Courts and Tribunals Bill

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Commons Chamber

Consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee

[Relevant documents: First Report of the Justice Committee, Courts and Tribunals Bill, HC 192, and the Government response, reported to the House on 12 October; Oral evidence taken before the Justice Committee, on the Courts and Tribunals Bill, 20 March, Session 2024-26, HC 1754.]

New Clause 23

Independent review

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must appoint one or more persons to review, and report to the Lord Chancellor on, the following matters—

(a) whether any of the relevant criminal justice provisions has created or exacerbated any differences in treatment or in outcomes as between—

(i) defendants of different racial groups (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010), or

(ii) defendants of different socio-economic status;

(b) any other matter specified in the appointment that relates to the effect of the relevant criminal justice provisions (or any of them).

(2) The “relevant criminal justice provisions” are—

(a) sections 1 and 2;

(b) Part 6A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as inserted by section 4);

(c) any regulations that are made by virtue of section 6(1) and provide for the general limit in a magistrates’ court to be greater than 12 months;

(d) sections 108(2A) and 108A to 108R of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (as inserted by Schedule 2);

(e) paragraphs 5, 10, 13 and 15 of Schedule 2.

(3) The Lord Chancellor—

(a) must appoint the reviewer or reviewers before the end of the period of six months beginning with the relevant day (see subsection (10));

(b) may appoint different persons to review, and report on, different matters relating to the effect of the relevant criminal justice provisions (or any of them).

(4) A person appointed to be a reviewer must be a person appearing to the Lord Chancellor to be independent of the Lord Chancellor.

(5) The Lord Chancellor must arrange for every reviewer to provide the Lord Chancellor with—

(a) an interim report, and

(b) a final report.

(6) The interim report must be provided before the end of the period of two years beginning with the relevant day.

(7) The final report must be provided before the end of the period of five years beginning with the relevant day (but may not be provided before the end of the period mentioned in subsection (6)).

(8) A report under this section may include such recommendations (if any) as the person making the report considers appropriate.

(9) The Lord Chancellor must—

(a) publish every report provided under this section, and

(b) lay a copy of it before Parliament.

(10) In this section—

“defendant” means a person charged with, or convicted of, an offence in England and Wales;

“the relevant day” means the earliest day on which any of the relevant criminal justice provisions comes into force for any purpose (ignoring the effect of section 26(1)(b));

“reviewer” means a person appointed under subsection (1).”—(Sarah Sackman.)

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to appoint one or more persons to carry out an independent review of the effect of the changes to the criminal justice system made by clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.

Brought up, and read the First time.

15:29

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 1—Report on the effect of the Act on prosecution of rape and serious sexual offences—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of this Act on proceedings of cases involving rape and serious sexual offences.

(2) The matters the report must consider include—

(a) the effect of the Act on the time taken to dispose of cases;

(b) the effect of the Act on witness participation in proceedings; and

(c) the effect of the Act on the experience of victims during proceedings.

(3) The report must make recommendations to improve each of the matters set out in subsection (2).

(4) Recommendations may include—

(a) recommendations about how the Act is implemented, and

(b) recommendations about further provision necessary to improve each matter.

(5) In this section, serious sexual offences are such offences as the Crown Prosecution Service may from time to time specify.

(6) Within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require a report on the effect of the provisions of the Bill on the progression of RASSO cases, and require the Lord Chancellor to respond to these recommendations.

New clause 2—Fast-track courts for rape and serious sexual offences—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations make provision for specialist court capacity for cases involving rape and serious sexual offences (“RASSO”).

(2) Regulations under this section must include provision for the prioritised listing and progression of RASSO cases.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must take reasonable steps for any necessary judicial, administrative and support resources to be made available to operate such court capacity.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to ensure that specialist court capacity is made available for the fast-tracking of RASSO cases.

New clause 3—Extended sitting hours for Crown Court Proceedings—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor may, by order, designate specific Crown Court locations or individual court rooms as extended capacity courts.

(2) Proceedings in any court designated under subsection (1) must consist of—

(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and

(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.

(3) Any court designated under subsection (1) will not have a limit on the number of cases that can be heard on the same day.”

This new clause would restructure the court sitting day to introduce a morning and afternoon session, to allow two different cases to be heard in the same courtroom on a given day.

New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (“the Scheme”).

(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—

(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and

(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.

(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—

(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;

(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;

(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and

(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.

(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.

New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.

(2) There must be a target for the—

(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and

(b) reduction of the backlog in each HMCTS region.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.

(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.

New clause 6—Victim-led Intensive Case Management—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the implementation of Victim-Led Intensive Case Management in proceedings in the criminal courts (“The Strategy”).

(2) The strategy must outline steps to prioritise the experience of victims in relation to proceedings in the criminal courts.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to lay before Parliament a strategy for victim-led case management in relation to criminal court proceedings.

New clause 7—Judicial training: anti-discrimination—

“(1) Any member of the judiciary who may be assigned to proceedings for a trial on indictment without a jury must have access to training on matters relating to discrimination against individuals from ethnic minority backgrounds.

(2) Training provided under subsection (1) must cover—

(a) the identification and prevention of racial bias, including unconscious bias, and

(b) the impact of discrimination on access to justice and judicial outcomes.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations specify how often members of the judiciary must undertake such training.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must lay an annual report before Parliament on the provision and uptake of training provided under this section.”

This new clause requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on discrimination against ethnic minorities, including racial bias and its impact on judicial decision-making.

New clause 8—Judicial training: violence against women and girls—

“(1) Any member of the judiciary who may be assigned to proceedings for a trial on indictment without a jury must have access to training on matters relating to violence against women and girls.

(2) Training provided under subsection (1) must cover—

(a) the nature and dynamics of violence against women and girls, including—

(i) domestic abuse,

(ii) sexual violence,

(iii) coercive control, and

(iv) so-called honour-based abuse;

(b) best practice in hearing cases involving violence against women and girls, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations specify how often members of the judiciary must undertake such training.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must lay an annual report before Parliament on the provision and uptake of training provided under this section.”

This new clause requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on violence against women and girls.

New clause 9—Judicial training: domestic abuse—

“(1) Any member of the judiciary who may be assigned to proceedings for a trial on indictment without a jury must have access to training on matters relating to domestic abuse.

(2) Training provided under subsection (1) must cover—

(a) the nature and dynamics of domestic abuse, including physical, emotional, psychological, sexual, and economic abuse, as well as controlling or coercive behaviour;

(b) best practice in the management of cases involving domestic abuse, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations specify how often members of the judiciary must undertake such training.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must lay an annual report before Parliament on the provision and uptake of training provided under this section.”

This new clause requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on domestic abuse.

New clause 10—Pilot of trial allocation reforms—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations bringing sections 1 to 7 of this Act into force unless—

(a) he has first made arrangements for a pilot scheme for the provision of those sections in accordance with subsections (2) and (3),

(b) a statutory instrument containing regulations for the commencement of sections 1 to 7 of this Act has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(2) A pilot scheme may—

(a) be for the purpose of trialling all provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this Act,

(b) be for such a period as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify, provided that the period does not exceed 24 months beginning with the day on which this section is brought into force,

(c) take place in at least one location in England and Wales as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify,

(d) apply to proceedings in the criminal courts as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify.

(3) Before the conclusion of the pilot scheme under subsection (2), the Lord Chancellor must—

(a) commission an independent review of the pilot scheme, and

(b) lay before Parliament a report on the assessment under paragraph (a).”

This new clause would require the Government to pilot the removal of the right to elect trial by jury before national implementation, and to report to Parliament on its impact.

New clause 11—Access to free court transcripts for victims—

“(1) Victims of criminal offences shall be entitled to receive, without charge, court transcripts of—

(a) judicial summings-up, and

(b) bail decisions and conditions,

which are relevant to their case.

(2) HM Courts and Tribunals Service must ensure that such transcripts are provided within 14 days of a request.

(3) The duty under subsection (1) shall apply irrespective of whether the victim gave evidence in the case.”

This new clause would give victims a right to receive, free of charge, court transcripts of judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to their case. It requires that transcripts be provided within 14 days of a request and clarifies that this right applies whether or not the victim gave evidence in the case.

New clause 12—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.

(2) A report under this section must—

(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—

(i) witness participation;

(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system; and

(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system,

(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in sub-paragraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).

(3) Within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.

New clause 13—Duty to provide trauma-informed training—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must ensure that appropriate training is made mandatory for members of all court staff working in the criminal courts on best practice in relation to victims' trauma.

(2) Training under subsection (1) must include—

(a) the nature, prevalence, and impact of domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, and rape and serious sexual offences (“RASSO”);

(b) the dynamics and psychological effects of trauma on parties and witnesses involved in proceedings;

(c) the identification and appropriate handling of cases involving domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, and RASSO offences;

(d) the ways in which trauma may affect memory, communication, behaviour, and engagement with court proceedings;

(e) best practices for reducing retraumatisation within court and tribunals settings.

(3) Training provided under this section must—

(a) take place on initial appointment to a role within a court, and at regular intervals thereafter;

(b) reflect current best practice and be informed by up-to-date research and guidance; and

(c) be developed in consultation with appropriate experts, including specialist support organisations and persons with lived experience of abuse and trauma.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must keep the training under review and revise it as appropriate.

(5) The Lord Chancellor must publish guidance on the implementation of this section.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to ensure that members of the court staff working in the criminal courts receive mandatory, consistent training on trauma-informed practice to improve understanding of how trauma affects victims’ evidence, behaviour, and engagement with court proceedings.

New clause 14—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—

(a) the provisions of this Act;

(b) the wider criminal justice system;

(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;

(d) the condition of the courts estate; and

(e) the use of technology.

(3) In considering “efficiency”, the review must consider the impact on—

(a) delays,

(b) backlogs, and

(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.

(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.

New clause 15—Expiry of sections 1 to 7 in specified circumstances—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament a report assessing the effectiveness of the provisions contained in sections 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) A report under this section must be laid—

(a) within 24 months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, or

(b) within 24 months of the latest date on which any of sections 1 to 7 is commenced,

whichever is the later.

(3) The report must describe—

(a) any time saved in court as a result of the measures included in those sections;

(b) any change in the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court since this Act was passed;

(c) the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court at the time at which the report is prepared; and

(d) any other effect of the provisions of sections 1 to 7 on the criminal justice system.

(4) The report must provide a conclusion by the Lord Chancellor on whether the reforms have been effective in reducing the number of cases awaiting trial at Crown Court.

(5) Where the report concludes that the provisions have not been effective, the Lord Chancellor must make regulations providing for the immediate repeal of sections 1 to 7.

(6) Where the report concludes that the provisions are effective, the Lord Chancellor must make regulations making provision for repeal of sections 1 to 7 subject to the condition in subsection (8).

(7) The condition is that the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court has in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor reduced to a sufficient extent.

(8) Regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause introduces a sunset clause requiring a report on the effectiveness of the provisions. If the report finds that the measures are not effective, the Secretary of State must bring forward regulations to repeal them. If the report finds that the measures are effective, the Secretary of State must set a deadline for their repeal and a return to fully jury trials.

New clause 16—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (“the strategy”).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, “remote proceedings” means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

New clause 17—Inspectorate of Criminal Court Administration—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor may appoint such number of inspectors of criminal court administration as he considers appropriate.

(2) Inspectors under this section are collectively known as “His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Criminal Court Administration” (“the Inspectorate”).

(3) The Lord Chancellor must appoint one of the persons so appointed to be His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Criminal Court Administration.

(4) The Lord Chancellor may make to or in respect of inspectors of court administration such payments by way of remuneration, allowances or otherwise as he may determine.

(5) It is the duty of the Inspectorate to inspect and report to the Lord Chancellor on—

(a) the administration and operation of the system that supports the carrying on of the business of—

(i) the Crown Court, and

(ii) the magistrates’ courts;

(b) the efficiency, effectiveness and accessibility of those courts and their services, having particular regard to the experience of witnesses and victims.

(6) Any report under subsection (5) must make recommendations to the Lord Chancellor in respect of subsection (5).

(7) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) any report under this section within one month of receiving it; and

(b) his response to the recommendations of a report within six months beginning on the day on which the report in question is laid.

(8) A response under subsection (7)(b) must describe—

(a) any action the Lord Chancellor proposes to take, and

(b) where the Lord Chancellor does not propose to take any action, a reason why he proposes not to take action.

(9) The Lord Chancellor may not issue any direction to the Inspectorate in relation to its duty under subsection (5).

(10) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make further provision about the Inspectorate.”

This new clause establishes His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Criminal Court Administration as an independent statutory body responsible for inspecting and reporting on the administration of criminal courts, with a particular regard to the experience of victims and witnesses.

New clause 19—Commencement of Part 1: Independent Reports—

“(1) Sections 1 to 7 of this Act may not come into force unless a draft of regulations providing for their commencement has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.

(2) The Lord Chancellor may not lay a draft of regulations under subsection (1) unless they have first laid before Parliament a report, produced by an independent reviewer, based on published Crown Court data, establishing that—

(a) delays attributable to trial by jury are a primary cause of delays to cases being heard in the Crown Court; and

(b) all possible alternative measures that could reasonably be implemented in criminal courts in England and Wales have been so implemented and found by the independent reviewer not to have reduced the Crown Court backlog.

(3) Alternative measures under subsection (2)(b) may include—

(a) increased funding for sitting days,

(b) holding two trials per day in specified court rooms, and

(c) developing and implementing specialist courts to hear cases relating to sexual offences and domestic abuse.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must appoint the independent reviewer to produce reports under this section.

(5) A person may not be appointed as the independent reviewer if they are a Minister of the Crown, a civil servant in the Ministry of Justice, or an officer of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service.

(6) A report under subsection (2) must be published without redaction, alongside its supporting data, at least three months before a draft of regulations is laid under subsection (1).

(7) Sections 1 to 7 expire 12 months after coming into force unless a further report under subsection (2) is laid and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament prior to the end of that period.”

This new clause requires an independent report demonstrating that jury trials are a primary cause of Crown Court delays and that alternative remedies have failed before sections 1 to 7 can take effect by affirmative resolution of both Houses.

New clause 20—Court service providers: performance—

“(1) HM Courts and Tribunals Service must make provision for the collection of data where a Crown Court has reported that a trial has been—

(a) adjourned,

(b) vacated, or

(c) delayed by more than 30 mins

due to the failure of a court service provider.

(2) Court service providers under subsection (1) include—

(a) prisoner escort and custody services;

(b) language and interpretation services; and

(c) video-link and information technology services,

and any other private company that provides a service to a court.

(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report (a “court contract performance report”) setting out—

(a) the number of trials or hearings delayed due to failures by private service providers; and

(b) an assessment of the impact of such delays on the backlog of cases in the Crown Court.”

This new clause would require all new contracts for court-related services to include a performance-related penalty clause for cases where a failure related to those services impacts the completion of proceedings.

New clause 21—Impact of sections 1 to 6 on domestic abuse victims—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament an assessment of the impact of sections 1 to 6 on the experiences and treatment, within the courts, of victims and survivors of domestic abuse.

(2) The impact assessment published under this section must include an assessment of levels of uptake of relevant training among trial judges on the experiences of domestic abuse victims and survivors.”

This new clause would require the Government to assess the impact of the Bill’s provisions on jury trials on victims and survivors of domestic abuse.

New clause 22—Immunity from suit: conduct of police officers in preparation for criminal court proceedings—

“(1) Except while acting as witnesses, no immunity from suit applies to acts or omissions by police officers where these occur in preparation for criminal court proceedings. This includes—

(a) the fabrication, concealment, improper alteration or destruction of evidence;

(b) conduct connected to criminal court proceedings involving dishonesty, bad faith, or negligence;

(c) the reckless or deliberate disclosure, in preparation for criminal court proceedings, of confidential information relating to victims, witnesses, or vulnerable persons; and

(d) breaches of duties owed under the Human Rights Act 1998.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulation make further provision under this section.

(3) Regulations made under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would restrict immunity from civil suit for police officers in relation to certain conduct in preparation for criminal court proceedings.

New clause 24—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—

“(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by a child to spend time with a party against whom the child, or a party representing the child, has made allegations of domestic abuse constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse.

(2) The presumption in subsection (1) may be rebutted only where the accused party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.”

This new clause provides that, in family court, where a child refuses or is reluctant to spend time with one party as a result of an allegation against that party of domestic abuse against the child, the court must presume the reluctance or refusal is reasonable.

New clause 25—Expiry of sections 1 to 7—

“(1) Sections 1 to 7 of this Act expire three months after the date on which the condition in subsection (2) is met.

(2) The condition is that the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court has been below pre-pandemic level in each of the previous four quarterly reporting periods.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court is that which is calculated by HM Courts and Tribunals Service.”

This new clause sunsets sections 1 to 7 of this Act so that they will no longer be in force once the court backlog has been resolved.

New clause 26—Unduly lenient sentences scheme: application to the magistrates’ courts—

“(1) Section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)(a) after “Crown Court” insert “, or the magistrates’ court where the sentence is in respect of an either way offence,”.”

This new clause would ensure that those affected by any case that was triable either-way before this Act was passed shall still be subject to the unduly lenient sentence scheme.

New clause 27—Review of jury composition—

“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a review of the methods used to determine the composition of juries.

(2) The review under this section must include an assessment of whether there are appropriate safeguards in place to prevent verdicts being returned which are influenced by jurors’—

(a) political views,

(b) religious beliefs, or

(c) other demographic characteristics,

in a way that conflicts with the interests of justice.

(3) If a review under this section determines that there are not sufficient safeguards in place, the Secretary of State must publish proposals aimed at introducing sufficient safeguards.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of jury composition, with a view to avoiding juries returning verdicts influenced by their politics, religion or other demographic characteristics.

Amendment 1, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.

