Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Western]

Exactly that—it is about how this Bill will play with existing legislation and how the responsibilities will be balanced. The fact, and the overriding argument, is that institutions in the higher education sector have done an amazing job of balancing the obligations and the competing freedoms that exist on our campuses, and they have done so with very few problematic exceptions. It will be interesting to see how this individual and their department will handle that. I do not hold out a huge amount of confidence and hope in what they will do, but I will be interested to see what the Minister says in response to the amendment, and we will hold fire until we have heard her words.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I have a problem with the amendment, because I think there is a lot of misunderstanding around the Prevent agenda. It is one of the four p’s—prevent, pursue, protect and prepare—which are, as the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings has just said, part of the Government’s Contest counter-terrorism strategy. The principles that underpin it are democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs, and of those who hold none. I do not understand how it would be a problem for the director or any other institution to have to take into account issues surrounding Prevent.

It would be problematic if we started to take people out of legislation. Prevent is clearly designed to identify individuals who are at risk, and having met—in another role—the people who co-ordinate Prevent, I know that they are very skilled at ensuring that only those who need the programme are put through it. I accept what the right hon. Gentleman said about the vicar, but I am not sure that the amendment would prevent him—pardon the pun—from being referred anyway; that is more about training and ensuring that those whose duty it is to operate Prevent actually understand it. Will we get the odd case of people being referred when they should not be? Possibly, but that does not mean that those cases will be taken any further. I am sure the vicar was not taken any further just because somebody thought that he had failed in the Prevent duties.

I do not think there is any need for the amendment. The principles underpinning Prevent go to the core of the Bill, which talks about freedom of speech, democracy and everything else.

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[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

When I first saw the amendment, I was slightly confused about its purpose. The idea that the Bill ought to refer to contradicting or overlapping—however one might phrase it—legislation and sets of guidelines is something that we have proposed in previous amendments, which I feel were slightly better worded.

I put it to the Minister that we need in the Bill a recognition that there are contradictory guidelines and that there will be guidelines to explicitly outline how duties and laws at universities will interact. That would relieve of a lot of pressure. We want surety that the guidelines will have that element to them in perpetuity, so that whatever new Government or office comes in, the guidelines will always outline how the Acts and duties interact with each other.

In that sense, I understand and agree with the spirit of the amendment, but the Bill probably needs something that goes further and has more detailed wording. I also understand that there have sometimes been cases in which either the Prevent duty as it is now, or the Prevent programme as it was, was used and had a chilling effect. We have heard that from different organisations. The Nottingham Two have been mentioned; that was a case of a PhD student researcher and a lecturer at the University of Nottingham. The university felt that it was its duty to report them to the police; they were arrested for downloading and disseminating the al-Qaeda manual and were refused bail for a period of time. There has been a lengthy court case on that. Compensation was paid to the two individuals because they were researching how terrorists radicalise people—the very thing we need researchers to be working on.

The law has helped to correct itself through the court process. I am not diminishing the awful effect it must have had on the two researchers, but they have received compensation and to some extent, unfortunately, these things do happen. Most institutions have already corrected their reporting mechanisms to ensure that that kind of thing does not happen. I am sure the example right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings gave us of the chaplain will be a one-off example that will help us to correct in the other direction as well. Those correction moments are sometimes needed, rather than using statute or legislation to do it.

One thing that should perhaps be included in guidelines is some idea of a process for when you are dealing with contradictory things, such as something that might breach the Equality Act but is necessary to talk about difficult issues that are discriminatory, or that might breach the Prevent programme in a literal reading, rather than its intended spirit. It is the same in universities when dealing with issues that might trigger a safeguarding process; a lecturer or researcher would write to the university to explain what they plan to do in order to get prior authorisation.

[Mr Jones]

There are no key principles for how somebody gets referred to Prevent; it is actually about assessing someone’s vulnerabilities and a pattern of behaviour. There may be an example raising one issue that would automatically get people put into Prevent, but I think the structure is already there.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

I totally agree. However, an example might be if a lecturer wishes to run a course about Islamic radicalisation. They might say to the university, “I need some extra safeguards put around this course because of the students it might attract and the topics we might be dealing with. It is important to teach this course for academic rigour, it is important to understand these issues, but it might attract people to join the course for undue reasons.” That is not to stop them from doing it; it is just to make sure there is a safeguarding approach. All of that kind of stuff needs to be in the guidelines, not here. I hope that that is what the Minister will say. I think a safeguarding, prior notification approach is what is needed here.

I did want to touch on the interesting contradiction brought up by this amendment. Prevent—although there is debate about its understanding and its use, I do not think that is relevant here—is an important programme to try to safeguard and stop the radicalisation of people in our country. However, it applies to the institutions, and the institutions cascade to bodies that work within them, such as student unions. It does not apply directly to student unions in terms of the duty. This does, which is an example of where this Bill overreaches.

If the Bill is going to have a deeper, more intrusive reach than the Prevent programme, we need either to revisit the Prevent duty or to say that this Bill is a bit of an overreach, that it is not necessary for it to be regulating as deep down as student unions and student clubs. This amendment helps to highlight that. That is an argument I have made many times in this Committee, so I will not go any further on that point.

