Railways Bill (Seventh sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the hon. Member for his apology, if that is what that was; it is accepted. My argument for integration between rail and all modes of transport, although I will use ferries as a particular example, is important. The Minister is also the Maritime Minister, and is well aware of the specific issues that my constituency faces.

The two amendments seek to deliver integration through strategy. If we think back to the evidence given to this Committee last week by the future Prime Minister who is currently apprenticing as the Mayor of Greater Manchester, he said that integration is essential—and he would know, being in charge of a combined mayoral authority. We are due to get a combined authority for Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, and the amendments can be viewed as mirroring the strategic responsibilities put on combined mayors, who have responsibility for travel and the interoperability of transport connections in their areas.

What the amendments—and particularly amendment 137 —seek to do is ensure that the Minister and the Government also have the responsibility to ensure co-operation. That is explicit in amendment 137, which calls for

“co-operation with relevant local and regional transport authorities”.

The amendments would end situations such as, for example, the one where, if I was to travel home on the 3.30 train from Waterloo down to Portsmouth Harbour station, the train would arrive five minutes after the ferry had departed. I imagine those are frustrations across pretty much every constituency in the land between trains and other forms of transport. If that situation is not addressed in the explicit way set out by the two amendments, it will continue to be a significant problem that will never get dealt with. Giving more attention and powers through the Bill will help to deliver improvements even for modes of transport, such as Isle of Wight ferries, that are not regulated by the Government and where they do not have explicit and express powers.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

The Transport Act 1981, which privatised British Rail’s ferry operations, including the Sea Link service to the Isle of Wight, contained no passenger interest provisions of the type contained in this Bill. Does the hon. Member agree that such an omission was an oversight and an historical missed opportunity?

[Joe Robertson]

I do. It is not difficult for me to agree and accept that the way Wightlink, which was part of British Rail, was dealt with was more than a missed opportunity; it was a bad decision. Locally, I work cross-party with the hon. Gentleman’s colleague, the hon. Member for Isle of Wight West (Mr Quigley) on that.

This Government have an opportunity. I thank the Minister for the work he is doing and I hope he will be prepared to intervene in a way no Government have done. There are clearly opportunities to make small improvements to the Bill, and accepting the amendments would do that not just in my constituency, but in others. I will leave the Minister with a question: if he does not support the amendments, how else might he use powers in the Bill, or would he be prepared to introduce amendments of his own, to improve connectivity for other modes of transport that do not have any formal regulation?

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[Rebecca Smith]

I believe that the Mayor of London’s transport strategy is already considered within the wording of the Bill. I did not draft the Bill; it is not my Bill. I am just highlighting those areas. Ultimately, many of those areas may well be further down the road towards becoming mayoral authorities. I am talking about the areas that are not even on that path. We know that certain counties outside London are doing so, but ultimately the point the hon. Gentleman is making is a valid one. However, I do not believe that it means we should not have the amendment that we are putting forward, because it would give strategic authorities the ability to communicate with the Mayor of London and with GBR. That is an additional layer of engagement and ensuring that those voices are heard. I do not see how that would be contrary to what is going on in London.

I will briefly speak to the new clauses and then bring my comments to a close. It is worth looking at the rolling stock leasing framework, and I was interested in the comments made by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage about pursuing a leasing framework. At the end of the day, let us be real: the Government and the country at this point in time are not in a position simply to buy new rolling stock just because GBR comes into ownership. Forgive me if I am wrong—I am not an expert on this—but ultimately there will be some requirement to continue leasing. As much as it would be great to have brand-new trains that all look identical and all do the same thing, realistically we are just not in that position.

That leads me to one point that has come up in some of the evidence sessions I have sat in, which is accessibility. I know that a lot is being done to ensure that accessibility is central to the Bill and that people who need access to trains are considered. The hon. Member for Hyndburn raised this issue specifically for those outside the disabled community, including people of particular ages who have mobility needs. We heard from Lord Hendy that it could actually be decades before we see an improvement to accessibility because of the rolling stock. I believe that the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham would give due regard to putting some system in place to ensure that that those accessibility improvements are looked at strategically and on a rolling basis—so to speak. I believe that the amendments add something, given the argument for accessibility.

We have talked a lot about supply chain manufacturing, which amendment 36 is about. I appreciate the comments of the hon. Member for Derby South. Ultimately, we need to ensure that a long-term strategy is in place for our manufacturing sector. I have already mentioned the defence sector; we have a huge requirement for our advanced manufacturing at the moment and we need that certainty. We have seen the role that private sector investment plays in the development of rolling stock. That is not to say that the private sector is better than the public sector—I happen to believe that they are both important in the right proportions—but we have had so much investment from the private sector while the railway has been privatised. To just walk away from that on an ideological basis does not seem right.

