NHS Risk Register

John Healey Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lansley]

I will give way to the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey).

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

In January 2011, the Secretary of State's Department set up the audit and risk committee with a commitment to publish minutes of its meetings within three months. The last note of any meeting of that committee published on its website is from February 2011. Is that international leadership or the same cloak of secrecy that prevents him from publishing the transition risk register?

[Mr Lansley]

When the right hon. Gentleman was a Minister he and his colleagues never published such information, so I will not take any lessons on that. As a Treasury Minister, he refused to disclose a Treasury risk register.

Let me explain what risk registers are for, because an hon. Lady on the Opposition Benches keeps chuntering about them. A high-level risk register, such as those being considered by the tribunal on 5 and 6 March, is a continuously reviewed and updated document that enables officials, advisers and Ministers to identify and analyse the risks of, and to, particular policies. Risk registers present a snapshot of the possible risks involved at any one time. Their purpose is to record all risks, however outlandish or unlikely, both real and potential, and to record the mitigating actions that can ensure that such risks do not become reality.

For such a register to be effective and for it to serve the public interest, those charged with compiling it must be as forthright as possible in their views. The language of risk registers must be forceful and direct. That is essential for their operation, to enable Ministers and officials fully to appreciate those risks and to take the steps to mitigate them, or to redesign policy to avoid them.

It is important to note that such high-level risk registers are different to the risk registers of the organisations from which the shadow Secretary of State quoted, such as the risk registers of strategic health authorities. The latter concern operational matters and not matters of developing and designing policy, and they are written with publication in mind—they are intended to be published. By contrast, there are very clear reasons why Departments—under not just this Government, but previous ones—do not publish their high-level risk registers while they are still active and while policy development is ongoing.

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[Andrew George (St Ives) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock). In fact, I approach this debate in many of the same ways as the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson). I will not speak for seven minutes on the suggestion that the debate is a sideshow, but if the information were published it would, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, be unlikely to change a single mind on the issue. That reflects our heated debates and the entrenched positions that people inevitably take. It is the nature of the process of politics—

[John Healey]

rose—

[Andrew George]

I will give way in a moment. I want to make my philosophical point first. In contrast to academia, which begins with a question or inquiry, gathers evidence and comes to a considered opinion, the pity of politics is that we begin with a prejudice and backfill with the evidence that suits our case.

[John Healey]

The hon. Gentleman said that the publication of the transition risk register would not change one mind, but does he not accept that the Information Commissioner, who has read and studied the risk register, is of the view in his decision notice that it would aid public understanding of the reforms and help to reassure the public that all the risks have been properly considered?

[Andrew George]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman and I have signed the early-day motion supporting the release of the register. The biggest ever reorganisation of the NHS is being undertaken and it is best not to do that in the dark. It is best to have as much information available as possible. I am not suggesting that we are completely in the dark—[Interruption.] I am just saying that it is best to cast as much light as possible upon the information, so that we can have an informed debate, rather than a semi-informed one. He makes a good point about that.

I guess that publication will eventually result from this process, and I do not think it will help the Secretary of State or the Government if it is dragged out rather than conceded. If and when that happens, the Opposition and people who oppose the Bill will inevitably highlight worst-case scenarios and throw them at the Government, and the Government will inevitably look at the best-case scenarios. The nature of political debate will not be improved by this process, but I hope that debate will be better informed.

Much of the debate throughout the course of the Bill’s progress, a process in which I have been involved through the Select Committee and elsewhere, has been about trying to anticipate the effects of the reforms. It would be far better to try to anticipate these things on the basis of the best information given by people who are inside the service and providing that advice. That is why I believe the risk register should be published. The impact assessment perhaps represents the selected highlights of that process. [Interruption.] The Secretary of State may intervene on me, if he wishes to do so.

The underlying core concern—this is in the nature of how we examine these issues—is about whether publishing the risk register will negatively affect the technical delivery of Government policy and services or whether it will affect the political prospects of a party or those in government. The nature of this debate means that we assume that if publication is being resisted, it will have political rather than technical consequences. Obviously, if we thought that the risk register’s publication would have technical consequences for the effective delivery of government—that is the primary point that the Secretary of State is advancing—we would clearly need to think carefully about the release of such information.