Amendment 47, clause 1, page 3, line 20, at end insert

“except where subsection (10) applies.

(10) Where—

(a) an offence is triable either way;

(b) the court considers that, if convicted, the accused would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment of more than 12 months but not more than three years;

(c) the accused is of good character; and

(d) the accused has not previously been convicted of an offence,

the accused may elect to be tried on indictment.”

This amendment preserves the right of a defendant of good character with no previous convictions to elect Crown Court trial where the likely sentence is more than 12 months but not more than three years.

Amendment 2, page 4, line 16, leave out clause 2.

Government amendment 3.

Amendment 21, clause 3, page 5, leave out line 27 and insert—

“(4) The trial is to be conducted without a jury in any other case only if—

(a) the prosecution has made a written application to the court requesting that the trial be conducted without a jury, and

(b) the defendant has given explicit written consent to be tried without a jury.

(4A) Where the prosecution does not make an application under subsection (4)(a), or the defendant does not give consent under subsection (4)(b), the trial is to be conducted with a jury.”

This amendment states that a case can only be tried without a jury following an application from the prosecution and where the defendant gives written consent.

Amendment 17, clause 3, page 6, line 25, at end insert—

“(4A) A trial conducted without a jury will be heard by one judge and two magistrates.”

This amendment implements the recommendation of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts to have cases heard in the Crown Court Bench Division by a judge and two magistrates.

Amendment 16, clause 3, page 9, line 17, leave out “no” and insert “a”.

This amendment entitles a defendant to appeal against a judge’s decision to allocate the case for trial by judge alone.

Amendment 51, clause 3, page 9, line 23, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) Where a court has determined in accordance with section 74A that a trial is to be conducted without a jury, the court cannot pass a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years on a person convicted of an offence.

(4A) Where a person is convicted of an offence and the court considers that the appropriate sentence is more than three years’ imprisonment or detention, the court must refer the case for retrial by jury.”

This amendment prevents a judge sitting alone from sentencing a defendant to more than three years in prison, and requires that if this is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial by jury.

Amendment 10, clause 3, page 9, line 28, leave out subsections (2) to (4).

This amendment would prevent the provisions on trial on indictment without a jury applying retrospectively to cases where the defendant has elected trial by jury before these provisions become law.

Amendment 4, page 10, line 5, leave out clause 4.

Amendment 52, clause 4, page 10, line 16, leave out “one or more of the offences is an offence” and insert “all of the offences are”.

This amendment would limit judge-only trials to situations where all of the offences are listed in Schedule 3ZA.

Amendment 53, clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”

This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.

Amendment 54, clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out from “is” to end of line 2, and insert

“a right of appeal against a decision to make an order under this section on the grounds of natural justice

(5A) where an appeal is made under subsection (5), it must not be heard by the judge who made the original determination.”

This amendment would add a right for defendants to appeal against the decision for a judge-only trial for lengthy and complex cases.

Government amendment 24.

Amendment 57, clause 4, page 12, line 27, leave out subsection (5)(a).

This amendment would prevent the court unilaterally overriding a reason to issue a revocation order so that a case allocated for judge-only trial under this section could be tried by jury.

Amendment 55, clause 4, page 13, line 11, at end insert—

“(g) the interests of natural justice for the defendant.”

This amendment would ensure that the interests of natural justice for the defendant are relevant to the decision to revoke an order for a judge-only trial for the offences listed in Schedule 1.

Government amendment 25.

Amendment 56, clause 4, page 13, line 30, leave out “trial beginning on or” and insert

“cases whose first hearing in the magistrates’ court takes place”.

This amendment prevents the provisions in section 4 coming into effect retrospectively.

Amendment 6, page 14, line 7, leave out clause 5.

Government amendments 26 and 27.

Amendment 59, clause 5, page 14, line 36, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary for preparing—

(a) pre-sentence reports,

(b) psychiatric or medical reports,

(c) victim personal statements, or

(d) further legal advice relating to sentencing.”

This amendment would ensure that judgments are handed down on conviction in all but the circumstances covered by the amendment.

Amendment 60, clause 5, page 15, line 8, at end insert—

“(5B) It is only permissible not to give judgment at the time of conviction if adjournment is necessary for—

(a) pre-sentence reports

(b) psychiatric or medical reports

(c) victim personal statements, or

(d) further legal advice about sentence.”

This amendment would ensure that judgments are handed down on conviction in all but the circumstances covered by the amendment.

Amendment 61, clause 5, page 15, line 16, at end insert—

“(4B) It is only permissible not to give judgment at the time of conviction if adjournment is necessary for—

(a) pre-sentence reports,

(b) psychiatric or medical reports,

(c) victim personal statements, or

(d) further legal advice about sentence.”

This amendment would ensure that judgments are handed down on conviction in all but the circumstances covered by the amendment.

Government amendment 28.

Amendment 7, page 15, line 23, leave out clause 6.

Amendment 11, clause 6, page 15, leave out lines 36 and 37.

This amendment provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months.

Amendment 62, clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—

“(1A) In paragraph 14A(3), for “negative” substitute “affirmative””.

This amendment ensures regulations to extend magistrates’ courts sentencing powers must be approved by both Houses of Parliament.

Amendment 19, clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—

“(1B) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This amendment would make changing the general limit on custodial sentence for an either-way offence in magistrates’ courts changeable by affirmative resolution only.

Amendment 18, clause 6, page 17, line 18, at end insert—

“(9) After section 15 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, insert—

“15A Entitlement to Crown Court funding levels in certain proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court

(1) This section applies to criminal proceedings in a magistrates’ court where—

(a) an individual is charged with an either-way offence; and

(b) the court, having regard to the sentencing guidelines, considers it likely that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months will be imposed upon conviction.

(2) Where this section applies, any relevant representation order shall provide for remuneration at the same rates and under the same conditions as would apply if the proceedings were determined in the Crown Court.””

This amendment links legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It ensures that defendants facing more than 12 months' imprisonment receive Crown Court level funding, regardless of which court the case is heard in.

Amendment 8, page 17, line 20, leave out clause 7.

Government amendments 29 to 32.

Amendment 67, page 30, line 4, leave out clause 17.

This amendment would keep the rebuttable presumption of parental involvement being beneficial for the welfare of the child.

Amendment 12, clause 17, page 30, line 24, at end insert—

“(3) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the commencement of this section, lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the resources required to give full effect to the repeal of subsection 2A in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989.

(4) The report under subsection (3) must include—

(a) an assessment of the level of legal aid provision necessary to ensure that parties in child arrangements proceedings are able to obtain timely and effective—

(i) advice, and

(ii) representation,

particularly where allegations of domestic abuse or safeguarding concerns are raised;

(b) an evaluation of the capacity of the family courts, including—

(i) the number of judges,

(ii) court staff, and

(iii) available hearing time,

to undertake robust risk assessment and fact-finding processes in line with Practice Direction 12J;

(c) plans to address any shortfalls in judicial training, including—

(i) training relating to coercive control,

(ii) domestic abuse dynamics, and

(iii) child safeguarding,

(d) proposals for investment in the family court estate and technology to ensure—

(i) the repeal operates effectively, and

(ii) decisions are consistently grounded in the welfare and safety of the child.”

This amendment requires the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement.

Amendment 22, clause 17, page 30, line 24, at end insert—

“(3) The Secretary of State must, within 18 months beginning on the day on which this Act receives Royal Assent, lay a report before Parliament on post-separation abuse in the context of decisions of courts under Children Act 1989.

(4) The report under subsection (3) must set out how post separation abuse is identified and understood in proceedings to which this clause relates.”

Government amendments 33 to 36.

Amendment 20, clause 26, page 35, leave out lines 29 and 30.

This amendment is consequential on new clause (Commencement of Part 1: Independent Reports).

Government amendment 37.

Amendment 13, clause 26, page 35, line 33, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4);

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts);

(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts).”

This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.

Amendment 14, clause 26, page 35, line 33, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until the pilot in accordance with section [pilot of trial allocation reforms] has been concluded—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4);

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts);

(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts).”

This amendment is consequential on NC10.

Amendment 48, clause 26, page 35, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.

(3B) The conditions are that—

(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,

(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and

(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”

This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.

Amendment 49, clause 26, page 35, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—

(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and

(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.

(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—

(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and

(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.

Amendment 50, clause 26, page 35, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing section 7 into force until he has undertaken an assessment of the rate of upheld appeals on convictions and sentences handed down in the magistrates’ court in the previous two years.”

This amendment would prevent the restriction of right of appeal against magistrates’ court decisions until the Lord Chancellor has undertaken an assessment of how many of those appeals are successful.

Amendment 68, clause 26, page 35, line 33, at end insert

“subject to the provisions of subsection (3A)”—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—

(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and

(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.

(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4);

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts);

(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts).”

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.

Amendment 5, page 36, line 2, leave out schedule 1.

Amendment 58, schedule 1, page 38, line 3, leave out paragraph 20.

This amendment prevents the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.

Amendment 9, page 38, line 9, leave out schedule 2.

Amendment 46, schedule 2, page 38, line 22, at end insert—

“(2A) After subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) Nothing in this section applies to an appeal which may be brought as of right under section 108(2D).””

This amendment is consequential on amendment 45.

Amendment 45, schedule 2, page 38, line 22, at end insert—

“(2C) Subsection (2B) does not apply where—

(a) the appellant was convicted by a magistrates’ court;

(b) the appellant has not previously been sentenced to a term of imprisonment or detention for an offence; and

(c) having regard to the applicable sentencing guidelines, the offence or offences for which the appellant was convicted are offences for which the sentence imposed, or likely to be imposed, does not exceed 12 months’ imprisonment or detention.

(2D) Where subsection (2C) applies—

(a) an appeal under this section may be brought, and

(b) and no permission to appeal is required.

(2E) An appeal under subsection (2D) may be brought against—

(a) conviction;

(b) sentence; or

(c) both conviction and sentence.

(2F) For the purposes of subsection (2C)(b), a sentence which is suspended, but which is a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of the applicable sentencing legislation, shall be treated as a sentence of imprisonment.

(2G) Where an appeal is brought under subsection (2D) and (2E), the appeal shall be treated as an appeal brought as of right and the provisions of this Part relating to permission to appeal shall not apply.”

This amendment preserves the existing automatic right of appeal from the magistrates’ court for defendants of good character with no previous convictions where the applicable sentencing guidelines indicate that the offence is likely to attract a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or less.

Amendment 63, schedule 2, page 39, line 16, leave out from “if” to end of line 18 and insert

“the defendant has made one”.

This amendment would require the Crown Court to allow an appeal if the defendant makes one.

Amendment 64, schedule 2, page 42, line 15, leave out “magistrates’ court” and insert

“jury in the Crown Court”.

This amendment would allow the Crown Court to order a retrial by jury in the event that it allows an appeal against a conviction or sentence in the magistrates’ court.

Amendment 65, schedule 2, page 47, line 13, leave out “magistrates’ court” and insert

“jury in the Crown Court”.

This amendment would allow the Crown Court to order a retrial by jury in the event that it allows an appeal against a conviction or sentence in the magistrates’ court.

Amendment 66, schedule 2, page 49, line 36, leave out from “Court” to end of line 39 and insert

“must allow an appeal under section 108 if the defendant makes one.”

This amendment would remove the provision limiting appeals to specific grounds and instead ensure the Crown Court allows appeals if one is made.

Amendment 15, schedule 2, page 52, line 7, leave out “on payment of a fee” and insert

“to victims of criminal offence without a fee within 14 days of a request”.

This amendment would make magistrates’ court transcripts free for victims and requires that such transcripts are provided within 14 days of a request.

Government amendments 38 to 44.

[Sarah Sackman]

It is an honour to open the debate on the Report stage of the Courts and Tribunals Bill, and to bring this important piece of legislation back before the House. This is a Bill with victims at its heart. Its purpose is urgent and long overdue: to ensure that justice in this country is delivered fairly for both victims and defendants. Currently, thousands of victims, witnesses and defendants are trapped in the long, slow wait for justice. That is simply unfair. For some, justice may never come. The old maxim rings true in our country today: far too often, justice delayed is justice denied.

Occasionally, there are stories that stop one in one’s tracks. I appeared on “Newsnight” to explain the situation in our courts—backlogs reaching 80,000 and far too many people waiting for justice—and on that programme, I was confronted with the story of Morwenna Loughman. She spoke of the devastating impact that those court delays had had on her life. Morwenna was violently raped in February 2023. She was forced to wait over two years for her attacker to be convicted after her trial was cancelled not once, but twice at short notice. During that time, she lost her job, her home and her sense of self. Her story has stayed with me ever since—it is people exactly like Morwenna whom I have in my mind’s eye as I return to the House with this legislation. For far too many survivors, delays themselves have become another source of trauma. We cannot sit idly by; we have to act now to resolve this situation.

The Bill seeks to turn a crisis into an opportunity—an opportunity to rebuild a justice system that is swifter and stronger, and has victims’ voices at its core. We have the opportunity to rebuild a system that gives courts, rather than defendants, the ability to triage cases, and that transforms our approach to the culture around rape and serious sexual violence. That is the ambition of this Bill—not just to repair what is broken, but to build something better in its place.

This Government inherited a criminal justice system that was on its knees, with trials taking longer, hearings constantly cancelled and victims facing unacceptable delays. Years of inaction and under-investment had led to a courts system that, as Lord Leveson’s report concluded, was and remains simply unfit for purpose. Today, the Crown court backlog stands at almost 81,000 cases, and the pressure is growing. Cases themselves are increasingly complex, not least because of the growth of digital and forensic evidence. A single smartphone can hold the equivalent of 50 million printed pages, and this adds to disclosure, complexity, and the time it takes to reach a verdict. The police are arresting more criminals. We make absolutely no apologies for that, but a system that is already under strain cannot continue to absorb ever-rising demand without reform. Old structures are creaking under new volumes and new types of crime, and if we do not act, the situation will continue to spiral.

Not only are we failing victims, this situation and these unacceptable delays are corrosive of public trust in the justice system itself. We can and must do better. To do so, we need a sensible, principled and pragmatic approach. As we will no doubt hear, the Opposition have offered plenty of objections, but precious few answers to the reality facing our courts. We will not take lectures from the party that left the criminal justice system in this state. This Government have a plan: a serious package of measures designed to drive down the backlog and ensure that victims get the fast, timely and fair justice that they deserve. Lord Leveson’s conclusion in the independent review of criminal courts was clear that there is no silver bullet for addressing this problem. We need to pull every lever—investment, modernisation and structural reform—and this Government are doing precisely that.

Let me begin with investment. For a start, we have removed the financial limit on court sitting days. We have recruited more judges and magistrates. By uncapping Crown court sitting days—meaning that there is no financial limit on the number of cases that courts can hear—we have unleashed the potential of our Crown courts, which are hearing more cases than ever before. We are investing an additional £287 million in court repairs and digital upgrades, alongside record investment in criminal legal aid to support the solicitors and barristers who run our criminal cases, alongside a package of more than half a billion pounds for victim services over the next three years.

In addition, I am proud that we have announced a £23 million package to introduce specialist rape courts—a manifesto commitment—in every single Crown court centre. That will improve the experience of victims of rape and other sexual offences at court, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols), whose bravery and determination has driven forward those changes.

Modernisation and efficiency matter, too. I abhor inefficiency. When I speak not just to victims, but to defendants and to people who work within the system, the wastefulness of ineffective trials is so frustrating. We hear stories of trials being put off because a prisoner was not produced on time or because counsel was unavailable. Working with the judiciary, we are modernising our system and we are throwing the kitchen sink at it.

[Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for throwing the kitchen sink at the problem, including court repairs. We wish to see those repairs make progress at Taunton Crown court. The Minister was good enough to write to me at the beginning of the summer to explain that the court, which has been closed since 2023, will be closed for longer. Will she contact me to give us an update on when Taunton Crown court will finally be reopened?

[Sarah Sackman]

I was glad to meet the hon. Member to discuss the situation at Taunton, which I know has been a deep source of frustration. Nothing could more exemplify the years of neglect of our justice system than our crumbling court estate that was presided over by the Conservatives. This Government are investing in the fabric of our court estate. That is not just in the bricks and mortar, but in the digital upgrades that are so important, and I will speak to those now.

We have the technology for remote hearings; we need to be deploying it. This Government will develop a pilot of virtual remand hearings, so that we do not need as many prisoner transfers as before. We will work with our judiciary to develop a new pioneering national video model. The model will allow suitable cases to be allocated to available judges across different locations. It might be that a judge in Cardiff is hearing a matter based down in London, helping to alleviate the pressures there, to make much more effective use of capacity and to target those areas facing the greatest backlogs.

We are also adopting a new national listing tool, harnessing the capacity of AI to schedule cases more efficiently. We will have case progression officers in every single Crown court, making the more complex cases progress further and faster. We are working with the judiciary to set up short trial courts, which hear similar cases together over concentrated periods so that they can be dealt with more quickly. We are also expanding a scheme already used in Manchester, Bristol and Nottingham to allow prison vans to use bus lanes. I agree entirely with those who say we need to make the system more efficient, and we are stretching and straining every sinew to do exactly that, with the investment to go with it. We welcome in particular the judiciary’s reforms to prioritise rape and serious sexual offences and to end the unacceptable practice of floating trials for such cases, giving victims greater certainty about when their case will be heard.

Lord Leveson’s review was clear that investment and modernisation can only take us so far. No single lever can fix a crisis that has been years in the making. We have had decades of under-investment in a system that has simply not kept pace with the 21st century, where cases now take twice as long as they did 25 years ago. So our third lever is pragmatic, principled structural reform to ease the pressure on the Crown court and ensure that its time is concentrated on the most serious cases, and that is precisely what the Bill delivers.