[Laurence Turner]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Rebecca Smith]

Bear with me one second. Ensuring that manufacturing process in the long term will be important. I will give way to the hon. Member, who is much more learned on this matter than me.

[Laurence Turner]

Much of the investment that has been channelled through the private sector since privatisation has in fact been underwritten by the state, and by Government guarantees. I will not put her on the spot to list specific examples but it would be helpful if Opposition Members could give examples of an at-risk capital investment that would actually be endangered by this Bill. I do not believe that such examples exist.

[Rebecca Smith]

The Committee heard from some representatives of the private sector. Lord Hendy has also highlighted that Hitachi—I believe it was—has made multi-million-pound investments that the Government were very happy to accept. It may well be that that is backed up by Government, but that was welcomed by the Prime Minister, so to say that we do not want private investment seems a bit churlish—ultimately, it has been accepted by the Government in its entirety.

The new clauses in this group are pushing the accountability piece: the reporting back, to make sure that the Great British public has the opportunity to see what Great British Railways is delivering and whether it is holding itself to account in the right way. I do not understand why the Government do not seem to think that the new clauses are a good idea. If Great British Railways will be so wonderful, would it not be great if the British people can see what it actually achieves and hold it to account? Marking one’s own homework is never good, and being able to hold GBR to account in all its forms will be essential.

Railways Bill (Sixth sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

New clause 39, tabled in my name, would set out Great British Railways’ financial duties. Its purpose is to provide focus for GBR on its long-term need to stand on its own commercially. A degree of state support is inevitable, and I take the point made by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage that to remove state funding for the railways is highly unlikely, but it is nevertheless an aspiration, and we should work towards it through efficiency and revenue growth. I accept that a degree of state support is inevitable, but the aim must be to minimise the need for the taxpayer.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but we have to consider the new clauses before us as drafted. Does he accept that almost no railways in the world run without subsidy on a net basis and that, where they do, there are unique geographical circumstances? The railways in Great Britain have operated with subsidies under all models since the early 1950s, and the effect of the hon. Gentleman’s new clauses, if they were to be implemented as written, would be Beeching on steroids.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I agreed with the hon. Gentleman until that last sentence, because new clause 40, which I will come to in a moment, would require not the removal of subsidy but looking towards it—it is aspirational. It would set GBR’s sights on minimising its costs to the taxpayer, not through penny pinching if that would be the wrong decision, but through growth in its revenue by becoming efficient and doing more for less. Those are all good incentives that a private business inevitably has because of the challenge of competition.

New clause 39 would require Great British Railways to focus on other opportunities for funding and on minimising operational costs, just like any other business. The areas of focus under subsection (7) are the revenue opportunities.

New clause 40, on non-reliance on taxpayer funding, would make the direction of travel for GBR clearer. It may be—in fact it is almost certain—that it will never achieve it, but it is a noble objective. It should be clear that GBR should aspire to reduce the need for the taxpayer to support the rail sector by making it as efficient and attractive to passengers as possible, thereby attracting more passengers and freight on to the railways. That would create a virtuous circle, rather than the opposite. We should start thinking about that, which is what new clause 40 is intended to achieve.

New clause 41, also tabled in my name, would require Great British Railways to publish an annual statement of its financial performance. The new clause builds on the theme, forcing Great British Railways to focus on its financial performance and reduce its reliance on the taxpayer. It may be the skimmed-milk version of new clause 40 that the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield might find more palatable.

It is important that we do everything we can to design into a nationalised structure, where there is no competitive tension, incentives for GBR naturally to seek to achieve efficiency and productivity enhancements. There is a very real need for that, because the taxpayer’s pound can only be spent once, and funds are needed in many areas of Government. Apart from anything else, we need to reduce the tax burden, which this Government have raised to the highest on record, so anything we can do to build a structure that incentivises GBR to reduce its dependence on the taxpayer is a good thing. It also forces public accountability.

Finally, new clause 44 would require the Secretary of State to give GBR an annual savings target. Taking all the new clauses together, the intention is to allow GBR to focus on providing genuine value for money for the taxpayer, not just in abstract terms, and to cut away some of the existing inefficiencies in the infrastructure commissioning and decommissioning process, to provide a longer period of certainty for the supply chain so that it can pass on the resultant efficiencies to the taxpayer. That money can be either reinvested in accelerated infrastructure roll-out, rather like the ability of ScotRail electrification to do more for less, or—heaven forbid—used to produce tax cuts for the hard-pressed taxpayer. I hope the Minister will be bowled over by those suggestions, and look forward to hearing his response.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is an honour to speak with you in the Chair, Mr Western. I will touch on three of the new clauses—one at greater length than the others—to follow up on the words of my hon. Friend.

