Ukraine

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am not aware of any specific analysis relating to the Russian decision on the conscription period. I suspect that that may reflect a demographic challenge that the Russian Federation faces. It has a dramatically ageing population and it is clear that maintaining force numbers when there are declining cohorts of young men will be a challenge. However, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The Russian military has been modernising and professionalising itself. There are now two parts to the Russian armed forces: a mass conscript body and an elite professional force. In our military planning, we need to be conscious of that evolution.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

NATO was formed originally so that no aggressor could try to pick off one country after another without knowing that he would immediately be at war with the major powers. Is it not vital that we maintain the distinction between NATO countries and non-NATO countries? Is not the best way to reinforce the impression of the strength of NATO to give an open-ended commitment in future, as we have in the past, that we will spend 2% of GDP—the NATO recommended minimum on defence?

[Mr Hammond]

As my hon. Friend knows, at the Wales summit all NATO partners signed up either to maintaining that level, for those who are already spending 2% of GDP on defence, or to making progress towards achieving that level. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the cornerstone of our security in the UK is the article 5 guarantee. Our allies and partners in the Baltic states are acutely conscious that their position is different from that of Ukraine, simply because they are inside NATO and benefit from the article 5 guarantee. He is absolutely right that we need to maintain the clear distinction between the guarantee that we extend to NATO, which is absolute, and the opprobrium we heap on those who launch the kind of attacks we have seen on non-NATO members, but we will deal with attacks on non-NATO members in a different way from attacks on NATO members.

Pakistan (UK Support)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rehman Chishti]

Yes, it is a privilege and a pleasure to do that. I know that my hon. Friend, as chairman of the all-party group on Pakistan, has done everything he possibly can to build the relationship between our two great countries. I know that the former high commissioner, who I see in the Public Gallery, will remember his many meetings with my hon. Friend. It is right that people across the UK came together to show solidarity with the people of Pakistan at this difficult hour.

This was a cowardly terrorist attack by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan which struck at the youngest and most vulnerable, and it is a reminder that Pakistan remains on the front line against terrorism. God forbid if Pakistan should fall as a front line in fighting terrorism, as the world will become a dark and unsafe place, with suffering affecting each and every part of it.

It is important to clarify one thing. The TTP, like many other terrorists, has often been described as “Islamist extremists” or “Islamist terrorists”, thereby linking Islam to them, which is what they want. We should be clear and refer to them and any other terrorists who want to link their evil acts to Islam simply as “terrorists” and “extremists”. That is it. They are terrorists and extremists, and we should not give them the credibility of linking this great religion with their evil acts.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I gently suggest that my hon. Friend might want to go one step further? These extremists never hesitate to call other Muslims with whom they disagree “unIslamic”. Although I see the point of my hon. Friend’s argument that these people are not Islamist and not Islamic, just calling them terrorists and extremists is not quite enough. We need some context, so may I suggest “unIslamic extremists” as a possible denomination for them?

[Rehman Chishti]

My hon. Friend is an expert on defence matters, and I have great admiration and respect for him. I take on board the point he makes. Everyone around the world wants to make it clear that these individuals are terrorists and extremists. When I comment on these matters on television, I often get e-mails saying I am a non-Muslim myself for calling them terrorists. We know who the terrorists and extremists are in this context.

Ukraine (UK Relations with Russia)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 11th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Whittingdale]

I will say a little more along those lines, but I very much agree with the hon. Gentleman. The idea that what has happened has been somehow at the instigation of the west and America ignores the fact that the people of Ukraine have the right to choose their future. They have overwhelmingly demonstrated—most recently in parliamentary elections, which I want to speak a little about—that they see their future as moving closer to the west and to Europe, and they do not wish to move away from that and back in the direction of Russia. We must respect their right to make that choice.

At the moment, the greatest violence is taking place in eastern Ukraine, and a war is going on in what is known as the Donbas region. There are violations of the Minsk accords every day. Civilian areas are being shelled, there are shootings, and an extremely fierce battle has been raging over several days and weeks for Donetsk airport, where despite the Russians deploying some of their best troops—the Spetsnaz—we understand that they have suffered heavier casualties and the Ukrainians have managed to repel them.

We are told by the Russians that there are no Russian troops in that part of Ukraine, but we know that there are regular movements of military vehicles across the border, and we understand that anything up to 10,000 regular Russian troops are in eastern Ukraine, not to mention the tens of thousands lined up along the border. So-called humanitarian convoys regularly cross into eastern Ukraine. The Red Cross or international observers have not been permitted to inspect those humanitarian white lorries, and local reports state that the most recent humanitarian convoys have contained ammunition.

The battle is fierce and has resulted in heavy casualties. In the summer a strong tank battle resulted in something like 70% of Ukrainian armour being destroyed by Russian forces. President Poroshenko has said that at the latest count, 1,250 Ukrainian servicemen have been killed and 3,000 injured, but casualties have not been only on the Ukrainian side.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Unpleasant though the alternatives are, given that Russia will clearly not allow pro-Russian forces in the east of the country to be militarily defeated, which is the least worse of these two outcomes? Either those areas are allowed to become relatively autonomous, or the situation is fought to a military finish, the only outcome of which—given that the west will not intervene militarily—would be Russian occupation of the whole country.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I will come on to what we need to do to respond to the Russian intervention. To some extent, I agree with my hon. Friend that we need political reform, but it should not only be about the two regions in Donbas. If he will forgive me, I will continue my current theme but I promise I will come back to that.

I want to talk not only about the fighting that is taking place in Ukraine, but about the massive abuse of human rights. We have Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe observers in eastern Ukraine, but confidence that they can monitor to the desirable extent is limited. I have heard criticism that they have been unable to carry out proper monitoring of the situation.

There has been a massive population displacement, from both Crimea and Donbas—something like 1.5 million people have been displaced, and that may well be an underestimate. Hostages have been taken. Nadiya Savchenko, the Ukrainian servicewoman who was elected to the Ukrainian Parliament, is being held in Russia. Wearing my other hat as Chairman of the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, I should mention that we are conscious that Oleg Sentsov, a distinguished Ukrainian film director, was abducted and is being held in Moscow. With my hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Sir Roger Gale), I attended a conference last week of the Council of Europe to discuss media freedom and the importance of the protection of journalists. We heard about two journalists who are being held hostage. There have also been a number of casualties among journalists.

If we listen to and watch Russian media, we get a completely different picture. There is no account of that whatever. The Russian propaganda machine is insistent that the Kiev Government are a bunch of fascist gangsters who have been imposed on the population. The Russians make regular claims of abuses by Ukrainian troops, and often produce photographs of bodies—it later becomes apparent that the photographs were taken during other conflicts many years ago.

Perhaps the most outrageous Russian media manipulation took place after the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines MH17. There was overwhelming evidence, which is now widely recognised throughout the western world, that the airliner was shot down by Russian separatists using a surface-to-air missile that they had managed to obtain. Despite that, Russian media initially told us that the aircraft had been shot down by the Ukrainians, because the Ukrainians had mistaken it for President Putin’s plane and were trying to shoot him down. Another claim was that the incident was a plot dreamt up by the west, which had flown an airliner full of dead bodies over Ukraine that could then be brought down to discredit the Russian separatists. Even this week, pictures have been produced in Russian media claiming to show a jet fighter that shot the plane down.

Despite the fact that those pictures were obviously faked, the concern is that a huge number of people believed the story. A substantial proportion of the Russian population—the majority—are convinced it is true. I therefore welcome the Prime Minister’s recognition of the importance of countering that propaganda, which he gave me when I raised the matter with him after the statement on the G20. He said that President Obama had also recognised the need to counter Russian propaganda. I welcome the launch in this country of Ukraine Today, an English-language channel that will try to set out events accurately. I hope we and the Ukrainians do what we can to increase our efforts to get out the truth of what is happening. I welcome the intention of the new Ukrainian Government to set up a national public service broadcaster, which they have suggested could be modelled on the principle of the BBC.

What do we need to do to put pressure on Russia, and make it clear that its behaviour is unacceptable and that there must be penalties? Sanctions were first imposed after the annexation of Crimea and there has been a gradual escalation since then. Many people say that sanctions are pointless and have no effect, but they clearly are having a significant effect on the Russian economy. There has been a sharp downward revision in its prospects for growth, and they have affected the Russian currency and the Russian stock market. In my view, we need to do more. I would like to see a strengthening of sanctions. I recognise that that requires international agreement. The Minister and the Prime Minister have been at the forefront in pressing for the strongest response from the international community, but I have been alarmed by reports that some have been suggesting that perhaps we can now begin to relax sanctions. I hope the Minister can reassure me that we will make the case as strongly as possible that there is no justification to relaxing sanctions. If the current destabilisation continues, there may even be a case for strengthening sanctions still further.

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is 33 years since I first met my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), and it is a real pleasure to sit beside him in the Chamber today and listen to his very sensible remarks about a situation that might see him classified as a bit of a peacenik. [Interruption.] He snorts at the suggestion. However, the circumstances in which we met all those years ago were the depths of the cold war. We co-operated with our colleague Tony Kerpel and others sadly no longer alive, such as George Miller, to do everything we could to counter communist-inspired campaigns to undermine the defences of western Europe in general and NATO in particular. Therefore, I do not think that either of us has a track record of being soft on the Russians. Why is it, then, that without having compared notes, we both find ourselves today urging caution in this scenario?

My hon. Friend concentrated on his historical analysis. I will concentrate on a rather simpler analytical approach. It boils down to one clear proposition: do not make military threats that cannot be or are not intended to be fulfilled. If military threats are made under those circumstances and they are not then fulfilled, there is a danger that your credibility is undermined for a time later, when you might have to issue a threat of retaliation that you intend to fulfil, and your adversary will not believe you mean it. That is how wars can start by mistake; because people do not take each other’s statements of position seriously.

Why does that relate specifically to Ukraine? It relates to Ukraine because the danger of the approach we are taking toward Ukraine in our rhetoric is to lump that non-NATO country together with other countries that are members of NATO. I must say to my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale), whom I congratulate on securing the debate and on the way in which he presented his case, that I agree entirely with his view of the condemnation-worthy activities that Russia is carrying out. However, I do not agree with saying that if Russia gets its way in Ukraine and in places such as Moldova and Georgia, then its next step will be to threaten the Baltic states, because we must not lump these things together.

NATO membership must never be offered glibly, lightly, or without thought of the consequences. [Interruption.] I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) agrees. We must consider the consequences of offering NATO membership without a serious intent to apply article 5 in circumstances of potential war. We all know what article 5 means: if any NATO country is attacked, the attacker is automatically at war with all the other members of NATO.

