Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank the Minister for her comprehensive response to this group of amendments. We have talked heavily about efficiencies: the shadow Opposition and the Liberal Democrats have put forward alternative measures to improve efficiencies that were not explored in Leveson’s report. I asked Sir Brian if he had explored the concept of doing two trials a day. He said, “No, that wasn’t really something that I looked at.” But he was quite open to it. We had the same conversation that it seems the Minister had with him, where he said, “I used to be able to get through two trials in a day.” We know that that world does not exist any more.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

Interestingly, we have been told all along that this is about the complexity of cases, yet the evidence is that the number of hours that things have been looked at has shrunk. To me, that is a much bigger issue. If we have fewer hours in a day to operate, of course it is going to take longer to get through complex cases.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is a worrying trend that the number of hours that are being used efficiently in Crown courts every day seems to be decreasing year on year.

The Minister spoke about not wanting to necessarily set a target. I agree with her: sometimes putting an arbitrary number on something does not actually reflect the situation. The previous Government attempted to do that, setting a target in 2019 to get the backlog down to a certain number. That does not always reflect the fact that the backlog could be a caseload 30,000 of the most complex cases that will take an incredibly long time to get to. Instead, we should look at the average time that it takes to get from charge to trial, and monitor whether we can bring that number down.

When I have talked about bringing that report to Parliament in new clause 5, it is not necessarily to say, “It was 80,000 and now it is 79,500,” because that does not reflect how long people are going to actually wait to have their cases heard. It is far more about the experiences of all of those people going through the system.

With regard to having reports established every year, the Minister spoke passionately, as she always does, about wanting to make sure that the reforms genuinely make a difference. But the Deputy Prime Minister has said that, even with all the reforms coming in together, he does not expect to see the backlog fall before the end of the Parliament. We need to be able to look at where the data is taking us every year, track what the backlog is doing, track the sorts of cases that are getting stuck in the backlog, and then scrutinise that, so that if there are other levers that can be pulled—whether they are things that have been suggested by me or by the shadow Minister—we have the opportunity to come back and review those things.

I am glad that the Minister recognises that trust in the criminal justice system is low anyway. It is not where it should be. I have said it before: the justice system is inextricably linked with how people view democracy. When trust in democracy is low, there is distrust in institutions, policing and the way our courts work. As cross-party parliamentarians, we have a duty to improve trust in all those systems. I worry that the measures in clauses 1 to 7 will not do that, but will erode trust.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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The Government should also take the opportunity to look at measures that would improve victims’ experiences, such as the Victims’ Commissioner’s model of a victim care hub, where victims would go to one place to get all the necessary advice on how to proceed through the criminal justice system. Alternatively, it could be a victim unique identifier, which is another idea that has been floated by the Victims’ Commissioner. Both of those would help victims to navigate a complex and changing system.

[Dr Mullan]

I wish to speak briefly in support of the principle that different approaches to case management and ways of working are making a difference in a number of areas. The Committee has had extensive back and forth about the fact that backlogs are actually coming down in certain locations. There has been debate about whether that is just a seasonal trend that we see at some points in the year; we will have to wait to see whether that is the case.

We have also spoken about the approach to case management in Liverpool, and this morning I read out various statistics from other courts that are bringing the backlogs down. I think new clause 7 drives at the same point; other measures are already showing benefits before the passage of this legislation, and we should prioritise them.

[Sarah Sackman]

Let me begin, as we all have in this Committee, by acknowledging the challenges that victims face in accessing the information and support they need. We have talked about the Government’s drive to centre victims in the criminal justice process.

I have a couple of things to say in response to new clause 7. First, there is lots of work under way. For example, on 5 February this year we launched a consultation on a new victims code to ensure that we get the foundations right for victims. Through the connecting criminal justice data programme, we are aiming to strengthen data sharing by seeing how we can both track and share that data with victims, as appropriate. We have published statutory guidance on independent sexual violence advisers and independent domestic violence advisers, recommending best practice for those roles. Of course, we have also begun to roll out the independent legal adviser service for rape victims. We have also undertaken consistent engagement; I met the Victims’ Commissioner just yesterday to discuss some of the ways in which we can marshal the over £500 billion-worth of investment that the Government have made in victims services, so that we can ensure that we have a victim-centred approach.