For me, new clause 39 highlights something that is clearly missing from the Bill: what actually happens when these currently franchised, privately run rail services come into public ownership across the board. Over many years, unions have fought hard for terms and conditions for staff and railway companies, but these are not uniform across the board. There is a huge differential in the terms and conditions that staff are subject to.

I pay huge tribute to the men and women who work on the railway; they are a brilliant group of people. I am obviously on a train every week, coming up and down from my constituency. However, it is really important that we have this conversation about what the Bill will actually mean. As my hon. Friend pointed out, value for money is mentioned only once in the Bill. We are, in effect, writing a blank check for GBR to spend whatever it wants on bringing all these staff into its employment.

We were told very clearly when the Committee began that this is not a civil service; it is the public sector, so there is a difference there, but it is effectively a private body as well. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments about how staff are being brought across—obviously some franchises have been brought into Government control already—and about the Department’s plans going forward, because time and again, we see pay going up for public sector workers without that necessarily reflecting any changes in performance.

[Laurence Turner]

The 1992 White Paper that preceded the Railways Act 1993 said that, at the time, British Rail had the second highest workforce productivity of any railway in Europe. What does the hon. Member think went wrong in all the years under privatisation that followed?

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[Keir Mather]

When it comes to setting up the operational structure of GBR, including questions about workforce and staffing, it is fair to say that no piece of railway legislation for 113 years has specified in statute what the operational decisions will be. Those conversations are ongoing, as they have been while rail companies have been taken into public ownership through DfT Operator, and they are always held, I am pleased to say, in close consultation with the workforce and trade unions.

On the overall principle of cost, I would point out to the right hon. Member that the Department’s view is that establishing GBR is set to cost £200 million to £400 million overall—which is 1% to 2% of a single year of operating budget—but could unlock up to a billion pounds-worth of efficiencies across the rail sector. Value for money is not only baked into the legal duties under this legislation, but is part of GBR’s operational ethos.

[Laurence Turner]

I again draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that I am a member of Unite the union. Does the Minister agree that changes to terms and conditions, if they happen at all, often take place on a very long-term transitionary basis? Indeed, that is my understanding of what happened the last time that the railways came under public ownership, when many people remained under pre-1948 terms and conditions for several decades. I would not wish to make assumptions or pre-judge future discussions, but can he confirm that nothing in the Bill would prevent similar transition arrangements in future?

[Keir Mather]

As my hon. Friend rightly highlights, questions about the operational structure of GBR have been left outside the framework of this Bill. That is precisely to allow those conversations to continue and so that the legislation can be fit for the creation of a railway system that works for the long term.

I thank hon. Members for their contributions, but would encourage them not to press their amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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[Keir Mather]

That is a very important point. While the hon. Member points to a system that is simple in the objectives that it sets out for the railway overall, I see one that provides sufficient breadth to allow the organisation to develop over time and offer a system of operation that is closer to the communities it seeks to represent—and which, most importantly, is agile in adapting to changing socioeconomic circumstances and technological innovation.

The need for objectives that are not overly prescriptive, and the place for KPIs being in the business plan, allows a holistic approach to setting objectives for the railway, which can guide work overall for a national organisation, offering a single uniting mind, while at the same time not fettering GBR’s ability to evolve as an organisation in future.

In that sense, I believe we desire the same outcome: to make sure that the railway operates in the most effective way possible. In the light of the measures in the Bill that I have outlined, I hope that the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 125 would require GBR to include in its business plan information about how it will minimise costs to the taxpayer, while amendment 127 would require the ORR to advise the Secretary of State on this. I agree that it is important for GBR to deliver in the most efficient way that it can. That is why GBR, the ORR and the Secretary of State—all the people involved in the railway, and in the business plan—are all subject to a cost and efficiency duty, which is applied by clause 18. That will ensure that GBR aims to be cost-efficient at all times, which aligns with the intent of amendment 125.

