Financial Services Bill

Kelvin Hopkins Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mudie]

I accept that point, which has been made clear all the way through, but that is negative language rather than positive. Instead of telling the FPC, “In carrying out your duties, you mustn’t adversely affect growth”, I would rather put it to work with the MPC on ensuring that we have a buoyant economy with steady, acceptable growth and employment levels. At the moment, apart from the negative words that the hon. Gentleman quotes, all we have is the requirement of financial stability.

The hon. Gentleman was with a number of colleagues here on the Treasury Committee. We go through accountability with the MPC. It is bad enough trying to get the Governor of the Bank of England to be accountable even when he has a named target; what would he be like, or what would a future Governor be like, when he came before the Committee to which he was accountable and only had to defend his actions on the grounds of financial stability, which cannot be defined? It is a case of the emperor’s new clothes. There really should be a joint mandate, with a definition of financial stability and an acceptance of the Government’s picture of growth and employment.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I agree with very much of what my hon. Friend says. When the Bank of England was given its independence—so-called—I thought that if it started to fly in the face of what was obviously sensible for the economy, a Government might choose to take that independence back to the Treasury and into the hands of the Chancellor. If the Bank is not sensible in respect of managing the economy as a whole, is it not possible that a Government might choose to take back that independence and operate policy from the Treasury?

[Mr Mudie]

One can see many scenarios. I have seen many political philanthropists since I have been a Member of Parliament. I worry because they come to the House as politicians, but seem not to want to do anything or take any responsibility. They have offloaded power to quangos and agencies, and gave independence to the Bank. The real question is why are the Chancellor and the Treasury sitting back and watching their ground—sensitive economic ground—being given away to a quango, an unelected bunch of people? Under the Bill, those people can take the remit and the guidance on it, which the Treasury sets, and say to the Treasury, “We don’t agree with you,” and that is that. That is the situation we are reaching on accountability and responsibility despite the worry about giving away powers.

On amendment 23, some hon. Members were hard on my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East, although it is not as if he cannot defend himself. The Government’s original proposition, which was put out for consultation, included macro-prudential tools, which, as hon. Members have said, are highly sensitive and powerful. One aspect of the proposal they have given up because of its sensitivity—I am going by what has been in the papers in the past few days—is the ability to interfere in the mortgage market on loan-to-value and similar matters. What happens if the unelected Financial Policy Committee starts leaning against the wind in a way that affects large numbers of people, and there is no way of talking to it or affecting its position?

The Government’s original proposal was that decisions on macro-prudential tools would go upstairs to the Committee Corridor as statutory instruments—secondary legislation—for a 90-minute debate on a measure that would not be amendable. All hon. Members know what happens upstairs. The Minister talks for an hour, the shadow Minister talks for 25 minutes and we all go home, with the measure voted through by the Government majority. That happens with Governments of all parties. The way secondary legislation is dealt with in Parliament is an absolute disgrace. We can excuse a lot of it, but matters as important as the ones we are discussing, it is scandalous.

To be fair to the Chancellor, I raised the proposal with him when he first introduced it and asked him to look at it again because of its undemocratic nature. I am pleased that the line has softened, but there is more talking and work to be done. If hon. Members are asked to give away powers that affect our constituents so directly, it is important for us to be absolutely sure that we have had the opportunity to at least have our say in the strongest possible terms and ones that might allow the regulator to think about what has been said, although it is not for us to take its take its job.

A Government Member attacked my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East and asked him whether he would interfere with a regulator. We had that situation when the Treasury Committee discussed the retail distribution review with the chief executive of the FSA. We said to him, “This Committee feels strongly about this matter. We’ve had a lot of press about it and a lot of pressure, and we’d like you to think again.” He replied, “No, we won’t think again, unless you give me evidence.” The Treasury Select Committee giving evidence to the chief executive of the FSA—what arrogance! My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East is doing the Government a favour. They might not agree with the detail of the amendment, but the spirit is that we give the House every opportunity to comment on, think about and be aware of the powers we give to individuals that might affect our constituents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Guy Opperman]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate, albeit briefly. Like Mark Antony in “Julius Caesar”, I come to praise the Bill, not to criticise it. I accept that the Government are all honourable men and women, but so, it might be reasoned, are the members of the Treasury Committee, who are also honourable men and women, advancing a slightly contrary view.

I support the fundamental ethos of clause 1 and welcome the review of the performance of the Bank of England. I certainly do not support Opposition amendment 28, which would remove clause 5; that would be entirely wrong in the present circumstances. I speak as a critical friend of the present system and as the secretary of the all-party group on the Arch Cru Investment Scheme, which is seeking to recover compensation for the thousands of men and women in this country who have lost their lifetime savings. What happened to them is manifestly wrong, and anything that this House can do to strengthen the regulatory system to prevent such disasters, I welcome wholeheartedly.

I speak also as an MP who, almost every week, has a constituent come to me saying that they are unable to obtain bank lending and finance. That is because of the lack of competition in the present banking structure—an issue that is raised regularly. I urge the House to embrace greater competition and to open up the market to competitors to the existing large banks, which will be in a position to provide the bank finance sought by businesses up and down the country.

