EU Retained Law

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his wise and witty suggestion.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

The Minister mentioned in his statement that he hopes that today’s proposals will reduce the cost of living, but is it not the case that the British Government’s post-Brexit policy is leading to reduced investor confidence and weakening the currency, which further fuels inflation? Would not a responsible Government, given the serious problems faced by households across the UK, stop shredding European regulations and rejoin the single market?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

No. The hon. Gentleman knows that I will not agree with that suggestion, because it would negate the referendum where a majority of people in Wales voted in favour of leaving, as did the majority of people in England. This is about reducing costs and taking burdens off. The single market is an extraordinarily regulatory organisation that boosts the costs of services and manufactured goods. To go back into it would make life more expensive and make things worse for British consumers.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong: House of Commons & Ping Pong
Wednesday 22nd January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Thangam Debbonaire]

That is indeed the impression that seems to be being given. I suggest that Conservative Members, particularly those who are newly elected and represent constituencies in Scotland and Wales, should ask themselves whether this is what they told their voters back in November. Did they tell them that they would be voting against respecting devolution? Is that what they said to their constituents?

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

The hon. Lady will, of course, be aware that the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Welsh Senedd and the Scottish Parliament have refused consent. What does it say about the so-called partnership of equals if the three devolved Parliaments are completely ignored by the British Government?

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting
Tuesday 7th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Steve Barclay]

I will move on, because new clauses 4 and 36 speak to the same point, but, in short, this is being done partly for the reasons I have already given the House in respect of what is set out in the political declaration, where there is a shared commitment, and partly because Members on my side of the House gave a manifesto commitment to stick to this timetable. I am sure the hon. Lady would be the first to criticise the Government if they made a manifesto commitment and then decided not to stand by it. So we are committed to the commitment we gave on the timescale, which is why we want to move forward with clause 33.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

rose—

[Steve Barclay]

I will make a little progress and then, of course, I will come back to the hon. Gentleman.

New clauses 4 and 36 stand in the names of the Leader of the Opposition and the acting leader of the Liberal Democrats respectively. New clause 4 has been tabled by the Leader of the Opposition in an attempt to force the Government to extend the implementation period if a deal has not been agreed with the EU by 15 June. The new clause would also give Parliament a vote on any such extension. New clause 36 is similar in effect to new clause 4, but it would do this without having any parliamentary vote. It states that a deal is required on both economic and security matters by 1 June or an extension is mandated as a consequence of this legislation. The Opposition parties therefore want to amend the Bill to force further delay.

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[Jonathan Edwards]

Is not the danger in setting this fixed date that the British Government will quickly have to make a decision about what they want to achieve in the second phase of Brexit? Are they going to go for close alignment? If so, they could possibly get the deal done in the year. But if they decide they are going to disalign, that will create difficulties, and the best we can hope for will be, if not a no-deal cliff edge, a bare-bones free trade agreement. That could be very bad news for the economy.

[Steve Barclay]

With respect to the hon. Gentleman, we see it as a win-win. The EU wishes to trade with the UK; we wish to trade with the EU. They are our neighbours and we want to have a constructive relationship, but at the same time people voted for change and they want to see change. The Government are committed to delivering, through the Bill, the change that the British public voted for.

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[Paul Blomfield]

I do not question the hon. Member’s credentials in terms of his concern about our leaving without a deal, but I ask him to look carefully at new clause 4. The framing of the new clause in relation to two years builds on the provisions of the withdrawal agreement to which the Government have signed up but includes the capacity for a much shorter transitional period if the Government are successful in concluding a deal or if this House agrees. Our proposal very much addresses the point that he makes. I will come to that in more detail, and he might want to intervene again.