Case management is ultimately a matter for the judiciary, but taking into account the impact that delays in processes have on victims will of course form an important part of that. I would say that a publication strategy is not a matter best addressed through primary legislation, but I understand the thrust behind the hon. Lady’s proposal, and it is one that we would agree with.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would give victims a right to receive, free of charge, court transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to their case. It would require that transcripts be provided within 14 days of a request and clarify that this right would applies whether or not the victim gave evidence in the case.

We spoke earlier in Committee about the important role of court transcripts. I recognise the challenges that the Government have in rolling out large-scale reforms to the way that we currently do court transcripts. The new clause is slightly more limited in its scope, because it specifically calls for transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to the victim’s case. I know that the Government are doing a great deal in trying to move the dial on making sure that we slowly get to the point where everybody has access to court transcripts. As a spokesperson for an opposition party, I will continue to put pressure on the Government wherever I can to try and push them to go further and faster in this regard. I will not press the new clause to a vote.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak briefly in support of the new clause. Whenever we talk about narrowed elements of a transcript, I always think to myself that, in giving these remarks, the judge will hopefully have written them down and not be doing these sorts of things off the top of their head. That is why I struggle to understand why these more limited elements are not more meaningful and easily available.

If a judge does not happen to write these sorts of things down, I do not think it will be much to ask them to do so and to make it so that the transcript can be quickly and easily checked. I appreciate that the hon. Member for Chichester will not press the new clause to a vote, but as she mentioned, in any opportunity we get we should push the issue of transcripts. It is particularly important in relation to, as we will come to talk about, the unduly lenient sentence scheme, because all these things would help somebody, in theory, to give an appeal a shot. If they do not have that sort of thing, it is much more difficult.

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Member for Chichester rightly acknowledges the significant amount of work that the Government are currently undertaking in this space, and we had an opportunity to debate that in Committee earlier.

In relation to the new clause, it might be worth briefly explaining why such an extension would not provide significant benefits compared with the systems already in place. In relation to bail decisions, a transcript of the hearing is rarely informative for victims. What victims need and want to know, and what the victims code already requires, is for victims to be informed of the outcome of the bail hearing and any conditions imposed. Those updates are already provided to victims by victim witness care units within five working days. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the code are being met by the relevant service providers and how to better support them in the delivery of the code. To strengthen that further, once commenced, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework, requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their performance against the code under review.

Transcripts of judicial summings-up are unlikely to add significant value for many victims. Those remarks are given before the jury begins to deliberate and are intended to guide them by summarising the evidence and setting out the relevant law. They are not, and cannot be, a reflection of the jury’s decision. Without the full context of the trial, they may risk causing confusion rather than providing clarity. Before being released, summings-up must be manually reviewed to ensure that they are accurate. That, too, is resource intensive. In looking at where we can roll out making transcripts available at either low or no cost, we must target those areas that add value for the public and victims.

As I said when we discussed this last Thursday, we are focused on driving improvement for the longer term. That is why we are undertaking a study in the use of AI to transcribe court hearings. The findings will identify what is possible from AI transcription in a Crown court setting, in considering how to make the provision of transcripts more cost-effective. I think we are in a good place. As the hon. Member for Chichester says, there is more to do, and the Government would be grateful for work across the House to see how we can drive greater transparency in transcription in our Crown courts, but I urge her to withdraw her new clause.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The new clause is a sunset clause that would require a report on the effectiveness of certain provisions of the Bill. If the report found that the provisions were not effective, the Secretary of State would have to bring forward regulations to repeal them; if it found that they were effective, the Secretary of State would have to set a deadline for their repeal and a return to full jury trials.

The design of these reforms has not been tested in practice. There are many different estimations of their impact on the backlog, and if they are shown to not be effective, they must not continue. If they prove to be effective at reducing the backlog, full jury trials could be reinstated when the backlog is reduced and we are working at a level that the criminal justice system can cope with.

[Dr Mullan]

My new clause 24 and new clause 18 in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester seek to achieve a similar outcome. Although there is broad agreement that the backlog is a challenging issue that must be addressed, we believe that any measure that curtails jury trial rights in such a significant—and, I would say, unprecedented—way should be proportionate to the problem it seeks to solve and be used only for as long as absolutely necessary while we are presented with this problem. Therefore, we propose a sunset clause to ensure that the powers expire once the court backlog has returned to pre-pandemic levels for a sustained period.