I never tire of making the point I am about to make. I have made it many times before and I am not going to be deterred from making it again; it is, indeed, a point about deterrence. In order for deterrence to work, it is not only necessary to show that if someone is attacked, the consequences—the retaliation—will be unacceptable; one must also show that it will be unavoidable. One must not give the potential aggressor any reason to gamble that he might be able to commit an act of aggression without facing the consequences.

When countries came together to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the intention was precisely to remove that uncertainty, which had existed in the 1930s. Then Hitler was able to gamble, while picking off one country after another, that the western democracies would do nothing. In fact, he got away with it in several countries, in a succession of aggressive manoeuvres, but then picked on one country too many and ended up involved in a war with the United Kingdom—or the British empire, as it still was at the time—on which he did not originally wish to embark.

By talking tough in military terms on the question of Ukraine, we are, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough suggested, in danger of avoiding the realities on the ground. As I have pointed out before, when Russia stood in control of the whole of central and eastern Europe, there were periods when one country after another tried to shake off the communist yoke. We saw it in East Germany in 1953; we saw it in Hungary in 1956; and I personally remember seeing it in Czechoslovakia when I was 16 years old in 1968. At that time, when Czechoslovakia seemed to have got out from under totalitarian control, I argued very strongly that we should offer it NATO membership in order to try to protect it. I realise now, because I am rather more experienced in the ways of the world, that that would have been a counsel of madness, because given our ability to protect the country that we would be promising to protect, the promise would have been totally lacking in credibility.

It totally lacks credibility to suggest that countries such as Georgia and Ukraine should be offered NATO membership. Not many people are present in the Chamber today, but I predict—I hope I never have occasion to see this prediction come true—that if the country about which we were concerned were a NATO member, the Chamber would be packed, and that is because we would effectively be debating whether we were prepared to start world war three on behalf of that country, whichever NATO member it happened to be.

I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Baltics must be our red line. I was very interested to hear my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham mention in an earlier intervention how, during his time in NATO, he had expressed concern about the extension of the NATO guarantee to so many countries from central and eastern Europe. I must say that I felt we were stretching the elastic to its limit when we extended that guarantee to the Baltic states, but I accept that we have a long history of trying to secure the independence of those states, stretching right back to the days of the Russian revolution itself. Therefore, there is a significant degree of credibility that we would be willing to resist militarily an invasion of the Baltic states, but that is not true in the case of Ukraine.

I can imagine four principal scenarios in Ukraine. The first is that, in an ideal world, Russia will have a change of heart, or sanctions will work and she will withdraw and restore the pro-Russian areas of Ukraine to Kiev’s control. I think that a fairly unlikely outcome. The second scenario, which in my opinion would be the best, would be an agreed decision to create an autonomous area within Ukraine, comprising the pro-Russian elements and territories. The country could therefore continue as a political entity, but with a loose federal structure.

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

My hon. Friend is talking about dividing up a sovereign nation. Surely it is a question of self-determination and up to the people of Ukraine to decide that.

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, in an ideal world it would be, but there is a slight problem with that scenario, namely that the Russians have the power to impose a solution and nobody else is willing to fight them to prevent them from doing so. That is the hard reality. We may not like the situation any more than we liked that in 1968 when Russia imposed its will with the crushing of the Prague spring; but I do not think anybody would suggest even now, with the benefit of hindsight, that it would have been right to provoke world war three at that time. In situations where we are up against people with a lot of power, we have to contain them until political affairs evolve gradually in the direction we want them to go.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

indicated assent.

[Dr Lewis]

I am glad that my hon. Friend agrees with me.

Let me deal with the other two scenarios before drawing my remarks to a conclusion. The third scenario is a split. It would be either a de facto split, which is being referred to as a frozen conflict—in other words, the pro-Russian communities would end up in control of their areas, glaring at Kiev and vice versa—or a de jure split, which would obviously be a less satisfactory solution than an agreed decision to stay together with an appropriate amount of autonomy.

Finally—this is the dread scenario, which really could happen—if we really were crazy enough to offer military assistance to Kiev and encourage it to think that there would be enough military supplies to enable it to overwhelm its adversaries in the pro-Russian parts of the country, it is an absolute certainty that Russia would respond militarily. In any conflict of that sort, Russia would prevail and it would not then be content to confine itself to the pro-Russian areas; it would invade and take over the whole country.

It is what is colloquially called a no-brainer that if the Russians are determined—however wrongly, as my hon. Friends have variously suggested—not to let the pro-Russian provinces go, and they are not prepared to do so, the best outcome we can hope for is an agreed negotiation of autonomy for those areas. Such agreements are not unprecedented. It took us 38 years to reach some sort of agreement even in a province such as Northern Ireland, which was a rather less fraught or challenging situation than the one that we and the international community face in Ukraine.

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[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I did not intend to speak in the debate, but I was listening to it from afar and was stirred to come, hot foot, to the Chamber by the opening speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale). I therefore apologise if my speech, which will be short, is a bit disjointed.

I am clear on Russia’s strategic military aim. My good and hon. Friends have alluded to it already and we are all talking along the same lines. In military terms, it is at the very least to secure a land corridor to Crimea. Some Members, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), have suggested that the aim is to go as far as Odessa, but I think that the immediate strategic aim is to get to Crimea. The Black sea is crucial as it is a warm water entry and exit point. In the 1950s, as everyone in the Chamber knows, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders never believed for a moment that Ukraine would not be a part of the Soviet Union or Russia. Khrushchev gave it away because of that assumption.

As I mentioned in an intervention, 20 years ago, when I was chief of policy at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, I argued that we have to be very careful as we move eastwards. I was concerned at that time about the idea that the Baltic republics would become part of NATO, because militarily I find it very difficult to think of how to defend that situation, particularly when there is a Russian enclave to the west. That is a scenario we have already rehearsed in this debate.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I know time is limited, but I wanted to point out that the only way we can defend NATO countries that are out on a limb is by having tripwire forces. That would show a potential aggressor that, while they might occupy those countries, they would let themselves in for a very long war with other countries that would be able, eventually, to liberate them.

[Bob Stewart]

I totally agree with my hon. and very good Friend. That was exactly my role as a young officer in West Berlin—a British tripwire—in case the then Soviet Union decided to take over.

[Bob Stewart]

I am afraid I totally agree—some tripwire indeed. A big stumbling block, although I was not quite as big then.

[Dr Lewis]

You were in spirit.

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my hon. Friend.

I slightly disagree with those who say that Putin alone is the problem. Putin is Russian, and he represents a Russian point of view, and the Russian attitude towards Ukraine comes from history. I totally take the point about how Stalin dealt with Ukraine, but fundamentally Ukraine is a sort of glacis plate—to use the old term—to protect mother Russia. I also understand that a lot of Russians feel antagonism towards NATO, because sometimes, looking at it from their point of view, it appears to have been quite aggressive.

Over the past few years, Russian anxieties have been well stoked by western actions. As we have discussed, there has been talk of Ukraine joining NATO. I remember reading carefully through the EU negotiations with Ukraine, and there, in one of the sub-paragraphs, I saw a couple of lines about the EU sending troops to start exercises in that country. Nothing could have been a bigger red rag to the Russians. I got it from the House of Commons Library, and I am sure it was publicly obtainable.

I totally support our policy of trying to stop Russian expansion, but despite the sanctions, which, as we have demonstrated, are biting, I suspect that de facto Russia will gain its land corridor, either by negotiation or by agreement, to Sevastopol. That link from Russia to Sevastopol and the Black sea fleet will be on dry land at some point. We will have to recognise that as a fact of life.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr McFadden]

I need to make some progress, and allow the Minister to wind up.

The issue between Ukraine and Russia is not the only relevant factor. We should also consider the economic health and the strength of democracy in Ukraine itself. Of course those issues are related, because as long as Russia backs the separatists in the east, it will be all the more difficult for Ukraine to recover and stabilise economically. Indeed, as well as the geopolitical aim that was referred to by the hon. Member for Beckenham, it may be a Russian aim never to allow Kiev to have full economic control of the east.

Ukraine has a new President and a new Parliament, and they have the urgent task of not only defending the country’s territorial integrity, but stabilising the economy and delivering honest government. There has been a 7% contraction in Ukraine’s GDP this year, and inflation is running at around 22%. The IMF now believes that, on top of the $17 billion aid package that was announced in April this year, a further $15 billion is needed. The Ukrainian economy is in deep trouble, and in urgent need of stabilisation.

In governance terms, too, the country needs both reform and help, and Britain could play a valuable role in that regard. In the early 2000s, this country offered help to new democracies of eastern Europe in the form of advice on and assistance in the running of Ministries, robust budgeting, and the transparency of actions. That help was valuable and important to those countries at the time. Would the Minister consider offering similar help to Ukraine at this difficult time—if it has not already been offered—so that it can improve its governance, enhance transparency, and increase confidence in the democratic process?

The situation both within Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia poses great dangers for stability and for peace. A huge amount of commitment and vigilance has gone into developing a network of states that do not transgress one another’s borders and do not foment nationalist and separatist movements within states. We defend this settlement and realise its value.

Of course there is potentially a different future for relations between Russia and other European states. Russia could cease aggression. It could let Ukraine choose its own path. It could respect the territorial integrity of other states. That path would lead to the lifting of sanctions, it would improve conditions for the Russian people, and it would gain Russia greater respect in the world. So we should be firm, we should be resolute in helping, and we should offer our assistance to Ukraine in terms of the sanctions and the governance help I have set out, but we should also be clear that this alternative future remains open to Russia and that it is far preferable to the current direction of relations between us.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) on securing the debate and, indeed, on the commitment he has shown in this House for some time—and well before the current crisis arose—to understanding Ukraine, its people and its political priorities. I also thank all hon. Members who have taken part in today’s debate.

I want to start the substance of my remarks with Ukraine, because it seems to me that any fair appraisal of the diplomatic crisis we face needs to start with the truth that Ukraine today is an independent sovereign state with a democratically elected president and Parliament and internationally recognised borders, and is entitled, not only morally but in terms of international law, to take its own decisions about its national future.

Furthermore, that sovereignty, that independence and those borders were recognised by Russia itself in treaties that both accompanied and followed the break-up of the USSR. Those borders included Crimea within Ukraine, and until the armed intervention by Russia at the beginning of this year—an intervention, we should remind ourselves, that the Russians persistently denied almost to the day when they announced the award of medals to the soldiers who had served in Crimea—no territorial claim was made over the years since the independence of Ukraine.