The case for reform remains as strong as ever, but good government requires us to listen, and this place exists to scrutinise and improve legislation. When concerns are raised, it is right that the Government reflect and react. When the Prime Minister took office he committed himself to looking at these proposals again, and that is why over recent months the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and I have listened carefully to stakeholders, to Members on both sides of the House, and to people who work within the system. We have heard that strength of feeling, and we have acted. I can confirm today that the Government have tabled an amendment to remove clause 3, relating to the bench division. The effect will be that all defendants facing a trial in the Crown court will be heard with a jury. That decision does not change the destination or the ambition of the Bill, which has always remained the same: swifter justice for victims.

Simplifying our approach and avoiding some of the operational reforms that would have come with a new division in the Crown court gives us the opportunity to move faster in implementing the changes set out in the Bill. Implementing those changes more efficiently will free up court capacity and make better use of court time, helping us to bring about fast, fair justice for victims. We remain confident that the guts of the Bill—the package of reforms backed by the record financial investment that I have described, along with our ambitious programme of modernisation—will be sufficient to free up Crown court time to turn the tide on the backlog within the current Parliament. This is the right decision for victims, and it is the right decision for the justice system.

I know that the Opposition have tabled amendments to remove the remaining clauses relating to Lord Leveson’s review, but I am afraid that doing so would be to bury one’s head in the sand. We are proceeding with other structural reforms in the Bill, including the removal of defendants’ right to choose whether their cases are heard in the magistrates court or the Crown court when they involve an either-way offence. The reform that we have always proposed is that, as in Scotland, it should be the court rather than the defendant that triages cases. This has a double effect. Not only is it more efficient, ensuring that when the prosecution and the court decide that a case can be heard in the magistrates court, that is where it is heard; it is also fairer. It is about putting the power in the hands of the court rather than those of the defendant and giving a far greater say to victims whose voice can be heard through the prosecution, which puts its case as to what venue the case should be heard in, as well as hearing from the defence. It means that cases will be heard on the basis of their seriousness and not simply the preference of the defendant, as is the case in Scotland.

This is exactly the right thing to do. These measures will not only reduce the demand on the Crown court, but will prevent defendants from gaming the system, electing for a jury trial in the simple hope that delays will drag on and the case will fall apart when the victims or witnesses withdraw. Our reforms are not only pragmatic but principled. For instance, giving magistrates courts greater sentencing powers means that more cases can be dealt with more quickly. The magistrates court is an efficient jurisdiction. It currently deals with triable either way cases about four times faster than the Crown court.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and Tavistock) (Con)]

Is the hon. and learned Lady as concerned as I am about the backlog in the magistrates court, which is four times larger than that in the Crown court and growing at 16% a year, whereas the Crown court backlog is stabilised? If this really is a reform in the interests of efficiency, should she not be sparing the magistrates court at a time when their backlog is growing so fast?

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not accept the premise of that question. I do not accept that we have a backlog in our magistrates court. What we have is a substantial caseload. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will know that the magistrates court hear more than 1.5 million cases a year, and it is coping well. What I do acknowledge is that we need to increase their capacity, which is why we are increasing the number of sitting days. In 2025 there were 114,000 sitting days, and we will increase that to 130,000 by 2028-29.

The other thing we are doing is increasing the number of magistrates. Under the previous Government, the number of magistrates in this country halved. We are going to restore the magistracy to its former glory. The changes that we have made to the application process, and the investment that we are putting into recruitment—quadrupling the budget—are already reaping the rewards, and we are on course to meet the 21,000 target. The right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) is right to say that we need to grow capacity as we see a more expanded role for the magistracy, but I believe that we can do it and we are on track to do so.

We are reforming the automatic right of appeal. It is vital that there is a right of appeal, but it is also reasonable to ask a defence to identify grounds for appeal. By introducing a permission to filter out cases without merit, we will avoid a situation in which victims are needlessly put through unnecessary re-hearings where the appeal totally lacks merit. As I said, these reforms must be matched by the capacity to deliver them. That is why we are investing in our courts and in the people who make justice possible, and we remain on track to reach our target of 21,000 magistrates by 2028-29. We are also strengthening judicial capacity by boosting the number of district judges and legal advisers, who need to see better pay and career progression.

15:44

There remains a strong case for judge-alone trials in the small number of cases that pertain to complex and lengthy fraud and financial matters. I can confirm to the House that we will proceed with this measure, which has had strong support from those responsible for investigating and prosecuting serious economic crime. Our primary objective here is to minimise the burden on ordinary people, who sit as jurors on such trials. We know that these trials can be lengthy, often lasting months at a time, which can mean long periods away from work and family responsibilities, lost income and real pressure on family life.

We are clear that reform must bring down delays and improve victims’ experience. It must also command public confidence and protect the principles that have made our courts respected the world over. The destination has not changed—it has never wavered. We will provide swifter justice for victims and continue to pull every lever to bring down the backlog, so that people no longer have to wait years for their day in court.

As I said, the Bill is also about making our justice system work better for victims and survivors, and I know that this part of the Bill commands a good degree of consensus across the House. Based on Law Commission research, it introduces vital reforms on giving evidence to challenge harmful myths about rape and sexual violence, such as preconceptions about how a victim should behave or respond. We are also making special measures easier to access and simpler for practitioners to navigate, so that victims feel safer, better supported and able to give their best evidence.

The Government remain committed to repealing the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989. Alongside a national roll-out of child-focused courts, this measure strengthens our approach to protecting children from the harm posed by abusive parents. Today we are joined in the Gallery by Claire Throssell, whom I have had the pleasure of meeting and who has campaigned so bravely and tirelessly for this change, following the tragic murder of her sons Jack and Paul. I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) for her tireless work on that campaign.

In the time I have left, let me turn to the rest of the Government amendments and new clauses. Fairness must be the foundation of any justice system. Whoever they are and wherever they come from, people must be able to trust that they will be treated equally before the law. Before introducing this Bill, we carried out a full equality impact assessment. Although that assessment found no evidence of discrimination arising from our reforms, we are aware that long-standing disparities remain in the criminal justice system. People from black and minority ethnic backgrounds are more likely to be victims of crime, while defendants from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds are also more likely to be remanded into custody before trial. When we talk about tackling delays, it is not simply a question of efficiency; it also becomes a question of fairness.

We know that gaps in the data make such disparities harder to understand and therefore tackle; the limitations were highlighted nearly a decade ago by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) in the Lammy review. That is why we are bringing forward new clause 23 and consequential amendments 35 to 37, which give the new clause effect. It requires an independent review of the court reforms in the Bill, to consider whether the differences in treatment or outcomes experienced by defendants from different racial and socioeconomic backgrounds are exacerbated as a result. The Lord Chancellor will appoint an independent reviewer within six months of the first reforms taking effect, and there will be an initial report within 12 months and a full report within five years, which Parliament will have the opportunity to consider and to which the Government will formally respond.

I now turn to some technical Government amendments. Amendment 38 to schedule 2 clarifies that new audio recording requirements in magistrates courts appeals will not apply to single justice procedure cases. These cases are generally dealt with on a computer without an oral hearing to record. Government amendments 39 to 41 to schedule 2 make further changes arising from the new permission stage for appeals, ensuring magistrates courts have the necessary powers over bail and costs, including to return an appellant to custody where appropriate.

Government amendments 29 to 31 to clause 8 clarify where the court can exclude sexual behaviour evidence that would require significant satellite litigation to be relied on. This essentially follows the Law Commission’s recommendation that the extent to which the evidence will distract the factfinder from the main issues in the case is relevant to the evidence’s admissibility. Government amendment 32 to clause 10 makes it clear that a victim’s failure to report a previous allegation of a sexual offence cannot by itself provide a basis for suggesting in court that the allegation was false; there must be additional evidence capable of supporting such an assertion.

Finally, Government amendments 42 to 44 to schedule 3 replace three mentions of the “Chancellor of the High Court” with a new terminology, “President of the Business and Property Division”. Clause 18 and schedule 3 make a range of changes to the current provisions for senior judicial leadership of the tribunals to unify tribunals and courts in England and Wales under the leadership of the Lady Chief Justice and reform the role of the Senior President of Tribunals.

Turning briefly to amendments tabled by other Members, I know that the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan) and for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller) will speak to their new clauses 25 and 15 to insert a sunset clause to repeal the measures if they are found to be ineffective. As I have said, these measures are principled and pragmatic. They are not simply a short-term emergency fix; they recognise that fundamental changes in crime, evidence and the nature of technology require that we put our courts on a sustainable footing for the 21st century. We believe in these reforms, and we think they are here for the long term. Our ambition therefore extends beyond simply reducing court delays to delivering lasting improvements in how the justice system operates, including a better balance between the interests of victims and defendants.

I close by returning to the central purpose of this Bill. We inherited a criminal justice system under severe pressure, with victims, witnesses and defendants facing unacceptable delays, and some victims dropping out of the process altogether. As I have said, I think of Morwenna Loughman. This Bill is a serious and practical response to the challenges we face. Rather than bury our head in the sand, it confronts the problems on every single front with investment, modernisation and reform. It will ensure that we rebuild a justice system that is fit for the pressures of the modern age, while remaining grounded in the fundamental principles of fairness and the rule of law that English and Welsh law has always stood for. Our task is not simply to reduce the delays that exist today, but to build a sustainable justice system for the future. I look forward to hearing contributions from across the Chamber and responding to the points raised in what I hope will be a thoughtful and constructive debate.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to take part in the further consideration of the Courts and Tribunals Bill as we reach Report stage. Not for the first time with this ministerial team, this Justice Secretary and this Prime Minister, what we were told was necessary has turned out to be unnecessary, what we were told was impossible is now possible, and what we were told was unavoidable was avoidable after all. This Minister told us again and again on Second Reading and throughout the Committee that each and every one of the measures in this Bill—each and every part of their proposals—was the only way to get on top of the court backlogs. But apparently not, because only days ago the Justice Secretary appeared on national television to announce a significant U-turn: the Government are dropping clause 3. We were told that their new division of judge-only trials was the only way the Crown court backlog could be brought down—that it could not be brought down without it. Yet now Ministers inform us that removing this very provision will actually allow the work to proceed faster.

The Opposition welcome this decision. I welcome the fact that the Justice Secretary put his name to our amendment removing clause 3, but how we got here matters. It is not the first time that this ministerial team and this Justice Secretary have let their Back Benchers defend the indefensible and then drop them in it. This same ministerial team and this same Justice Secretary told us that the release of various serious sexual and violent offenders was an absolute necessity, that they had no choice other than to put victims through the distress and upset over the summer. And then they did have a choice.

Why does this matter? Most of the time in politics in this place we are debating choices—which choice we should make as MPs and as different parties, weighing up the pros and cons of the options—but sometimes Ministers attempt to cut through that to secure the support of MPs by saying that they have no choice. When MPs resist and tell them their concerns over what the Government are proposing, Ministers have a fundamental duty to this House and to their own Back-Bench colleagues in particular. That duty is to test to destruction the proposition that there is no choice.

Only the Ministers have the army of civil servants, the data, the costings and the honest advice. When a Minister tells their own MPs that they have no choice, surely it must mean exactly that. That is how they secure the support of their Back-Bench colleagues. These Ministers have failed in that duty and have failed their colleagues. Ministerial credibility is a precious resource and this Minister has exhausted hers. If clause 3 was never truly required to tackle court delays, we must ask: what other assertions made by this Front-Bench team are equally unfounded? How can they expect their propositions of “no choice” to be accepted in future, and not just in future but on this very Bill before us today?

We must also be clear that, despite the headlines surrounding this partial retreat, the core damaging framework of the Bill remains almost entirely intact. The Government continue to press ahead with clause 1, which completely strips adult defendants charged with triable either way offences of their historic right to elect for a jury trial. At the same time, clause 6 doubles magistrates’ maximum sentencing powers up to 24 months. That means complex, high-stake cases—including sexual assault, actual bodily harm and burglary—will be retained in summary courts, exposing defendants to two-year prison sentences without ever having access to a jury.

Clause 7 and schedule 2 dismantle the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court. Instead of a full rehearing before a judge and lay magistrates, wrongly convicted individuals will face a restrictive permission barrier on written papers alone.

It should be clear that, taken together, we are still facing a fundamental attack on the existing rights to a jury trial. The provisions still represent a sweeping contraction of access to jury trial and summary justice safeguards. The opposition from legal professions, victims groups and civil liberties organisations remains as firm today as it was on Second Reading.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham Yardley) (Lab)]

As somebody who has had someone elect to have a jury and now awaits a trial in 2029 on a simple order breach, I ask the hon. Gentleman: does he think, in his defence of jury trials, that a victim should be able to say whether they want the case to be tried by a jury, or should it just be the defendant? That is the system we have today. In the light of his desire to see jury trials, does he think that the system should be changed so that anyone can say, “No, I want it to be heard in front of a jury”?

[Dr Mullan]

What we are talking about is where we draw the ledger. I do not think the hon. Member is suggesting that we should have everything done by magistrates. Why not have everything done by magistrates? If it is fundamentally unfair to allow people to have a jury trial, why not let everything be done by magistrates? Then the victims do not have a say on whether it is a jury trial. The point we are clear about is that this is an unprecedented erosion of that right. It was not in the Government’s manifesto, it was until recently largely opposed by very large numbers of their own MPs, and it is based on a premise of necessity that I am afraid is paper thin. Ministers turned around and said that these were things that they had to do to get the backlog down. It turns out that they did not have to do that.

[Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)]

I think the hon. Member misses the point of the question that was just raised. The question he seems to misunderstand is the fact that the right to choose a jury trial is being used by perpetrators to continue the abuse of the victims and survivors. Does he think that the state should be party to continuing that abuse and allowing perpetrators to play the system through a jury trial selection or an appeals process?

[Dr Mullan]

I listened closely to the words that the hon. Member used: she talked about “perpetrators”. We heard the word again and again from Labour Members in Committee. May I remind her that defendants are not guilty until found guilty, and that this erosion of rights affects innocent people, too? Labour Members repeatedly forget that. Being accused does not make you a perpetrator. I ask the hon. Member to think about that carefully.

16:00

[Ayoub Khan (Birmingham Perry Barr) (Ind)]

Does the shadow Minister agree that justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done? One of the key cornerstones of getting justice is being tried by one’s peers, and giving that to a defendant builds confidence in a jury system.

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Gentleman is right. As I pointed out at the start, and as Labour Members have highlighted, it is not just people concerned about defendants who have raised concerns about the proposals; victims have as well. Victims groups wrote an extensive letter to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, asking them to think twice about the erosion of jury trials. Any criticism that Members make of me will, I am afraid, also have to be levelled at the victims who do not agree with them. Victims are not all of one voice on this issue, and we should respect that, instead of assuming that every victim agrees with Labour Members, which they do not.

The erosions under the proposals are significant. This Government, in which trust is so low, also seek for themselves an extraordinary power to do what they set out to do in clause 3 through the back door, via clause 4, in which they are not only introducing judge-only trials in the Crown court for what they describe as lengthy and complex cases, but giving themselves the power to add to the list of eligible cases through order alone, bypassing the fullest scrutiny of Parliament. That is quite extraordinary from a Government who, when in opposition, concerned themselves greatly with the proper use of delegated legislation.

The Opposition remain as concerned as everybody else about the Crown court backlog. We know that victims and innocent defendants are suffering as a result of it, but so much of the Bill will not help, and may make matters worse. That is the reality. I notice that the Minister was happy to repeatedly say in Committee that opposing the measures does not suggest not having concern for victims; I hope that she sticks to that line during the rest of the debate, and I would encourage all of her colleagues to listen to the words that she said. Being concerned about the erosion of jury trial rights does not in any way mean that we do not care about victims, and I hope that the Minister repeats that later.

I was able to visit the Supreme Court yesterday, and I encourage any Members mulling this over to head to the exhibition space and take a look at the replica of Magna Carta. They should read for themselves the words illuminated on the wall: at its heart, the highest and best form of justice is justice delivered by your peers. That brings me to the position of Labour Members. Prior to this partial U-turn, dozens of Labour Back Benchers, including 37 MPs who signed a public letter, expressed deep opposition to the Bill’s proposals to curtail jury trials. They rightly described the stripping of jury rights as “madness” that

“will cause more problems than it solves”.

Labour Members spoke forcefully about the unique value of the jury, yet today, following the removal of just one clause—just one element of this damaging Bill—the Government expect those same Members to walk through the Lobby in support of it. I ask those Members: what has actually changed? Clause 1 still abolishes the right of an ordinary citizen to elect for jury trial. Clause 6 still pushes serious cases into summary courts, where backlogs are already surging, and clause 7 still cuts off automatic appeals. If removing the right to elect a jury trial in either-way cases was wrong before, it remains wrong today. Dropping one element of a bad package does not make the remaining elements good law.

In Committee, Opposition Members and Labour Back Benchers put forward a series of modest, constructive amendments designed to insert basic safeguards into the Bill, and the Government rejected every single one. We tabled amendments to preserve a natural justice exception, ensuring that where a defendant could demonstrate that a summary-only trial would result in a clear breach of natural justice, a jury trial would remain available. The Ministers defeated those amendments. We pressed the Government on the severe misalignment in legal aid—a defendant in a Crown court benefits from higher legal aid eligibility thresholds—but the Government rejected those amendments. Everything we sought to do to protect natural justice and lessen the impact of the Bill was blocked.

[Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)]

I thank the shadow Minister for being generous with his time. What did his Government do in 14 years to ensure that people were tried by their peers? That is exactly what magistrates are there to do. I know that all too well, because my dad served as a magistrate in Warwickshire for over 40 years, and I am proud to say that. Magistrates courts are the bedrock of our justice system. The shadow Minister’s Government did nothing to protect them, but that is exactly what we are doing: we are investing in more magistrates, so that more people can be tried by their peers, and we are supporting those magistrates in doing the job effectively.