A sunset clause is a measure in a statute that provides for a law or specific provisions to cease to be effective after a predetermined date, or once a specific condition is met, unless Parliament takes further action to renew them. Although they have experienced a resurgence in recent decades as a tool for managing extraordinary or controversial measures, sunset clauses have been employed by Parliament since at least 1500. Historically and in contemporary practice, they serve vital democratic functions. They are used to facilitate the passage of controversial legislation by assuring critics and the public that the measures are temporary, rather than a permanent erosion. They act as a safeguard for democracy, particularly when emergency legislation is required, by preventing the normalisation of extraordinary powers.

Furthermore, sunset clauses create a more formal trigger for post-legislative scrutiny, forcing both the Executive and the legislature to revisit their assumptions and evaluate whether a law has been effective before deciding whether to prolong its life. The Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 both utilise sunsetting or recurring renewal requirements to ensure ongoing parliamentary oversight. More recently, sunset clauses were used in covid-19 legislation to ensure that restrictive measures did not extend longer than necessary. The UK Coronavirus Act 2020 contained a two-year sunset clause and a requirement for six-monthly reviews to determine whether temporary provisions should expire early.

When considering radical changes to our trial system during a time of crisis, we should look to our history for a more direct precedent. During world war two, a period when our continued existence as a free nation was genuinely uncertain, the Government of the day did not choose to radically cut down the use of jury trials or erode the right of the citizen to elect to be judged by their peers. Instead, they reduced the number of jurors from 12 to seven. Importantly, that was a temporary adjustment. As soon as the Nazi threat was defeated, the Government of the day restored the number of jurors to 12. That demonstrates a principled understanding that emergency measures taken in response to a temporary crisis should be reversed once that crisis is resolved.

In contrast, the measures before us today regarding the erosion of jury trials and the abolition of the right to elect are drafted as permanent changes to our statute book, with no built-in mechanism for their reversal once the backlog is managed again. As I have said, that is a significant departure from the most closely related historical example of what we did during even the darkest days of the 1940s.

Our sunset clause would tie the duration of these reforms to the very problem they are intended to fix. The Government’s case is that these are necessary, backlog-driven measures, and it is entirely consistent to state that they should expire once that backlog is brought down to a more historically normal level, which we define as the pre-pandemic level—a level that the system was able to manage sufficiently, if not perfectly, without the need for structural erosion of the right to a jury.

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[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

If you will indulge me, Dr Huq, I want to congratulate the hon. Member for Rugby on the news that he has been appointed as a trade envoy. We can all recognise that he has put an enormous amount of work into that. The Opposition think that he is amazing at selling the unsellable; he does it all the time. If he has British products to sell, he will be amazing at it. He should just double check that he is going to the south of Korea, rather than the north.

As we have said before, we are debating a Bill that represents one of the most significant reconfigurations of our criminal justice system in modern history, and it is therefore unsurprising that we feel that other contingent parts of the system need to be considered in that light and adjusted accordingly. As we expand the reach and punitive power of the magistrates courts, we must ensure that our procedural safeguards in both directions keep pace with that expansion. That is the core purpose of new clause 26, which proposes to extend the unduly lenient sentence scheme to triable either-way offences, which will now be increasingly retained and sentenced at the summary level. If we can trust magistrates with the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, the public must have the assurance that there is a mechanism to correct sentencing decisions that fall in the other direction by being unduly lenient.

The Government have occasionally attempted to reframe their reforms as affecting only low-level or petty crimes such as shoplifting, but the reality of the triable either-way category is very different from that. As the Criminal Bar Association and JUSTICE have pointed out, some of the offences that will be almost exclusively in the jurisdiction of the magistrates courts include unlawful wounding, actual bodily harm and, as we have discussed, even some sexual assault cases. Those are offences where the impact on the victims can be very significant. For some time, I have been aware of dissatisfaction in many ways with the punitive element of our justice system, and whether it sufficiently punishes perpetrators in a way that victims and the wider public would consider to be justice. That is one of the reasons why the unduly lenient sentence scheme exists.

