Financial Services Bill

George Mudie Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Ruffley (Bury St Edmunds) (Con)]

I rise to support new clause 1 briefly. I had the privilege of sitting on the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and of being a member of the Treasury Committee, which is chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie)—colleagues have noted that he is not a Privy Counsellor, but as far as many of us are concerned he is right honourable in spirit.

The main purport of new clause 1 is to establish a duty on the court of directors to conduct retrospective reviews of the Bank’s performance. The Governor of the Bank of England, in giving evidence to the Joint Committee and the Treasury Committee, has argued that it would be a bad idea to have a review into anything other than the processes by which certain policy decisions are reached. In other words, he does not want there to be a duty on the Bank to scrutinise retrospectively how good its decisions—meaning the decisions of the Financial Policy Committee or the Monetary Policy Committee—turned out to be. One of the reasons he gave was that there are lots of external commentators, such as outside economists in the City and the commentariat in the fourth estate, but it is fairly obvious that those entities are under no statutory duty to crawl through every decision of the FPC or the MPC and decide with hindsight whether they were good or bad.

The second reason the Governor gave is that the Treasury Committee holds the Bank to account, a point alluded to by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). The Treasury Committee, packed with talent though it is on a yearly basis, still has a huge amount of work to do and, not for the want of trying, does not have the amount of technical expertise or the number of macro- and micro-economists needed to conduct work month after month, tracking back and looking at how good or bad the judgment calls of the FPC, as constituted by the Bill, and the extant MPC turned out to be. My word, don’t we need such backward-looking analysis? If it had been present in 2007 and 2008, we might have avoided the difficulties of which we are all too well aware.

The Bill gives the Bank of England unprecedented powers. As a result of it, we will have a Governor of the Bank of England, whomever he or she is in the future, who will be chair of the Monetary Policy Committee, have a place on the court of directors of the Bank of England, chair the Financial Policy Committee and chair the Prudential Regulation Authority. With the creation of the FPC, alongside all the work that the Bank does on monetary policy, a lot of decisions are going to be made.

Not since the creation of the Bank of England in the late 17th century has its senior management and Governor had so much power, and, from even a cursory glance, the Joint Committee’s evidence and the evidence taken by the Treasury Committee in recent months all leads to one thing: one cannot have enough scrutiny of this big beast that the Bank will become as a result of the Bill coming into force.

The Treasury Committee argued forcefully for a severe new set of accountability and scrutiny powers. We advocated the creation of a new supervisory body inside the Bank of England in order to replace the court of directors, because the court, as everybody knows, is packed full of amateurs—well-meaning amateurs, but people who simply are not, by any stretch of the imagination, able to hold the Bank of England’s senior executive members, who are on the MPC and will soon be on the FPC, to account.

The court includes has-beens in the City, or “never-was’s”, and people with indifferent reputations in the trade union movement, in manufacturing and in all aspects of public policy. But the evidence shows that remarkably few of them have any expertise in central banking matters, in fiscal policy, in macro-prudential policy or in monetary policy. The court is desperately under-geared, and its intellectual horsepower is not what it should be.

A supervisory body, with a majority of external members, overseeing the FPC’s and MPC’s judgments and undertaking retrospective reviews is the best-case scenario; it is what the Treasury Committee thought would be the best solution for scrutinising this very powerful—all-powerful, I might add—Bank.

I understand why Ministers have concluded that they do not want to go into battle with the Governor and the senior executives about a supervisory body, because it is way too radical, but it is absolutely incumbent on this House to look at the purport of new clause 1 to see that it actually imposes more scrutiny than the Bill currently provides on the policy decisions of not just the MPC, but the FPC. Let us not forget that the MPC has recently acquired, or arrogated to itself, certain very significant discretionary powers over monetary policy—not in setting the bank rate, but in quantitative easing.

How many debates have we had in this Chamber about QE and its merits or relative de-merits? The answer is relatively few. The Monetary Policy Committee is held to account only by the Treasury Committee. It is my suggestion that the Treasury Committee, marvellous and wonderful though it is—I am a member of it, so I would say that—will need the assistance of ex-post reviews to look retrospectively at the quality of the decisions that the Bank, with its new powers, makes. I therefore urge colleagues to support new clause 1.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Chairman of the Treasury Committee on new clause 1. I disagree with what was said about him becoming a right hon. Member. In my experience of this place, somebody as independent and straightforward has little chance of becoming right honourable.

