Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many (a) Royal Naval and (b) Royal Marines reservists received their bounty in 2019-20; what estimate he has made of those respective personnel who will receive their bounty in 2020-21; and if he will make it his policy to award their bounty to those reservists who would have qualified for it in 2020-21 but for the decision to stand them down.
Answered by James Heappey
In 2019-20, the reserves bounty was paid to 1,587 Royal Naval Reserves and 335 Royal Marines Reserves. It is estimated that approximately 65% of the maritime reserves will achieve the Certificate of Efficiency and consequent bounty payment in 2020-21 compared to 55% in 2019-20.
Reservists who are unable to complete the authorised training due to the current pause in activity will be invited to apply for a waiver to the Bounty Waiver Board.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many (a) Royal Naval and (b) Royal Marines Reservists have served on operations in (i) Afghanistan and (ii) Iraq for each year for which figures are available; what recent estimate his Department has made of the added value to each campaign of such service; what specialist skills Reservists have brought to those campaigns from their full-time civilian careers; what assessment he has made of how such skills would have been made available in the absence of volunteer Reservists; and what estimate he has made of the effect on the morale of volunteer Reservists of standing them down for a protracted period.
Answered by James Heappey
Since 2006, 95 Royal Naval Reservists (RNR) and seven Royal Marine Reservists (RMR) have served on operations in Iraq and since 2005, 180 RNR and 330 RMR have served on operations in Afghanistan.
As you know, Reservists bring valuable skills from their civilian employment and their contribution to operations is fully understood and appreciated. This year, Maritime Reserves have used their civilian skills on numerous occasions as part of the Defence contribution to the UK's Government COVID-19 campaign, providing niche expertise, including pandemic statistical modelling, chemistry and pharmaceutical expertise, communications, logistics supply and contract management.
The temporary cessation of some in-year Maritimes Reserves activity may result in disappointment for individual Reservists during the short period that it remains in force, but the current measure will not impact on any Royal Navy operational tasking. Activity undertaken by those on FTRS or Additional Duties Commitments will continue as normal; as will some Transformation projects that are deemed critical to meeting future Royal Navy and Defence outputs.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the out-of-service dates for HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark will remain 2033 and 2034 respectively.
Answered by Jeremy Quin
On current plans, the out-of-service dates for HMS ALBION and HMS BULWARK will remain 2033 and 2034 respectively.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the ways in which the provision for a presumption against prosecution in the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill ensures the prevention of repeated cycles of reinvestigation; and what recent assessment he has made of the adverse effects on (a) present and (b) former Service personnel who have undergone repeated reinvestigation for alleged offences for which ultimately they were not prosecuted.
Answered by Johnny Mercer
I refer the right hon. Member to paragraphs 27 to 29 of the Impact Analysis for the Overseas Operations Bill, which was published on 17 September 2020.
We assess that, over time, as prosecutors become familiar with the presumption against prosecution, they will be able to advise investigators earlier in the process as to whether this new statutory requirement - that it is to be exceptional for a decision to be made to prosecute for an alleged offence - would be met in a particular case. This may therefore reduce the likelihood of investigations being reopened without compelling new evidence.
A thorough investigation is important, as it can serve both to exculpate - which is a good thing for the reputation of our Armed Forces - as well as to incriminate. We do, however, recognise not only the inherent difficulties, but also the adverse impacts on our personnel, of investigations regarding allegations of offences committed on overseas operations. These investigations are all the more difficult when a period of time has elapsed since the alleged incident. It is to the benefit both of alleged victims and alleged offenders that investigations are conducted as expeditiously and effectively as possible, so that decisions on whether or not to prosecute are made without delay in the interest of all parties knowing the outcome of these proceedings.
We have learned lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, and will take the necessary steps to try to ensure that future incidents are reported and appropriately investigated at the time, thereby reducing the risk for our personnel of historical investigations, and reinvestigations, into their conduct.