It was because of the risks of a disorderly departure that we were first to argue—it seems like a very long time ago now—for a transition period, which at that stage the Government opposed. We were raising the voice of business and of the trade unions, and we were pleased when the Government accepted that principle, although they saved face by renaming it an implementation period. When the end of the transition was originally set for December 2020, it was on the assumption that we would have left the EU on 29 March last year, leaving 21 months—[Interruption.] The Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union asks, “Why didn’t we?” He could ask that of a number of his colleagues, including the Prime Minister. That would have left 21 months to negotiate our new relationships on trade and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) pointed out, on security in particular. Twenty-one months was seen as ambitious. Many in the Government sitting around the Cabinet table doubted its deliverability. That is why there was a provision to extend it. But now there is only 11 months, and in trade negotiation terms 11 months is unbelievably short.

The Government say that they want an ambitious, best-in-class free trade agreement. They talk about CETA as a model, but not about the time taken to negotiate CETA, of which they are well aware. They say that it will be easy to negotiate, because we start from the unique position in trade talks of existing alignment; the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) is nodding. But it is the Government’s objective to diverge from that alignment, to seek a deal that allows the UK to race to the bottom, undercutting the EU on obligations and regulations and stepping off the level playing field. That will be uniquely difficult to negotiate, and any deal secured in 11 months is highly likely not to be a good deal for the UK.

[Jonathan Edwards]

The hon. Member is making an important point. Essentially, this will be the first trade deal in history where the aim is to put up barriers rather than remove them. Rather than this being an easy process, is it not likely to be convoluted and difficult?

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[Sammy Wilson]

The Democratic Unionist party will be supporting clause 33, though tomorrow we will be tabling amendments to the Bill, because, although we accept that it is essential to get out of the EU as quickly as possible, we believe that the terms of the withdrawal agreement are detrimental to Northern Ireland. The purpose, however, of any amendments my party puts forward will be to assist the process of leaving the EU and to ensure that the whole UK leaves. That is not the case with new clauses 4 and 36, which are designed to extend the period for which we stay in the EU and would make it much more difficult to have a clean break.

Have we learned nothing from the tactics the EU has used over the last few years? The longer the period, the more it can hold back, and the more demands it can make. We have seen that time and again.

The last Parliament made it clear that it would not give the Government the support that they needed to move forward with a deal. The EU dug its heels in deeper, and did not try to be accommodating. What is important about clause 33 is that it draws a line, sends a signal and makes the position very clear. It says, “Here is the deadline: now get on with the negotiations.” No clearer message could be sent to those who are negotiating on the EU’s behalf.

Indeed it is significant that, although we were formerly told that a trade deal could take years to negotiate, the language is suddenly changing because the arithmetic in the House has changed and the Government’s will is different. We are now being told, “Well, it might not be as difficult as it was for Canada and Japan. After all, we are starting from the same place, and we have a lot of the same regulations”—and there are a number of other reasons why the negotiation might be easier than we were previously told that it would be.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I suspect that the right hon. Gentleman is referring to the comments of the EU Trade Commissioner. He made those comments in the context of a decision by the British Government to retain close alignment. The difficulties occur when we disalign.

[Sammy Wilson]

Of course that will be the opening negotiating position. He is not going to say, “Yes, and by the way, we do not have to have close alignment.” There will still be a desire on the part of the EU to keep us as close as possible. However, one way of ensuring that we get a deal, and get the kind of deal that we want, is to make it clear that we will not engage in protracted negotiations. We must say, “We will not allow you to use all the tactics that you have used before. You must come to a conclusion. If you want access to our UK market—and you need access to it because you sell more to us than we sell to you—and if you want the future trading relationship and the co-operation that the Government have offered time and again, you must reach a deal quickly.”

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill and Extension Letter

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay]

As I think is the case with all MPs, there have been occasions when I have, for example, dictated letters to my parliamentary office, and they have been sent out as dictated and signed on my behalf.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

When you mentioned your activities at 9 o’clock yesterday morning, Mr Speaker, I was rather hoping that you would say that the pressing engagement was a famous Welsh rugby victory in the quarter final of the world cup. It was slightly fortunate, but a famous victory none the less.

When it comes to the more complicated matter of the future trade relations, every single member state of the European Union, including some constituent parts, such as Wallonia in Belgium, will have to endorse the final free trade agreement. The withdrawal agreement and the political declaration make no mention of the British Government’s having to seek the consent of the Senedd in Cardiff or, indeed, of the Scottish Parliament. Why, as things stand, will Wallonia, a constituent part of the Belgian state, have more influence over the future FTA with the EU than Wales and Scotland will have?