In the Crown court, sentencing outcomes are subject to the oversight of the Attorney General’s office through the unduly lenient sentences scheme. It is an essential safety valve that helps contribute to public confidence by allowing the public—it has always been open to the public—and, most importantly for me, victims and family members to refer unduly lenient sentences for consideration by the Court of Appeal. As I have talked about previously, I have made it use of it and so have other Members of the House, so it is important. It would be illogical to allow offences with the same potential gap in public confidence in the outcome to be without this equivalent safeguard, simply because the Government have decided to change the likely venue of trial in so many of these cases.

The need for the extension is further underscored by the evidence on the rate of appeal of sentences from the perspective of defendants. About 47% of appeals against sentences from the magistrates courts result in a change. Those figures are not marginal; they indicate that the lower courts fall into meaningful error in nearly half of the cases where they are challenged. That is from the perspective of the defendant—that is, the person found guilty—appealing the sentence. There is nothing to suggest that, if victims were given a similar opportunity to challenge sentences, no similar rate of error would be found from their perspective. That is, at the very least, of equal importance to someone who has campaigned significantly on behalf of victims in sentencing. For me, it is probably the more important of the two.

Historically, one of the primary arguments against extending the ULS scheme to magistrates courts was a practical one: there was no comprehensive record of the proceedings and sentencing decisions were often delivered without the detailed recorded remarks that characterised the Crown court. However, the Bill fundamentally changes that landscape. Schedule 2 introduces proposed reforms to introduce a mandatory requirement for audio recording and the provision of transcripts in the magistrates court. The Government are making this change to support their new appeal model, recognising that a fair system cannot function without an accurate record of what was said and decided. This move towards digital transparency is a game changer for sentencing accountability for victims as well.

As the Minister herself noted, sunshine is the best disinfectant. Once we have a reliable audio record of the sentencing remarks and the mitigations offered, the logistical barriers to reviewing a sentence for undue leniency from a victim’s perspective and that of the wider public falls away. We will, for the first time, have the infrastructure to allow the Office of the Attorney General to scrutinise sentences with the same precision applied to the Crown court. We should use this new capability to ensure that the sentencing code is applied fairly. Extended sentencing powers must be matched with extended accountability. If a magistrate is given power more akin to a judge, then they must be subject to the same oversight of their sentencing decisions. New clause 6 is not about creating more work for the Court of Appeal; it is about ensuring that, as we redraw the boundaries of our legal system, we do not leave victims of serious crime behind in a two-tier justice system where leniency cannot be corrected.

In summary, the proposals to extend the ULS scheme to either-way offences is a necessary and proportionate response to the Government’s radical restructuring of the trial process. Magistrates will soon be passing sentence on much more serious offences where the interest of victims will be of even greater concern. The record is improving to allow this to happen at the same time and it is common sense that there is consistency. I do not think there is a rational basis for excluding more serious offences from the ULS scheme simply because of the venue.

We should not wait for a high-profile case where a victim is concerned and able to seek redress in the way that they might in the Crown court. I ask the Minister to be proactive. I can understand that the Minister would perhaps argue for a more gradual approach—and perhaps not applying it to every single case might be a compromise that the Minister could bring forward. Perhaps it should be for the more serious of these less-serious, more-serious cases. However, I certainly think that we can have some kind of progress.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for this new clause on the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The ULS scheme is an exceptional power, reserved for the most serious cases, that applies only to offences passed in the Crown court. One of the things that we have seen—this is not an unwelcome development—is its expanded use. What started as an exceptional power used in a handful of exceptional cases has grown in usage as members of the public, their representatives and others who have either experienced crime, or have loved ones who have, take up the ULS scheme in greater numbers. In 2025, the Office of the Attorney General assessed around 1,500 cases.

It is important to focus on what the ULS scheme is and what it is not. It is a legal backstop that rightly sets a hard test. Someone simply not agreeing with or taking issue with the sentence handed down to a particular offender is not, of itself, a basis for challenging it. One needs to show that there has been a gross error in the application of the sentencing guidelines, and that the sentence is manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of the offence.