The irony of the Russian intervention is that it has reinforced a sense of Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian nationalism not only, and most obviously, in the west of the country, but also in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine where those feelings were more muted. I saw something of that myself when I was in Dnipropetrovsk earlier this year.

Nor am I persuaded by the argument that Russia has somehow reacted to provocation by either the European Union or NATO. President Poroshenko has made it clear that he has no intention of even applying for membership of NATO, and his Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin made it clear at the most recent meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council that, while Ukraine wished to move towards NATO standards in terms of the effectiveness of its armed forces, this was going to take Ukraine many, many years to accomplish.

As for the idea that there has somehow been EU provocation, let us remind ourselves that the negotiations for an association agreement started as far back as 2007, during the term of President Yushchenko. They were carried through by President Yanukovych, who is never normally accused of being a foe of Russia. When I was in Ukraine in October 2013, I talked to very senior members of the Yanukovych Administration who assured me that the President had decided that that association agreement was what he wanted to conclude.

We need to be clear about what Russia is attempting to do. It is now attempting to prevent Ukraine from successfully building a unified, democratic society based on the rule of law. Rather, its intention—to judge from its actions—appears to be to try to keep Ukraine weak, divided, corrupt and dependent on Russia to determine what its international alignments and mode of internal self-government should be.

Under successive British Governments, we have encouraged and supported Russia to move closer to the values that have underpinned peace and prosperity since the end of the cold war. That is why the United Kingdom has supported the admission of Russia to the G8 and the World Trade Organisation and looked forward to its admission to the OECD. But now, under President Putin, we have witnessed a severe decline in support for those values, a crackdown on civil society and other voices of freedom and independence inside Russia, and a rejection of that offer of partnership. There are clear signs, too, that Russia is not prepared to see its neighbours move in that direction either—and not just Ukraine.

Reference has been made during the debate to the events in Georgia in 2008, but in 2014 alone we have seen increased Russian meddling in the internal affairs of Moldova, the description by President Putin of Kazakhstan as “not a proper state”, the abduction by Russians of an Estonian official from inside Estonian territory—the man is still being detained in prison in Moscow—and the seizure on the high seas by Russia of a Lithuanian fishing vessel, which remains in Murmansk and has not been returned to its Lithuanian owners. We have also seen the interruption of gas supplies to Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. That has been attributed to technical problems, but I think it is a political signal that the Russian Government were unhappy with the reverse flow of gas supplies to—

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Lidington]

I do not have time.

Those actions are based on a doctrine enunciated by the Kremlin: Russia has the right to intervene wherever it chooses when it claims that it is doing so in support of Russian speakers or ethnic Russians. Like hon. Members on both sides of the argument today, I believe strongly that there is a difference in terms of a defence commitment between NATO allies, where article 5 applies, and between friendly countries that are not part of the NATO alliance. Let us be in no doubt that the enunciation of that doctrine—of that right of intervention—was calculated to sow fear in the Baltic states, and it did so very successfully. Thankfully, it also resulted in a determined response from NATO and the deployment of additional NATO forces on exercises and patrols in the Baltic region.

[Dr Lewis]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Lidington]

I am sorry, but time is very short indeed.

We know that Ukraine needs support, and the United Kingdom has already spent money on a range of technical assistance programmes to support reforms of financial and economic governance, including tackling corruption. Through our conflict pool, we are also providing a range of programmes, including support for the reform of the Ukrainian armed forces and the supply of non-lethal equipment, as well as support for the OSCE special monitoring mission.

To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), under the conflict security and stability fund we will improve on our record next year with a particular focus on defence and security reform and constitutional and public sector reform, and on the battle against organised crime and corruption in Ukraine. In my meetings this week with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine and with Mayor Klitschko, I made it clear that we welcomed an approach from the Ukrainian authorities in relation to other areas in which they might welcome United Kingdom know-how and technical assistance.

I want to return briefly to the subject of Ukraine’s Euro-integration aspirations and the need for reform. We have a substantial stake, as do other European countries, in Ukraine’s future, through €11 billion in the EU assistance package and a $17 billion International Monetary Fund loan. The EU-Ukraine association agreement represents a clear public commitment by both the EU and Ukraine to a deep relationship and close co-operation. It would be a great mistake for President Putin to see that agreement as a threat. A strong and prosperous Ukraine can only be in Russia’s interest, just as a strong and prosperous Poland has proved to be since the recovery of democracy in that country.

I was asked about sanctions. The answer is that our judgment about sanctions will depend upon Russia’s actions. If the Minsk agreement is implemented in full—if we see an end to the Russian reinforcements of the separatists, we start to see the withdrawal of Russian forces, we see Ukraine getting back control of its borders and the OSCE monitors able to deploy, and we see a genuine ceasefire—at that point perhaps we should consider whether any relaxation of sanctions might be appropriate. But, equally, if we see further military aggression, the EU has done a fair amount of contingency planning for the possibility of further sectoral economic sanctions. The Prime Minister personally and Ministers and officials at all levels are engaged with that work and in work to try to make sure that, despite different systems on the two sides of the Atlantic, there is coherence between the sanctions policy of the United States and that of the EU. I believe we have been able to deliver on that.

I wish to make it clear that our aim is not to cripple the Russian economy—the structural challenges that the Russian economy faces will do that. Russia needs to address those rather than focus on military intervention in its southern neighbour. Our aim is to exert a proportionate and reversible cost for Russia’s illegal actions and to persuade the Russian leadership that this crisis is better resolved through diplomatic means. I agree with those who have said that isolation is also not the answer either; we need dialogue with Russia to resolve this crisis. That is why the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary have continued to engage with their counterparts in Russia, and are committed to doing so.

Going forward, we will offer our support to the new coalition Government in Ukraine, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as they need all the support they can get. We will help them with their reform programme and will monitor progress on their commitments and obligations tied to the association agreement, the related EU assistance package and the IMF loan. We will help to strengthen Ukraine’s economy, through technical assistance, to allow for better economic management and we will help Ukraine to address its energy security, through its need to modernise its systems and become more efficient and self sustainable.

We do not seek a hostile relationship with Russia. Indeed, for 23 years the United Kingdom has tried to build a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow, and we do not give up on that aim. But, equally, we have to be clear-headed about the actions that we have seen Russia take, particularly in the past 12 months, and act upon the basis of what Russia has actually done rather than upon promises that, so far, have not been implemented in practice. We will support Ukraine, we hope for a better relationship with Russia, but we must be realistic in preparing ourselves for a relationship with Moscow that, I fear, is going to be more difficult and more fractious than we had hoped. That is the choice of Russia’s leaders, who at the moment have chosen to treat Europe and the transatlantic alliance as a strategic adversary, rather than, as we had hoped, a potential partner for the future.

Iran (Nuclear Talks)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

If the hon. Gentleman is referring to the Gulf countries, I can say that all of the E3 participants have regular discussions with Gulf colleagues, and indeed with Israeli Government representatives. We are very much aware of the views of other countries in the region who are not represented around the table.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is often said that, because of the mutual hatred between Iran and Saudi Arabia, if Iran got nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would follow suit. How realistic is that danger?

[Mr Hammond]

I am not in a position to comment on how Saudi Arabia might react to any hypothetical situation. Our focus is on ensuring that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons and does not acquire the capability to build them in future.

EU Reform

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Sir William Cash]

I entirely accept the hon. Gentleman’s second point about the referendum; I have never disputed that. Far from it—it was an extremely good thing, although back then it was about a kind of Europe different from the one we are now experiencing.

I voted for the Single European Act, but I tabled an amendment to preserve the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. If that amendment had been allowed for debate, which it was not, it would have changed the whole nature of the matter. I was strongly supported by Enoch Powell, who understood that if we were to have a single market that did not work, the only way to retrieve the situation would be through some form of “notwithstanding” formula of the sort I have returned to over and again in subsequent years.

German economic policy is obsessed with fiscal discipline and large current account surpluses. Without the euro, currency adjustments would control Germany’s ability to export cheaply. German economic efficiency, combined with the single currency, allows for artificially cheap German exports at the expense of Mediterranean countries, which can deflate their currencies to offset cheap German goods, drawing money and jobs north and leaving the southern Governments unable to finance their deficits through economic growth.

German insistence on fiscal discipline is, as Wolfgang Munchau made clear in yesterday’s Financial Times, ideological and a deeply held response to the crisis of the 1930s. The result will be the destruction of the Mediterranean export economies while simultaneously deepening the damage through austerity on a massive scale. An attempt to impose German-style labour laws and fiscal discipline on those countries will fail and will not bring the required efficiency to compete with Germany.

The eurozone, which is dominated by Germany, is a disaster, as is increasingly recognised publicly by some of my Labour colleagues, and it seriously damages our economy. Furthermore, although we are told that consensus is the norm, the political consequences of the present treaties mean that, as of 1 November this year, the majority voting system in the EU Council of Ministers has been profoundly changed, subject only to a compromise transitional arrangement called the Ioannina compromise.

Germany and France with two small states can now effectively determine European decision making. The consensus is insufficiently transparent and is achieved primarily because the member states know the outcome of a given vote, which in any case does not sufficiently correspond to our concerns. In my European Scrutiny Committee, we have been very critical of how Coreper functions and the manner in which we are unable to achieve our objectives. We also have some critical things to say about UKRep.

Indeed, VoteWatch Europe has demonstrated that when the UK has voted between 2009 and 2012, it has done so in favour with the majority of member states in 90% of all votes. That strongly suggests that most European Commission proposals go through in practice. Therefore, the change in the voting system will tend to affect British interests increasingly adversely.

Professor Roland Vaubel of Mannheim university has examined the voting system and argued that the outcome is one of regulatory collusion, favouring Germany in particular. One must recognise that Germany makes a very substantial net contribution—£13 billion in 2013 compared with our £8.6 billion, although our contribution is rising. In return, Germany now acquires disproportionate advantages under the voting system and through its economic influence in Mitteleuropa.

In his speech in Berlin on 13 November, John Major reinvoked the concept of subsidiarity and he did so again on “The Andrew Marr Show” on Sunday. He said that subsidiarity is the answer and that we must

“nail it down as a matter of European law”.

I do not know which planet John Major has been living on since Maastricht, but that is already a matter of EU law. When he promoted subsidiarity in the Maastricht treaty, I described it as a con trick. In my 30 years on the European Scrutiny Committee, I have never come across a single example of the direct application of subsidiarity. Even John Major now reports its failure, and his speech in Berlin was a catalogue of the failures of his European policy at Maastricht.

