemented, so that they do what they are designed to achieve?

[Mr Hayes]

I asked the same question. My right hon. Friend is an immensely experienced parliamentarian with an eagle eye for these things. He will know that it is all very well to pass regulations, but unless we know that they will work, that does not mean a lot. Of course, there is the contextual point, and no doubt the hon. Member for Swansea East, in what I think is her first encounter of this kind, will want to ask questions on this as well. The problem is that if I am right about the context—the figures suggest that I am—and the problem is growing and the number rising, how do we chart what difference these measures make against that backdrop?

The answer, I think, is that we need to put in place— I am happy to commit to this now—a review of the effect of the regulations that involves prisoners themselves, through prison governors. We should involve the National Crime Agency, which of course will be associated with this, and the police, and I think that we should have the engagement of the prisoner community itself. By a variety of means we should conduct a review. On the basis of that review, we should consider the effectiveness of the regulations, and clearly that would mean that if we felt that they had not had an effect or we needed to do more, we would do more. I am more than happy to commit to that now, in the course of this Committee. As I have said, I have no doubt that the hon. Lady will want to question me further on that.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between John Hayes and Simon Burns

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Simon Burns (Chelmsford) (Con)]

I am pleased to take part in this debate, although I shall only speak briefly because I know that many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, and Opposition Members, wish to participate. What we are debating in this group of amendments is crucial, because we are dealing with investigatory powers and, specifically, the role of technology in policing the modern age. Although I represent a constituency in Essex, which sometimes seems a world away from Westminster, I can tell hon. Members that my constituents and I worry about the same things: how we protect our country’s visible and invisible borders; how we keep our local community safe; and how we spot young people at risk of abuse or of going off the rails, so that we can do something about it before it is too late.

I certainly want to ensure that our liberties are fully understood and protected. That is why I welcomed the fact that during the Committee stage, which I took part in towards the end, the Government, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, the Solicitor General and the Minister for Security were prepared to listen to arguments—particularly those made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer)—that sought to strengthen the protections without compromising the aims of the legislation. It was refreshing, in many ways, not to have the normal Punch and Judy politics, whereby everything the Opposition proposed must be wrong because the Government had not thought of it first. That give and take, which is shown in Government new clauses 5 and 6, and in some of the amendments, particularly amendments 33 to 38 and 45 to 48, is important in meeting concerns about protecting civil liberties without compromising the main aims of the Bill. Those amendments have been tabled to make it clear that warrants or other authorisations should not be granted where information could be reasonably obtained by less intrusive means.

More than anything, however, we have to ensure the liberty of my constituents to live quietly and peacefully, free from attack—that is, of course, the most fundamental liberty of all—and it must be protected from those who wish them harm. Today such people live everywhere, and they have the powers, through the internet and modern communication techniques, to be everywhere, plotting, planning and executing their evil deeds. That is why I was pleased to see the supporting provisions that this group of amendments address in ensuring that we have not only those protections for my constituents and others, but a sympathetic and reasonable approach to protecting people’s civil liberties.

This Bill goes further than ever before in terms of transparency, making clear the most sensitive powers available to the security and intelligence agencies and the strict safeguards that apply to them. The controls on bulk powers and the double lock protection, which requires a sign-off for action by not just the Home Secretary but independent commissioners, are extremely important in winning public confidence in the measures being proposed. That will be discussed in greater detail when those Committee provisions come before us later in our proceedings on this Report stage.

I ask those who worry about interception powers to remember the following simple facts relating to technical capability. Since 2010, the majority of MI5’s top priority British counter-terrorism investigations have used intercepted material in some form to identify, understand or disrupt plots to harm Britain and its citizens. In 2013, this material was estimated to form between 15% and 20% of the total intelligence picture in counter-terrorism investigations. Data obtained by the National Crime Agency suggested that in 2013-14, interception played a critical role in investigations that resulted in more than 2,200 arrests and the seizure of more than 750 kg of heroin and 2,000 kg of cocaine, more than 140 firearms, and more than £20 million.