[Stephen Barclay]

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point about how we engage with the devolved Assemblies as we take forward the negotiations. It is a fair point and one we are keen to address. I recognise that there have been concerns, particularly in respect of the first phase, about the effectiveness of the Joint Ministerial Committee discussions. One thing that I changed in my own Department was to ask officials to engage at official level much more. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has spoken to the Scottish and Welsh Governments in the past day or so, and the Minister of State in my Department went up to Edinburgh for meetings, but the hon. Gentleman raises a fair point on which I am keen to work with him.

European Union (Withdrawal) Acts

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Saturday 19th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay]

I very much respect that point. The right hon. Gentleman has always reached out to build consensus across the House, which is important. The commitment that the Prime Minister gave in his statement, on how the House will be consulted on the new phase of negotiations, is intended in part to address the concerns that the right hon. Gentleman and other Members across the House have raised, in order to have a balanced approach to the future relationship.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

I listened intently to the Prime Minister’s statement and the debate that followed, and it seemed that assurances were given to Europhiles that the intention in phase 2 would be to follow close regulatory alignment with the EU, yet a carrot was offered to Eurosceptics in the form of there being unalignment, and even the suggestion that no deal would not be off the table in phase 2. Both cannot be true, so which is it?

[Stephen Barclay]

Paragraph 77 sets out our commitment to high international standards and to their being reciprocal, as befits the relationship that we reach with the European Union. The hon. Gentleman really should have more confidence that we in this House will set regulation that is world leading and best in class, that reflects the Queen’s Speech, with its world-leading regulation on the environment, and that reflects the commitments that many in the House have sought on workers’ rights. We should also be mindful that, of course, it is this House that went ahead of the EU on paternity rights and parental leave. We can go further than the EU in protecting people’s rights, rather than simply match the EU.

Compliance with the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Thursday 26th September 2019 Commons Chamber

[James Duddridge]

Without wanting to up the tone of a debate that has been quite consensual, the Act does surrender some of our negotiating power by matter of fact. It compels the Government to do something, reducing the leverage in negotiation. I am actually seeing that as being part of the negotiating. It is deeply unhelpful and it has surrendered some of our powers of negotiation, which makes it more likely that we will get no deal. It is unfortunate. I am trying not to up the tone in any way but just to speak factually about what is happening.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

Am I right in understanding that the British Government have sought and obtained legal advice on how to avoid the provisions of the Benn Act?

[James Duddridge]

We do not discuss what legal advice has been taken; nor do we discuss the contents of that legal advice, as I have already said in the House.

European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 4th September 2019 Commons Chamber

[Hilary Benn]

I think I have just explained the reason, which has been made clear by my right hon. Friend the leader of the Labour party, my right hon. and learned Friend the shadow Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, and others. We must deal with first things first, and preventing a no-deal Brexit is the central, most important question facing the country.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

I think the right hon. Gentleman has answered my query. The reality is that an election at this stage, or even next week, would undermine the purpose of the legislation. We cannot support one.

[Hilary Benn]

I can only agree, and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for being one of the Bill’s sponsors.

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[Keir Starmer]

Of course that information should be put in the public domain, so that everybody understands the impact of no deal. The fact that the Government do not want it in the public domain speaks volumes. The mantra is that they cannot put our proposals in public because they do not negotiate in public, but they can surely put them before the partners they are supposed to be negotiating with. They just are not there.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way on that point?

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[Mr Speaker]

Order. Could I just make the point that there are lots of people who want to speak? There is very little time, and if there are continual interventions very large numbers of colleagues who wish to speak will not do so—simple as that.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. The Welsh Government have been provided with a copy of the original Yellowhammer document. Will he call on his colleagues to publish it?

[Keir Starmer]

I will, but I am not sure that my calling for that is enough in itself to get it published. We will see what else we can do. Mr Speaker, I will press on, because I do know there are other speakers to come.