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[Fiona Bruce]

New clause 5 would ensure that employment tribunals had jurisdiction to hear claims relating to the duty in new section A1 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. This Bill has been introduced in part because of the high-profile instances of academics being dismissed. Many of the controversial examples have involved extramural speech rather than research or teaching, which again emphasises the importance of our earlier discussion grappling with the proper ambit of protection of academic freedom

The Committee will recall that Kathleen Stock, who gave oral evidence, faced calls for her dismissal due to her gender critical views. In 2019, we heard about Sarah Honeychurch, a lecturer who was sacked as editor of the academic journal Hybrid Pedagogy after signing an open letter to The Sunday Times criticising LGBT training in universities. What legal remedy do such academics currently have? One may argue that higher education providers, as public authorities, could be judicially reviewed, but judicial reviews are often prohibitively expensive, particularly for junior academics. Moreover, judicial review does not ordinarily review the merits of an decision, but more usually involves consideration of whether the correct procedures have been followed, which may still not capture some of the mischiefs identified by the Government before introducing the Bill.

Crucially, there is a real risk that, even if they were able to pursue a claim in the High Court, a dismissed academic may not be able to claim dismissal-related losses if they were dismissed due to an exercise of their lawful free speech and academic freedom. In the case of Johnson v. Unisys Ltd, the House of Lords took the view that the clear intent of Parliament was that dismissal-related cases and claims of a similar nature

“should be decided by specialist tribunals, not the ordinary courts of law.”

That is why I have tabled this modest but hugely significant amendment. We must ensure that those who have been dismissed due to the exercise of academic freedom have an appropriate route of challenge in the employment tribunal—a venue that has the relevant specialisms to deal with dismissal claims, recognising the spirit of and understanding the letter of the law the Bill will introduce. Employment tribunals also have appropriate procedures to simply and significantly reduce the cost burden of claims, especially when compared with the complexity and expense of claims in other proceedings, such as judicial review proceedings.

It may be argued that employment tribunals already deal with claims concerning free speech and that is correct, but invariably such claims must be linked to a protected characteristic, in particular freedom of religion or belief, which has a very specific meaning in equality and discrimination law. I anticipate that most academics would not ordinarily be able to argue that their academic viewpoint springs from their philosophical or religious beliefs, and nor should they have to. Academic freedom is there to ensure that academics have the space to rigorously test and develop new ideas. Dismissal on that basis ought to qualify for specific and special protection with meaningful remedies.

The amendment would address that problem and is consistent with evidence we heard, such as the recommendations from Tom Simpson, who said, for example,

“would seriously support considering introducing the employment tribunal as the first court to consider cases of dismissal in that situation, in addition to the existing measures in here.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 72, Q149.]

I spoke about the Bill to associate professor in the faculty of law at Oxford, Paul Yowell, and I thank him for his time. He particularly emphasised how important he considers such an amendment. I take the opportunity to refer colleagues to his Policy Exchange paper published in the last few days, “The Future of Equality”.

In his evidence, Professor Goodwin astutely pointed out:

“If the current system with regard to sacking and dismissal were working, we would not be having this conversation. We would not have had dozens of academics appearing in the newspapers. There was another one this weekend from the University of Bristol who was accused of being Islamophobic. The university had ruled that he was not Islamophobic, but had none the less removed his course in response to student satisfaction.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 96, Q195.]

He said “satisfaction”, but I think it might have been dissatisfaction. In any event, the academic’s course was removed in response to comments from students.

[Mr Jones]

Like the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings, the hon. Lady obviously reads a lot into individual cases that are highlighted in the press. I have some sympathy with her new clause, but it would not prevent people from being appointed. People would find other reasons for debarring people from applying. Could she address the issue of tenure? Employment tribunals deal in contract law—contracts between individuals—but tenure is slightly different. Would the new clause require a change to the way tenure is given to academics?

[Fiona Bruce]

That may require some consideration, but as I am sure the right hon. Member knows, tenure is attained only after very many years of often insecure academic life on the part of academics, and that is one of the issues of which we need to be acutely aware when looking at the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

I am aware of that, but if somebody who has tenure is dismissed from a university because of their views, they would not actually be protected by new clause 5. Although I agree with what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve, it may be difficult to achieve because of the issues around tenure.

[Fiona Bruce]

I am not entirely taking the right hon. Gentleman’s point—it probably requires some reflection on my part—but I thank him for raising it, and no doubt the Minister might do the same.

Professor Nigel Biggar noted that

“appeal to the courts is expensive and risky. It seems to me that academics who have lost their job ought to have readier access to lodge a complaint than through the courts.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 31, Q62.]

I hope the Minister will consider my comments.

[Matt Western]

I understand the points that have been made by the hon. Member for Congleton, and I appreciate the sentiment, but I disagree with how new clause 5 is worded, because implicit in its words is quite a narrow conception of unfair dismissal. New clause 13 is broader and affords greater protections, and I hope that the hon. Lady will support it.

