Courts and Tribunals Bill

Josh Fenton-Glynn Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Johnson]

That is why I have explained that the presumption is that the parents have involvement. The court must take the risks to the child into consideration and, unless shown otherwise, give contact to both parents. If the child is at risk, however, the court has the absolute right to prevent the child from seeing those parents or to restrict contact to different forms and timeframes. The welfare of the child is key in those decisions.

That is in line with international law, which I know the Government are fond of. The UN convention on the rights of the child says that parents and children should maintain

“personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s…interests.”

[Josh Fenton-Glynn (Calder Valley) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Dr Johnson]

Not for the moment. Article 8 of the European convention on human rights provides the right to family life and suggests that consideration be given to all alternatives before ordering no contact. The Government, however—

[Josh Fenton-Glynn]

Will she please give way?

[Dr Johnson]

I give way.

[Josh Fenton-Glynn]

In talking about the right to family life, the hon. Lady is talking not about the rights of the children, but about the rights of the abusers. If we start from the idea that an abuser has the right to contact their children, we end up with bad decisions. That is why, in the past 30 years, 67 children have died when contact should not have been granted. That is the change that we are making, those are the lives that we are saving and that is why it is important to do this today.

[Dr Johnson]

I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I will continue my speech and perhaps he will listen to what I have to say.

The purpose of court decisions is, as the hon. Gentleman said, to prevent unsafe contact and to prevent tragedies. As a paediatrician, I have seen situations where children have been given back to parents and have come to significant harm as a result. I have dealt with and looked after those children, and unfortunately they have not been protected or saved in every case. The law is there to prevent unsafe contact, but the children’s needs must be put first, with the power to restrict access where they are in danger. The court must listen to all the evidence available, but no system is infallible and sometimes judges get it wrong. When they do, the outcomes can be hugely tragic, leading to the loss or serious injury of a child.

I know that this legislation has been brought forward with good intentions. The test is whether it will prevent such harm and such tragedies. I think that it might not. The reason is that the impact assessment produced by the Government says that it is “unlikely to materially change” the outcome in court. If that is the case, what is the point of the legislation? Will it, on the other hand, reduce the likelihood of children seeing their parents? Will that, in and of itself, cause some harm? Will it prevent some children from having the contact they need with their family members? Will it prevent the tragedies that we wish to prevent or not? Will it isolate those children who will come to harm? Do we have the right risk assessments to do that?

Every single one of us in this House wants to protect children. We need to improve the risk assessments and ensure that social workers have time to make proper risk assessments so that they identify the children who may be at risk and separate them from those who are not. We also need to improve the representation of children in court. I was once in court, in the witness box, and the barrister who was representing the children got up to speak. He asked me a question, but he had forgotten the name of one of the two children in the family and I had to remind him from the witness box. We really need to improve the quality of the representation of children.

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Josh Fenton-Glynn Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Rebecca Smith]

No, I have already given way twice. I will not get any more time. I am very sorry.

We must avoid a situation in which the law views children as the state’s ultimate responsibility while parents must justify their involvement on a case-by-case basis. We must also avoid anything that presumes that the state makes a better parent than the actual parents themselves. Of course, the state should intervene when a child is at risk, but our default position should be that, wherever it is safe and appropriate, children benefit from the love and guidance of both their parents. The state should step in only when there is clear evidence that it should do so, and we do not reject that point. If we remove this principle from the law, we take another step towards a system in which parental involvement becomes discretionary and the state’s role becomes paramount. That is not a healthy direction for family justice.

I recognise, of course, that this is a sensitive issue for survivors of domestic abuse. To be clear, there is no absolute right to contact under existing law. Courts already have the power to restrict unsafe contact. The presumption of parental involvement is already qualified by risk of harm to the child, so why do we need this clause at all? Surely we in this House should be ensuring that current safeguards work properly instead.

As I said in a recent debate on fathers and male role models,

“There is a widespread perception that family courts make it difficult for fathers to maintain a meaningful relationship with their children.”—[Official Report, 10 September 2026; Vol. 790, c. 450WH.]

One possible solution is a child-centred parental relationship test. The test would direct courts to consider the quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent. It would help courts to distinguish between safe and harmful contact.

As things stand, there is a real risk that clause 17 will weaken, not strengthen, children’s relationships with safe parents without addressing the current failures that leave children exposed to their unsafe ones. Fundamentally, parental involvement is a relationship recognised by the state, not a privilege granted by the state. Both parents matter, and we should not be afraid to say so.

[Josh Fenton-Glynn (Calder Valley) (Lab)]

I will focus my remarks on clause 17 and the presumption of contact. My involvement in this issue started with a letter from a constituent—a mother trying to protect her child from an abusive ex-partner. In such cases, the court can play a role in retraumatising people, and can even be a tool of the abuse.

Since I first spoke out about this matter, I have heard from countless victims. I say to them: thank you for telling your story, sorry that the justice system has failed you for so long, we will make progress, and we will not allow the Opposition to ignore your lived experience and the hard evidence that has been given to us by people who work on the frontline. I pay tribute to Claire Throssell, who is in the Gallery today. Her boys, Jack and Paul, were killed by her abusive ex-partner in horrific circumstances. No mother should have had to have shown the strength that Claire has shown, but she has changed the law and saved lives. I will vote today to make sure that the Opposition do not block that legacy.

The presumption of parental involvement is so damaging because it has allowed abuse to continue through the courts. The safety of children must always be the top priority. Over the past 30 years, 68 children have died because the presumption of involvement was applied when it never should have been—68 children who should have grown up, but whose lives were taken from them. I am proud that this Bill will ensure that that terrible number never rises again.

Changing the law must only be the start. Judges, magistrates and Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service operators work within the pro-contact culture that has been set by the laws we have at the moment. The Judicial College must take that on board. In the almost two years I have been working on this, the worst opinion I have heard came from a family magistrate, who told me about his friend’s experience of the parental alienation myth—ignoring the evidence, and letting his anecdotes override it.

Survivors in Calder Valley tell me that they fear not being believed, being blamed or being pushed into unsafe arrangements. They fear the drive to drop off their children with an abusive ex-partner. They fear the agonising wait for their children to be returned to them safe. For too long, the judicial system has felt unreliable, as a deeply traumatic tool of abusers. This Government have committed to halving violence against women. This change is a step towards that. There is more to come, but our courts must put victims and children at the centre of the decisions.

[Several hon. Members rose—]