The Secretary of State for Defence announced on 13 October a judge-led review into how allegations of wrongdoing are raised and investigated. The review will make sure the guidance and policy framework for investigating allegations during overseas operations is fit for the future. This will help ensure that all allegations are taken forward in a timely manner, providing reassurance to victims and closure to innocent personnel caught up in investigations.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many (a) present and (b) former armed forces personnel have been investigated more than once for allegations of human rights abuses where such investigations have resulted in (i) a prosecution and (ii) no prosecution being brought in each year since 2001 for which figures are available.
Answered by Johnny Mercer
There is no criminal offence of "human rights abuse" nor any category thereof, and therefore the records management system cannot be searched for such data.
The information is therefore not held in the format requested.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether it is his Department's (a) plan and (b) assessment that the time-limiting provisions of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill will have the effect of ending any prospect of nuclear test veterans bringing to court with any prospect of success cases for compensation for serious health consequences which emerged many years after the tests in which they were required to participate.
Answered by Johnny Mercer
The nuclear test programme of the 1950s and 1960s does not fall within the definition of "overseas operations" which applies to the limitation longstops in Part 2 of the Overseas Operations Bill. This means that any personal injury or death claims brought by the Nuclear Test Veterans will not be impacted by the limitation longstop for those claims.
Nuclear Test Veterans who believe they have suffered ill health due to their service have the right to apply for no-fault compensation under the War Pensions Scheme.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
What recent assessment he has made of the utility of offensive cyber in countering conventional aggression.
Answered by Ben Wallace
We recognise cyber as a domain of military operations alongside air, land, sea and space.
Offensive cyber is now a critical part of our arsenal. Defence has integrated this into our military planning alongside the full range of military effects. We will continue to develop and exploit Offensive Cyber’s potential to complement and enhance our conventional military capabilities and assets.
Offensive Cyber has already demonstrated its utility, against Daesh, where the UK suppressed Daesh propaganda, hindered their ability to coordinate attacks, and protected coalition forces on the battlefield.
For reasons of safeguarding national security, I cannot discuss our cyber capability in greater detail or be specific on how it is employed.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, in which multi-national military exercises UK armed forces (a) are participating and (b) have participated since the UK left the EU conducted under the aegis of (i) NATO, (ii) defence organisations that are part of EU structures and (iii) other defence organisations; and what the (A) location, (B) duration and (C) purpose has been of each military exercise.
Answered by James Heappey
The UK is only participating in two NATO exercises in the coming months.
NATO | JOINT WARRIOR 20-2 | West Coast Scotland | 2 Weeks (Sep 20) | NATO Force Generation and Validation Exercise |
NATO | LOYAL LEDA | UK | 3 Weeks (Nov 20) | NATO Collective Training Exercise |
The UK has participated in the following exercises under the auspices of NATO, the European Union or other Defence Organisations since 31 January 2020.
NATO | JOINT WARRIOR 20-1 | West Coast Scotland | 2 Weeks (Mar 20) | Carrier Strike Group 21 NATO Force Generation and Validation Exercise |
NATO | PILA BESOK | Norway | 2 Weeks (Mar 20) | Planning Exercise |
NATO | COLD RESPONSE 20 | Norway/North Sea | 2 Months (Feb 20) | Maritime Amphibious Task Group and Lead Commando Group NATO Chapter 4 LIVEX |
EU | QUICK RESPONSE | Bosnia & Herzegovina | 3 Weeks (Aug 20) | OP ALTHEA Annual reinforcement rehearsal exercise |
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the engine modification programme for the six Type-45 destroyers, if he will publish for each destroyer the (a) nature of the original engine design fault; (b) proposed remedy; (c) estimated sea-time lost annually; (d) scheduled completion date for each upgraded vessel; (e) estimate of the additional cost of the upgrade and (f) recovery of the additional cost of making the ships seaworthy to be borne by (i) the engine designer, (ii) defence manufacturers and (iii) the public purse; and if he will make a statement.