On a more serious note, I follow my colleague on the Treasury Committee, the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds (Mr Ruffley), in saying that the Minister would be well advised to accept the amendment or to indicate that further thought will be given to it. I agree with my colleague that the amendment could and should have been much harder. The problem is with the behaviour of the court of the Bank of England. It is not that it has not been given power; it is that it has accepted the boundaries and the servile role imposed on it by the Governor and the executives of the Bank of England. As I have said in this Chamber and as has been said to the Treasury Committee in all but terms, the court is allowed to count the paperclips, but that is about it. Anything serious or to do with policy is nothing to do with it. If its members had any dignity or self-regard, they would not be part of it, because apart from receiving a nice little stipend for going, one wonders what on earth they do.

The discussion in the Treasury Committee, and even in the Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, has been about bringing the corporate governance of the Bank of England into the 21st century with a proper board, and about stopping it being the fiefdom of one person. If I were the Minister, I would accept the new clause in spirit and say that I would speak quietly to people about it to strengthen the proposals and move on. He could well find himself having a much stronger position forced upon him, which would be good for the Bank of England in the long run.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) on amendments 22 and 23. I will deal with them briefly because many Members want to speak. This is not a political point, but the response to those amendments from Government Members is interesting, because my hon. Friend has raised a matter that deserves discussion and thought. The powers being given to the Financial Policy Committee will affect people, industries and firms, and there must be accountability. The problem arises from the fact that there is no consensus on the definition of financial stability, but the House is setting up a Financial Policy Committee, the objective of which is financial stability. The Chancellor of the Exchequer raised the most pertinent point before the Joint Committee, which was that although we do not want it to, the FPC could define financial stability as the “stability of the graveyard” and reach it. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East raised that point today.

If the FPC had the responsibility for making the definition and wanted to do it without much fuss, it could set the required level of economic activity so that it neither pressed the ceiling nor went through the floor, but would that give us the growth and employment that the Government might want? Should not the FPC be asked to work towards the Government’s policy, whichever party is in government?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Rutley]

I know that the hon. Gentleman is very knowledgeable about these matters and was on the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee, but has he not seen that proposed new section 9C(4) in clause 3 contains some clear wording about what the FPC should do? It states that subsections (1) and (2) of that proposed section do not

“authorise the Committee to exercise its functions in a way that would in its opinion be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy”.

The matter is addressed, so what does he want in addition to that, and why does he feel the need for more?

[Mr Mudie]

I accept that point, which has been made clear all the way through, but that is negative language rather than positive. Instead of telling the FPC, “In carrying out your duties, you mustn’t adversely affect growth”, I would rather put it to work with the MPC on ensuring that we have a buoyant economy with steady, acceptable growth and employment levels. At the moment, apart from the negative words that the hon. Gentleman quotes, all we have is the requirement of financial stability.

The hon. Gentleman was with a number of colleagues here on the Treasury Committee. We go through accountability with the MPC. It is bad enough trying to get the Governor of the Bank of England to be accountable even when he has a named target; what would he be like, or what would a future Governor be like, when he came before the Committee to which he was accountable and only had to defend his actions on the grounds of financial stability, which cannot be defined? It is a case of the emperor’s new clothes. There really should be a joint mandate, with a definition of financial stability and an acceptance of the Government’s picture of growth and employment.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I agree with very much of what my hon. Friend says. When the Bank of England was given its independence—so-called—I thought that if it started to fly in the face of what was obviously sensible for the economy, a Government might choose to take that independence back to the Treasury and into the hands of the Chancellor. If the Bank is not sensible in respect of managing the economy as a whole, is it not possible that a Government might choose to take back that independence and operate policy from the Treasury?

[Mr Mudie]

One can see many scenarios. I have seen many political philanthropists since I have been a Member of Parliament. I worry because they come to the House as politicians, but seem not to want to do anything or take any responsibility. They have offloaded power to quangos and agencies, and gave independence to the Bank. The real question is why are the Chancellor and the Treasury sitting back and watching their ground—sensitive economic ground—being given away to a quango, an unelected bunch of people? Under the Bill, those people can take the remit and the guidance on it, which the Treasury sets, and say to the Treasury, “We don’t agree with you,” and that is that. That is the situation we are reaching on accountability and responsibility despite the worry about giving away powers.