The European Union is not an abstract concept. It is about the daily lives of our voters, to whom we are directly accountable, across a vast range of matters. The list of chapters in the consolidated treaties sets out the immense impact that the European Union now has on us all.

The European Scrutiny Committee, of which I was elected Chairman in 2010, argued strongly and unanimously in November 2013 that the Government should reintroduce the veto. We were promised that the veto would never be abandoned when the White Paper was issued in 1971; that was the basis of our voluntary acceptance of the treaties by our Parliament in the passing of the European Communities Act 1972, yet so many other additional competences have been added since. That paper described the veto as being in our vital national interest, and stated that to abandon it would even endanger “the very fabric” of the European Community itself. Somebody out there understood where all this could lead, as it has.

The Prime Minister, to his credit, did veto the fiscal compact, although my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) will remember a conversation that we had with him shortly beforehand. My Committee proposed the application of the formula

“notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972”

to our Westminster legislation when it is in our national interest to do so. We could thereby override European laws and the European Court of Justice when necessary, as we can and should, under our own flexible constitutional arrangements unique to the United Kingdom among the 28 member states, thus regaining our right to govern ourselves in matters of vital national interest.

Those proposals were rejected by the Government, which shows how weak our negotiating stance really is in relation to the need to change fundamentally our relationship with the EU in the interests of our parliamentary democracy and the needs of our voters.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Am I right in thinking that my hon. Friend has referred to the fact that Germany—the country on which this debate is focused—has a sort of parliamentary supremacy as a safeguard in its legislation, and that that is what he has tried to introduce for the United Kingdom? Can he tell us how well it works for Germany?

[Sir William Cash]

The short answer is that in the German constitution, in the preamble to the Basic Law of 1949, an assumption is built in for a united states of Europe. Unfortunately, therefore, a change in the German constitution would be required to enable the Karlsruhe court to override the provisions of the Basic Law. Therefore, Germany faces a real constitutional question that we do not, because we do not have a written constitution and we have the inherent right, within our own Parliament, to make the kind of adjustments that we want in this area.

To refuse to accept our Committee’s proposals—I say this with great respect to the Minister—is not merely walking away; it is not even engaging with the real problem, which is the dysfunctional structure created by successive treaties and the disadvantages that that creates for the United Kingdom.

All that demands a direct return to democratic accountability at Westminster—not the Maastricht-based co-decision with the European Parliament, which I opposed at the time, and not the manner in which the majority voting system and the so-called consensus have led to us being put at significant disadvantage from time to time in matters of our national interest. Those are increasingly becoming a matter of concern following the change in the voting system as of 1 November.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In 1997 it was an act of rebellion for a Conservative candidate in the general election to campaign against the UK joining the single currency. Indeed, I had to resign my post at Conservative central office in order to do so. In the lifetime of this Parliament it was also an act of rebellion for a Conservative Member to vote for an in/out referendum. Both those rebellions are now seen as core Conservative commitments, and even the Labour party and many others, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) said in his outstanding speech, would not dream of going to the electorate pledging themselves to trying to join the single European currency. That shows that, over time, progress can be made in opening people’s eyes to what is at stake with Britain’s troubled relationship with the European Union.

On two grounds in particular, no one could be better qualified to introduce such a debate than my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). First, as we have heard, his father won the military cross but also lost his life fighting to liberate France from German occupation in 1944. Secondly, although of course I knew that he is Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, I did not learn until today that he has served on that Committee scrutinising Euro-legislation for the last 30 years, which is an exercise in self-flagellation bordering on the heroic.

There seem to be two strands to the idea of Germany in Europe, and the first strand appears to have something in common with what used to be said in the early years of NATO, which, as we all know, was once described as being designed

“to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.

In other words the idea was that, because Germany had twice brought world war to the European continent, the best way of preventing it happening again was to tie Germany into multinational alliances and institutions. That is one point of view; the other point of view is that it is not only about trying to prevent war in Europe. The question is whether it is an alternative way for Germany to exercise the sort of power and control in Europe that she failed to get by other means in those two terrible conflicts. I do not know which of those two strands is the primary motivation among German democratic politicians. Some of them may indeed be afraid of their country’s past being repeated; others may actually covet ways of gaining, through peaceful methods involving the slow absorption of other countries that are gradually drawn into the EU net, the sort of influence that they failed to gain in the past.

In the 1970s I studied the theory of international relations under the great Professor Sir Michael Howard, as he now is. One of the topics I studied was integration theory. The idea was that countries could be made to merge with each other not by telling them directly what the end product would be, but by drawing them through imperceptible degrees and through the exercise and creation of new common functions into an ever-closer relationship, so that they did not realise where they were going until they had already arrived at their destination.

I must admit that I was sceptical. I thought that countries might start on that path but that at some point they would wake up, realise the destination, decide that they did not want it and turn back. I admit that I have had to qualify my scepticism over the subsequent decades because, time and again, I have seen our country being drawn down that route. I wish I had £5 for every time somebody involved with the European project has said, “The high point”—or the high-water mark, or something else of that sort—“of European integration has now been reached.” Funnily enough, there is always one high-water mark after another. Frankly, I am getting fed up with it.

[Mr Redwood]

Has my hon. Friend also noticed that each successive federalising treaty has been explained to us as representing no serious transfer of power of any kind? How is it that we have so little power left?

[Dr Lewis]

Indeed. The process has become such a habit that the mask slips very rarely; but there was one notable occasion when the mask did slip. On new year’s eve just over a decade ago, when the European single currency was about to come into force, I saw the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, being interviewed at midnight, and he was asked the following question: “This is a political project, isn’t it?” For once he let the mask slip, and he smiled beatifically and said, “It is an entirely political project.”

[Sir Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for allowing me a brief intervention. In the 1980s the mantra of Conservative Governments and Ministers was “No essential loss of sovereignty.” That was haunted right through and dragged across the nation as if there was a truth in it. Any time anyone suggested that sovereignty is a perfect construction in itself, they immediately wanted to tell us why sovereignty was no longer sovereignty, having said there would be no loss of sovereignty.

[Dr Lewis]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend who, like my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham, has done so much over the years to try to arrest the slide to a destination that nobody in this country actually wants. The reality is that if there is a single currency, it will only work if there is a single economy. And if there is a single economy, it will only work if there is a single Government. And if there is a single Government, it will only work if there is a single country, which is what the architects of this scheme want us to have. Although they admit to each other that it is political, what they say to us is that it is economic and that it all depends on our economic and trading relationship with Europe. I conclude by saying that just because one has a strong trading relationship with other states, it does not mean that one has to merge one’s currency, one’s economy, one’s population, one’s foreign policy or one’s country with those other states. We want a good relationship with Europe, but we are our own country, which is how we intend to stay.

US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Indeed; those countries have all been involved in conflicts, and we have come near to the use of nuclear weapons in the case of Korea and in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Clearly, their existence poses a threat. When the House debated Trident renewal in 2007, many Members took the view that Britain’s security depended on having nuclear weapons. If that was the case, someone could argue for any country in the world developing nuclear weapons on the basis that that would guarantee its security.

As I have explained, the reality is that the vast majority of nations do not have nuclear weapons and do not want them. Although some are under a nuclear alliance such as NATO, many are not and do not possess nuclear weapons, yet have massive natural resources. Many countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia are part of nuclear weapons-free zones. That is my view.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I appreciate that I will have the opportunity to speak after the hon. Gentleman, but I want to take him back to the point made by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). The hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) said that if nuclear weapons were used, there would be dire effects on the environment and on the planet, but does he not recognise that people who believe in deterrents believe that the nuclear deterrent is constantly in use, because the use resides in the possession, which results in the deterrent effect on any other power against using such weapons against this country?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The hon. Gentleman and I have debated that view, and I simply do not agree that they provide security. Yes, they are in existence every day and therefore clearly are potentially a threat to somebody, but it did not do the USA much good on 11 September 2001. Nuclear weapons were not much help on that occasion; nor are they much help in dealing with poverty, environmental disasters and people who are forced to flee and seek refuge elsewhere.

My purpose today is to debate the mutual defence agreement and that, of course, is central to Britain’s nuclear relationship with the United States. I turn to the history of the agreement. The USA had the McMahon Act, which did not allow the sharing of its nuclear or defence information with any other state, notwithstanding the provisions of the NATO treaty of 1948. Britain, which had a very close relationship with the USA throughout the 1940s and ’50s, could not legally share a relationship of nuclear information with the USA. The McMahon Act was then amended, and straight after the amendment was agreed, the mutual defence agreement came into being, by which information and technology is shared between Britain and the USA.

An interesting legal point relates to the use of testing facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston and plutonium, which it would be completely illegal to use or test in the USA. I would be grateful if the Minister said whether there is any testing involving plutonium or potential uses of plutonium at AWE Aldermaston, because it is a significant part of the issue.

The mutual defence agreement has been amended a number of times in its history and was most recently renewed, on a regular 10-year cycle, to allow arrangements for the transfer of special nuclear materials and non-nuclear components. The treaty was last extended in 2004 and will be extended a further 10 years from this year. As I have explained, the US Congress debated it earlier; we were not able to debate it.

The next issue relates to what I have just said about the use of AWE Aldermaston, but also to the legality of nuclear weapons and the relationship of the agreement to the non-proliferation treaty, which is the result of an initiative by a previous Labour Government to try to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty has two central themes. One is that all states that do not possess nuclear weapons and that sign the non-proliferation treaty agree not to possess them, take them on board or develop them. The other is that the five declared nuclear weapon states—Britain, France, China, Russia and the USA—agree both to take steps towards disarmament and not to allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So it would be interesting to know how Israel managed to get hold of its nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities.

It would also be interesting to know how this Government or any other Government can justify nuclear rearmament within the terms of the articles of the non-proliferation treaty. In a legal opinion released in July 2004 for Peacerights, BASIC—the British American Security Information Council—and the Acronym Institute, Rabinder Singh, QC, and Professor Christine Chinkin of Matrix Chambers concluded that

“it is strongly arguable that the renewal of the Mutual Defence Agreement is in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”.

I would therefore be grateful if the Minister said in his reply to the debate what the legal process is in the evaluation of the mutual defence agreement and how he believes that it is compatible with our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which is coming up for its five-year review in May 2015—unhelpfully, during the general election period in this country. Will he explain exactly what power and what finance have been used, in advance of the Trident replacement programme, to ensure that the British Government have that money available, even though there has been no main-gate decision, which is due to be taken in 2016?