I understand the points that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle is making. I would, though, draw attention to the fact that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of criminal appeals, which includes looking at reforms to the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The Law Commission is due to publish its report in autumn 2026. I suggest that that is an appropriate moment to look at the operation of the scheme and at what is suggested in the new clause about its current operation as it applies in the Crown court, rather than pre-empting what that report might say and how the Government might think about the scheme’s potential extension to the magistrates court.

I cannot support the new clause at the moment, as it would in effect significantly alter the scope and operation of a power that is supposed to be exceptional. It would make the exceptional the norm. It would entail administrative burdens and goes against the grain of what was intended when the scheme was first conceived. However, I look forward to seeing the Law Commission’s work. That will be the appropriate moment to re-examine how the scheme operates and how it operates in a reformed system. I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw the new clause.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister opened her remarks by saying that the scheme applies only to certain cases in the Crown court. The point that the Opposition make is that it will no longer apply to some of the cases to which it would apply now. The Minister has given figures. If the scheme is configured in the right way, and sufficiently constrained to just pick up those cases that are moving, it should not necessarily lead to any increase in the number of cases referred, so I do not accept her argument.

I would not expect the Minister to know this—she has given a single set of figures—but I would be interested in the historical trend, and the number of applications in the preceding few years. It would be helpful if she could give those figures. I also want to make clear—I have been quite clear about this with other stuff that we have done on the ULS scheme—I think it is unusual that the scheme is available to absolutely anybody. I would be open to any expansion or modification being constrained just to victims and family members. I think that I have made that clear in relation to other reforms.

That brings me to the Minister’s point about the Law Commission. That was the answer I was given repeatedly over very many months by the Victims Minister as to why the Government would not make reforms to the scheme, yet they accepted such reforms last week as a result of pressure. If the Minister insists that that is the route forward, I ask her to write to the commission. I point out the reforms that the Minister is making, which will not have been in the terms of reference for the Law Commission. At the point at which it started that work, the reforms were not even on the operating table, so it is important that the Government write to the commission and make clear that they would welcome it expanding the matters that it is considering to include this question, which would have been novel to them at the point of that undertaking.

I have learned from our experience with the other element of the ULS that, I am afraid, one should just keep pushing and pushing on such issues, so I will put the new clause to a vote. However, I have given some points on which I ask the Minister to go away and reflect to determine whether there is a way forward that can be satisfactory to both sides of the House at some point in future proceedings.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 35, which I tabled last week after a conversation with the Victims’ Commissioner, would reinstate an inspectorate body for the criminal courts in England and Wales. The Courts Act 2003 introduced His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration, which was established in 2005. The inspectorate was then closed in 2010, with the then Government arguing that audits of HMCTS, combined with the inspection regimes of the current justice inspectorates and the National Audit Office, negated the need for HMICA. However, a 2022 Justice Committee report found that that argument had not stood the test of time, and it called for the re-establishment of an inspectorate body. The report stated:

“A Courts’ Inspectorate, which is independent from Government, could make a substantial difference to the accountability and transparency of the justice system. It could use inspections and the promised improvements to the quality of the data to make recommendations that can inform policy and guidance in both criminal and civil justice. An inspectorate could also help to monitor the use of technology in the courts.”

This is a really important time to introduce the additional level of having a courts’ inspectorate, especially when the use of technology will play a much larger role in the criminal justice system, as well as the quality of the data coming out, which the Committee has debated various times. The proposal was backed by Andrew Cayley KC, then chief inspector for the Crown Prosecution Service. He favoured an even broader court inspection regime to scrutinise the operation of the disjointed parts of the system, particularly regarding the listing of cases. The re-establishment of a courts inspectorate was also recommended by Sir Brian Leveson in part 2 of his independent review of the criminal courts; it was recommendation 58. While there are four criminal justice inspectorates, Sir Brian notes:

“There is, however, no one body that is responsible for the inspection of the criminal courts in England and Wales.”

Due to limitations to the scope of this Bill, our new clause proposes a criminal courts inspectorate that would inspect and report on the administration and operation of the criminal courts. The new clause stipulates that that inspectorate must have

“particular regard to the experience of witnesses and victims”

when assessing

“the efficiency, effectiveness and accessibility of those courts”.

An inspectorate would identify inefficiencies and monitor victims’ experience in the system.