On amendment 23, some hon. Members were hard on my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East, although it is not as if he cannot defend himself. The Government’s original proposition, which was put out for consultation, included macro-prudential tools, which, as hon. Members have said, are highly sensitive and powerful. One aspect of the proposal they have given up because of its sensitivity—I am going by what has been in the papers in the past few days—is the ability to interfere in the mortgage market on loan-to-value and similar matters. What happens if the unelected Financial Policy Committee starts leaning against the wind in a way that affects large numbers of people, and there is no way of talking to it or affecting its position?

The Government’s original proposal was that decisions on macro-prudential tools would go upstairs to the Committee Corridor as statutory instruments—secondary legislation—for a 90-minute debate on a measure that would not be amendable. All hon. Members know what happens upstairs. The Minister talks for an hour, the shadow Minister talks for 25 minutes and we all go home, with the measure voted through by the Government majority. That happens with Governments of all parties. The way secondary legislation is dealt with in Parliament is an absolute disgrace. We can excuse a lot of it, but matters as important as the ones we are discussing, it is scandalous.

To be fair to the Chancellor, I raised the proposal with him when he first introduced it and asked him to look at it again because of its undemocratic nature. I am pleased that the line has softened, but there is more talking and work to be done. If hon. Members are asked to give away powers that affect our constituents so directly, it is important for us to be absolutely sure that we have had the opportunity to at least have our say in the strongest possible terms and ones that might allow the regulator to think about what has been said, although it is not for us to take its take its job.

A Government Member attacked my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East and asked him whether he would interfere with a regulator. We had that situation when the Treasury Committee discussed the retail distribution review with the chief executive of the FSA. We said to him, “This Committee feels strongly about this matter. We’ve had a lot of press about it and a lot of pressure, and we’d like you to think again.” He replied, “No, we won’t think again, unless you give me evidence.” The Treasury Select Committee giving evidence to the chief executive of the FSA—what arrogance! My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East is doing the Government a favour. They might not agree with the detail of the amendment, but the spirit is that we give the House every opportunity to comment on, think about and be aware of the powers we give to individuals that might affect our constituents.

[Mark Garnier]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Leeds East (Mr Mudie), with whom I serve on the Treasury Committee. It is interesting that I am the fourth consecutive Committee member to speak.

The House will not be surprised to hear that I rise to speak to new clause 1, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Committee Chairman, under whom it has been a great pleasure to serve. He is a very forensic Chairman of a Committee doing some extraordinarily good work at a time when it could not be more important—when we are facing some of the most fundamental problems in the economic world and when it is incredibly important that we do something significant about financial regulation. There is no doubt that something needs to be done. We have had a problem with a system of financial regulation that failed to address the problems with the banks, and the Bill travels a huge distance in trying to resolve those problems and come up with a robust new regulatory framework.

Having been a compliance officer under not one but three regulatory regimes—the Securities and Futures Authority, the Financial Services Authority and the Securities and Investment Board—and, prior to that, a regulated dealer on the floor of the stock exchange under the old stock exchange rules, I have had a fair degree of practical experience of financial regulation. Furthermore, in the past 18 months or so, I have, with the rest of the Committee, spent a huge amount of time scrutinising and studying the draft recommendations for the Bill. I also spent some 50 hours, in the Bill Committee, with the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), who waxed lyrical and at great length—and with great intelligence, I might add; and here we are on the Floor of the House talking about the matter yet again.

A number of things in the Bill are not ideal, but the one surgical cut that would have the most effect would be new clause 1. The Bill contains perhaps the single most fundamental change that we will see in financial regulation—the creation of the Financial Policy Committee. We have heard a lot about the FPC. One of the criticisms is that it could make profound changes to our financial system in trying to deal with financial instabilities, with bubbles that seem to be growing and all the rest of it. We can speculate ad nauseam about the type of interventions that could be made, but the one that people talk about a great deal is where the FPC may, with one of its tools of direction or recommendation, direct banks to change the loan-to-value ratios on mortgages. That could have far-reaching effects for our constituents.