I believe that the power to intercept communications from potentially very dangerous people has helped to keep my constituents and those of other right hon. and hon. Members much safer and much more secure in their homes, in their jobs and on the streets they walk every day; but I also recognise the calls from some that we must be careful not to risk the fundamental liberties of our democracy as we do battle with potential terrorists. The Government have clearly been mindful of the Wilson doctrine and have tabled amendments, which I welcome, to require that the Prime Minister approve, rather than just be consulted on, all equipment interference warrants relating to parliamentarians.

We must ensure that the powers that we give to our police and security agencies, while they are sufficiently transparent, are also fit for purpose. Terrorists and other threats to my constituents’ safety are constantly evolving and adapting their techniques to trump the safety system. They do not want to get caught; they want to catch us out, and that is why we must be prepared to adapt our rules to keep pace with technology. We cannot use an analogue approach to tackling criminals in a digital age. Such an attitude just is not safe, and I am not prepared to go back to Chelmsford and explain to my constituents there and in Great Baddow, Chelmer Village, Beaulieu Park and Old Moulsham that I was not prepared to support measures designed to make them all more secure.

I support the proposals that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has outlined to strengthen judicial commissioners’ oversight and give commissioners a role authorising national security notices and technical capability notices, but we must not lose sight of the essence of why we need these proposals: we need them to help our police and security agencies to better identify the internet activity of potential threats, and indeed victims of crime, so they can do their jobs more quickly and effectively.

The people outside Westminster who think this is about stopping people being rude on Twitter, or cleaning up the Facebook jungle, are wrong. The Bill is about protecting those rights—the right to be irreverent or to disagree; the right to surf the net without being at risk from those who would do us harm. The Government have acted properly by being prepared to listen and to think again to a degree that I have not often encountered in the past. They have considered carefully, and we should be careful not to assume that our police and security agencies do not need these powers as amended, with the new safeguards that have been promised today. For those reasons, I shall support my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Lobby tonight.

[Mr John Hayes]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Reference was made earlier to an exchange of correspondence that I enjoyed with the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). I wanted you and the House to know that that correspondence is now available in the Vote Office for the information of Members.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between John Hayes and Simon Burns

Committee Debate: 12th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Hayes]

With a certain power of prophecy, I made it known at the beginning of our considerations that it was likely that there would be a continuing debate that would have at its heart, considerations about what should be on the face of the Bill and what should be in supporting documentation. I did so perhaps not so much as a prophet as an experienced Member of this House, because I have never served, either as a shadow Minister or as a Minister, on any Bill Committee where that has not been a matter of debate. How far one goes in putting specific matters on the face of legislation is always a matter of fine judgment. Hon. Members know the argument very well.

[Sir Simon Burns (Chelmsford) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend raises a very important point. All too often, too many people have a tendency to put things on the faces of Bills that are not altogether relevant and which could be done by secondary legislation. His point, therefore, is extremely valid.

[Mr Hayes]

My right hon. Friend, who is a distinguished Member of this House, a former Minister of note, a sagacious figure now on the Back Benches, bringing that experience and quality to our considerations—what a delight it is to have him join us on this Committee—is right.

I was responding to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire accordingly that the debate about whether material is put in the Bill or in supporting documentation comes down to this point: those who wish to place things in the Bill do so because they want to firm them up, to make them more sure and certain. Of course, for much of what we wish to do it is vital that we pursue that course. Those who argue for material in supporting documentation do so on the basis exactly as my right hon. Friend says: that it allows greater flexibility. In an area as dynamic as this—I hinted at this earlier, but will make the point once more—I would have thought the argument for flexibility holds a great deal of water.

The last thing I want is to pass the Bill into law and for it to become an Act of which we can all be justly proud—every member of the Committee will deserve a certain credit—only to find that events have moved on and we are stuck with an excessively rigid Act incapable of being changed easily as needed.