This is a very simple Bill. It is deliberately constrained. It does not answer the question, “What else needs to happen?” It gives the Prime Minister the chance to get a deal and to get it through. It gives the Prime Minister the chance to have the courage to come to the Dispatch Box and say, “My policy is to leave without a deal. Do I have a majority for it?” If he did that, we would not need to go down this route. He will not do that, however, because he knows what the result will be. Only if there is a no deal and only if there is no approval for leaving without a deal do the provisions in the Bill requiring an extension kick in.

Mr Speaker, this is an extraordinary route, but these are extraordinary times. We have to act. We have to act now. Today is the last chance to prevent no deal, and we must seize it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Thursday 16th May 2019 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The Government’s position is that the referendum result is binding until it is delivered.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

Will not the biggest danger to confidence in democracy come when the promised sunlit uplands fail to materialise? Is not the only way out of this mess to go back to the people and ask them to exercise their democratic choice?

[James Cleverly]

The British people have already exercised their democratic choice. I do not subscribe to the negative predictions that the hon. Gentleman and others have made about a post-Brexit British future. More importantly, international businesses do not agree with him; inward investment into the UK is still flourishing. The employment market does not agree with his predictions either, because unemployment is still reducing and employment is still increasing. I am confident—the Government are confident—that there is a bright future ahead for this country outside the European Union. That is what we are committed to delivering and that is what we are working towards.

Article 50 Extension

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 20th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I do understand the difficulty, but I do not think it is appropriate for me to respond to or comment on what may or may not have been said by Heads of State about what may or may not be agreed tomorrow. The point I am making is about the expectation of this House as to the approach that the Prime Minister would take. There is an even greater expectation—a yearning, which I can feel across the House and which I could feel last week—that this House be given an opportunity to break the impasse for itself by finding a way forward. I am afraid the Prime Minister’s approach is the same old blinkered approach, which is, “All I’m going to do is seek time to put my deal, exactly the same, back before the House for another vote.”

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

Based on the Prime Minister’s letter, I am not entirely clear why the EU would grant an extension in the first place, but the question for us all is the length of the extension that it would grant, and for what purpose. What is the Labour party’s policy?

[Keir Starmer]

I shall come to that later, but I will make this point. The period should of course be as short as possible, but it must be long enough to determine the purpose. In other words, the purpose has to determine the length. One of the mistakes we have made in the past two years, on which we have struggled and challenged the Prime Minister, is that if we let the clock, rather than the purpose, dictate we end up exactly where we have ended up now.

European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay]

With characteristic aplomb, my hon. Friend alludes to one of the key issues in this debate: how one assesses the balance of risk. The Attorney General said in his statement to the House on 3 December, when these issues were explored in great detail, that how one assesses that balance ultimately is a political decision. In a way, the same point can be made about the concerns Members have expressed about the Union. There is a balance of risk in terms of concerns about the backstop, including the issue of that small section in the backstop where EU competence will continue. What is the risk of that? I have alluded to the safeguards. How does that risk elide with other risks, such as the risk of inaction?

The same is true of the assessment of my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), whom I hold in the highest regard. The difference there is an issue not of understanding—he understands these issues in great depth—but of how one assesses the balance of risk. The Attorney General dealt with that in some detail in his comments to the House.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

I support the backstop. What concerns me is our future trade relations. We are essentially renegotiating access to our biggest market as a third-party country. Does that not leave the British state in an extremely vulnerable position?

[Stephen Barclay]

It is a statement of the legal position to say that to enter into a permanent arrangement, we need to be a third party. That reality is part of the difficulty of this situation. That is why we need an implementation period. We have in the political declaration a framework and in the business statements of the December Council a commitment. In “best endeavours”, we have something that gives legal force to ensuring momentum. It is a shared endeavour, too, because it is in neither side’s interests to trigger the backstop. There is, then, a mechanism, a framework and a process for addressing these concerns. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, however, that there is further significant work to be done, and that will be the job of this House.

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[Keir Starmer]

I am not going to give way.