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Lady asked what we did to preserve the right to trial by jury. We brought the backlog in the Crown court down from the level we inherited from the previous Labour Government. Prior to the pandemic, our record on the Crown court backlog was better than the previous Labour Government’s, which is something that Labour Members all conveniently seem to forget.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful argument in defence of jury trials. Members are rightly thinking about the impact on victims and defendants, but would he agree that the erosion of jury trial also has significant implications for the judiciary? In jury trials, for the public, the jury very often stands between the defendant, or the convicted, and the judge. If we remove that shield between the two, the judge, their prejudices, demographics and how they were selected become more a focus of public contemplation, and that may in the end lead to political interference in the selection of judges.

[Dr Mullan]

My right hon. Friend is right on both points. As he was speaking, the Justice Secretary said from a sedentary position that he removed that clause. Perhaps he does not understand his own Bill. You are retaining judge-only trials for complex and lengthy cases, and retaining the power to use delegated legislation to allow judges alone to sit on those cases. Exactly the sort of scenario that my right hon. Friend was describing would be produced.

Magistrates have a degree of confidence and community support that is in proportion to the use of their powers. If we significantly increase the use of their powers, the pressure on magistrates, and scrutiny of them, is also likely to increase. Picking up on that point, I want to make sure—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. That is the third time that I have heard the shadow Minister say “you”. It is not my legislation.

[Dr Mullan]

Lucky you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I take that point.

The schedule 1 powers that I have talked about are a significant Henry VIII power. Under proposed statutory instrument powers, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State will have the authority to add further categories of offences to schedule 1 by secondary legislation. I am not aware of any time before in this place when the Secretary of State could use secondary legislation to erode and remove the right to a jury trial from a particular defendant. That is completely unprecedented and indefensible.

The Conservatives do not merely criticise this bad package of legislation; we have repeatedly sought to put forward practical, evidence-based alternatives that tackle the delays without taking a sledgehammer to our constitutional rights. The Government must fix the operational failures that currently waste thousands of court hours every year. Last year, between 23% and 26% of Crown court trials were ineffective. Rather than stripping citizens of jury trial rights, the Minister should be focused instead on failures in prisoner transport, which result in hundreds of trials being derailed, simply because defendants are late to the dock.

The Government must keep all existing courtrooms open and fully funded, and must use new artificial intelligence tools for disclosure and listing, and they must expand live-link video participation. [Interruption.] Ministers on the Front Bench chunter that they are already doing that. If that is the case, why is the Crown court backlog going up? They are clearly not succeeding with the measures that they are bringing forward, and a number of things are getting worse.

We must improve case management and incentivise earlier case resolution, instead of forcing complex cases into the overburdened summary courts, where there are backlogs too. Extraordinarily, the Minister claimed that there was no backlog in the magistrates courts. I do not know how she decides what is or is not a backlog. Cases going up by 10% in one year is a backlog by any measure. I visited Liverpool Crown court, where the wait for trial is roughly half the length of the wait for trial in other parts of the country. The Government should replicate the proactive case management model successfully pioneered in courts like Liverpool, Preston and Cardiff, where active Crown Prosecution Service case ownership and early trial-readiness reviews have driven down backlogs.

Our sunset clause draws attention to the true motivations of this Government. If the Government sincerely feel that these measures are a necessity to bring the backlog down, as they have argued repeatedly to their Back Benchers, our clause is quite clear that when the backlog is down to the pre-covid average for a period of four quarters, these damaging, rights-eroding measures should be withdrawn. I do not expect that the Government will support that proposal today, because fundamentally they do not have the same faith that we do in the importance and value of a jury trial.

The Government’s partial U-turn demonstrates that sustained scrutiny can force a rethink, but a partial U-turn is not enough. The central flaws of the Bill remain: the abolition of the right to elect trial by jury, the risky expansion of summary jurisdiction, the restriction of appeal rights and the creation of secondary powers to expand juryless trials. We should not erode centuries of procedural safeguards to achieve marginal administrative speed gains. I urge hon. Members across the House, and especially those who have previously spoken out against these measures, to stand by their previous words, to stand by their principles, and to reject these remaining clauses tonight.

[Karl Turner (Kingston upon Hull East) (Ind)]

May I begin by welcoming the Justice Secretary to his place, and thank him for his engagement with me over recent weeks? More particularly, may I thank him for appointing Holly Lynch, the former Member of Parliament for Halifax, who apparently—goodness knows why—is still a big fan of me, despite the fact that I have opposed these policies in previous months?

Goodness me, a lot has changed since I last addressed the House on the Bill, and not just in the Bill itself. I welcome the removal of clause 3, which introduced the idea of the Crown court bench division, but let us not pretend that its removal is because of rebels, or opposition from across the House, the Bar Council, the Criminal Bar Association and the Law Society—or indeed, I am told, from the Lady Chief Justice herself. The reality is that the CCBD was completely, unbelievably unworkable, as Members from across the House warned the Government. It would not—could not—have worked. It will never work.

I welcome the fact that the Government have done the right thing—they have listened to those of us who were bitterly opposed to the idea of the CCBD—but I regret to say that I cannot support the Bill today, in its current form. The backlog in the magistrates court is 380,000 cases and rising. The backlog in the Crown court, as I understand it, is 80,000, and it is fairly static; the number is probably falling. If we do away with the right to elect, the backlog will be transferred from the Crown court. The Government estimate that 25,000 fewer cases will be heard in the Crown court, and 5,500 trials will be moved from the Crown court to be heard at summary trial in the magistrates court. Well, that just removes a problem from the Crown court and transfers it to the magistrates court. I do not care what we call it, be it a backlog or something different; however the Government want to describe it, there are 380,000 cases and rising in the magistrates court. That is 380,000 criminal cases, in which complainants are waiting for an outcome—for their trial to be concluded.

I agree that a trial in the magistrates court is a lot quicker than a trial in the Crown court. Of course it is—it is swift, summary justice. But that is why we need to be very cautious about what category of case is heard before a bench of lay magistrates in the magistrates courts. That matters, because the rights and liberty of the accused are at stake. That is why we limit magistrates’ power on sentencing in the system in England and Wales. I cannot support clauses 1 and 2.

16:15

I am concerned about clause 4, which is on judge-only trials. The Government are in listening mode and I am grateful to them, but I am worried. Jonathan Fisher KC, who was the independent reviewer, has reviewed that clause and said it makes no difference. It is true to say that there has been a very complex and lengthy fraud trial in the Crown court, but we should not necessarily jump to the conclusion that the jury members did not understand; I am sure they understood very well. The question might instead be whether the judge properly understood, because it was the judge who dismissed the jury and decided to call it a day and start over.

This is the thin end of the wedge for me. The problem is that the powers are available to the Government to keep pushing forward with more “complex” cases.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is talking about complex and lengthy trials. Has he considered the effect on the Court of Appeal of making those types of trial judge-only? If I have correctly understood the Government’s proposals, they wish to require a judge to give reasons for conviction. Juries need give no reasons for conviction. Does he think that that will change the rate and frequency of appeals to the Court of Appeal in such cases?

[Karl Turner]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes a very good point—of course it will. When a judge is required to give reasons, counsel for the by-then appellant is poring over the judge’s statement, looking at every single line. Clever people such as the very eminent King’s counsel, the right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox), will be instructed to pore over the judgments in those cases, and the likelihood of an appeal will increase. The beauty of a jury trial is that the men and women—the ordinary citizens who are picked at random and summoned to court to hear a trial as a member of a jury—go home at the end of the case and very rarely, and certainly not publicly, speak about the case again. There is no requirement to give reasons in that scenario.

[Ayoub Khan]

On appeals, if elected trials do not happen and cases are dealt with summarily, there is a good prospect that those appeals will also find their way into the Crown court. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that would not allay the concerns that the Government want to address?

[Karl Turner]

I agree completely, and the hon. Gentleman makes the point very strongly indeed.

Clause 6 is on magistrates’ sentencing powers. I cannot support the idea of magistrates having powers to give sentences of between 18 and 24 months without a credible plan to address the dire, desperate need to recruit magistrates, legal advisers, court staff and lawyers. That risks just transferring the pressure rather than solving the backlog. That is the reality of what this Bill will do.

That brings me to the anomaly in the Bill. As currently drafted, it presents a fairly obvious problem: a defendant of good character, with no previous convictions and who has never been arrested, interviewed, charged, prosecuted or convicted of a criminal offence is likely, by virtue of the sentencing guidelines on an either-way offence, to be tried in front of a magistrates court, whereas a defendant with numerous previous convictions, by virtue of the fact that under the guidelines that offending behaviour exceeds the three-year threshold, gets the benefit of a Crown court trial.

Let us picture the scenario: a section 47 offence of actual bodily harm is triable either way. This is a serious assault in a domestic scenario. Defendant A has no previous convictions and has never been convicted by a criminal court—

[Jess Phillips]

Just because a domestic abuser has no prior convictions, it does not mean he does not have priors. It does not mean he has good character.

[Karl Turner]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. She is absolutely right, of course. In my experience, offenders who appear in incredibly serious cases of violence in domestic scenarios have often never had previous convictions.

Let us think about the fairness of this scenario. Defendant A, who has never been convicted of a criminal offence, is charged with a section 47 ABH and appears in a summary trial. It is a very serious assault, an ABH. Defendant B, who has had numerous convictions over his adult life—let us be honest, it is mainly men who commit domestic assaults; that is the truth of it—gets the benefit of a trial in front of a jury. How is that possibly—[Interruption.] Well, it is a benefit. I am hearing “Why is it a benefit?”

[Jess Phillips]

A longer sentence is the benefit.

[Karl Turner]

I am hearing comments from a sedentary position. I have an awful lot of time for my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), I truly have—she is a mate of mine, as it happens—but there is a benefit to a jury trial.

The reality is that when a defendant appears in a summary trial before a bench of lay magistrates or a district judge, it is swift, summary justice. The evidence is heard, but it is not heard and presented in the same way as it is in a Crown court. That is just the truth. A Crown court trial in that scenario would last four or five days, and potentially into a second week. There is an opportunity to call defence evidence. Legal aid is available for experts. There is the potential for reports by the defence and the prosecution. It is about equality before the law. That is the reality of the scenario, and I cannot believe that this consequence is intended by this Labour Government. That is why I say that I cannot possibly support clause 6.

[Emily Darlington]

Is my hon. Friend aware of the Rape Crisis report that says that juries bring misconceptions and bias into the system and are less likely to convict? I am sure he is not talking about that being the benefit, is he?

[Karl Turner]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the intervention. I will be honest: I did not know about the report, but I am keen to have a look.

[Dr Mullan]

As I said in my opening speech, a number of women’s victims rights groups were the leading critics of getting rid of jury trials. We cannot make out that victims have a singular view on this and that they are happy with it. There are different opinions among victims groups, and many of them agree with the hon. Gentleman.

[Jess Phillips]

None of them agree with you about the presumption of contact.

[Karl Turner]

Well, I am not going to get into the whys and wherefores of this particular juncture of the debate.

There is an easy fix for the scenario that I have described. My amendment 47 states that where a defendant has no previous convictions and the court decides that the case is suitable for summary trial, that defendant should be entitled to elect to have their trial in the Crown court. I do not think that the numbers will be very big. It is probably impossible for the Ministry of Justice to do modelling. In the 16 years that I have been a Member of this House and have been involved in debating criminal justice issues, I have rarely seen MOJ modelling that has been anywhere near accurate. However, even if it could do the modelling—I suspect it cannot, because that data is not kept—the numbers would be tiny. Why? Because only 0.4% of all convictions in the magistrates court are appealed.

However, in 41% of that 0.4% of cases—it is a tiny number—the conviction is overturned in the Crown court, because there has been a wrong decision. The Bar Council has produced more up-to-date data, which suggests that that 41% has now gone up to 56%. More than half the cases that are appealed from the magistrates to the Crown court for a rehearing end up with a defendant who was convicted in the magistrates court being acquitted in the Crown court. Why do I say that there is a benefit to a Crown court hearing? It speaks for itself.

What could the Government do instead? There is plenty that they could do. They could implement the relevant recommendations of the Leveson review. They could improve co-ordination between the police, the CPS and the courts to progress and identify unnecessary prosecutions earlier. It happens to be a fact that prosecutions sometimes end because the CPS—the Crown—throws in the towel. There is lots to welcome in the Bill, and I do welcome it, but there is too much in it for me to support it at this time.

Finally, I want to say a few words of gratitude. I thank the Prime Minister, because from the very outset of my opposition to the worst excesses of the Bill, he was supporting me in the background. Similarly, Lord Sadiq Khan was there texting me, encouraging me and supporting me when it mattered. My biggest thank you of all is reserved for my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) for her bravery in standing up, waiving her anonymity and explaining her personal situation in the criminal justice system, in the face of all the pressure that was being exerted on Members who had the audacity to say that these measures were not suitable for a Labour Government to be implementing. We suffered the pressure exerted on us, and my hon. Friend showed real bravery and determination. For that, I will forever respect her.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. Can I just emphasise to Members that votes will come at 6 o’clock, which leaves us very little time, and inevitably not all Members will get in? I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The entire criminal justice system is on the brink of collapse. We can all agree today that the current backlog in our Crown courts is unacceptable, untenable and unsustainable. The situation we face—a backlog sitting at over 80,000 cases and victims of rape waiting on average 424 days for their case to complete—is the direct result of the historic and monumental failings of successive Governments. Whether it is a lack of prison places, soaring reoffending rates or the horrendous backlog in the Crown courts with a growing backlog in the magistrates, it is a national emergency waiting to happen. But the Government’s plans to address this situation have been equally dangerous. Under Keir Starmer, this Government led us down a path—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. We must refer to other Members by their constituencies. Oh, he is not a Member any more—apologies!

16:30

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Under Keir Starmer, this Government led us down a path towards curtailing jury trials, presenting it as the only way to deal with the backlog. That was despite widespread opposition from the legal profession and Parliament, including from their own Benches, and despite the absence of any coherent modelling or trialling to demonstrate the impact of the proposed Crown court bench division. Political capital was wasted pursuing a solution that was never feasible. What we are presented with today is still fundamentally a flawed plan.

We remain deeply concerned about the pressure that these changes will place on magistrates courts. The plans for those charged with either-way offences to lose their right to elect trial by jury, alongside the increases in sentencing powers and the removal of the right to appeal, will place immense and dangerous pressure on magistrates courts, while simultaneously removing vital safeguards. The Government now predict that an additional 25,000 cases will be added to magistrates court caseloads each year, and the current rate of increase in the backlog of open cases is expected to be 9%—it is exceeding that of the Crown court backlog.

Increased complexity also raises questions regarding the suitability of summary justice to deal with these cases—a point that has been raised by the Bar Council and others. I also have profound concerns about the experiences of victims in summary justice; it is not just the Crown court where victims are so often failed. The Minister spoke very powerfully about Morwenna. I remember Morwenna’s powerful testimony. I am thinking today about Georgia, whose case in the magistrates court was postponed four times in a row. She spent months and months of building herself up for that moment before being totally failed because she did not get her day in court. The Government have done little to address those concerns, which is why amendment 11, tabled in my name, remains on the amendment paper. It would prevent magistrates’ sentencing powers from being increased beyond 12 months.

The Liberal Democrats also fundamentally oppose the removal of the automatic right to appeal decisions made by magistrates. This is a vital safeguard for summary justice, where lay magistrates are expected to make decisions with significant and real consequences. On the whole, we all agree that they make these decisions very well, with fewer than 1% of cases being appealed. But of those cases, the latest figures show that 56% were successful. We are now expecting magistrates courts to hear more complex cases carrying higher sentences at the same time as the Government are bluntly removing this protection against those miscarriages of justice. The Government want to speed up the process within a system, but changing the appeals process at this point is unnecessary and frankly dangerous. The reasoning, as per their own response, is:

“If we do not reform the appeals process, we expect absolute volumes of appeals to the Crown Court to increase given the impact of other reforms will be to retain more cases in magistrates’ courts.”

Let us reflect on that for a moment. Over half of current appeals are currently successful, and because the Government believe this number may increase, they are satisfied to remove that safeguard. How can the Minister defend a position that removes that vital safeguard in summary justice, while also accepting that it would be more needed than ever?

There is also scant provision in this Bill for, or consideration of, the implications for legal representation in magistrates court. Currently, there are differing income thresholds for legal aid between the Crown and magistrates courts. Shifting cases from the Crown courts will mean that many more defendants who may be accused of crimes carrying sentences of up to 24 months will be ineligible for legal aid, leaving them unrepresented. Baron Leveson reflected in his review that the differing thresholds for legal aid could be creating a “perverse incentive” for a defendant to choose the Crown court, but the Government rejected Baron Leveson’s recommendation in their response yesterday.

This not only has a profound effect on fairness in our justice system; it also affects the Government’s assumptions about how quickly the backlogs can be cleared. A lack of legal aid impedes efficiency and will slow down cases, leaving victims and defendants waiting once again. That is why we have tabled amendment 18, which links legal aid to the severity of the sentence, rather than the venue of the trial, and we have written to every Member of the House asking them to support it.

New clause 20, tabled in my name, requires all new contracts for court-related services to include performance penalties, to put an end to these sham contracts that are currently failing to deliver prisoners on time.

The Liberal Democrats also believe that opportunities have been missed to maximise the use of time within the existing court structures. There is scope to increase the number of trials heard in selected courtrooms across England and Wales from one to two a day. That approach was trialled during covid, and it resulted in 3.5 trials per week being cleared, compared with fewer than 0.9 trials in courtrooms operating under standard hours. New clause 4 calls for a review of the feasibility of hearing two trials a day in selected courtrooms, split between morning and afternoon sessions, with each trial sitting for four hours. Solutions such as this—which have not been explored by this Government, as confirmed in Committee—would supercharge the Crown court process, with a specific focus on clearing the backlog.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I recognise the hon. Member’s enthusiasm for making the criminal courts work more efficiently, but I put to her a practical problem with the solution she proposes of courts starting at 9 o’clock in the morning—especially if we were not able to resolve the problem she identified of prisoners not always being brought to court on time. She will recognise that those of us who represent criminal clients in the criminal courts do not start our day at the time the court starts; we start a lot earlier. The opportunity to speak to our client, discuss the case properly with them and perhaps find a way of resolving the case without the need for a trial is extremely valuable. Does she recognise that problem?