The other end of the telescope must also be addressed. At present, we have the large banks, but there are no small banks. Germany and America have local banking structures that work tremendously positively: individuals can set up local banks, which provide for a community purpose above all else, which is manifestly a good thing. That is why I support wholeheartedly the competition objectives set out in new section 1E of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, inserted by clause 5, which states that there should be an emphasis on

“the ease with which new entrants can enter the market, and…how far competition is encouraging innovation.”

I have met the chairman of Metro bank, which is that remarkable thing: a bank set up to exist at the weekend. It opens on weekends and at 8 o’clock in the morning. Imagine what could be done if we had that at the local level.

I am grateful for what Hector Sants, the present chief executive of the FSA, told me in a letter dated 12 March:

“We are conscious of the balance to be struck between ensuring high standards at the gateway, and the importance of allowing innovation and appropriate levels of access for new firms.”

The letter continues:

“there has been public debate about the potential advantages of new entrants in the area of small, regional banks focused on servicing the SME sector. In such cases we will be proportionate in our approach and would invite all firms with a viable business model and appropriate levels of resources to a pre-application meeting to help guide them through the application process”.

The Bill will, I suggest and sincerely hope, make it easer to establish local banks, which can only be a good thing.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I rise to express my strong support for the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell).

There are two components of the argument: the first is the relationship between the Governor of the Bank of England and the Government, but the second is the relationship between this House of Parliament and the Government. On both, I strongly believe my hon. Friend has a point. Like him, I was unhappy about the decision to hand power over monetary policy to the Bank of England and give it independence. All aspects of macro-economic management ought to be matters for Ministers accountable to Parliament. I maintain that view and, in a sense, recent events have proved that my hon. Friend and I were right. I thought at the time that if the Governor of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee chose to be hawkish on interest rates when we had a recession on our hands, there could be a serious conflict between the Bank and Government. Fortunately, the Bank has been sensible in managing monetary policy and that clash did not occur, but it could have happened in 2008. Had the Bank been governed by a hawkish Governor, we could have seen a serious clash and those powers no doubt taken away. I was comforted by the thought that if the Bank of England got out of control, we could easily take back powers. It is not the same with the European Central Bank, where powers have been given away and cannot be taken back.

In relations between Parliament and Government, pre-appointment hearings have been shown to be a success. I have been involved in not just the two most recent pre-appointment hearings, but in developing the arguments in favour of pre-appointment hearings as a member of the Public Administration Committee for the past 10 years. Brilliant work was done by Tony Wright, who made a real impact on our constitution. Pre-appointment hearings are first class. They are not just an experiment; they are here to stay. I would like the Governor of the Bank of England to be subject to a rigorous pre-appointment hearing so that we know that they will serve the economy and relate to the House, and not just be a law unto themselves. I have probably run out of time. I know the Minister needs to speak, but I have made my point.

[Mr Hoban]

This has been a thoughtful and constructive debate covering the wide range of issues in this group of amendments. I shall organise my remarks in two parts. I shall deal first with issues relating to the Bank of England and the Financial Policy Committee, and secondly with the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority.

I begin by speaking to Government amendment 12. This change was prompted by an amendment proposed in Committee by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), on the wording used to ensure that the view of the Treasury member of the FPC cannot be taken into account in determining whether the FPC has reached a decision by consensus. Although the substance of the provision, which is consistent with the general principle that the Treasury member of the FPC should not have a vote, was endorsed by the Committee, some members of the Committee thought that the wording was ambiguous. Some, including the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), felt that the current wording could imply that the Treasury is not even allowed to exercise influence through debate or discussion.

I therefore committed to look again at the wording to see whether it could be made clearer. Amendment 12 amends the provision to make it clear that in determining whether the FPC has reached consensus, the chair should disregard “any view expressed” by the Treasury member. This does not mean that the Treasury member cannot influence the discussion and debate, but in determining consensus, that voice should not be taken into account.

The main focus of the debate has been accountability and transparency. That is absolutely right. Hon. Members are right to highlight the fact that as a consequence of the Bill, the Bank of England takes on more power and responsibility, partly because the PRA becomes part of the Bank family, and through the creation of the FPC. It is right that we strengthen the transparency and accountability of the Bank as a consequence of the reforms before us. The debate about macro-prudential tools was a helpful way of characterising that debate and talking about some of the proposals that we have made. We are committed to ensuring the ex ante approval of those macro-prudential tools by this place and the other place. Hon. Members are right to call for a review of the use of those tools and a retrospective review of the Bank’s performance. That is important too.

Let me deal first with the ex ante side of the equation. Amendment 22 talks about economic growth being part of the FPC’s objective. The Government are clear that the FPC’s principal aim should be to make the financial system safer and more stable. We do not seek the stability of the graveyard. The FPC should not be able to pursue stability to the point where the financial sector can no longer support the real economy. This means that the FPC should not be able to take action that would seriously damage the ability of the financial sector to contribute to growth in the medium to long term and the FPC should consider whether the costs of the action that it proposes would be disproportionate to its benefits. The Bill as drafted already ensures this.