It is no good us pretending about this. I have said in recent weeks and months that the future relationship document is 26 pages long and that it is thin and flimsy, and the answer that now comes back occasionally is, “It was always going to be that way. What did you expect? It’s a future relationship.” Well, I will tell Members what the Prime Minister expected. I see nods from Conservative Members, but the Prime Minister was very clear about what she expected, and she set it out in her Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017:

“I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two-year Article Fifty process has concluded.”

I repeat:

“I want us to have reached an agreement.”

She continued:

“From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for the new arrangements”.

At the time, I was proposing that that was a transition period, and the Prime Minister and various Secretaries of State for Brexit kept insisting it was not a transition period, because that would imply that we were negotiating in it; instead it was an implementation period, because—[Interruption.] No, this is what they argued. They said that the agreement would have been reached and all we would need to do was implement it—to phase it in—during the two-year period. So the idea that this is as it was always going to be—that a blind Brexit was inevitable or an inherent part of the process—is completely contradicted by the Prime Minister’s own words when she said what was going to be achieved.

There are very serious consequences to having such a flimsy document on the future relationship. First, it invites this House to vote on a blind Brexit. I and other Labour Members have very strong views on what the future relationship should look like. Given a document that does not set out whether it might end up as a distant Canada-style model of some sort, or a closed Norway-style model, how can one expect any responsible Member of this House to say, “I don’t know where this is going to end, I don’t know what it’s going to look like, it could actually turn out to be an agreement I fundamentally disagree with, but I shall vote for it”? That just cannot be right. That is the problem—it is a blind Brexit. Secondly, as I have said, because the document is so thin, nobody serious, either here or in Brussels, is suggesting for one moment that the agreement is actually going to be ready by January 2021.

That means that we are going on to either an extended transition or the backstop. That is going to happen. If anybody is intending to vote next week on the pretence or understanding that we are not going to be here arguing about this in July 2020, I genuinely think they are labouring under a misconception—they are wrong. We will either be going on to the transition or going on to the backstop if the deal goes through in this form. We cannot escape that and simply pretend it is not going to happen.

I have said a few words about the backstop. As the Secretary of State rightly said, it provides for citizens’ rights and financial obligations. I do not shy away from the commitments made under the Good Friday agreement. I certainly have no truck with those who play down the importance of the Good Friday agreement—it is not the Secretary of State, the Government or the Prime Minister—or even say that their version of hard Brexit somehow overrides it. Those commitments are serious, and they have to be kept.

I also accept that, given the lack of progress in the 26-page document that we have, at this stage, sadly, some sort of backstop is inevitable. Having got to this stage of the article 50 exercise, it is now inevitable that we cannot finish the exercise within the transition period. There are risks under the backstop, and the Attorney General’s advice, which we fought to uncover last year, set them out pretty starkly. There is the fraught question of whether the backstop would, in truth, be indefinite or temporary. We can have views on that, but we cannot avoid the fact that it is a live dispute, and the Attorney General gave his view on that.

It is also indisputable that once we are in the backstop, if that is what happens in January 2021, it will introduce barriers to trade between England, Wales and Scotland and the EU. That is spelled out in the document. We are putting up barriers to trade in January 2021 if we go into the backstop. I have already touched on the inadequacy of the proposed customs arrangements.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I am sure the right hon. and learned Gentleman will have seen the article written over the weekend by Peter Hain and Paul Murphy—both former distinguished Members of this House and Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland who played an important part in the peace process—in which they made the case that the backstop is an important element that we must honour. Has he had an opportunity to reflect on that?

[Keir Starmer]

I have read the article, and I reflect on it. I used my words carefully; I said that there are risks in the backstop, which the Attorney General’s advice set out, and they are real risks.

There is a risk that we should not be blind to. The Attorney General spelled out in his advice that the backstop, as a matter of international law, may well be indefinite—he said that it is arguable either way—and that we therefore cannot get out of it unilaterally. We know that, and we have had a discussion about it. However, he went on to say that we cannot get out of it even if the negotiations completely break down and an allegation of bad faith is found. That is not just—