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Absolutely. The right hon. and learned Member makes a really important point about the prisoner escort and custody services contract and ensuring that defendants are delivered to court on time, but not all defendants going into a Crown court are being held on remand. There are also defendants on bail who can get themselves to court, and it would be up to the listing officers to ensure that those cases are heard in the morning, which would take off the pressure that the PECS contracts clearly have in delivering people to start at a 10 am slot; instead, those defendants might be arriving for a 2 pm slot. He raises an important point and gives me a lovely opportunity to explain why I have thought about that and how we would overcome it.

New clause 2 supports the implementation of fast-track courts for rape and serious sexual offences. We have heard powerful testimony across the House during the passage of the Bill about the need for rape and serious sexual offence courts, which we on the Liberal Democrat Benches have called for. It was therefore welcome when the Government announced their plans to implement them, but it is puzzling that they have not included those provisions in the Bill, because there is no point in waiting—these courts should be implemented urgently, to bring an end to the disgraceful waits that these victims are facing.

The Government also announced when they agreed to roll out these RASSO courts that all judges presiding over them will undergo specialist trauma-informed training. Given the Government’s decision not to include domestic abuse cases in these RASSO courts, that would surely strengthen the case for having universal specialist trauma-informed training for all of the judiciary, which we have called for throughout the passage of the Bill.

New clause 11 would give victims the right to receive transcripts of all judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to their case. Amendment 15 is particularly relevant given the direction of the Bill, as it would ensure that magistrates court transcripts are free for victims and accessible within 14 days. On the issue of transcripts, the Government have made real progress, which I welcome. Many victims choose not to attend the entirety of their hearing or trial, and even when they do attend, being able to process the events of a court case afterwards provides a valuable opportunity to better understand why those decisions were made. Transcripts being freely accessible aids in moving forward with one’s life, and at every turn, the Liberal Democrats will continue to push the Government to go further.

Finally, I turn to new clause 17, tabled in my name. The Courts Act 2003 introduced Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration, which was established in 2005 but then closed in 2010. A 2022 Justice Committee report found that the argument for closing the inspectorate had not stood the test of time and called for the re-establishment of an inspectorate body. In his review, Baron Leveson also recommended a mechanism to inspect His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, which was rejected by the Government. This is a particularly important time to introduce the additional oversight that a courts inspectorate would provide—a position that was also supported by the Victims’ Commissioner.

In conclusion, the Government have approached this issue in the wrong way, pushing unworkable measures, opposed by those working in the legal sector who have to deliver the reforms, and eroding the safeguards that protect those who come into contact with the criminal justice system, be it defendants or victims. The Bill before us today makes dangerous changes that will have little effect on the backlog. That is why the Liberal Democrats will be unable to support the Bill, which is unfortunate especially given the good clauses at the end of the Bill that deal with the serious issues around presumption.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the Chair of the Justice Committee.

[Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)]

When I first put on my barrister’s robes and horse hair wig nearly 20 years ago, victims and defendants were not commonly waiting years for trial, victims of rape and serious sexual assault were not having their cases adjourned at the last minute multiple times, and it was not common to see significant numbers of defendants in the magistrates courts facing custodial sentences without lawyers and representing themselves.

Years of austerity, court closures, pandemic pressures, court sitting day limits and increasingly complex evidence have driven the Crown court backlog to 80,000 cases. Removing the limits on court sitting days has not been enough. The backlog is still going up and our criminal justice system remains in crisis. I welcome the fact that this Bill is now back before the House, as further action is needed. I thank the Government for responding last week to the Justice Committee’s June report on the Bill. I welcome Government amendment 3, which directly answers the concerns raised by the Committee and Members across this House regarding the proposed Crown court bench division, where a judge, without a jury, would have decided cases.

The Committee raised a number of other concerns. I will focus on three: the impact of magistrates courts delays, how the question of whether cases stay with the magistrates court or go to the Crown court will be determined, and the impact of the number of people representing themselves in our criminal courts, which is already too high. In order for the backlog in the Crown court to come down in this Parliament, as the Government intend, the reforms are to be brought forward sooner. I want to see rapid action, but we cannot ignore the storm that is gathering in our magistrates courts.

Clause 6 doubles magistrates’ sentencing powers to up to 24 months’ custody, shifting significant caseloads out of the Crown court, but the backlogs in our magistrates courts are already climbing month on month. Even without these reforms, the workload in magistrates courts over the last three years has increased by 65%. The Committee made it clear that without “significant additional support”, our local courts will not be able to cope.

It is positive that the Government are confident that they are on track to meet their target of 21,000 magistrates, taking numbers back to where they were in 2014, and I welcome additional recruitment of trainee legal advisers and district judges. But will that be enough? Will it happen fast enough? Do we even have enough physical courts to cope with demand, when 165 magistrates courts were closed between 2010 and 2020.

[Ayoub Khan]

Is there not another problem? Even if we had capacity at the magistrates courts, where trials would be taken away from the Crown courts, is not the elephant in the room that we do not have enough lawyers?

[Jess Phillips]

There’s loads around here!

[Catherine Atkinson]

While there are some lawyers on the Benches of this House, there are also many coming through the ranks; we need to ensure that they are going into the criminal justice system, and I am concerned that we are not seeing enough taking that path.

Accelerating reforms means accelerating the strain on our magistrates court, so will the Minister bring forward target dates to match the accelerated timeline? Precisely what capacity will be added to the magistrates court before this wave of work arrives?

Removing the right to elect in either-way offences drives an even bigger wave of work into the magistrates court. I understand the Government’s concern that more and more defendants are electing a jury trial; many are exploiting the Crown court delays and betting that victims and witnesses will tire and pull out. I have spoken to lawyers and judges who share our frustration. However, if the right to elect is removed, the allocation guidelines that the magistrates apply in deciding whether defendants should face a magistrates court or a jury trial should be reviewed.

16:45

Currently, magistrates send cases to the Crown court on only two narrow grounds: that the sentencing will be more than they have the power to impose, or that the case is too complex. The Justice Committee warned that that was not enough and is too inflexible. Let me give just three examples of what might lead magistrates to consider it just to send cases to the Crown court: cases where the defendant is of good character, with no previous convictions; where their conviction would potentially pose exceptional hardship to others, such as a single parent, as custody would force their children into care; or where victims have justifiable reasons for wanting a jury trial. In cases such as those, limited and rigid rules fall short. That is why I have tabled amendment 69, which would grant the magistrates court a more flexible discretion to send a case to the Crown court whenever the interests of justice demand it. We should trust our magistrates with that judgment.

We are seeing far too many defendants representing themselves in the magistrates court because they earn too much to qualify for legal aid. Our legal aid report found that as many as 48% of defendants appeared in 2023 without representation for imprisonable, summary-only offences. We also found that today, an adult working full time at the national minimum wage may earn too much to qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court. We have low-paid workers walking into courtrooms without a lawyer to advise and guide them. They do not understand the rules, and the consequences if they lose could mean that they lose everything—their job, their home and their family. This may be an inherited crisis, but making it worse is a choice.

Legal aid means tests are tougher in the magistrates court than the Crown court, and the Government’s equality assessment acknowledged that the Bill could mean that defendants who currently get legal aid in the Crown court would not get it in the magistrates court. Baron Leveson and the Justice Committee have called for the threshold in the magistrates court to be increased to stop that happening, but, as we have heard, the Government’s response published yesterday rejected that recommendation. They have said that they will look at thresholds only once the changes in the Bill have been implemented.

I have therefore tabled amendment 70, which is based on a recommendation by the Committee that would require the Government to increase the legal aid thresholds in the magistrates court before the removal of the right to elect can be implemented. I urge the Minister to consider giving us that commitment today. Otherwise, the House is being asked to double the sentencing powers of magistrates and remove the right to elect without any reassurances that defendants who cannot afford to pay privately will be legally represented.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

As the hon. Lady has just turned a page, I am confident that she will go on to the fact that, at the same time, the Government are proposing to remove the automatic right of appeal. If somebody has no legal background and cannot navigate a system that is totally alien to them, they will not know how to follow the process or what legal backing they could have if they had grounds for appeal.

[Catherine Atkinson]

I am very conscious of the time available for this very important legislation, so I am turning the page to conclude.

To return to where I started, I welcome the Government’s commitment to bringing down the backlog. However, if we sweep the queue away from the steps of the Crown court only to lengthen the line around the block at the local magistrates court, we will not serve that aim, and we will continue to fail victims of crime and defendants alike.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. I will be introducing a five-minute time limit after the next speaker.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I draw your attention, Madam Deputy Speaker, and the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

It has been a peculiar pleasure to listen to the two speeches made so far by Labour Back Benchers. Both the speech of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and that of the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson), have been treats to listen to, and I feel I can do no better than to say, “Listen to both of them.” However, it would be wrong of me to say that I oppose the Bill in its entirety. The truth is that some of its provisions contain very useful and reasonable directions of travel. Personally, I do not have the profoundest objection to grounds needing to be given for an appeal to the Crown court. I think that would be a reasonable thing to require, provided that the Chairman of the Select Committee’s warnings are heeded and those who have to fill out that appeal are given the opportunity of advice. As has been said, I think by Opposition Members, the problem is that there is a lack of legal advisers in the magistrates court—what we used to call magistrates court clerks.

That brings me to another way in which I should commend the Minister and the Government. The initiative to enhance the resources of the magistrates court can only be a good thing, although I must warn the Minister that the recruitment of more magistrates is something that we looked at years ago, when I sat in the position that she now sits in. It is social and economic factors that are effecting the diminution in the number of those willing and able to put themselves forward for this onerous type of public service, so that diminution is not going to be remediable just by brave words and advertisements. It is going to have to be a sustained campaign, and it will not happen even in the term that she will serve as Minister—long may that continue. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That was not a wish—it was an observation—but nevertheless, it was heartfelt.

With those cautious commendations given, though, I have to return to the very focus and centre of this Bill. It is a bit like asking us to be grateful to the crocodile who leaves us with our head after it has taken our legs. The reality is that the right of election of trial by jury is at the very heart of the right itself. Since the 17th century, Governments of all colours that have come and gone have continued to respect that as a right, not as a concession or a privilege afforded by the state to a defendant. It is perfectly true that in Scotland it is the court that decides whether or not the defendant should enjoy the right of trial by jury, but in England, it has always been a right—a right given, broadly speaking, to anybody accused of an offence serious enough to warrant more than 12 months’ imprisonment.

For the first time in English legal and political history, a Government have decided to breach that right, and to make the decision reside with the representatives of the state. That places the decision out of the hands of a powerless defendant—some of the most powerless in our society. Some of them may very well be guilty. Many of them may very well be guilty, but the system we have adopted over the centuries does not legislate so much for the guilty, but for the innocent caught up in the system. So many examples in history have shown how the innocent can be caught up in this system, and it is for the innocent that the criminal justice system is ultimately designed. It is designed for their vindication, requiring against them the level, burden and standard of proof that the criminal justice system enforces, with the presumption of innocence.

[Jess Phillips]

rose—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Because time is short, I will give way to the hon. Lady, but only she.

[Jess Phillips]

What the right hon. and learned Member is saying about the system being designed for the innocent is compelling, but the system is absolutely not designed for the person who is absolutely innocent in the system, and that is the victim. No part of the system asks them to elect where the trial might go. No part of the system asks them if they think it should be appealed. The real innocent—the definitely innocent—gets no say.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

That invites a long answer, which I do not have time now to give, but any defendant who appears before a court enjoys the presumption of innocence, and it is upon that basis that any system has to proceed. In England, the right has been accorded to those who enjoy this presumption of innocence to decide where they should be tried. Any abrogation of that right, such as for an offence that carries a sentence of more than 12 months’ imprisonment, removes the power from the individual and hands it to the state. In England—peculiarly in England—it has always been regarded as the right of a defendant. Make no mistake, this is an historic Bill for that reason.

To remove and abrogate the right of a litigant to trial by a jury of their peers has exactly the effect that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East has said. A person of good character, a professional person or an employee in the workplace accused of theft from his employer—all of these would have had the right to say, “No, I wish to have the careful and meticulous process that the Crown court provides, not the swift and summary justice that the magistrates court provides.” That person may suffer for the remaining years of their life the most profound impact upon their history. A Member of this House accused could be tried before the magistrates court, despite the impact and consequences that that might produce. In the magistrates court, the only criteria will be whether it might receive more than two years’ imprisonment. Many such offences would not. That is broadly the criteria that is applied by the magistrates.

If this egregious act is to be taken by this House, I strongly support that the Chairman of the Select Committee’s recommendation be taken on board by the Minister, because unless the magistrates have the express ability to consider whether someone is of good character, whether they have a profession, whether it would mean that they would be disqualified forever from whatever profession they are in, or expelled from their employment—with massive implications for the rest of their life—how can it be fair or proper to impose upon that person a system of summary justice that cannot, at its heart, achieve the levels of fairness of a Crown court trial? That is not only because legal aid is available in the Crown court, but because of the forensic scrutiny that the allegation is placed under. The automatic right of appeal has always been provided in the magistrates court, even where the sentence would be less than 12 months, because it has always been acknowledged that the kind of justice distributed in the magistrates court is necessarily swift and necessarily summary.

There are not provisions for the disclosure of unused material in the magistrates court. What is to be done about those, if offences are now going to be tried that might carry a two-year imprisonment? None of these things have yet been thought through within this Bill. There has simply been a transference from the Crown court to the magistrates court, in breach of a provision and a right that has been respected in this country for 300 years.

I therefore say that Members should listen to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East and to the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Derby North. They spoke the milk of human wisdom, and I suspect the fact that it came from them is not wholly unrelated to the fact that each of them have years of experience in professional practice in the courts. Heed them.

I urge the Minister—even if she is to take the step that I profoundly oppose and regard as an historic mistake: the abrogation and dilution of the right to trial by jury, making it, in fact, no longer a right but a concession made by the state to the individual—to listen, please, to the comments, the recommendations and the warnings given by those on her own side. For someone of good character to come before a court for the first time, facing a two-year sentence of imprisonment, and for the magistrate to be unable to consider such a factor would, in many cases, constitute the profoundest injustice. The risk is that over the coming years there will be all the appalling, wearisome, grievous experiences of realising that injustice has actually been done, although the whole system that we have devised over the centuries was designed to avoid that at all costs.

17:00

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I come to this debate with experience. I spent 15 years as a prosecutor, and during that time I was designated a sexual abuse prosecutor, which meant that I dealt with a great many cases involving sexual abuse and of course, domestic and other violence. I then defended cases, both in the magistrates court and, obviously, in the Crown court.

I welcome the Government’s decision to get rid of clause 3. I also welcome their decision to introduce a RASSO court, and the money that will ensure that that happens. I am grateful for the fact that the Government have listened. However, the central plank of my argument is that restricting jury trials is assumed to be the panacea that will solve the problem of the backlogs in both the magistrates court and the Crown court, which, with respect, is not the case.

The reasons for those two backlogs are virtually identical. Covid played a massive part, but so did closures in the magistrates court as well as the Crown court. The number of judicial sitting days were cut massively in the Crown court, and there were not enough sittings in the magistrates court because of the record shortage of lay magistrates. The cuts in legal aid for defendants in both the magistrates court and the Crown court have caused problems. Defendants in the Crown court often do not know what they are doing until they have sorted out their finances and can obtain legal advice from lawyers, and many who appear in the magistrates court are not represented.

We must also not forget that the police and other bodies in the criminal justice system have caused delays. Sometimes evidence is not ready when a trial starts. That applies particularly to unused materials and forensic evidence. In many instances pleas have not been discussed, and I know that even now many lawyers who are in court find that on the day of the trial there is a gaping hole in the evidence. That is something that we do not talk about. There is a capacity issue in other parts of the criminal justice system, and that must be dealt with as well. There has also been a problem with the prison services who produce defendants in courts. Defendants are often not produced in time, and that has an impact on trials, which are adjourned to other dates. The backlog is caused by those factors, not by the fact that in the case of either-way offences defendants have been electing for Crown court trials.

I believe that the Government have made a good start. They have spent money on increasing the number of judicial sitting days. However, I ask them to go further, and to provide even more sitting days, open up even more courtrooms in both the magistrates court and the Crown court, and, of course, ensure that there is proper legal provision for everyone. I think that that, along with the other things I have mentioned, will bring the court backlogs down. However, I am concerned about an aspect of the Bill that others have already mentioned.

At present, someone who is convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal against conviction and sentence. Most people who appear in the magistrates court are unrepresented. The Bill currently states that such people must make a reasoned argument to the judge to obtain leave to appeal, but there is no way an ordinary lay person will be able to draft complicated legal arguments to justify why a sentence or, especially, a conviction should be considered further. I know that if I had to draft grounds for appeal, it would take me hours and days. I cannot imagine an ordinary person being able to that, because the court would have to say, “Fundamentally, you’re wrong in so many aspects.” Because of that, there will be unfairness in the magistrates court if people are not given their right, and we have heard that 56% of appeals are successful. The system is there for a purpose, and it helps.

Coming back to the RASSO courts, I know that some of my colleagues have talked about victims. Of course we all want to protect victims, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) said—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. I call Sir Andrew Mitchell.