I shall quote from written evidence given to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs by Nick Ritchie of the Bradford disarmament research centre:

“The UK is entirely dependent upon the United States for supply and refurbishment of its Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles… The missiles themselves are produced and serviced in the United States by Lockheed Martin. The UK does not actually own any individual missiles, but purchased the rights to 58 missiles from a common pool held at the US Strategic Weapons facility at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, Georgia. British Trident submarines also conduct their missile test firings at the US Eastern Test Range, off the coast of Florida.”

The obvious point is that the claim that Britain has an independent nuclear deterrent must be treated with the utmost caution, if not derision, when what is quite clear is where the technology comes from, the relationship with the mutual defence agreement, the expenditure involved and the testing facilities that are available for Britain to use in the USA.

[Dr Lewis]

There is a question of independence in terms not of manufacture, but of control. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that it is entirely a matter for the United Kingdom Government whether the deterrent would be fired—as opposed to used—in response to a nuclear attack on this country and that the United States could do nothing to prevent that from happening?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

That is indeed a very good question. I hope that the Minister can assist the hon. Gentleman with the answer, because it is fundamental. We have been told all my life that we have an independent nuclear deterrent in Britain and that we can operate independently. The mutual defence agreement should not have been necessary in 1958 if that was the case. It clearly was the case before 1958. Whether it was after that, I doubt, and it certainly was not the case at all after Polaris came in during the 1960s. That was a US import, as is the current technology. Could Britain fire off a nuclear weapon independently of the United States? No, I do not believe that it could. I believe that it would require the active participation of the US military and US Administration to undertake that. I simply do not believe that it is an independent nuclear weapon. I hope that this debate begins to raise more of those extremely important questions.

I was referring a few moments ago to the activities at AWE Aldermaston. Stanley Orman, a former deputy director of the AWE, said in 2008 that

“we also devised a technique...of imploding a non-fissile plutonium isotope. Now because it was plutonium the laws in the States would not allow you to implode this even though it was non-fissile, because it was plutonium. So again the American scientists would come across and use our laboratories because they couldn’t use theirs.”

If that is the case, one has to ask this question. Why is this treaty so one-sided that the USA is unable to do some testing in its own jurisdiction and therefore does it in ours, when the mutual defence agreement has received very limited parliamentary scrutiny, apart from today?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to contribute to the debate under your chairmanship, Sir Roger, and a pleasure, as always, to follow the eloquent case made by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). I am always happy to support him when he applies for debates such as this, just as he is always happy to support me when I apply for debates about nuclear deterrence. The reason why we are happy to support each other, despite taking entirely opposite views, is that we both feel that we have a good case to make.

There is no earthly reason why Parliament should be shy of debating such an important matter. The hon. Gentleman may find it a trifle more disappointing than I do that if we took a trip down memory lane to a similar debate in the 1980s, the Chamber would be full of people wishing to contribute. He and I have, to put it mildly, struggled a little to get people to come along and take part in this debate, for the simple reason that the issue is not nearly as contentious now as it was two or three decades ago.

I venture to suggest that that is because the British public have spoken on the matter, over and over again. They spoke decisively on it in the general elections of 1983 and 1987, when the question of Britain one-sidedly abandoning its nuclear deterrent was central to campaigning. They have spoken time and again in public opinion polls. Of course, it is possible to vary the answers that we receive in such polls according to the questions we ask. However, when we ask what I regard as the fundamental question: “Do you think that Britain should continue to possess a nuclear deterrent or nuclear weapons while other countries have them?”, invariably, about two thirds of the respondents say yes, about a quarter say no and a small, single-figure fraction are undecided. The issue is divisive, because fundamentally it is an article of faith. Are we more likely to keep the peace by getting rid of such weapons unconditionally or by showing a potential enemy that it would be too dangerous to attack us with their nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction?

[Mr Leech]

What does the hon. Gentleman think the answer would be if we asked the general public whether they would prefer to dump Trident rather than sack soldiers?

[Dr Lewis]

I think it would depend on the extent of the debate that had taken place before the question was asked. I would be confident that if there were to be a debate on the subject, the public would come to share my view that no amount of conventional forces can be adequate to prevent an attack on us by an enemy armed with weapons of mass destruction if we lack the means to retaliate in similar terms.

While I am dealing with the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, let me return to a point that he made earlier in an intervention on the hon. Member for Islington North. He pointed out that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence had not abolished war, and that wars continued all over the planet. That is not an argument against nuclear deterrence; it is an argument in favour of it. After the second world war, if we had lived through 50 years of hostility between the then Soviet bloc and the west and there had been no conflicts anywhere in the world in which the nuclear balance of terror did not apply, one could indeed make the case that the nuclear balance of terror had had nothing to do with the prevention of war. The reality was that proxy wars were being fought by client states of the superpowers during the cold war, but the one thing that the superpowers never dared to do was to fight against one another directly, because they knew the potential outcome of all-out war between nuclear-armed powers.

Why is it important to have a debate on the matter, even though public opinion is fairly settled and parliamentary opinion is fairly relaxed? There are two reasons.

[Mr Spellar]

The hon. Gentleman says that parliamentary opinion is fairly relaxed, and that may be a proper assessment of the arithmetic. In that case, why does his Prime Minister not put the issue of Trident renewal to a vote of Parliament?

[Dr Lewis]

I wish I knew the answer. I have asked that question many times, and it takes me neatly on to the two reasons why it is important that we have a debate on this subject, even though Parliament seems relatively relaxed about it. There is no doubt that if we look at the arithmetic of the 2007 vote that took us through the first stages of the successor programme to the Vanguard class submarines, it was exactly as the shadow Minister says—virtually every Conservative MP and a substantial majority of Labour MPs voted for continuing the deterrent into the next generation, and a significant minority of Labour unilateralists voted against the measure. The figure was about 80 or 90, if I remember correctly.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

One hundred.

[Dr Lewis]

One hundred exactly. Any advances on 100? No, so let us take that as the figure.

There is no doubt that, if there were to be a free vote in the House of Commons, this matter would proceed. One of the reasons why I want to continue having these debates until such a vote happens is that there should already have been a vote. The shadow Minister is right about that. The main-gate contracts were due to be signed during this Parliament, and it was entirely a result of coalition politics and a back-door deal with the Liberal Democrats, who are opposed to renewing Trident, that the vote was not held and that the life of the existing submarines was extended by five years. The key vote has now been put off until 2016.

One of the two main reasons why it is valuable to continue having these debates is that it is important that Front Benchers from both main parties put their respective positions on the record as often as possible. Let us face it, much as Labour and Conservative Members might regret it, there is always the possibility that we may end up with another hung Parliament that is once again dependent on the Liberal Democrats, or conceivably on the UK Independence party or, worst of all, the Scottish National party—I say that without reference to the fact that the party’s parliamentary leader, the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), has just vacated his place—if Labour suffers as badly in Scotland at the general election as some predict. It is therefore terribly important that the Front Benchers of both main parties have their feet held to the fire as often as possible so that there can be less room for wriggling out of it in the event of another hung Parliament.

[Mr Spellar]

The hon. Gentleman refers to wriggling out, but that is exactly what he is doing. It was absolutely clear where the parties stood in the debate on 17 July 2013, when the policies were enunciated perfectly clearly. My party’s policies were endorsed by the national policy forum and the recent Labour party conference. I am not aware of any changes in his party’s view. This debate is therefore not about the position of the parties being enunciated or holding people’s feet to the fire. The fact is that he has not managed to persuade his Prime Minister to do anything, and he ought to come clean about that.

[Dr Lewis]

There is a very good reason why I have not been able to persuade the Prime Minister to do anything, which is that it was evidently part of the negotiations—albeit that they were not made public at the time—on the formation of the coalition Government.

[Mr Spellar]

Secret negotiations.

[Dr Lewis]

Indeed. Evidently as part of the deal an agreement was reached between the Conservative leader and the Liberal Democrat leader that the decisive steps for the renewal of the successor submarines for Trident would be put off until after the next general election.

[Mr Spellar]

rose—

[Dr Lewis]

I will give way one more time, but I want to make some progress.

[Mr Spellar]

I wholly understand the hon. Gentleman’s desire to make progress. Let us be clear that what he has said is that, for a squalid deal to get office, the Prime Minister was prepared to damage the defence of this country. That is according to the hon. Gentleman’s own arguments.

[Dr Lewis]

What I am saying is quite clear. If we end up with a hung Parliament and the balance of power is held by a small unilateralist party, it will be able to blackmail one or other of the main parties into not doing what should be done, which is to sign the contracts to make the renewal of Trident for another generation a certainty. I am clear that that was part of the potpourri of things that were negotiated in private. At the time I described it as a love gift to the Liberal Democrats. I thought it was absolutely wrong. It was a shock and a surprise, and it is not something of which any Conservative should be proud. Having said that, I look to my own party’s Front Benchers for an assurance that nothing like that will ever happen again, and I look to the Opposition spokesman for an assurance that no Labour leader will be tempted to conclude such a deal either.

The second reason why it is important to have a debate on this subject at this time is that the terms of trade, as it were, in international relations have changed. When the hon. Member for Islington North and I addressed these matters in January 2013, when we debated the nuclear deterrent, and in June 2013, when we debated the non-proliferation treaty, much of the argument was focused on the fact that the cold war was over and showed no sign of returning and that the nuclear deterrent was therefore irrelevant to the threats that then confronted us. As some of us stated at the time, it was far from certain that we could ever know significantly in advance whether those circumstances were going to change. We all hoped that Russia, having shed communism and started along a more democratic path, would continue to go in that direction, but there could be no guarantee.

Even now, we cannot tell where our relationship with Russia will be in the next 10, 20 or 30 years. Nobody predicted the crisis that has arisen over Ukraine, and some might argue that if Ukraine were a member of NATO, the Russians would not have done what they have done. Conversely, it could also be argued that if Ukraine were a member of NATO and the Russians had done what they have done, we would possibly now be on the brink of an extremely dangerous east-west confrontation.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that there was an agreement between Russia and the west at the time of Ukrainian independence that Ukraine would not join NATO and would not be a nuclear power? Indeed, at the time Ukraine itself renounced nuclear weapons and their presence in Ukraine.

[Dr Lewis]

Indeed, Ukraine did renounce nuclear weapons. I strongly suspect that public opinion in Ukraine might now be divided, to put it mildly, over the wisdom of that decision. Given that they were Soviet nuclear weapons, Ukraine probably had little choice in the matter.