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[Chris Skidmore (Kingswood) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow two of my fellow Health Committee members. The Chairman of the Committee wrote to the Secretary of State on 16 November 2011 to ask for the Government’s reasons for not publishing the risk register. In response, the Secretary of State wrote:

“It is important to understand that the risk register sets out all of the potential risks identified by the Department of Health for the entire range of areas for which it is responsible. These include financial risks, policy risks and sensitive contractual risks. It is a means by which the Department focuses on risks and acts to mitigate them. If the Department were to release risk registers in the future, there is a genuine possibility that the most significant risks will no longer be recorded, and no solution or mitigating action will therefore be identified. Any action that could deter staff from articulating and addressing business risk to their senior management and ministers carries with it the potential for highly damaging consequences.”

That is remarkably similarly to an answer given in Hansard on 23 March 2007 by the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) in response to a parliamentary question tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes). The right hon. Gentleman stated that the Department’s risk register dealt with

“emerging risks to the Department’s programme and the national health service, and what can be done to control and mitigate these risks. It also informs discussions between the Department and top management in the NHS about addressing key issues in policy, resourcing and service management. Putting the risk register in the public domain would be likely to reduce the detail and utility of its contents. This would inhibit the free and frank exchange of views about significant risks and their management, and inhibit the provision of advice to Ministers. We therefore cannot agree to place a copy of the current version of the register in the Library.”—[Official Report, 23 March 2007; Vol. 458, c. 1191W.]

We had a similar example on 31 July 2008, when the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson) responded to a freedom of information request by stating:

“Putting the risk register in the public domain would be likely to reduce the detail and utility of its contents. This would inhibit the free and frank exchange of views about significant risks and their management, and inhibit the provision of advice to Ministers.”

The Department of Health also refused a freedom of information request for copies of any presentations given by the director of public health concerned with the risk of not delivering on targets to reduce health inequalities, so it is not only risk registers that the Department has previously refused to reveal.

Members have talked today about the risk register in apocalyptic terms, as though it were a document that should remain within the confines of MI5 or MI6. The Health Minister, Earl Howe, has revealed details of the broad issues that are covered by this risk register. I should like to read them out, so as to set the debate properly in context. They include:

“how best to manage the parliamentary passage of the Bill and the potential impact of Royal Assent being delayed on the transition in the NHS; how to co-ordinate planning so that changes happen in a co-ordinated fashion while maintaining financial control; how to ensure that the NHS takes appropriate steps during organisational change to maintain and improve quality; how to ensure that lines of accountability are clear in the new system and that different bodies work together effectively, including the risk of replicating what we already have; how to minimise disruption for staff and maintain morale during transition; how best to ensure financial control during transition, to minimise the costs of moving to a new system, and to ensure that the new system delivers future efficiencies; how to ensure that future commissioning plans are robust, and to maximise the capability of the future NHS Commissioning Board; how stakeholders should be engaged in developing and implementing the reforms; and finally, how to properly resource the teams responsible for implementing the changes”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 28 November 2011; Vol. 733, c. 16.]

[John Healey]

The hon. Gentleman is right to draw the House’s attention to that fact, but does he accept that that is information that has not been published elsewhere and that the Secretary of State’s argument that the impact assessments that have been published are sufficient therefore simply will not wash?

[Chris Skidmore]

It is interesting that the right hon. Gentleman raises that point, because Earl Howe was mentioning the transition risk register, which is continually updated. That is an important point, because the appeal to the Information Commissioner to release the risk register was made on 29 November 2010, in the autumn when the register was live. The Information Commissioner made his ruling based on the fact that there was an issue of public interest at the time of the request. If the risk register is released today, it will be the risk register from autumn 2010 rather than that from February 2012. That is the moment when the wheels come off the bandwagon. The Opposition are asking the Information Commissioner to release the risk register from autumn 2010, not the risk register from February 2012. The risk register that would be released is that from the time of the White Paper, before the changes were made and before the listening exercise. It is complete nonsense. If the document was released, it would be out of date, inaccurate and would scaremonger among the population.

[John Healey]

So the hon. Gentleman agrees with Lord Henley, the Minister in the House of Lords, who told the House in January that if the Government lose the appeal next month they will publish not only the risk register from November 2010 but the updated risk registers, too?

[Chris Skidmore]

The Government do not have to publish the updated registers on the basis of the Information Commissioner’s verdict, which was on the autumn 2010 register. That is the Information Commissioner’s advice that is referred to in the motion. The Opposition are asking for an out-of-date document—we might as well give up and go home.

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[George Hollingbery (Meon Valley) (Con)]

I want to begin by challenging something that was said by the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), when he opened the debate. He has also shouted it several times from a sedentary position, and indeed he intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson) a moment ago to make the same point. He keeps saying “It is a different register”.