[Sir Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)]

I want to draw the House’s attention to new clause 22, which I have tabled with the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), my parliamentary neighbour, whose absence from the Government Front Bench is a matter of regret to all of us on the Conservative Benches. I thank both the Lord Chancellor and the shadow Lord Chancellor for engaging with us on these issues. The new clause would restrict immunity from civil suits for police officers in relation to certain conduct in preparation for criminal court proceedings.

I want to draw the House’s attention to a deeply troubling development in our law. Last year the Court of Appeal handed down a judgment that, in my view, risks placing police forces beyond proper accountability for serious wrongdoing committed during the preparation of criminal cases. If left unaddressed, this new legal principle could make it far harder for victims of police misconduct to obtain justice, even where the harm that they have suffered is severe and life-changing. The doctrine has been described as a form of police misconduct immunity. We all know that the rule of law depends on a simple principle: no one is above the law—not politicians, not public officials and not the police.

New clause 22, which I have tabled with the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley, would restore accountability and make it clear that there cannot be one rule for the police and another for everyone else. The issue arises directly from the 2025 Court of Appeal case of the chief constable of Sussex police and the CPS v. XGY. I know that the hon. Lady will refer to the case of XGY if she catches your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker. The victim of the abuse had given her confidential refuge address to the Sussex police, and that address was later disclosed in court, exposing her location to the abuser and forcing her to flee.

The Court of Appeal answered the question by extending what is known as core immunity. Historically, this immunity was narrow but existed to protect witnesses and advocates for what they say and do in court, allowing them to give evidence freely without fear of being sued, but the Court’s judgment went much further. It expanded that protection beyond the courtroom and into the wider process of criminal investigation and prosecution preparation. In practical terms, it means that certain police actions connected to a future prosecution may now be shielded from legal challenge, even where those actions caused significant harm. The Court’s ruling therefore raises serious concerns about whether victims will be able to seek redress when police misconduct, negligence, human rights breaches or serious errors occur. That is why the case of XGY matters far beyond the individual victim involved.

I want to illustrate the practical consequences of the new doctrine, and the human cost, through another case with which I have been closely involved for some years: the case of Ali Kololo. Mr Kololo is a Kenyan forest dweller and woodcutter who was wrongfully convicted in 2013 in connection with the murder of a British tourist and the kidnapping of that tourist’s spouse, Judith Tebbutt. These were grave crimes. At the time, I was the Secretary of State for International Development and was engaged in the Government’s response to the kidnapping through COBRA, but we now know that Ali Kololo was innocent. A Kenyan court has since overturned his conviction, with the evidence showing that he had become a scapegoat in a deeply flawed investigation.

What makes this case particularly troubling is that the Metropolitan police played a significant role in supporting the investigation. The Independent Office for Police Conduct found that a senior Metropolitan police officer had a case to answer for gross misconduct. The investigation concluded that the evidence provided by the officer had the potential to mislead the court, because important forensic information had been omitted. The consequences for Mr Kololo were catastrophic. He spent 11 years in prison, he faced a death sentence, and he endured abuse, illness and separation from his family. He lost years of his life that can never be returned, and although his conviction was eventually quashed and he was released, he has yet to receive redress for the harm he suffered.

Let me be clear: the original principle of witness immunity serves an important purpose—witnesses should be able to give evidence without fear of personal litigation, and our justice system depends on that protection—but extending immunity far beyond the courtroom and into the wider conduct of criminal investigations risks creating an accountability gap.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Clause 17 of the Bill—Jack and Paul’s law—fulfils my constituent Claire Throssell’s promise to her two beautiful boys after they were killed in a house fire set alight by their known domestically abusive father during a court-ordered contact visit. Claire promised her sons that no more children should lose their lives like they did at the hands of an abusive parent. For nearly 12 years, she has campaigned relentlessly to honour that promise. When I first met Claire, I told her that if I was elected, I would do all I could to help her fulfil that promise, so it is a pleasure to have her in the Chamber with us today. I urge Members across the House to support this Bill and ensure that no more children die like Claire’s sons did, and that no more towns like our hometown of Penistone are left to grieve.

Clause 17 will repeal the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989: our Government putting children’s best interests first and tackling the pro-contact culture that prioritises parental involvement over children’s welfare. This is urgent. Domestic abuse continues to be everyday business in the family courts, featuring in 90% of the cases reviewed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner in 2025. Being a parent is a privilege, not a right, and when a parent poses a serious risk to a child, the law must act. Conservative Governments had a decade to act after the tragic murder of Claire’s boys and her campaign to change the law.

[Kirith Entwistle (Bolton North East) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is staggering that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan), did not even mention amendment 67, tabled in his name, in his remarks?

[Dr Tidball]

I do indeed agree with my hon. Friend.

The Tories failed to act while they were in government, despite the fact that it was a Conservative Government who commissioned the harm report published in 2020. The report stated that

“the presumption should not remain in its present form”,

and recommended addressing its “detrimental effects”. It specifically said that

“the courts’ pro-contact culture operates as a barrier to addressing domestic abuse”,

with the presumption reinforcing that culture and children’s voices being “muted or unheard”, leaving children invisible and silenced like those referred to only as Child A or B in serious case reviews. But Conservative Governments did nothing, and the retention of presumption continued to be fatal.

Since Jack and Paul’s murders in 2014, 19 more children—who we know of—have died at the hands of known domestically abusive parents, including Sara Sharif. That makes a total of 68 child homicides since Women’s Aid started researching this issue. Yet today the Conservatives have the audacity to attempt to remove Jack and Paul’s law from this Bill with their amendment 67. They have the audacity to ignore a report their Government commissioned and to table that amendment, after the inaction of no fewer than five Conservative Prime Ministers. I will not stand for it. Claire Throssell, my fearless constituent, will not stand for it. The people of Penistone and Stocksbridge, so many of whom have stood behind Claire and held her up, will not stand for it. I ask this House to show that it will not stand for it either, and to vote to finally repeal the presumption of contact in law, in order to demonstrate that this House believes that every decision that this Government make in the family courts and justice system must prioritise children’s safety, wellbeing and right to grow up free from harm.

17:16

At the heart of Jack and Paul’s law is a simple principle: a child’s safety must always come first. As the Minister for victims, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), has said, if we remove the presumption of parental involvement, the courts will approach every case on the basis of what is best for the child. Where a parent poses a risk, courts will continue to be able to restrict their involvement. Children have a right to live free from harm. Claire’s loss was the ultimate loss for any parent, but the violence that ended with Jack and Paul being murdered by her ex-husband started with his violence against her. Other measures in the Bill will cumulatively act as a shield and a sword for victims like Claire.

Two years ago, in my Westminster Hall debate on presumption, I implored the Courts Minister to let us not just imagine a world where the voices of children were put at the heart of our family court system, but legislate for it, so that children like Jack and Paul are listened to, and not ignored; and to legislate for a world where childhood is free from fear and oppression, and where children live the lives that they deserve to live. That Minister listened. Today, we have the opportunity to vote for a clause and Bill that do that, so we no longer need to imagine that world, but can make it a reality.

[Sarah Pochin (Runcorn and Helsby) (Reform)]

I make my contribution as someone who served as a magistrate for 20 years. I am deeply concerned about increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers to two years of custody. That must be accompanied by rigorous training, because in reality we get good and bad, and experienced and inexperienced, magistrates on magistrates’ benches. For a lay person, removing the liberty of another is one of the biggest decisions that they can make.

I am also concerned about the presumption of suspension of all custodial sentences of up to 12 months. That is what is in the guidelines, but in training, magistrates are being told that there is a presumption of suspension of sentences of up to 18 months. Punishment should not be dumbed down because of insufficient prison places. Furthermore, the Government are leaving the supervision of the requirements of community orders in the hands of the Probation Service. How can those in the Probation Service be qualified to do that, when they are not trained to do that, unlike magistrates? Even more troubling is the fact those in the Probation Service are being given the power to cancel community orders, if they feel that the offender has been sufficiently rehabilitated. This comes at a time when the Probation Service has never been so overwhelmed and underfunded. The policy of the presumptive suspension of sentences, and the removal of magistrates’ powers to decide on community orders, betray justice for victims.

[Jess Phillips]

There are so many things in the Bill that I could talk about, but I shall start where my friend, the right hon. Member for the royal town of Sutton Coldfield (Sir Andrew Mitchell), left off; I am from the royal town of Birmingham Yardley. I want to get Members to understand what we are seeking to change and clarify in law. When we are in this Chamber, we do not get sued for the things we say. I can be held accountable for anything I say—I would not say it on X, because I would not go on it—until I walk into this building. Civil action could be taken against me for work that I did leading up to that point. Let me set out what the judgment that the right hon. Gentleman talked about means. In cases in which the police or the Crown Prosecution Service make mistakes, they should of course have immunity covering all the time that leads up to them entering court, as any witness does; but that that immunity cannot cover them against civil action relating to anything that happened in the case. If I had a pound for every time I have seen terrible mistakes made by police officers or the CPS, I could get rid of your backlog—not your backlog, Madam Deputy Speaker, but the nation’s.

I want to be clear about how dangerous the overreach is that results from the Court’s decision to allow that immunity, and will refer to some cases that caused Front Benchers to change the law. These were legal cases taken by victims of rape, domestic abuse and other forms of sexual violence that have changed the law of our land. They were based on civil actions taken by those victims against the police and the CPS, including by Jade Blue, the survivor of rape who waived her anonymity and brought a claim against the CPS after it made an erroneous decision to discontinue the proceedings against her abuser. As a consequence of Jade’s civil action and campaign, and her successful claim against the CPS, the Government rolled out the early victims’ right to review scheme. That was done on the basis of civil action taken by a rape victim, but this could be threatened by this new overreach in the law, and I hope that the Minister will tell us how she intends to sort this out. If we do not allow victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence—or any victim, or anyone who is treated poorly by the police and the CPS—to take civil action, we in this place are missing an opportunity to make better laws. Frankly, if I can be held accountable, coppers and the CPS should be held accountable, too.

I understand that we are awaiting a Supreme Court judgment, but I would be interested to hear what the Front Benchers can say to allay the fears of victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence all over the country. They fear that if, say, their address was wrongly given out, they would have no recourse to civil action, despite the danger they would be put in.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) gave a powerful speech. I worked with Claire Throssell for years. The shadow Minister said that victims groups do not all think the same about the jury part of the Bill; I can tell him that they all think the same thing about the presumption of contact. The fact that the shadow Minister did not even mention that he has tabled an amendment that would genuinely endanger victims of domestic abuse across the country is—I do not know what I am allowed to say—a bit cowardly. He should have stood by his words and argued the case.

As a victim who has been dragged back to court on a completely unmeritorious appeal case by people who stalk me, so that they can get me in another room, I am pleased about the changes in the Bill. In these debates, I often think that this place thinks that the very worst thing that could happen to a person is being accused of rape. I think the worst thing that can happen is to be raped and have no one believe you.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

I draw the House’s attention to the fact that I am a member of the Bar of England and Wales, and my wife is an employment judge. Notwithstanding some noble and commendable elements, particularly in clauses 12 to 17, in totality, I am afraid that this is a bad Bill. It was a bad Bill when it came before the House on Second Reading; it was a bad Bill when it left Committee; and without significant refinement, it will be a bad piece of law, should it come on to the statute books.

This is not the Lord Chancellor’s legislation; he inherited it from his predecessor. It is right to welcome his efforts on the amendment that recognises that clause 3 is unsustainable; it would be churlish not to. He has listened to the legal profession, to this House, and most importantly, to the public, who have raised serious and significant concerns. But I am afraid that the measures do not go far enough. If this Bill is the answer, then the exam question is fundamentally wrong. Nowhere can that be seen more clearly than in clause 6. That is why I am very supportive of amendment 7 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan), which seeks to remove clause 6.

The clause, as we have heard, merely moves the problem from one part of the system to another. It pushes, on a conservative basis, some 25,000 cases into the magistrates court. About 5,500 of those are likely to be trials—and not necessarily straightforward trials; they may take more than a day or two to be heard. We are asking an under-resourced and ill equipped magistrates court to deal with them. That is not the way to deal with the magistrates court backlog, which, in the last year, increased by more than 9.5%.

[Karl Turner]

I think I am right in saying that a lay magistrate is required to sit 15 days a year. Very often, magistrates sit for a day at a time; they may do a day every other week. The scenario that the Government are presenting expects a lay magistrate to sit for two or three days in a row, and potentially into a second week. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that is unsustainable?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Gentleman, as always, has his finger on the pulse on these issues. The Government’s proposals would narrow the pool of magistrates able to deal with these cases, by virtue of the time commitments that would be foisted on them.

I want to spend a little bit of time on clause 4, which deals with complex and lengthy cases. In essence, through new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the clause confines complex and lengthy cases to fraud or fraud-aligned cases. However, importantly, there is a provision that the Secretary of State can increase the number of offences captured in this provision. The danger is that there will be a slow accretion of such offences. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that misconduct in public office could be added to that list. The provision fails to recognise the very important work done by Jonathan Fisher KC in his independent review. He pointed out that these cases are not held up because of a jury; under the Bill, they would be delayed, because a judge would have to weigh up the evidence, and reach and write up a judgment. The provision also fundamentally undermines the point that facts of dishonesty—the offences in the schedule are offences around dishonesty—are matters for judgment by the ordinary citizen. Removing the jury element risks the erosion of civic ownership of these cases by the criminal justice system, and the criminal justice system’s engagement with them.

The provision would also have a chilling effect, in that the powerful narrative can be developed that these cases are being heard behind closed doors. This stems from a single case from 2005, the Jubilee line case. When the case was reviewed, the very sensible conclusion was reached that the issue came down to poor strategy by the CPS in processing the case; the issue was not jury trials themselves. Amendment 4 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle is therefore eminently sensible.

If the House is not with me on that, there is an alternative. Amendment 52 by the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), seeks to limit the scope of this provision to trials where all the offences that a defendant is charged with are captured by new schedule 3ZA. That seems eminently sensible in the circumstances.

I want to mention the rule of law. If the rule of law is to be taken into account, we must have an impartial system of adjudication. That means having a fair hearing, which in turn means having the ability to challenge. Therefore, amendment 54 must be right. It must be right that in complex or lengthy cases, a defendant has an opportunity to challenge the decision that the case will be heard by a judge sitting alone.

I want to spend a few moments on new clause 25. When this Bill was brought before the House, the narrative that we heard from Government repeatedly was that it was being introduced so that we could deal with a backlog in the Crown court. It appears from the Minister’s remarks—she knows that I have enormous respect for her—that it is more of an ideological argument. The question today is whether hon. Members want to do this to deal with a backlog—a specific problem—in which case a sunset clause would be eminently sensible, or whether they are making an ideological argument, which I think is much more chilling on our society.

17:30

[Kirith Entwistle]

I speak today as a victim of domestic abuse who has found going through the court system especially triggering and on behalf of constituents who have shared their harrowing experiences with me. One wrote to me and said that

“the system still allows a father to weaponise the child, to throw accusations whilst protecting his position, while none of the issues I raised got any acknowledgement.”

Another felt that

“the process itself has repeatedly failed to meet the standards expected of our justice and child protection systems.”

I start with new clause 6, on victim-led intensive case management, which I stress is an issue across all courts. Recent experience of the courts shows that special measures are still not being properly implemented. The lack of a common-sense approach to communication is still a problem in 2026, when great technological advances have been made.

I commend the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller) on her many amendments that seek to improve experiences for victims, such as new clauses 7 to 9 on judicial training. I stress that all members of the judiciary should always have access to training. In fact, they should have to hear at first hand from victim-survivors about their experiences as part of that training. It does not matter how many times somebody tells me that they understand what I am going through or acknowledge what I have been through—they really cannot unless they have lived it themselves or they know somebody who has.

The phrase “trauma-informed” is incredibly powerful and crucial. Such training should always be trauma-informed. That brings me to new clause 13 and the duty to provide trauma-informed training, which needs to include looking at how we communicate what will happen in court with victims, as well as the impact those proceedings will have on victims.

There are severe issues with diversity and representation across all levels of the judiciary. I would be interested to hear more about what our Government are doing to ensure better representation.

New clause 16 is about remote participation. As someone who has recently been through that as a victim, I believe that we must include an assessment of the special measures involved and whether they are adequately communicated to victims. In my case, they were not. I recently experienced an online hearing in which I had my perpetrator staring at me the entire time. I was not able to blur the background on my screen and I was not able to hide his face. The hearing was adjourned because the relevant documents did not reach the right parties on time, despite the fact that email exists and has done for some time.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank the hon. Member for her bravery in sharing her powerful story and for highlighting how special measures do not work if people do not know that they available to them. During the Bill Committee, I argued that special measures should be there as standard, with people having the ability to choose to remove them to face their perpetrator in court. Does she agree that we could easily roll that out across all our courts so that every victim would be protected from the moment they arrived?

[Kirith Entwistle]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I agree that we should look for that to be the standard measure. I did ask for special measures, but when I turned up at court they were not implemented, so I had to walk past my perpetrator before going into the courtroom. That is what I experienced as a Member of Parliament. I dread to think—although I do know—what some of my constituents are experiencing.

On new clause 24, I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Alison Hume) for ensuring that children’s voices and views are enshrined in the family courts. I know that representatives of Women’s Aid are here, as is the formidable Claire Throssell. I also commend my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) on her tireless efforts in making that happen; she is incredible. The pro-contact culture embedded in the court system puts too many children at unnecessary risk. I am really pleased to see that the Government are removing that.

I am also pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Josh Fenton-Glynn) addressing, in the form of amendment 22, the issue of post-separation abuse, which the courts have facilitated. I thank him for being a strong ally and for standing up for his constituents. He and I have both experienced a deluge of constituents contacting us about the abuse that they face and their experiences of the court system. It is always good to have his support.