Several witnesses underlined why the inclusion of employment law provisions in this conversation is so important. When questioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown on whether employment law would be a better basis for defining some of these rights, Professor Stephen Whittle responded with a categorical yes. In her evidence, lawyer Smita Jamdar said:

“there are often cases where there is a very vigorous disagreement about whether something was an exercise of academic freedom or not when it relates to criticism of the institution.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 57, Q110.]

Employees need the full protection of the law, which is what new clause 13 seeks to provide. Employees would not have to conform to the stringent requirements for bringing an unfair dismissal claim—usually, a two-year qualification period and a range of reasonable responses test, which is construed broadly, often in favour of the employer. They also would not be subject to capped damages awards. There was cross-witness support for this, including from Thomas Simpson, who said:

“I would seriously support considering introducing the employment tribunal as the first court to consider cases of dismissal in that situation, in addition to the existing measures in here.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 72, Q149.]

On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Devizes (Danny Kruger) said:

“We should allow academics to appeal not just through the civil law but to an employment tribunal if their academic freedom is restricted.”—[Official Report, 12 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 76.]

New clause 13 is actually an extrapolation of new clause 5. We think that it is broader.

[Mr Jones]

I have a lot of sympathy with this, but will my hon. Friend address the issue of tenure, which is quite a unique employment status. Will it be covered by new clause 13?

[Matt Western]

I am not a lawyer. I would hope that it would be, but my hon. Friend may well be right that it may not be covered. That would be its intent. The concern is about the vulnerability of academics in terms of their tenure and whether they will have the protections that others already have.

I hope the amendment covers that. If it does not, then perhaps this is something we should revisit. I hope the hon. Member for Congleton will recognise that our new clause is an enhanced version of what she is proposing and vote with us.

[Michelle Donelan]

New clauses 5 and 13 seek to provide that a dismissal and breach of the new section A1 duty is specifically to be treated as an automatically unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996. New clause 13 further seeks to disapply the two-year qualifying period for unfair dismissal in these cases, removing the limit on the level of compensation that can be awarded and applying provisions allowing claimants to seek interim relief, pending determination of their claim.

Let me be clear that the Bill does not stop employees in higher education from taking their claims to employment tribunals. In doing so, employment tribunals may consider questions of freedom of speech and academic freedom and alleged breaches of the section A1 duty in that context, although the Bill does not give them the jurisdiction to hear freedom of speech cases.

The current two-year qualifying period for unfair dismissal is intended to strike the right balance between fairness for employees and flexibility for employers, to ensure that employers are not discouraged from taking on new staff.

[Mr Jones]

I am very interested in what the Minister just said. It is clear that an employment tribunal can be held on sex discrimination grounds or on other grounds, but could she point out in present employment law where it states that someone would be able to bring an industrial tribunal on the basis that they were discriminated against because of freedom of speech? I am not aware of such a law.

[Michelle Donelan]

As I said, tribunals cannot take a freedom of speech case per se, but if there were evidence of discrimination on the grounds of freedom of speech in the case that they were taking, that could be heard. I can come back to the right hon. Gentleman with the details of that after the Committee, but I cannot point out the exact line of the legislation on the spot.

[Mr Jones]

As I understand it, an industrial tribunal case could not be taken on the grounds that someone had been dismissed because their freedom of speech had been infringed. That is a problem that came out in the evidence. A tribunal could be brought on the basis of sex discrimination and for other reasons, but if the sole reason for a tribunal was that someone thought they were being dismissed because of their views and that their freedom of speech was being questioned, I am not sure such a tribunal would have jurisdiction over that, given present employment law. If the Minister does not know, I am happy that she writes to the Committee.

[Michelle Donelan]

The point I am trying to make is that an employment tribunal will determine whether a dismissal was fair or unfair, depending on the specific circumstances of the case. Therefore, it may take into account breaches of academic freedom of speech. The Bill does not amend employment law in this regard and we do not think it would be appropriate to make dismissal because of a breach of the new duties an automatic unfair dismissal.

The Bill does, however, give new protections to academic staff, including those who may not have employee status or who have been employed for less than two years. It therefore broadens the scope of the current provision section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, to ensure that visiting fellows, for example, have the freedom to research and teach on issues that may be controversial or challenging, without the risk of losing their post.

The Bill provides new specific routes of redress for those without employee status, including a complaints scheme operated by the Office for Students and a statutory tort. I hope that Members are reassured that the Bill strengthens protections for academic staff and employees. It expands the range of available routes of complainants and ensures that a wide range of individuals are able to secure redress.

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[Fiona Bruce]

The Government might want to continue to consider this issue as the Bill progresses.

[Mr Jones]

I am now a bit confused by what the Minister has said. Tribunal cases are done on case law. I am not aware of any case law in which unfair dismissal has been upheld on the basis of a freedom of speech issue, so I am at a loss as to what the Minister has said. However, I agree with the hon. Lady that this is something that needs to be looked at in detail on Report.