When debating an earlier group, the Minister mentioned what I think she called a public governance board that she is exploring. It would be helpful if she could outline whether she sees my new clause as different from that, or whether she is looking to create an additional level of inspection and scrutiny in the criminal courts system.

[Dr Mullan]

As I have alluded to several times, the Conservative party is considering more broadly how we tackle judicial accountability in all its different elements. It would be premature for us to settle on this new clause if, as the hon. Member for Chichester pointed out, it had to be necessarily narrow to fit in the Bill. On that basis we will not vote for it. We are not against it as an idea, but we need greater time to think about accountability and performance in the justice system in a more comprehensive way.

[Sarah Sackman]

I agree with the sentiment behind the new clause to ensure that we are monitoring efficiency, effectiveness and performance across our criminal courts system. However, as the shadow Justice Minister just said, the best mechanisms for holding the system to account in terms of performance and judicial accountability merit greater reflection. We are taking the time to consider the IRCC’s recommendations. The hon. Member for Chichester alluded to the history, and that there has previously been an inspectorate of court administration; that of course ceased operation under the coalition Government, who found it unnecessary at the time.

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[Sarah Sackman]

These clauses are in part 3 of the general provisions of the Bill. They provide the position on the commencement of measures in the Bill, the powers to make consequential, transitional and other provisions in connection with the coming into force of the provisions of the Bill, and the Bill’s territorial extent and short title.

Clause 21 is a technical clause that will allow the Secretary of State to make any further consequential amendments or legislative changes where required to implement the provisions in the Bill. Clause 22 creates a power to allow the Lord Chancellor to make “transitional or saving provisions” by regulation

“in connection with the coming into force of any provision of this Act.”

Clause 23 will allow the Secretary of State to, by regulation, amend the Sentencing Act 2020, so as to specify the cases or purpose for which the amendment or repeal made by the Bill has effect.

Clause 24 allows for regulations under statutory instrument to be made under the Bill once it becomes an Act. The Bill contains nine delegated powers; we have considered the scope and extent of those powers carefully and have taken the decision to include them only where it is necessary, in respect of particularly technical or detailed areas, or to allow flexibility for our legislation to remain up to date and be responsive to changes.

Clause 25 sets out the extent of the Bill. All measures apply to England and Wales only, save in respect of four areas: section 7; section 18(6) and subsection (7); sections 10(4) and 11(8); and part 3. Those four areas have UK-wide extent, except for sections 10(4) and 11(8), which have the same extent at the Armed Forces Act 2006, so that they extend to the UK, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories except Gibraltar.

Clause 26 states that the measures in the Bill will be commenced via regulations on the day that the Secretary of State appoints apart from clauses 21 to 25 and clause 27, which come into force on the day on which the Act is passed, and section 6 and section 20, which come into force at the end of a period of two months beginning with the day on which the Bill is passed. Finally, clause 27 states that the Bill

“may be cited as the Courts and Tribunals Act 2026”

once it becomes an Act of Parliament.

I thank all members of the Committee for the spirit in which they have engaged over the last five days. Some may know the famous line, “I fought the law and the law won.” Some may also know that I have been developing a Spotify soundtrack to get me through the Committee, inspired by some of the interventions. Everyone has not only made this stage constructive and engaging, but given the Government a lot of food for thought as we take the Bill through to the next stage. It will be all the stronger for the contributions that have been made, so I thank everyone for that.

[Dr Mullan]

I have just one remark to make. I draw the Committee’s attention to the submission we received from the circuit in Wales. Clause 25 is about the territorial extent of the Bill, and the circuit pointed out that it feels the Welsh system has been unfairly caught up in these reforms, which it does not think are applicable in terms of the need to reduce waiting times. It is important that the Committee makes note of the evidence that was submitted to us.

I join the Minister in thanking everybody for their time and deep concentration when listening to the exchanges throughout. I thank the Clerks who have assisted us over the many days, including during a late sitting. I thank the House staff in that regard, and I thank the Minister for the constructive manner in which she has engaged with feedback and proposals from this side of the House.

[Sarah Sackman]

I commend clauses 21 to 27 to the Committee. I did not specifically mention the House staff and all our wonderful Chairs. I add my thanks to everybody for their hard work. I also thank my team of officials—those watching at home and those in the room—who have worked very hard.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.