I am grateful that the Government are taking steps to go further for victims by introducing the victims helpline, addressing the issue of the automatic right to appeal so that victims are not retraumatised, and establishing specialist RASSO courts. However, I want to put on record my experiences as a victim and those of my constituents to ensure that the system truly supports all victims and ensures that they are genuinely heard and properly communicated with, that they know what their rights are and what is available to them, and that we are all shielded from further triggering and traumatic experiences involving our abusers.

I am fed up of people and institutions telling me that they understand and then taking action that tells me they do not. I am fed up of being told that they are familiar with domestic abuse or coercive control and then telling me that it does not matter. I am fed up of feeling ignored and dismissed, and so are my constituents. Our justice system exists to protect victims, not to enable perpetrators. We should always remember that.

We still allow our perceptions about how good a person looks on paper to cloud our judgments. Perpetrators walk among us: they are police officers; they are teachers; they are fathers; they are mothers. They are here in every aspect of our daily lives, and we cannot judge somebody because of how good they look on paper and give them the benefit of the doubt because of that. We have to look at the facts, we have to ensure that victims are heard and, crucially, we need to make sure that their voices are put at the heart of every decision that we make and that they are properly and adequately supported at every single step of the way.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

With an immediate three-minute time limit, I call Sir Ashley Fox.

[Sir Ashley Fox (Bridgwater) (Con)]

I start by expressing my relief that the Government are removing clause 3 from the Bill. I congratulate the Lord Chancellor on performing that U-turn so swiftly upon taking office.

In earlier debates, the Courts Minister said that curtailing the right to a jury trial was a good thing in any event and that she would go ahead with the change even if there were not a court backlog. What caused her to change her mind? Perhaps it was the change of Prime Minister. The Minister is a skilled orator. I am quite sure that she will manage to persuade the Lord Chancellor that she meant something completely different and always supported his position, and her rise through the ranks of Government will continue. We on the Conservative Benches wish her well.

The Crown court backlog is a serious challenge, and both victims and defendants deserve timely justice. Throughout the debate, Ministers have struggled to demonstrate that curtailing jury trials would meaningfully solve the problem. I still have concerns about clauses 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which serve to add restrictions to jury trials and transfer more power to magistrates courts. That is why I support new clause 25, tabled by the shadow Justice Secretary, which seeks to put a sunset clause in the Bill. That would see the remaining restrictions on jury trials proposed by the Government end when the backlog is reduced to its pre-covid level.

I urge the Government to be cautious about the expansion of the powers of magistrates. The evidence is not clear that that will result in a reduction of the backlog. Where is the assurance that increased jurisdiction will not simply create new delays in different courts? Thousands of additional magistrates will be required in the coming years, yet previous recruitment efforts have failed. What will be different this time? The Justice Committee described the targets as “unrealistic”. Perhaps the Minister should consult her new Solicitor General and ask what his views are on the subject.

The Government still intend to remove the right to a jury trial for those charged with an either-way offence. I oppose that and support amendment 1, tabled by the shadow Justice Secretary. This matter poses a particularly grave threat to those who would face professional ruin if they were convicted of an offence of dishonesty. Solicitors, barristers and Members of Parliament, for example, would all have their careers destroyed were they convicted of theft, which is an either-way offence. That is why I support the sentiments in amendment 47 tabled by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and amendment 69 tabled by the Chair of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson). I appreciate that we will not vote on those amendments tonight, but I hope that Members of the House of Lords will look at the issue again when they consider the Bill.

[Lee Barron (Corby and East Northamptonshire) (Lab)]

I want to raise three issues. Having been a magistrate for 20 years, I think that one of the things that has led to the problems has been the closure of so many courts across the estate. The potential to reopen some of those sites should be in the mix to get the magistrates courts up and running.

On the right to elect a court, I was opposed to clause 3, as the Minister will know, but the right to elect a court was not a red line for me, because it does not happen in Scotland, and I do not see its constitutional skies falling in upon its system.

I would like to see some changes in the victim contact scheme. At the moment, the scheme does not allow victims to be advised of whether an offender has changed their name or their appearance. That information is not routinely shared with victims because it is considered to be sensitive personal data, and there is a presumption that it will not be disclosed unless there is lawful reason to do so. Let us take the example of the Haselip family. In 2003, Mick Haselip was violently murdered in his home in Corby. Rikki Stewart was convicted of the murder and received a mandatory life sentence. When he was released in July 2024, he changed his name to Rory Wilson. Nobody informed the family of that, and they were absolutely unaware that he had changed his name. They say:

“This omission has undermined our ability to understand his movements, monitor our own safety and engage meaningfully with the Victim Contact Scheme.”

In 1986, Adam Stein murdered six-year-old Collette Gallacher. He has changed his appearance and name multiple times, and Collette’s younger sisters, Lauren and Claire, fear for their own safety if he is ever granted parole again. They do not know what he looks like. They do not know what his name is. The family are not aware. These people are living in plain sight, and this is a loophole that we need to close. We need to change the presumption that this information will not be disclosed to a presumption that it will be, so that families know what is happening.

To put the shoe on the other foot, Izzy was murdered by her husband as their two young daughters slept in the room next door. Izzy’s mum, Helena Sharrott, was granted a special guardianship order and there is a request to change the children’s names, but they have been told no because the father, who murdered their mother, has a say in it. That is wrong; it is unjust, and we need to change it.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

Clause 17 would repeal the presumption of parental involvement contained in section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989. That presumption currently provides that unless the contrary is shown, the involvement of each parent in the life of the child will further the child’s welfare. Amendment 67, tabled in the name of my hon. Friends the Members for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) and for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan), would keep the presumption that parental involvement is beneficial for the welfare of the child. It is my belief that our legal system should reflect the fact that in most cases, a child benefits from having both parents involved in their life. Clause 17 would do the opposite. It sends a serious social signal that the active involvement of both parents is no longer our expected starting point when considering a child’s welfare.

[Dr Tidball]

Does the hon. Member not agree with the harm report commissioned by her party in government, which found, on the basis of the evidence, that this presumption creates a pro-contact culture, meaning that the voices of children are hidden and unheard? The evidence from Women’s Aid demonstrates that 68 children have lost their lives because of the presumption.

[Rebecca Smith]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention and for her powerful speech earlier. Ultimately, the impact assessment for this Bill says that there would be no impact, but I believe that the impact on families more broadly is not worth the change.

[Dr Mullan]

As my hon. Friend points out, the impact assessment says that this particular measure, on its own, will not make any difference to the harm done to children, but we absolutely recognise that the checklist as a whole, and the way that it works, does need to be reformed. We think a more wholesale reform of the checklist is more appropriate than just attracting interest in one particular element of it.

[Rebecca Smith]

Exactly. I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention.

My concern is that, in some cases, clause 17 will increase the state’s power to erase one parent from a child’s life, and we know that that is often their father. It will rebalance the relationship between parents and the state.

17:44

[Jess Phillips]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Rebecca Smith]

No, I have already given way twice. I will not get any more time. I am very sorry.

We must avoid a situation in which the law views children as the state’s ultimate responsibility while parents must justify their involvement on a case-by-case basis. We must also avoid anything that presumes that the state makes a better parent than the actual parents themselves. Of course, the state should intervene when a child is at risk, but our default position should be that, wherever it is safe and appropriate, children benefit from the love and guidance of both their parents. The state should step in only when there is clear evidence that it should do so, and we do not reject that point. If we remove this principle from the law, we take another step towards a system in which parental involvement becomes discretionary and the state’s role becomes paramount. That is not a healthy direction for family justice.

I recognise, of course, that this is a sensitive issue for survivors of domestic abuse. To be clear, there is no absolute right to contact under existing law. Courts already have the power to restrict unsafe contact. The presumption of parental involvement is already qualified by risk of harm to the child, so why do we need this clause at all? Surely we in this House should be ensuring that current safeguards work properly instead.

As I said in a recent debate on fathers and male role models,

“There is a widespread perception that family courts make it difficult for fathers to maintain a meaningful relationship with their children.”—[Official Report, 10 September 2026; Vol. 790, c. 450WH.]

One possible solution is a child-centred parental relationship test. The test would direct courts to consider the quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent. It would help courts to distinguish between safe and harmful contact.

As things stand, there is a real risk that clause 17 will weaken, not strengthen, children’s relationships with safe parents without addressing the current failures that leave children exposed to their unsafe ones. Fundamentally, parental involvement is a relationship recognised by the state, not a privilege granted by the state. Both parents matter, and we should not be afraid to say so.

[Josh Fenton-Glynn (Calder Valley) (Lab)]

I will focus my remarks on clause 17 and the presumption of contact. My involvement in this issue started with a letter from a constituent—a mother trying to protect her child from an abusive ex-partner. In such cases, the court can play a role in retraumatising people, and can even be a tool of the abuse.

Since I first spoke out about this matter, I have heard from countless victims. I say to them: thank you for telling your story, sorry that the justice system has failed you for so long, we will make progress, and we will not allow the Opposition to ignore your lived experience and the hard evidence that has been given to us by people who work on the frontline. I pay tribute to Claire Throssell, who is in the Gallery today. Her boys, Jack and Paul, were killed by her abusive ex-partner in horrific circumstances. No mother should have had to have shown the strength that Claire has shown, but she has changed the law and saved lives. I will vote today to make sure that the Opposition do not block that legacy.

The presumption of parental involvement is so damaging because it has allowed abuse to continue through the courts. The safety of children must always be the top priority. Over the past 30 years, 68 children have died because the presumption of involvement was applied when it never should have been—68 children who should have grown up, but whose lives were taken from them. I am proud that this Bill will ensure that that terrible number never rises again.

Changing the law must only be the start. Judges, magistrates and Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service operators work within the pro-contact culture that has been set by the laws we have at the moment. The Judicial College must take that on board. In the almost two years I have been working on this, the worst opinion I have heard came from a family magistrate, who told me about his friend’s experience of the parental alienation myth—ignoring the evidence, and letting his anecdotes override it.

Survivors in Calder Valley tell me that they fear not being believed, being blamed or being pushed into unsafe arrangements. They fear the drive to drop off their children with an abusive ex-partner. They fear the agonising wait for their children to be returned to them safe. For too long, the judicial system has felt unreliable, as a deeply traumatic tool of abusers. This Government have committed to halving violence against women. This change is a step towards that. There is more to come, but our courts must put victims and children at the centre of the decisions.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. I will be starting wind-ups at 5.52 pm, so for the last two minutes, I call Sarah Russell.

[Sarah Russell (Congleton) (Lab)]

I draw attention to my declaration of interests: I am a solicitor. I continue to have two concerns about the Bill as drafted, and I am very grateful to the Government for changing their position on clause 3. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Corby and East Northamptonshire (Lee Barron), who said that the right to elect is being abused and probably is not critical, but there are two things that are.

First, I support amendment 70 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson) on the importance of the extension of legal aid in the magistrates court. As solicitors, we have a saying: the lawyer who represents themselves has a fool for a client. As solicitors, we do not attempt to represent ourselves, even in our areas of interest—I have given employment law advice to an employment lawyer. Yet we expect lay people to go into the magistrates court with sentencing powers of now up to two years with no legal advice and representation. When the Justice Committee asked what evaluation had been made of the impact on unrepresented litigants in person on the Crown court backlog, the answer from the MOJ was that no evaluation had been done. I feel strongly that we need to look at that as one of the causes of delay.

The second matter I want to draw attention to is that sentences under the unduly lenient sentence scheme only apply in the Crown court. When we double the magistrates courts’ potential sentencing powers to two years, we will take very large numbers of offences out of the purview of the unduly lenient sentence scheme overnight. Fear of domestic violence, stalking involving fear of violence, coercive and controlling behaviour, and many first-time sexual offences will be likely to attract sentences of less than two years. They will be heard in the magistrates court, and if those sentences are unduly lenient, there will be nothing that we can do about it.

[Sarah Sackman]

We live in an era of problem solving, not point scoring. Indeed, as the Courts Minister, that has always been my focus. There is no bigger challenge in my portfolio than the unacceptable—indeed, intolerable—delays in our criminal courts, and that has always been the approach. To do politics is ultimately to make choices, and the choices we have made as a Government are around the action that is needed to reform, invest in and modernise our criminal justice system, so that it is fit for purpose.

I always enjoy the oratory of the right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox)—I am sorry that he is not here—who talked about our ancient rights. Magna Carta is absolutely clear:

“to no one will we deny or delay right or justice.”

That is a recognition that timeliness is an essential ingredient of the thing that the state must guarantee: a fair trial. A trial that arrives for a victim today in 2029 or 2030 is not fair on the victim or defendant alike.

It was said that we should try to invest. Well, we have done that. We have lifted the cap on sitting days and made record investment in legal aid and in our court estate. It was said that we should look at the Liverpool model, and I have been to Liverpool; it is indeed an excellent model, and we are entrenching many of those practices in the new national listing framework in the introduction of case progression officers. It was said that we should make prison vans run on time, and we are pulling out the stops to do just that, asking local authorities, Transport for London and others to open up bus lanes, while ensuring that PECS actually does its job. Those on the Opposition Benches say, “Nightingale courts” and “Let’s work longer days,” but they do not recognise the fact that the court day does not start at 10 am or 10.30 am. As we know, judges and barristers are working around the clock and around the court day to prepare cases and get the show on the road. We cannot ignore the conclusion of the independent review of the criminal courts: there is no single solution. There needs to be investment and modernisation—and we are doing both those things—but there also needs to be structural reform.

I thank Members across the House for their valuable contributions, which have raised some really important themes that I want to address. The first is the impact that these changes will have on our magistrates courts, which was raised by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson) and my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor), who talked so credibly about the contribution of her father as a magistrate. Those who act as magistrates and volunteer their time do an incredible job. They bring local voices—lay voices—into our justice system, which is incredibly precious.

It is right that we are challenged and held accountable for whether we are increasing capacity in the magistrates courts to absorb the additional work, and indeed we are. Whether it is our recruitment drive for 21,000 magistrates—not an unrealistic one, as the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) put to me, but a credible one to get back to where we were as recently as 2014, and I am pleased to report to the House that we are on track—or the recruitment of an additional 166 legal advisers since April 2025 and an additional 100 district judges, that is what I mean when I say we are rebuilding our justice system from the bottom up. The impact on the magistrates courts is important, and we are increasing capacity.

The hon. Member for Runcorn and Helsby (Sarah Pochin) made a really good point about training. The Judicial College is working overtime to ensure that magistrates and district judges alike are trained, so that they are able to exercise the sentencing powers that this Bill will give them.

The second excellent point that was made was about allocation and whether trials should be heard in the magistrates court or the Crown court. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and I have had our differences in the course of this debate, but I have always respected his voice, and I have always listened. My hon. Friend the Member for Derby North made a similar point about the allocation process. Let me be clear: the exercise that we are committing to in this Bill is the same that has always existed in primary legislation, whereby the court will look at allocation guidelines published by the Sentencing Council. Sentencing and likely sentence is a relevant factor, but so too is hearing representations from both sides—the prosecution and the defence, the prosecution being able to bring in the victim’s perspective—on not just the likely sentence but the seriousness and complexity of the case at hand. Given the procedural, legal and factual complexity and any aggravating factors, that holistic exercise will determine where a case should be heard, so that the determining factor is the seriousness of the case, rather than the identity of the defendant.

The next point that was forcefully and well made by the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller), my hon. Friends the Members for Derby North and for Congleton (Sarah Russell) and others was in relation to legal aid, and new clauses 18 and 70. There is no greater champion of access to justice and the importance of legal aid than this Government and myself. I am a powerful advocate for legal aid, not least because I saw at first hand—when I was in practice, before coming to this place—the vital role it plays in our justice system. That is precisely why one of the first steps that I took as a Minister was to invest in our criminal legal aid system, with £116 million for criminal solicitors and an additional £34 million for criminal legal aid advocates. That investment is important, but it will not go all the way, and I recognise that. That is why we need to review the support that we give to unrepresented defendants in our magistrates courts or, indeed, in the Crown court in the rare cases where that arises. As I said in our response to the Leveson review, we will look again at those thresholds once these reforms have been embedded.

I am sorry that I have to be very brief, but I want to address new clause 22 in relation to police accountability. The right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir Andrew Mitchell) will be aware—as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) will be—that there is currently a case before the Supreme Court relating to this matter, so he will understand that the Government have to carefully consider the outcome of that before giving a full response to the issue raised around police accountability.

I want to conclude by returning to what I said about the removal of the right to elect. This Bill is designed to bring down the backlog and to deliver timely justice, but it is also about building a better and fairer system—one in which the court triages cases, not the defendant. That is about redressing the balance of power between defendant and victim. It is also about making improvements to open justice by enhancing transparency and expanding the use of transcripts; improving the laws of evidence; and improving training for our court staff and judiciary by having trauma-informed training, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle) implored us to do.

To govern is to choose. We are making that choice. In the Courts and Tribunals Bill, we will deliver not only timely justice but a fairer justice system that puts what has been the pride of the world—the English and Welsh justice system—back on its feet.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

11:30

Proceedings interrupted (Programme Order, 10 March).

The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).

New Clause 25

Expiry of sections 1 to 7

“(1) Sections 1 to 7 of this Act expire three months after the date on which the condition in subsection (2) is met.

(2) The condition is that the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court has been below pre-pandemic level in each of the previous four quarterly reporting periods.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court is that which is calculated by HM Courts and Tribunals Service.”—(Dr Mullan.)

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

18:00

Division 76

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 189

Noes: 306

Clause 1

Removal of right to elect trial on indictment

Amendment proposed: 1, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.—(Dr Mullan.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

18:15

Division 77

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 196

Noes: 304

Clause 3

Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation

Amendment made: 3, page 5, line 12, leave out clause 3. —(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment would remove clause 3 (trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation) from the Bill.