It would be a mistake to put countries on the path to NATO membership—I have said this consistently—if other NATO members would not be prepared to go to war in defence of their borders. It is all well and good to say that everyone would like to be a member of every alliance, but NATO has been so successful for so long because there is no doubt about its security guarantee. That is the importance of deterrence. In order to deter, we must be able not only to threaten an aggressor with an unacceptable level of punishment but to ensure that he is in no doubt that that unacceptable punishment will inevitably follow if he commits himself to an attack using weapons of mass destruction.

It was said earlier in the debate that the fact that the nuclear deterrent did not prevent the attacks on America in 2001 disproves the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. It does nothing of the kind. The efficacy of nuclear deterrence lies in its ability to deter another country with weapons of mass destruction from firing them in an act of aggression against you—not you personally, Sir Roger, but the person trying to deter the potential aggressor from attacking. The fact that the ability to deter one form of attack does not act as a panacea to prevent all forms of aggression or attack is neither here nor there.

The question we must ask ourselves is what the situation would have been if a country that did not possess nuclear weapons but had overwhelming conventional power faced a country that was weaker conventionally but could nevertheless deploy even a small number of nuclear weapons in an act of aggression. The answer is that no amount of conventional forces could make up for it.

When I saw that the hon. Member for Islington North wanted this debate, I knew that although it would hinge on the mutual defence agreement, that would be only a peg on which to hang the wider argument. The truth of the matter is that the mutual defence agreement is merely a facilitator for the UK’s continuing ability to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

When somebody is against maintaining the nuclear deterrent, there are a number of ways for them to campaign against it. They can try to win votes in Parliament, but as we have seen, when votes are held in Parliament on the issue, the majority of MPs are in favour of continuing the deterrent. They can try to win the battle for public opinion, but as we have seen in general elections during the cold war and in subsequent opinion polls, most members of the public think that the country should continue to possess some nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them. Therefore, the advocates of unilateral British nuclear disarmament must try to find indirect means of pursuing it. They think that if they can cite the non-proliferation treaty or the mutual defence agreement and derail the latter or get a legal opinion about the former, they might achieve by indirect means what they cannot achieve directly.

The truth of the matter is that nuclear weapons indeed have terrible humanitarian consequences, but those consequences arise when such weapons are fired; they do not arise when the weapons are used as they are meant to be used by democratic states. As I said in my first intervention on the hon. Member for Islington North, they are used in order to show any country that might contemplate or toy with the idea of aggression against the United Kingdom—a NATO democratic country—that that cannot be undertaken without the certainty of incurring unacceptable levels of retaliation.

Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty says:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

The only thing that is time-limited is the

“cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date”.

I am sure that the Minister will spell out how this country least of all the nuclear powers can be accused of being involved in a nuclear arms race—I am glad to see him nodding—because it has done more to reduce its nuclear stockpile than any other nuclear country.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

To take the hon. Gentleman back to what he said a couple of moments ago about the effects of nuclear weapons, surely he must be as aware as I am of the effects of nuclear testing in Australia, the Pacific, the United States and the former Soviet Union. To say that nuclear weapons’ existence has no effects is simply not correct.

[Dr Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that the testing of nuclear weapons—they were physically fired and exploded—had effects. That is why there have been subsequent agreements to ensure that no testing of that sort is ever done again in the atmosphere. He is absolutely right about that, but I am afraid that we have moved long beyond that point now. We are now at the point where we must decide which is the more humanitarian way to proceed. I would argue that the lesson of 50 years’ stand-off during the cold war, albeit with some intense crises at one time or another, is that the people who first thought about such matters in 1945 were correct. They viewed it slightly differently from Clement Attlee.

The hon. Gentleman—I like to call him my hon. Friend—quoted Clement Attlee at the beginning of this debate as saying that the only way to prevent catastrophe would be to outlaw war. I believe that the only way to prevent catastrophe—he has heard me quote this before, but I am afraid that will not prevent me from quoting it again—was set out in 1945 by Professor Sir Henry Tizard, the leading defence scientist of the day, when he was considering the future nature of warfare in a secret report for the chiefs of staff. He was not allowed to consider the coming of the atomic bomb in any detail, but he could not resist making a general observation about it:

“A knowledge that we were prepared, in the last resort,”

to retaliate with an atomic bomb

“might well deter an aggressive nation.”

He drew a rather revealing parallel:

“Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so long as the duellists stood 20 paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a primitive type. If the rule had been that they should stand a yard apart with pistols at each other’s hearts, we doubt whether it would long have remained a recognised method of settling affairs of honour.”

[Jeremy Corbyn]

It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman quotes Tizard. He could also have quoted Sir William Penney, but I suggest that he look at the profound comments of Einstein, who said that if he had known what was coming, he would rather have been a clockmaker. Joseph Rotblat, whose work was crucial to the Manhattan project, was so appalled by the power of nuclear weapons that he spent his whole life campaigning for a nuclear-free world. Surely they are more apposite than Tizard.

[Dr Lewis]

I am afraid that I have not put my argument across sufficiently well. I was not trying to suggest that we should accept the argument based on the eminence of Sir Henry Tizard; I used the argument because of its innate strength. The fact is that many distinguished philosophers have been ardent nuclear unilateralists, including some who worked on the bomb. I gave that quote not so much because of who said it, although I felt it necessary to spell that out, but because of the truth that it contains, which is that when a weapons system is not only able but certain to inflict unacceptable damage, therefore making retaliation unavoidable to those who wish to commit aggression, people will think much more deeply and carefully before they embark on attack, aggression and conflict. The experience of the cold war proves that, and the majority of people in Parliament and among the public recognise that.

There is therefore nothing to fear in debating issues such as whether or not the mutual defence agreement should continue, because what the agreement amounts to is a method of ensuring that this country can never be threatened by an undemocratic state brandishing atomic, nuclear, thermonuclear or chemical weapons. Also, if we look not at the question of who manufactures the components of the weapons system but at who has control over whether the weapons would ever be fired, we can be in no doubt, and neither can any potential aggressor, that any attempt to threaten this country with nuclear blackmail would be suicidal.

It is not a nice thing to live under a balance of terror, but it is a lot better than living under a monopoly of mass destruction weapons that are in the hands of undemocratic countries.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Thank you, Sir Roger, for calling me to speak. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship in this debate, which was secured by the unlikely duo of my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis).

My hon. Friend and I served together for many years on the London Labour party executive; it was probably around the same time that the hon. Member for New Forest East was a member of the Labour party. I have known my hon. Friend a long time and he has been consistent; it is fair to say that I have consistently disagreed with him during that time. However, he has been extremely patient in constantly ploughing his furrow, as I suppose would be true of any allotment-holder in being patient as they wait for things to come around, but I fear that he will not see fruition on this issue too soon.

Of course, the hon. Member for New Forest East has a very different position from that of my hon. Friend. I almost think that his working with my hon. Friend is a sort of diversion therapy from his frustration with his own leader. He vented that frustration very strongly back in 2010, when he wrote about the formation of the coalition. He said:

“It is not in dispute that, when Conservative MPs met at Westminster to endorse the proposed Coalition, we were categorically assured that the Liberals would have to accept the Trident successor programme. As David Cameron gave this guarantee, George Osborne nodded in confirmation. Unfortunately, all these assurances have since been disregarded.”

I hope that the Minister, in his response to the debate, may be able to shed some light on whether the hon. Member for New Forest East was either wilfully self-deluded or woefully misled by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor in the assurances that they gave.

However, that situation is also based on a misapprehension that the Liberal Democrats are unilateralist disarmers—the hon. Member for New Forest East said that again today—because the policy that they have been pushing to get the Trident review is not a unilateralist one; it accepts the continuation of a nuclear deterrent. However, to try to provide some differentiation between themselves and others, they went for some rather exotic—as well as more expensive, destabilising and uncertain—alternatives, all of which were appropriately demolished by the review.

[Dr Lewis]

I do not intend to emulate the right hon. Gentleman by making as many interventions on him as he made on me, but I will say that I have never regarded him as a naive politician. Nevertheless, if he really thinks that the undercurrent and the real message of the stance taken by the Liberal Democrats on this matter is that they were really in favour of a nuclear deterrent, he should do what I did, although it might disturb his sleep a bit, and watch the rebroadcasting of the Liberal Democrats’ conference debates on this subject, because—believe me—all they were interested in during those debates was getting rid of Trident. One never heard anything mentioned about the positive case for a nuclear deterrent. It was another indirect way of going for unilateralism, because they knew that overt unilateralism would be too unpopular.

[Mr Spellar]

I always say that MPs and Ministers must be responsible for their own words, but if the hon. Gentleman rereads the debate from the time of the Trident review he will see clearly that at one stage the Liberal Democrats argued for the use of nuclear-enabled Cruise missiles. Apart from being a much more expensive option, that is—as I have already said—a far riskier option. I do not mean “risky” in terms of whether or not that option is a credible deterrent, although that is true as well, but in terms of being a destabilising factor, which could lead to much greater tension and—equally importantly—considerable risk of error.

[Dr Lewis]

In the spirit of compromise and convergence, can the two of us at least agree that, since the review of the Trident alternatives, the Liberal Democrat position—sending submarines to sea with no nuclear warheads on them, then waiting for a crisis to arise before sailing them back to port and arming them with nuclear warheads—has to be the most irresponsible fantasy-land thinking in the age of the nuclear deterrent? Furthermore, is it not a shame that no Liberal Democrats are here in Westminster Hall today to defend their decision, or—indeed—to explain it?

[Mr Spellar]

We can draw a veil now over the incoherence and absence of the Liberal Democrats, and get down to the serious and proper debate—it is certainly a proper debate to have—about Britain’s nuclear posture. It is a debate that my party has engaged in for a considerable number of years, in fact ever since the great post-war Attlee and Bevin Government commissioned Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, a policy that, I am pleased to say, continues today.

Having said that, none of us should underestimate the weighty issues—both the hon. Members who have already spoken stressed this point—that should weigh heavily on all those who have to make these decisions or arguments. I say that because it is very clear that there are huge issues. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North, nobody underestimates the impact of nuclear weapons nor the potential devastation that they could cause. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons are a fact in our world.

I partly differ from my hon. Friend in this regard. He made passing reference to the non-proliferation treaty conference that is due to take place next year. Clearly, it will be resolved by—we could say by the nuclear weapon states, but frankly the key discussions that need to take place are between the USA and Russia. If agreement can be reached by them, we should rightly be part of the subsequent discussions. However, as I say, the key initial discussions must be between the USA and Russia.

