Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I am thinking about the hon. Member’s arguments about clause 64(3). Does she not think that there may be circumstances where higher charges actually help to get private investment into the railways? For example, GBR could agree to fund infrastructure improvements in exchange for an operator paying higher access charges over an agreed period and, through that mechanism, recoup at least some of the costs of that welcome upgrade to the network.

[Rebecca Smith]

I can appreciate where the hon. Member is coming from. It sounds like a good idea; however, it could still be in the legislation directly, and the illustration he gave still leaves a huge number of questions about what happens if there is more than one user of that bit of infrastructure. Why should the private operator be the one that has to pay for the infrastructure? If anything, there is an issue, which I may come to, about the impact on fares, because ultimately, by the sound of it, GBR is going to have far fewer costs than other operators. In principle, I can see why the hon. Member made that point, but I think it is not clear enough at this stage.

Clause 64(8) allows a right of appeal, but only under judicial review-type provisions, which is no right at all. Any of us who has worked with anyone who ever wanted to get a judicial review knows that it is incredibly difficult. It is also incredibly expensive, so it is certainly not a level playing field.

The industry has rightly been outspoken on clause 64. In evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Freight Group stated:

“The Bill sets out the future framework for access charges for freight. In headline terms the charges will be calculated in a similar way to today (costs directly incurred by running the train) which we welcome. However, the Bill provides for extra costs to be levied on freight services

a. Through a mandatory reservation charge for capacity which is booked and then not used (for example, if a customer cancels a train due to poor weather) (Clause 64)

b. Through a general clause 64(3) which allows GBR discretion to charge more if ‘an efficient operator can pay it’. This is a very broad test and far wider than the test in current law ‘if the market can bear it’. This raises the prospect of far higher, and potentially uncapped charges being levied.

Increasing the costs of rail freight will simply make using rail too expensive for customers when compared to road freight, and will reverse modal shift and undermine growth. It is essential that the powers to charge more than the standard charge are strictly limited for GBR.”

The key point there is about reversing modal shift. On the one hand, the Government want to promote modal shift. Indeed, there is a scheme coming in— I mentioned it on Tuesday, but now I cannot remember its name—that will look at different types of transport, and one of the plans is to ensure modal shift. Anything that undermines that is potentially contradictory and a backwards step.

The Transport Committee also heard evidence from Nick Brooks of ALLRAIL, who said:

“I was just going to say something about privately owned investors and privately owned operators, specifically privately owned investors that want to invest in our sector rather than in other sectors—aviation, the road sector, or even completely different sectors. There is a certain risk. There is a commercial risk, of course, and ultimately they are looking for lower fixed costs and higher variable costs. The worry with GBR is this: who determines what the market can bear? Is GBR an independent entity, or not? I think the Bill says it should be GBR itself that determines that, if I am not mistaken.

It is a little bit like another conflict, or potential problem, with track access fees. Who decides the size of the track access fees? If you are a privately owned operator, is it your competitor—GBR—that decides your track access fees? That is a potential cause of worry.”

Lumo and Hull Trains also had similar concerns, which they raised in their written evidence to the Transport Committee:

“A transparent and proportionate charging regime will be critical to ensuring the financial sustainability and competitiveness of the railway. If GBR were able to set and revise access charges without independent oversight (as suggested by clause 64), it could create uncertainty and deter private investment. Independent regulation of charging is therefore vital to maintain investor confidence and ensure fairness between different operators. Open Access operators already make a substantial contribution to the upkeep of the network while receiving no public subsidy. The charges paid by Open Access are calculated independently by ORR to encourage investment, sweat the railway asset and deliver connectivity and the associated economic benefits. It also acts as an additional income stream to Network Rail. These arrangements demonstrate the sector’s willingness to invest and its commitment to supporting the network’s long-term health.

Ensuring that access charges remain proportionate and independently regulated will help reinforce the Government’s objective of crowding in private capital to support network growth. Confidence in a fair charging regime is essential for the continued profitability of private operators. Reinforcing a transparent and proportionate charging system will also help deliver the Government’s wider fiscal priorities by attracting and retaining private investment. By giving investors certainty that network costs are predictable and fairly allocated, the Bill can ensure that private operators continue to play a central role in funding innovation and expanding passenger capacity across the UK.”

Lumo and Hull Trains recommend:

“The updated charging regime must be developed in consultation with private stakeholders, appropriate for the markets being served and regulated with independent oversight from the ORR. This will sustain confidence in a fair and transparent access regime and ensure that private investment continues to play a central role in delivering a successful railway.”

Amendment 83 would prevent GBR from charging any sum it liked without notice. Instead, it would be required to follow the standard pricing structure set out in clause 64(2), based on actual costs incurred as a result of the activity. Does the Minister agree that any serious business case for private investment in our railways will need to have the certainty of fixed costs? How does the clause achieve anything other than the opposite?

Amendment 82 would remove the right of GBR to charge its competitors costs, basically at any time and without notice, on grounds that they have access to more money that they could pay. Instead, it would impose a duty on GBR to give other operators a minimum of 12 months’ notice of changes to the charging scheme, so at least they can react to the change and seek any appeal before the event rather than after it.

Speaking to amendments 82 and 83, the Rail Forum has said:

“We strongly support these amendment, access and other charges should be reasonable and operators should have sufficient warning of changes to be able to plan accordingly.”

The amendments are not just a nice idea being suggested from the Opposition Benches, but something that the industry would like to see as well.

Amendment 84 would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways can take any step to implement any part of the charging scheme until it has been laid before Parliament for three months. Once again, that would put accountability and transparency back into the system—something the Government seem hellbent on ignoring.

The second impact would be to allow affected organisations time to prepare an appeal. Judicial review requires a very short application process of just 12 weeks. This amended clause would help aggrieved parties to prepare a complex challenge in time for a JR timetable. Amendment 84 is more a probing one, so it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. The reflection on the judicial review process is particularly important, because we do not want to crowd people out of the opportunity to appeal. Anything he can offer in response would be appreciated.

Amendment 230 would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions—a case of natural justice. Does the Minister accept that the existing wording of the clause would allow GBR to profit from a cancellation of services caused by GBR’s failure to provide infra-structure? If so, will he explain how that could be a fair result?

Amendment 242 would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains that are planned to use GBR infrastructure, but do not operate or do not operate in full. Again, that is in effect a probing amendment, or a making-a-point amendment, as it were. With that, I shall sit down.