Answered by Jeremy Quin
In 2011, an independent study commissioned by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) reported there was "no single root cause underlying the low reliability" experienced in the Type 45 Destroyers but a "large group of unconnected individual causes". It nevertheless concluded that Integrated Full Electric Propulsion remained a sound choice for the Type 45 Class. The nature of the interrelated defects associated with the fully integrated propulsion system masked the true extent of the inherent design shortcomings.
Subsequent experience gained by deploying the ships to the most demanding operational environments revealed that the original design intent of operating the ship whilst running the WR21 gas turbine alone was flawed. The system in this mode was still not capable of delivering the desired level of reliability and the power generated by the ships' diesels meant that they could not provide the resilience required. Only the installation of additional diesel generators would allow these shortfalls to be addressed.
For further details of the technical issues with the Type 45 Power and Propulsion System I would refer the rt. hon. Member to the Independent Power and Propulsion System Performance Review, dated March 2011, a copy of which, redacted in accordance with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, was placed in the Library of the House on 13 May 2016.
In 2014, Project Napier was established with two core strands. First, the Equipment Improvement Plan (EIP) which has built on the work to enhance system reliability and to meet the original design intent in the near term. This work has delivered positive results with increases to availability across the fleet. In the longer term, the Power Improvement Plan (PIP) will improve system resilience by adding upgraded diesel generators to provide the electrical generation capacity required to meet many propulsion and power requirements without reliance on WR21 gas turbine.
All Type 45 Destroyers will receive new diesel generators under the £160 million PIP conversion programme. Work is currently underway on HMS DAUNTLESS, the first ship to enter the programme, and she will return to sea for trials in 2021. Following completion of these sea trials, she will re-join the fleet. It is planned that all six Type 45 ships will have received the upgrade by the mid-2020s.
The programme is dependent on the availability of ships to undertake the upgrade, balanced against the Royal Navy's current and future operational commitments. PIP conversions will be planned to take into account the regular Upkeep cycle to maximise the overall class availability. The first of class embodiment is expected to take 13 months from docking to enable a comprehensive suite of sea trials to prove the capability.
The issue of liability stems from decisions taken early in the programme. This includes the main investment decision by the MOD in July 2000 to proceed with a Type 45 design based on an Integrated Full Electric Propulsion solution and subsequent selection of the WR21 gas turbine. As the issues now being addressed result from those earlier decisions, it is appropriate that liability for funding this work now rests with the MOD. A number of early modifications were implemented under the Type 45 Destroyer Contract for Availability arrangement with BAE Systems at no additional cost to the MOD.
The Type 45 Destroyers are hugely capable ships and have been deployed successfully on a range of operations world-wide and they continue to make an enormous contribution to the defence of the UK and our international partners.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether outbreaks of covid-19 infection have occurred on (a) Royal Naval and (b) Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels; whether those vessels' deployments have been affected as a result of covid-19 infection; whether naval personnel are kept in barracks for a sufficient period to check for infection with covid-19 before deployment at sea; and what his policy is to minimise the effect of naval personnel embarking on a deployment soon after taking leave in numerous different locations within the UK.
Answered by James Heappey
For reasons of operational security, we cannot comment on the number of COVID-19 cases that have occurred on Royal Navy (RN) or Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels. As of 31 May, there have been 45 confirmed cases of Royal Navy Service personnel with COVID-19. No deployments of RN or RFA vessels have been affected as a result of these infections.
The RN has a policy on COVID-19 risk mitigation measures, which includes direction on the use of quarantining and COVID-19 testing to minimise the risk of COVID infection onboard deploying RN vessels to as low as reasonably practicable. The nature of these measures depends on the vessel and activity that is being undertaken, and may require personnel to be quarantined ashore in a cabin or onboard the vessel if they display symptoms or have been in contact with others who have displayed symptoms.