I do not think that any of the participants in this debate about nuclear weapons, including those who have spoken today or in similar parliamentary debates, in any way underestimate the impact of nuclear weapons on those directly affected, on the environment or indeed on the wider world.

[Mr Spellar]

I take my hon. Friend back to the Attlee memorandum, and indeed to many other documents by those who have written about this subject. That is because the key issue—as Michael Quinlan, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, who is also a committed Christian and someone who has thought very deeply about these issues, has said—is the removal of the risks of war and instability. That is absolutely crucial in all these circumstances, including in the middle east. That is why it is so important to achieve a two-state solution in Israel-Palestine, although Israel-Palestine is by no means the only source of tension in the middle east. We are seeing so many conflicts taking place in that unhappy region, and that is without any question of nuclear weapons, although, sadly, chemical weapons has been another issue. The resolution of those conflicts and the creation of a stable and peaceful environment is so important.

In the meantime, notwithstanding that, it is also important that the UK plays its part—indeed, it has played its part more than any other country, as I think the hon. Member for New Forest East mentioned—in reducing the proportion of our nuclear armoury. Significantly, that took place under the defence team that I was a member of in 1997 to 2001, but, to be fair I should say that it has been continued by our successors not only in the Labour Government, but in this Conservative Government as well.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

This is positively my last intervention on the right hon. Gentleman, although that is perhaps giving a hostage to fortune. Will he confirm that, when we took those unilateral steps of reducing our nuclear warhead stockpiles, there was no similar response from any of the other existing nuclear powers?

[Mr Spellar]

I think that is right. We had hoped that there would be such a response, but we took that decision in context and reduced to the minimum level necessary to maintain effective deterrence. We have reduced the explosive power of our British deterrent by some 75% since that time. That gives us good credentials and bona fides in those discussions.

I return to the point I made about the NPT. The crucial discussions have to be between the two major nuclear powers, which are still the United States and Russia. That needs to be re-emphasised.

The policy of the Labour party was made clear, as I made clear in previous interventions, by my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) in a debate in the main Chamber on 17 July last year. He was explicit about our commitment to continuous at-sea deterrence—in the most cost-effective way possible, of course. I mentioned earlier that that was also the conclusion of the Government’s own review, which systematically and elegantly dismantled the Lib Dems’ excuses, even though the document contained the bizarre disclaimer, which I hope the Minister will touch on, that it was not a statement of Government policy.

Incidentally, I hope that this afternoon we will hear no more nonsense from Ministers, as we have heard previously in the main Chamber, claiming to speak not on behalf of the Government but on behalf of a political party, because I think that I have fairly well established, with rulings from the Speaker, that whoever speaks from the Dispatch Box—from that position and that microphone—actually speaks from the Treasury Bench and is therefore speaking on behalf of the Government. At a time when various Ministers seem to be dissociating themselves from the Government, it would help, particularly on an issue as significant as this, if the Government spoke with a clear voice.

An argument about cost is sometimes made regarding the more general Trident discussion, and we have mainly had that discussion here, rather than discussing the debate subject of the UK-US mutual defence agreement. Indeed, cost was mentioned in an intervention by the hon. Member for Manchester, Withington (Mr Leech). The question there was, would people rather have the nuclear deterrent or the Army? Would they rather have soldiers or air cover? It is not an appropriate comparison. However, one argument is that this programme costs too much. It therefore seems rather strange, if not perverse, to then argue against an agreement that substantially and significantly reduces the cost of the programme in a number of ways. For example, it reduces the cost of delivering the deterrent, even the design and development costs. It is reckoned that the common design has saved the UK in the region of £500 million and precludes the need to design, develop, manufacture and test our own missile system.

The Trident alternatives review estimated that a new warhead alone would cost £8 billion to £10 billion. I have already mentioned the extra cost of moving to cruise missiles. Regarding a cost-effective system, my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham made it clear that our two criteria were maintaining continuous at-sea deterrence and doing so with the minimum possible cost, and the approach I am talking about assists us towards the minimum possible cost.

There was a cross-debate on the independence of the system. The fact that we are buying F-35s, made in the US but with substantial elements made in the UK, does not mean that we do not have an independent Air Force. It is the control of the system, not the sourcing of the weaponry, that is the important test of independence. Therefore we ought to be clear that this is Britain’s independent deterrent, but in a NATO nuclear alliance, as was reaffirmed at the NATO summit. It is slightly odd that our now absent friends from the Scottish National party want to be anti-nuclear but want to join a nuclear alliance. That is a slightly perverse position to take.

I want to be clear, because the hon. Member for New Forest East wanted me to be clear—certainly, clearer than his own Government—about the Opposition’s position. We have made it clear through our policy statement. Labour has said that

“we are committed to a minimum, credible independent nuclear deterrent, delivered through a Continuous At-Sea Deterrent…Labour recognises the importance of Britain leading international efforts for multilateral nuclear disarmament”—

I mentioned the NPT—

“and non-proliferation. Following the action we took when in government, Labour would actively work to enhance momentum on global multilateral disarmament efforts and negotiations”.

The NPT conference in 2015 will be a key moment for a Labour Government to show leadership in achieving progress on global disarmament and anti-proliferation measures.

For all those reasons, we will support the reaffirmation of the agreement and the policy initiated by that great Labour Government of Attlee and Bevin.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ellwood]

The House will be aware of the hon. Gentleman’s consistent views on this subject. The goals of the conference are unclear and, consequently, none of the P5 nuclear weapon states has attended the conferences in the past, as he said. We do not believe that a ban on nuclear weapons is negotiable, nor that it would even be observed by many nuclear powers. Even if it could be achieved in theory, in practice the confidence and verification measures that would be necessary to make it effective are not in place.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the greatest humanitarian effect of Britain’s possession of a nuclear deterrent is to reduce the chances of nuclear war or nuclear blackmail against this country?

[Mr Ellwood]

The House is, as ever, grateful for my hon. Friend’s interest and expertise in this matter. The Government’s policy is that the Vanguard class submarine will be replaced at the end of its life in the late-2020s by the successor strategic submarine, which will carry the Trident missiles, subject to main-gate investment approval for the programme in 2016. I know that he will approve of that.

Points of Order

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Speaker]

We must now make some progress, but not before the jack-in-the-box is satisfied—the hon. Gentleman is bobbing up and down with purpose—and we hear a point of order from Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Lewis]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Thank you for that build-up. May I ask whether you have had any notification, either from the Foreign Secretary or from the Defence Secretary, that we will be having a dedicated statement on the ending of the campaign in Afghanistan, because such a statement would give opportunities to pay tribute to the fallen and to the wounded, particularly among hon. Members’ constituents, and to debate issues about the way in which the campaign was fought?

[Mr Speaker]

The hon. Gentleman is a canny enough fellow to know that he has now, for his own part, substantially achieved his objective, but I know him well enough to know that he will want lots of other colleagues to have comparable opportunities.

Palestine and Israel

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Richard Burden]

Yes, that is absolutely right. The international position is clear: it is delineated by the green line. The final borders will be negotiated in final status negotiations. That is understood, and that is the same for Israel and for Palestine. But let us also remember that it is more than 20 years since the Palestine Liberation Organisation, acting on behalf of the Palestinian people as a whole, recognised the state of Israel. Yet, despite that, when Israel talks about itself, it still says that it wants constant reaffirmation of that recognition. How many times have I heard Israeli Ministers—indeed, some hon. Members—ask, “How can you talk with people who do not recognise your right to exist?” So for them and Israel, recognition is not about negotiation; it is about something fundamental. Well, if that is the case for Israelis, Palestinians have no fewer rights than that. Recognition for Palestinians cannot be a matter of privilege; it, too, must be a matter of right. That is the problem with the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb), because saying that recognition can only happen with the outcome of negotiations very much gives Israel the right of veto not only over a Palestinian state but over the UK Parliament’s ability to make our own decision to recognise that Palestinian state.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Richard Burden]

No. I am afraid that I have given way once. Time prevents me from doing so any more.

In the House, we make our own decisions, and we act on them bilaterally. We do so as members of the European Union and as members of the United Nations. The choice before us is clear: do we want to achieve a two-state solution in practice, with Palestinians and Israelis treated as equals, or are we content to repeat a theoretical mantra about two states where the reality is slipping away before our eyes, either because Binyamin Netanyahu, as he said to The Times of Israel this summer, has said that he will never countenance a Palestinian state that is sovereign in the way that he expects sovereignty for Israel, or because another generation of Palestinians has grown up being told that they must reject the path of violence when the only reality that they see ahead of them is occupation in the west bank and a blockade in Gaza?

I received an e-mail today from a Palestinian living in East Jerusalem. He described some of his life under occupation in East Jerusalem and he asked me to say this tonight: “I want to see light at the end of the tunnel, but I really want to see light at the end of the tunnel; I don’t want to see a train coming at me from the other end.” That is the challenge before us today. Are we prepared to give him that light at the end of the tunnel and to assert that a negotiated solution must be based on equality: two states for two peoples, with equal rights and each with equal stature in the international community? If we are going to do that, it is not just something to talk about; it is something to get on with. People will vote tonight for different reasons, but if we want to achieve a Palestinian state in practice, vote for the motion tonight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hancock]

I do not believe for one minute that the Israelis’ attitude and the sort of punishment they dished out was in any way the right thing for them to do; it was not in their best interests and it certainly was not in the best interests of the people of Palestine. “The Gatekeepers”, a “Newsnight” special, has been mentioned. In it, five of the past six heads of the top security agency in Israel say that successive Prime Ministers had not wanted to solve the problem with Palestine, and five out of the six say that that was a mistake and that Israel had to change its policy. These were the people who were leading the defence of Israel, but they recognise—obviously far too late, because they did not do this when they were in office—that something has to give in Israel.

Let us return to the initial point of this debate. If we give this motion our blessing, there is not a single thing that will harm Israel, but it will send a powerful message which is crying out to be heard for the people of Palestine, whether they are in the refugee camps—where four generations have now lived—or in Gaza, the west bank, Lebanon, or wherever. The people of Palestine have waited 65 years to get the justice they deserved. We did not listen then: when we could have given a two-state solution in ’48, we chose not to do it. People made that biggest mistake.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am sorry to correct the hon. Gentleman on a historical point, but my understanding is that the UN did vote for a two-state solution and five Arab armies then invaded Israeli territory, so it is not quite as he suggests, I think.