Let me quote, at some length, what the right hon. Gentleman said earlier: “This led my predecessor”—the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey)—“to initiate a freedom of information request for the transition risk register. I wish to point out that my right hon. Friend did not request the full departmental risk register, which was subject to a similar request in 2009”, which was, indeed, released by the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Member for Leigh went on: “There are three crucial differences between the situation and the subject of today's debate. They would do well to listen because the Prime Minister got his facts wrong at Prime Minister's Question Time. The first important difference is that this relates to a different document. This debate is about the transition risk register, not the strategic risk register”.

I may have misinterpreted this, because it is not my key area, but let me refer briefly to the decision notice issued by the Information Commissioner. Paragraph 16 about the “Scope of the request” states:

“At the internal review stage the public authority referred to two separate risk registers which it said were relevant to the request and held by the department – the ‘risk register centred on the Health and Care Bill’ and the ‘strategic risk register'… For the avoidance of doubt, the Commissioner wishes to state that he agrees with the public authority…and that it is the strategic risk register which should properly be seen as falling within the scope of the request.”

In short, the document that is requested now, and the one that the right hon. Member for Leigh refused to release in 2009 are, as adjudged by the Information Commissioner, exactly the same document. The right hon. Gentleman may wish to refer to that later, and I am entirely happy for him to do so. If I have got it wrong, I am happy to be corrected.

[John Healey]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way because, uncharacteristically, I think that he has got it wrong. The Information Commissioner’s notice considered two different freedom of information requests: one for the transition risk register from me, and one for the strategic departmental register from a journalist from the Evening Standard. The decision notice was a decision on both those registers. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) is absolutely right: in our motion and the debate, we are talking about a different document—different in nature—from the one to which he referred and the one which was relevant in 2009.

[George Hollingbery]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for clearing up part of this, but I think that the decision that was made by the Information Commissioner was on the strategic risk register and its release. No doubt we can discuss that later, but I am grateful to him for his intervention and for clearing that up.

More generally, we must consider whether the Bill has been properly assessed both in the House and outside by many people. There are 443 pages of closely worded analysis on the impact of the Bill, and the impact assessments cover every possible aspect imaginable, including risk management and the risks associated with the new Bill. That information has been in the public domain for many months, and I do not honestly believe that there is anything to be gained by issuing further risk registers that may scare a number of people about the things that they have to consider. The risk register would add very little. The answer, basically, is that it is an expedient hook on which to hang a debate: to raise again in the House a topic that has been raised a great many times—quite rightly, in many ways, as many amendments have been made to the Bill. However, the quality of speeches from the Opposition demonstrates to me at least that the point of the debate was not to discuss the risk register but to use it as a hook on which to hang a particular viewpoint.

It is well known that when the right hon. Member for Leigh was Secretary of State he refused to release the risk register. I have examined that, and I was going to quote him further at length, but the House has heard that quote several times today, so I will not trouble hon. Members with it again. The argument that he made then was a sensible one, and it remains sensible now. Do we really believe that it is good for the Government to make public all their plans for the management of every conceivable risk that they might encounter? Some of those risks will scare people rigid, and I do not honestly believe that that is the right use for the strategic risk register.

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[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

It is good to follow the hon. Member for Meon Valley (George Hollingbery), although he is wrong to say that this debate is simply a device for having a bigger debate. The motion is very simple and I had hoped that it would command wide support across this House, because this is not about being for or against the NHS Bill, or about being for or against the NHS reorganisation. The matter before us is whether we are for or against good government and the proper accountability of government to the public and to Parliament. A more open Government—a Government required to be more accountable—must raise their game and are more likely to be a better Government.

The Prime Minister said as much in the first month after the last election. He said that

“we’re going to rip off that cloak of”—

Government—

“secrecy and extend transparency as far and as wide as possible. By bringing information out into the open, you’ll be able to hold government and public services to account.”

Not for the first time, people are looking to the Prime Minister now to honour the promises he made, especially on the NHS. I have to say that 15 months after I made the original freedom of information request and 13 months after the Government introduced the NHS Bill, they are now dragging out the refusal to comply with the Information Commissioner in a way that prevents the public from getting a better understanding of the plans and prevents Parliament from doing our proper job of legislating well and legislating wisely.

[George Hollingbery]

rose—

[John Healey]

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, as I have followed his speech.

[George Hollingbery]

I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman could provide the House with a single example of where, in the transition of a Bill, a risk register of this sort has been used to inform the House’s debate. He may well be able to do so, and I would be grateful if he could.