Clause 4

Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases

Amendments made: 24, page 11, leave out lines 7 to 9 and insert—

“(8) For further provision about trials conducted without a jury by virtue of this section, see section 42D.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 25.

Amendment 25, page 13, line 22, at end insert—

“42D Further provision about trials without a jury

(1) This section applies where, by virtue of section 42A, a trial is conducted without a jury.

(2) The court is to have all the powers, authorities and jurisdiction which the court would have had if the trial had been conducted with a jury (including power to determine any question and to make any finding which would be required to be determined or made by a jury).

(3) Except where the context otherwise requires, any reference in an enactment, or an instrument made under an enactment, to a jury, the verdict of a jury or the finding of a jury is to be read, in relation to a trial conducted without a jury, as a reference to the court, the verdict of the court or the finding of the court.

(4) Where the court convicts or (as the case may be) acquits a defendant, the court must give a judgment which states the reasons for the conviction or acquittal.

(5) The judgment must be given at, or as soon as reasonably practicable after, the time of the conviction or acquittal.

(6) Where the court convicts the defendant, the reference in section 18(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (notice of appeal or of application for leave to appeal to be given within 28 days from date of conviction etc) to the date of the conviction is to be read as a reference to the date of the judgment given for the purposes of subsection (4).”—(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 3. It replicates the provision currently made by clause 5(4) of the Bill, which as a result of the omission of clause 3 would apply only in relation to trials conducted without a jury in accordance with the new Part 6A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to be inserted by clause 4 (complex or lengthy cases).

Clause 5

Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4

Amendments made: 26, page 14, line 11, leave out from first “of” to end of line.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 3.

Amendment 27, page 14, line 15, leave out subsections (2) to (4).

This amendment is consequential on amendment 3.

Amendment 28, page 15, line 17, leave out subsection (7). —(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 3.

Clause 6

Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ court

Amendment proposed: 18, page 17, line 18, at end insert—

“(9) After section 15 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, insert—

“15A Entitlement to Crown Court funding levels in certain proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court

(1) This section applies to criminal proceedings in a magistrates’ court where—

(a) an individual is charged with an either-way offence; and

(b) the court, having regard to the sentencing guidelines, considers it likely that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months will be imposed upon conviction.

(2) Where this section applies, any relevant representation order shall provide for remuneration at the same rates and under the same conditions as would apply if the proceedings were determined in the Crown Court.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)

This amendment links legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It ensures that defendants facing more than 12 months' imprisonment receive Crown Court level funding, regardless of which court the case is heard in.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

18:28

Division 78

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 89

Noes: 312

Clause 8

Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history

Amendments made: 29, in clause 8, page 18, line 10, after “evidence” insert “(see subsection (2B))”.

This amendment is a minor drafting change which would add, after the reference to “important explanatory evidence” in new subsection (2)(b) of section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, a signpost to new subsection (2B) of that section (which defines that term).

Amendment 30, in clause 8, page 18, leave out lines 32 to 35.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 31.

Amendment 31, in clause 8, page 18, line 39, at end insert—

“(2AA) The court may refuse leave by virtue of subsection (2)(a) in relation to any evidence or question if it appears to the court that—

(a) the probative value of the evidence which the accused proposes to adduce, or which the question is intended to elicit (“the proposed evidence”), relies on a matter which is disputed by another party but which is not itself of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole, and

(b) the extent of the additional evidence necessary to enable the court or jury properly to make a finding in respect of that matter would be disproportionate to the probative value of the proposed evidence.”—(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment is intended to clarify that a court may refuse to admit evidence about a complainant’s sexual history under new section 41(2)(a) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 if it considers that doing so would entail disproportionate consideration of collateral issues (commonly referred to as “satellite litigation”).

Clause 10

Evidence about previous false complaints relating to sexual offences

Amendment made: 32, in clause 10, page 23, line 1, leave out from “offence” to first “as” in line 2 and insert

“—

(i) was not reported to the police or another investigating authority, or

(ii) was not so reported”.—(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment is intended to clarify that in new s.100A(6)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (matters on the basis of which jury may not properly find complaint was false), the reference to a previously alleged sexual offence not having been reported as soon as reasonably practicable includes its not having been reported at all.

Clause 25

Extent

Amendments made: 33, in clause 25, page 35, line 8, leave out “Parts 1 and 2” and insert “the following provisions”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 35.

Amendment 34, in clause 25, page 35, line 9, at end insert

“—

( ) Parts 1 and 2;”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 35.

Amendment 35, in clause 25, page 35, line 9, at end insert—

“( ) section (Independent review).”

This amendment would provide for NC23 to extend to England and Wales.

Amendment 36, in clause 25, page 35, line 14, leave out “this Part.” and insert—

“sections 21 to 24, this section, and sections 26 and 27.”—(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 35.

Clause 26

Commencement

Amendment made: 37, in clause 26, page 35, line 31, at end insert—

“( ) section (Independent review) (independent review).” —(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment would provide for NC23 to come into force two months after Royal Assent.

Schedule 2

Appeals from Magistrates’ Courts

Amendments made: 38, page 52, line 7, at end insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(i), a summary trial begins when the court begins to hear evidence from the prosecution at the trial.

(3B) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply in relation to any proceedings conducted in accordance with section 16A (trial by single justice on the papers).”

Section 108S of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, inserted by Schedule 2, provides that rules of court must provide for the audio recording of trials and sentencing hearings in magistrates’ courts. The amendment would clarify what constitutes a trial for these purposes, and exclude proceedings conducted under the single justice procedure (which take place in the absence of the parties and without hearing oral evidence).

Amendment 39, page 54, line 19, at end insert—

4A “(1) Section 109 (abandonment of appeal) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) in the words before paragraph (a), after “appeal” insert “, or an application for permission to appeal, against a decision”;

(b) in paragraph (a), for “against whose decision the appeal was brought” substitute “by which that decision was given”;

(c) in paragraph (b), after “appeal”, in both places it occurs, insert “or application”.

(3) In subsection (2), after “abandon an appeal” insert “, or an application for permission to appeal,”.”

This amendment would have the effect that, where a person abandons an application for permission to appeal against a decision of a magistrates’ court, the court is able to take steps to enforce its decision, and may order the person to pay any costs incurred by the other party to the application.

Amendment 40, page 54, line 19, at end insert—

“4B After section 109 insert—

“109A Refusal of permission to appeal

(1) This section applies where the Crown Court refuses a person’s application for permission to appeal against a decision of a magistrates’ court.

(2) The magistrates’ court may issue process for enforcing that decision, subject to anything already suffered or done under it by the person.

(3) Subsection (2) is without prejudice to any power of the Crown Court to enforce the decision.”

This amendment would have the effect that, where the Crown Court refuses a person’s application for permission to appeal against a decision of a magistrates’ court, the magistrates’ court may take steps to enforce that decision.

Amendment 41, in schedule 2, page 54, line 19, at end insert—

4C “(1) Section 113 (bail on appeal or case stated) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), after “notice of appeal” insert “, or notice of an application for permission to appeal,”.

(3) In subsection (2)(a), for the words from “notice of appeal” to the end substitute “notice as mentioned in subsection (1), such time and place as the Crown Court may require”.”—(Sarah Sackman.)

Section 113(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 provides that, where a person is granted bail by a magistrates’ court pending an appeal to the Crown Court, the person must surrender to the Crown Court at the appeal hearing. As there may not be a hearing if permission to appeal is refused, this amendment would enable the Crown Court to determine when and where the person must surrender: for example, the Crown Court could require the person to surrender to the magistrates’ court.

Schedule 3

Leadership of Tribunals

Amendments made: 42, page 96, line 35, leave out

“Chancellor of the High Court”

and insert—

“President of the Business and Property Division”.

This amendment, amendment 43 and amendment 44 are consequential on the renaming of the Chancery Division, and the resultant renaming of the head of that division as “President of the Business and Property Division”, by the Senior Courts (Transfer, Amendment and Consequential Provision) Order 2026 (S.I. 2026/723).

Amendment 43, in schedule 3, page 96, line 36, leave out

“Chancellor of the High Court”

and insert—

“President of the Business and Property Division”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 42.

Amendment 44, in schedule 3, page 97, line 8, leave out

“Chancellor of the High Court”

and insert—

“President of the Business and Property Division”.—(Sarah Sackman.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 42.

Third Reading

18:40

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Norris)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Before I turn to the substance of this important Bill, let me recognise those who have helped bring it to this stage: those who have sat in the Chair, both in this Chamber and in Committee; the excellent Clerks of the House, who serve us so well; the Whips on all sides; the hon. and right hon. Members who served in Committee with such vigour; the Minister for Courts; my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy); Members from across the House for their contributions to debate on the Bill, today and at previous stages, especially those who shared their or their constituents’ experiences; and those legal professionals from outside who have engaged with us.

I give specific recognition to the artist formerly known as Sir Brian Leveson for his landmark review. During this process, he has been elevated to the other place, where he is the noble Lord Leveson of Liverpool. What a public servant he is, and what work he did in his review! I recognise his efforts, in this area and in many other aspects of British life. It is a real pleasure to work with him, and we are grateful for his work, which underpins the Bill. Crucially, I recognise the victims and survivors who have shaped the reforms, including those who join us today in the Public Gallery. They should be proud of what they have done. I know that they bring forward their stories at a cost to themselves, in order to make change, and we are very lucky that they do so.

The Bill has victims at its heart. Its purpose is urgent and long overdue: to ensure that justice in this country is fast and fair, because victims today face intolerable delays. People suffer appalling crimes; they summon extraordinary courage to come forward; they relive their most traumatic experiences; and they put their trust in the system, and hope that justice will be done. What happens next is that they wait, and wait, and wait. Trials are pushed back. Cases drift further into the future, and there are years of anxiety before a trial can even begin, while confidence in the system drains away. All too often, victims give up because the process is unbearable.

As the Minister for Courts said—and as the age-old maxim goes—justice delayed is justice denied. This Government cannot and will not accept that. The Bill grips a problem that the previous Government simply would not. It tackles the record and rising Crown court backlog that we inherited, which now sits at nearly 81,000 cases—more than double the level in 2019. I am afraid that is testament to the Conservative party’s record in government, and their failure to grasp the nettle and tackle the reform needed to wrestle our criminal justice system back on track. Again, today we have seen the Conservatives simply deny the reality; they refuse to be reconciled with their record.

Our modelling shows exactly where this trajectory leads, if things are left unchecked: to even deeper delays, collapsing confidence, and a justice system that cannot fulfil its most basic promise, which is that justice will be done swiftly and fairly. This Government will not normalise that delay and allow victims, witnesses and defendants to bear the burden of a system under strain. We cannot continue to try to meet 21st-century pressures with a 20th-century model.

On Report and throughout this process, we have heard colleagues call for greater investment. They are right, and we are investing at record levels. There are unlimited sitting days for our criminal courts.

Others have called for modernisation. They are right to do so, and we are modernising. Through greater use of technology and AI to maximise our capacity, we can speed up justice and ensure that our system responds to the changing nature of crime, which has meant massive increases in digital evidence and demands on court time. But investment alone will not solve the crisis, nor will modernisation. As the noble Lord Leveson of Liverpool made clear, and as all the evidence shows, only when we have structural reform in the form of pragmatic changes can we really begin to turn the tide on the backlog. That is what this Bill will deliver.

I make no apology for looking again at this proposal— I myself as the new Lord Chancellor and my right hon. Friend as the new Prime Minister. Of course we looked again at some of the measures in the Bill. We listened to the strength of feeling from across the House and the legal sector, and we have made changes that mean that now almost all defendants facing trial in the Crown court will continue to be tried by a jury.

The Bill is not solely about bringing down the backlog. It is about making the system work better. I am proud that through other legislation alongside this Bill we have already been able to bring forward measures to improve victims’ experiences of court, with new specialist courts for survivors of rape and sexual offences. I want to recognise, as other colleagues did, the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) at previous stages of the legislation to bring us to this point.

The Bill goes further in supporting that wider effort and challenging the damaging myths that have so often silenced rape victims. It makes it easier for victims to access special measures in order to give their best and proper evidence. Crucially, in the family courts it will finally repeal the presumption of parental involvement. The safety of children must always come first. I recognise the incredible efforts of Claire Throssell to bring this change forward and make it a reality today. It has come at extraordinary cost. I hope that this is a day of pride at what is a significant step forward.

Much of the debate around this Bill has invoked tradition, but the history of our justice system has never been a history of standing still. It has always been a history of adaptation and institutions evolving to meet the demands of a changing society and a changing age. This Bill represents those timeless values applied in a modern context. We are acting to put the interests of the British people first, because the status quo, which would take our courts to a point of no return, which continues to deny fast and fair justice to those who need it, and which damages public confidence and consent, is simply unacceptable to us.

The Government are the only ones with the courage to address the challenges we face head-on, and we have heard that in debates at all stages of the Bill. We are pulling every lever within our power to rebuild a court system capable of delivering justice fairly, swiftly and sustainably. With this Bill, we choose that path, because the cost of doing nothing is simply too high. I commend the Bill to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

18:48

[Nick Timothy (West Suffolk) (Con)]

Time and again, for more than a year now, Ministers have come to the Dispatch Box and told the House that their attack on jury trials was essential to making the courts work efficiently. Time and again we told them that they were wrong, and so did more than 100 of their colleagues on the Government Benches. We said that the right to a trial by jury is an ancient English right—a vital part of our national inheritance and a necessary safeguard against the might of the state.

Ministers ignored us and said that we did not understand. They briefed against their colleagues and, in the case of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), they smeared him disgracefully. Now they admit that they were wrong and we were right. All those Ministers and Labour MPs who stuck to the Government line in the face of all the evidence should reflect on the limits of blind party allegiance and following the instructions of their Whips. It makes them look very foolish today.

I remind the Courts Minister in particular of our exchange in the House in June. When I told her that the incoming leader of the Labour party, now the Prime Minister, was going to scrap her prized policy, she told the House that I misunderstood his position. She said that the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) did not in fact oppose their assault on jury trials. Yet here they are, with their policy largely abandoned, and her authority as Courts Minister lies in pieces.

Like Monty Python’s Black Knight, the Courts Minister declared in June, “I move for no man.” As her policy lost one limb, she insisted it was but a scratch. As it lost another, she claimed it was just a flesh wound. Now that the Bill is left completely dismembered, she has gone from insisting, “I am invincible,” to finally saying, “All right, we’ll call it a draw.” But it is not a draw; it is a very serious defeat, and it is a victory for our constitutional settlement, our rights under the Crown and the sacred principle that no one shall be convicted and deprived of their liberty except by a jury of their peers.

This was a battle that should never have been fought. In the last year, 17,601 sitting days were lost because Crown courtrooms sat empty. On average, about 16% of Crown courts are not sitting on any given day. We have repeatedly called on the Government to get the courts sitting throughout the year. That is how they should cut backlogs, not by attacking juries.

I said that the attack on juries had been largely abandoned, but the Government have not completely given up. There remain serious problems with the Bill, which will remove the right of defendants to elect a jury in either-way cases and increase the sentencing power of magistrates courts so that more cases are heard there. However, the magistrates backlog has reached 380,000 open cases—a 9% increase on the previous year. The Government have not told us what additional resources will be given to magistrates to manage the increase in workload, nor what new safeguards will ensure justice. Indeed, there has been no assessment of the likely effect of the change on appeal rates. We know that of appeals against verdicts given by magistrates, up to 56% are allowed.

The Bill will also remove juries from what it calls complex and lengthy trials, which are normally said to be cases involving fraud. The independent reviewer of fraud, Jonathan Fisher KC, concluded that there was no justification for the change. But clause 4 does not only concern fraud trials; the Government seek to extend the scope of judge-only trials to other complex cases in later years by secondary legislation. That would give them the power to resume their attack on jury trials without proper scrutiny or debate. The proposal is a disgrace and we reject it emphatically.

The Bill as amended will also establish a review of the court system with a specific remit to consider inequality of outcome based on racial identity. Once again, the Labour party is trying to engineer judicial outcomes based on identity rather than treating us all as free individuals accountable before the law. The Opposition will resist that and stand for the principle that it is only our actions that matter, not who and what we are.

Opposition Members are committed to the ancient right to trial by jury, but while the principle of jury trials is sacrosanct, there is increasing evidence from recent cases that juries may, in some examples, have been compromised by the political or religious bias of some jury members. We have seen the acquittal of violent thugs, including the man who smashed a female police officer’s spine apparently because he was a member of Palestine Action. We have seen vandals from Just Stop Oil found not guilty despite clear evidence of their guilt.

Many in the legal profession are concerned that this is an increasing trend in courts across the country. If those who break our laws walk free because jurors feel kinship towards them or because the cause for which the defendant committed a crime is just, justice is no longer blind. That flies in the face of the rule of law. It must be stopped.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The hon. Gentleman mentioned that many in the legal profession are sounding the alarm about the perceived bias of juries. Will he please state which legal organisations have expressed that view to him?

[Nick Timothy]

Had the hon. Lady listened, she would have heard that I said individual barristers—I did not say organisations. [Hon. Members: “Ah!”] The Justice Secretary and others ought to listen to those professionals who experience the justice system every day.

The Government’s handling of the Bill has been a shambles from start to finish. It still contains dangerous provisions that limit the right to elect and to appeal, and that allow Ministers to attack jury trials by secondary legislation and put more cases through the magistrates court. We will vote to reject the Bill to preserve equality before the law and the right to a fair trial.

Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

18:54

Division 79

Question accordingly agreed to.

Ayes: 301

Noes: 193

Bill read the Third time and passed.

Deferred Divisions

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 41A(3)),

That, at this day’s sitting, Standing Order No. 41A (Deferred divisions) shall not apply to the Motion in the name of Secretary Chris Bryant relating to Northern Ireland Troubles Bill: Carry-over extension.—(Rachel Hopkins.)

Question agreed to.