[Mr Hancock]

The hon. Gentleman will recollect that those five Arab states were seeking more of a reassurance that their borders would also be safeguarded, so it was a two-edged sword, I am afraid. We therefore have to be very careful when we talk about that situation.

I want to end by saying, please—for goodness’ sake—let us all send out a positive message to the people of Palestine and give them the hope and the light at the end of the tunnel that they deserve to see coming their way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Crispin Blunt]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The right of return will have to be dealt with at some point during the negotiations. In the course of the debate I was delighted to hear the contribution of my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway) and see the scales begin to drop from his eyes, with the latest land grab by the state of Israel. I was slightly surprised by his characterisation of the six-day war as an effort to destroy Israel. It was a brilliant Israeli feat of arms to dissipate what appeared to be a coming threat to Israel, but it certainly was not a response to an attack on Israel.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

My hon. Friend predicted that he would provoke me to intervene and he has succeeded in that aim. I think the laying of mines across the straits of Tiran could just conceivably be described as an act of war.

[Crispin Blunt]

I will let the lawyers and my hon. Friend come to their own conclusion on that.

My last visit to Israel was with a collection of colleagues from this House to again play cricket for the parliamentary cricket team. I note that the chairman of the Israeli cricket board who entertained us so magnificently—he is a Jew from South Africa who is now an Israeli citizen—said that in his view Israel had begun to lose its moral and legal authority from 1967. Since 1967, we have to understand and consider Israel’s approach to the negotiations and the realities that have been created on the ground. I am afraid that in recent years it has become clearer and clearer that Israeli politicians have avoided the opportunity to deliver a settlement. As the realities on the ground have changed, so it has become more difficult for Israeli leaders to deliver a settlement. The 400,000 settlers in the occupied territories form the most enormous political problem for any Israeli leader to have to address.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I apologise to colleagues for having missed some of the Back-Bench speeches earlier due to an unbreakable commitment related to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

As was observed earlier, when my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) is thought about in defence terms the one word that will be associated with him will be “strategy”. When my political epitaph comes to be written, I guess most people would think that the one word that would be associated me would be “Trident”—or, if they were feeling kinder, it might be “deterrence”. Actually, a different word ought to be associated with what I am trying to outline in terms of strategy today: “containment”. Containment is the key to what we need to do in the two very different scenarios of Russia’s behaviour and ISIL’s behaviour. Containment sometimes has to be done by means of a balance of terror, as when dealing with a nuclear-armed state such as Russia. On other occasions, it has to be done with the more traditional concept of the balance of power, as when dealing with states such as those of the middle east. Containment by means of the balance of power often means active intervention.

Let me refer briefly to two scenarios. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, what Russia is doing is not new, as the hon. Member for Preston (Mark Hendrick) observed in his interesting speech. In fact, it is based on a model of what it did in the immediate aftermath of the second world war, when countries such as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary were first subverted and then taken over. I have previously mentioned the important work of Professor Anatol Lieven in analysing the situation in Ukraine. Time prevents me from doing more than pointing out that he has consistently said that the only way in which a disaster will be averted is for some considerable degree of autonomy to be awarded to the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine. If we try to egg on the other parts of Ukraine to win militarily, Russia will simply step up its military effort and the overall effect will be disastrous.

[Helen Goodman]

The hon. Gentleman is making a very powerful point, and I agree with him. Did he agree with the remarks of the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood), as I was somewhat alarmed to discover that I did?

[Dr Lewis]

Sadly, that is one of the Back-Bench speeches that I missed.

I am grateful, in any case, for the hon. Lady’s intervention, as it gives me a little more time to refer to the important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth). There is a huge difference between NATO members that are covered by the article 5 guarantee and other countries, no matter how sympathetic we are towards them, that are not. When I was 16, Czechoslovakia was invaded. I thought what a shame it was that while Czechoslovakia was temporarily free we did not scoop up this poor vulnerable country under the protection of NATO. But I was 16 then—I am not 16 now, and I know the realities. I know that what was done in the aftermath of the second world war was nothing more than a recognition of the reality that the west could band together to protect itself by means of NATO, but it could not, at that stage, protect the countries of central and eastern Europe. Russia had to be contained by means of the balance of terror involving nuclear deterrence.

Let me quickly move on to ISIL. We are not in a situation where we have a choice of good outcomes. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi) set out certain conditions in hoping for a good outcome in relation to the choices that face us. I hope they are right, but the likelihood is that there will be no good outcome in these confrontations—that no good guys are going to come out on top, but only somebody of the stripe of an Arab dictator, on the one hand, or revolutionary jihadists on the other.

That is where we move on to containment by means of a balance of power, whereby sometimes there is no ally to be helped and all we can do is try to ensure that no one of a bunch of undesirable actors on the international stage gets to be dominant. That is what we have to do in this case. That is why I gently disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex about the vote that we had last year. I am absolutely delighted to look back on the fact that I was one of the people who made sure that we did not intervene to drag down Assad, atrocious though he is, because the upshot of that would have been similar to that of dragging down Gaddafi. The effect of the latter was not to further western strategic interests but the interests of our deadly enemies on the jihadist front.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that one of the crucial things in some of the recent military adventures in the middle east is, perhaps, a lack of understanding that once a dictator goes there is no Government structure or stability and that, therefore, the rule of law and everything else we love are not possible?

[Dr Lewis]

Absolutely. As always, my hon. Friend, with his Foreign Office background, makes the pertinent point. Thanks to his courtesy of giving me more time, I would like to quote a recent editorial from The Spectator:

“Such is the march of Islamic fundamentalism that if you remove a dictatorship in the Arab world and you don’t end up with a western-style liberal democracy, you end up with a snake pit of competing religious factions, the most malign of which tends to dominate.”

What we are up against is a choice of the lesser of evils. Sometimes we will have to strike down one element of an evil choice, and sometimes we will have to suppress another. We should not, however, climb into bed with the enemy of my enemy on either occasion. The enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend; the enemy of my enemy can be my enemy as well. That is why we have to contain and control them and intervene from time to time, but we must not delude ourselves that there will be any perfect outcomes.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

I disagree with the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) about the idea of containing ISIS, because allowing a caliphate, however small or large, to establish itself would pose a great threat to the neighbouring Arab countries.

[Dr Lewis]

I obviously did not make myself clear enough. I said that containment by balance of power often means active intervention, and at this stage it means active intervention against ISIS. I am sorry that I did not make that clear.

[Mike Gapes]

Perhaps we can talk about a different wording later.

When I was in Perth three weeks ago, I visited the Black Watch museum, and after that I visited Edinburgh, where I was struck by a very interesting exhibition on the role of Scottish troops and Scottish diaspora troops in the British imperial forces during the first world war. Is it not sad that an organisation is campaigning on an anti-British platform when, historically, the British imperial army was, and the British Army today is, very much rooted in the contribution of Scots to many of our country’s distinguished regiments? That is another aspect that those of us from England, Wales and Northern Ireland should remind our brothers and sisters in the rest of the United Kingdom about when they vote next week.

The end of the first world war, nearly 100 years ago, led to the treaty that resulted in the creation of a number of states. Turkey, which came out of the Ottoman empire, has already been mentioned, and others included countries on its borders, such as Syria, as well as Lebanon and Jordan, and countries further away, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Later came the establishment of the state of Israel and the consequences that were touched on earlier.

The Kurds, who were scattered among up to three, four or five countries in the region, did not get a state at that time. Events in Iraq have led to the establishment of an embryonic state in the form of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, which has its own flag and defence forces—the very brave but poorly equipped peshmerga, who are fighting so hard and who are now, I am pleased to say, going to be armed by the United Kingdom, at last, as well as by other European partners.

There will be ramifications as a consequence of current events, because the PKK in Turkey and the PYD in Syria, which has been fighting against Assad, have been co-operating with the peshmerga to get the Yazidis and others off Mount Sinjar to safety. Yet we know that Turkey, Syria and Iran are very much against an independent Kurdish state, because of what the consequences would be. Therefore, a very complex development is going on.

Some people have said that the Sykes-Picot line, which was drawn on the map by French and British diplomats nearly 100 years ago, is dead. It is not yet dead, and we must be very careful. I believe that we may need a comprehensive international conference in the region at some point to redraw the boundaries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baron]

I agree. Technically, the motion was about that, but there was also a push last year by the Government to arm rebels fighting Assad. However, because it would have been impossible to track and trace those arms, some of them would have ended up, inadvertently, in the hands of the very extremists we are now taking on in northern Iraq—a bitter irony if ever there was one.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

It was precisely for that reason that my hon. Friend and I made common cause against the folly of that intervention. On Afghanistan, does our policy not tend to be too reactive to the last thing that happened? It was said that as soon as the Soviets left, the west left Afghanistan to stew in its own juices. It was to prevent that from happening again that the west made the bad mistake, as it turned out, of engaging in nation building.

[Mr Baron]

I pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friend and others on both sides of the House in asking those difficult questions a year ago. We were right to do that. He is absolutely right about Afghanistan as well.

The litany of errors does not stop with Afghanistan. We now have the Libyan Government meeting on a Greek ferry off Tobruk; there is civil war; the number of civilian casualties is shooting up; and we have not got a proper policy. I certainly do not think our intervention helped the situation. We have now discussed Syria, and it is clear that the Government’s intentions to arm the rebels were misplaced, given that it would have been impossible to track and trace the arms. Our bigger issue is now taking on in Iraq some of the rebels who confronted Assad.

It is right to be cautious and to ask questions, and it is right that the bar has been set higher. I am pleased that Ministers realise the difference between air strikes in Iraq, which many of us could support, provided certain preconditions were in place, including a request from the Baghdad Government, and air strikes in Syria, which would be a much higher risk policy, not only because of Russian-built air defences, but because of the legalities and the fact that a common feature of the Syrian civil war has been the extremist groups lurking in the shadows and morphing into each other—al-Nusra, linked to al-Qaeda, for example—and would be difficult to say who might take ISIS’s place in Syria.

I welcome the caution. At the end of the day, the politics in Iraq must succeed. The elephant in the room is the Iraqi army. It has to be ground forces that defeat ISIS—air strikes alone will not succeed—but they must not be western. The symbolism of the west defeating this caliphate would be too great. The Iraqi army is the elephant in the room, but the politics must come through and succeed. What fomented the presence of ISIS was the very sectarian politics pursued by Maliki, the predecessor of the current Government. We must have more inclusive politics in Iraq, but at the same time we have to ensure that the army drives out ISIS.