[John Healey]

There is the precedent of releasing a programme risk register connected with the third runway at Heathrow, but the principle of the Freedom of Information Act is that each case is different—every risk register is different. The reason why this case is important and exceptional and why the Information Commissioner has, on balance, required the Government to disclose rather than withhold the risk register is that the Government’s health reforms are the biggest ever reorganisation in NHS history; that the legislation is the longest in NHS history; and that it has been introduced at a time of unprecedented financial pressure.

[Mr Simon Burns]

Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm for the House that, on behalf of Lord Boateng, he refused to release a risk register when he was a junior Treasury Minister?

[John Healey]

I do not think that the Minister was listening to the point that I just made: on the Freedom of Information Act, the decisions that Ministers make—I hope—as we did, and the decisions that the Information Commissioner would make on a challenge, depend on the specific information and, in this case, the risk register at stake. This case is unprecedented and exceptional and the Information Commissioner has come to this view because we are faced with such huge upheaval. It involves the biggest reorganisation and the longest legislation, at a time of the tightest financial squeeze for 50 years. Furthermore, this reorganisation was explicitly ruled out in the Conservative manifesto and in the coalition agreement. That is why, less than two months later, the huge upheaval of the White Paper was so unexpected, and why the NHS and the civil service were so unprepared for what they are now being forced to implement.

[Ben Gummer]

rose—

[John Healey]

I will not give way again; I have given way twice. The hon. Gentleman has spoken and has not been here for the whole debate.

Risk has been at the heart of the concern about the NHS reforms right from the outset. When I led an Opposition day debate from the Dispatch Box in November 2010, I described the reorganisation as

“high cost and high risk; it is untested and unnecessary.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2010; Vol. 518, c. 908.]

The lack of evidence and lack of confidence in how well the Government were prepared to manage the risks was the major cause of the growing concern among the public and professionals and in Parliament in the late autumn of 2010 and the winter of 2011. That alarm has only grown. It was first expressed by the all-party Select Committee report of December 2010, and reiterated in its January 2011 report, which concluded:

“The Nicholson challenge was already a high-risk strategy and the White Paper increased the level of risk considerably without setting out a credible plan for mitigating that risk.”

Not only is this reorganisation unprecedented and therefore exceptional; the NHS as an institution is exceptional. We all need the NHS. We trust it when we are most fearful, and we utterly depend on it when we are most vulnerable. That is why it matters so much to people, and why there is an unprecedented and exceptional level of public interest in any changes to the NHS and especially any risks to the NHS. The plans are unprecedented in their nature, their scale, their pace and their timing. That means that there is exceptional concern over the risks associated with their implementation. That is why there is an exceptional case for releasing this transition risk register. The Information Commissioner has had the benefit of assessing the risk register, and he has stated:

“There is a very strong public interest in disclosure of the information, given the significant change to the structure of the health service”.

There are two other factors that reinforce the case for, and the public interest in, the publication of the transition risk register. First, the story of this reform is a masterclass in poor policy making. It has been misjudged and mishandled from the outset. Good policy making normally involves policy consultation, followed by legislation and implementation. The Government have turned that on its head. First, we had implementation ahead of any legislation, followed by a forced pause to consult on the policies when they encountered so much resistance. That all adds to the risks and to the public interest in and the case for the disclosure of the risk register.

The Department of Health has a poor track record on risk assessment, on the use of evidence in policy making and on policy delivery. When the Cabinet Secretary did his first capability review of the Department, he concluded:

“Management of risk across the delivery chain is weak. There is no formal linkage between risk registers and mitigation strategies held by the Department and those in the delivery chain.”

Two years later, when the capability review was repeated, many of the same problems still applied, and the Department was again flagged in the review as at an amber state of concern—[Interruption.] Yes, that was under the previous Government. My point is that the Department of Health has a poor track record on planning and dealing with management risk, which is why it is so important to publish the risk register.

Clearly, in a short debate such as this, we cannot nail all the arguments that the Government are trying to put up. Suffice it to say that the Information Commissioner has heard them and has judged that the register should be released. The arguments will be tested in court on 5 and 6 March at the Information Tribunal and I shall give evidence to that tribunal. All I am asking for—and all the motion is asking for—is what the Government have promised. Today, on the Treasury website, one can see the Government’s principles for risk management:

“Government will make available its assessments of risks that affect the public, how it has reached its decisions, and how it will handle the risk.”

That is what we are asking for.