Adding additional requirements for GBR in this space could create perverse incentives. For example, a focus on minimising costs, without other checks and balances, could drive GBR to cancel unprofitable lines even if they are important to local communities because doing so will save money. Clearly, it would not be appropriate for GBR to neglect connectivity in those important rural regions. GBR will also be robustly scrutinised from a value-for-money perspective by the ORR, and the Secretary of State will need to consider the ORR’s advice before approving GBR’s business plan. I hope that is enough to assure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that the Bill can deliver the outcome he seeks without amendment, while allowing GBR the autonomy necessary to plan in the way it sees as most appropriate.

Finally, amendment 128 seeks to limit the information that GBR could redact from its approved business plan. I agree that GBR’s activity must be transparent, and that will be an important part of how we hold GBR to account. That is why the Bill already requires GBR to publish its business plans. The Bill provides for slightly more discretion for GBR to redact sections of the business plan than amendment 128 proposes. That is because it is important that all types of sensitive data, not just the commercially sensitive, are able to be protected. Personal data, security-sensitive information about stations or anything legally privileged are all examples of content that may need redaction from the final plan. A flexible requirement can be better used to navigate these nuances. However, let me be clear that GBR’s public law duties and wider accountabilities framework will ensure that GBR will not be able to hide information that is important and relevant to public scrutiny.

In the light of these considerations, I ask the hon. Member not to press the amendments.

[Laurence Turner]

On amendments 125 and 127, I have full sympathy with the ambition of reducing costs to the taxpayer wherever possible. However, the word “minimise” is important here, because a natural reading would be to bring that cost to a minimum.

Each Government have recognised that there is a balance to be struck between the charges raised against the taxpayer, fare payers and other users of the railway. We heard evidence from Richard Bowker, the former chief executive of the Strategic Rail Authority, who has contributed what is sometimes known as Bowker’s law—there are only two sources of income to a railways: passengers and taxpayers.

I fear that if these amendments were incorporated into the Bill, the natural outcome would be that fares would rise, as indeed may charges levied upon freight users of the railway. For that reason, I hope they are not supported.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Mr Western, you get what you measure. We on this side of the Committee are very keen that we measure the level of involvement for the taxpayer and that we do our best to look after the taxpayer in the design of this structure, so I intend to press all the amendments.

Railways Bill (Fifth sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

I had not forgotten the shadow Minister’s request for me to provide specific examples. In a sense, though, I do not believe that it would be wise to do so. I do not think that the purpose of this Committee is to speculate about what GBR may or may not do in future; it is important that we develop a suite of measures that create the accountability that is required.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Keir Mather]

I will give way one final time, and then I really do want to make some progress.

[Laurence Turner]

I will not test the wisdom of speculating about future legal circumstances, but is it not the case that when Railtrack was in a state of advanced collapse, that particular case did end up in court?

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[Jerome Mayhew]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. When one’s children come and ask for something, the wise answer is always to ask first, “What did your mother say?” If we were able to apply that common sense to this situation, I would not be so concerned. What we have instead is stakeholder management culture seeping into the core aspects of GBR functions.

[Laurence Turner]

Will the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that progress has been made on the cultural issues and the micro-management that he describes? I note in passing that he dates that culture from 2012 onwards, which was, of course, entirely under the Government of which he was part. In the Transport Committee, we heard that until the election, Network Rail had to seek Treasury permission to do as much as put up a passenger footbridge. Is it not welcome that that has now come to an end?

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is certainly welcome, but we are still in the position in which an improvement to a line—something as small as the Haughley junction improvement, which costs roughly £15 million to £20 million—still needs ministerial sign-off from the Treasury before it can be authorised. The Government have some way to go to improve the situation.

This will leave us with a stakeholder management culture. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon is entirely right that many organisations in the 60% of the railway that is not being nationalised as part of GBR will be intimately and hugely impacted by GBR’s decisions—or will they? Will they, too, have to wait for the all clear from the Department for Transport? If GBR gets on the wrong side of Ministers or the Department, its course is going to be corrected to all manner of different ports.

The combination of clauses 7 and 9 removes almost any semblance of operational independence from GBR. Clause 9(5) states that GBR

“must have regard to guidance given under this section.”

That sounds soft, but in practice it creates a standing expectation of compliance and makes it impossible for GBR to make dynamic tactical decisions that are free from day-to-day second guessing by departmental and ministerial intervention.

That brings me to amendments 19 and 21, which would help defend the operational independence of GBR. If the Secretary of State is concerned about an aspect of GBR’s performance, they may instead issue guidance to inform GBR of its failure to meet the key performance indicators. Additionally, under clause 10, the Secretary of State may give guidance only if

“Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator…and…Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”

As a result, the amendments would apply to GBR in both England and Scotland.

Finally, amendment 20 repeats the argument made about directions or guidance given by the Secretary of State on the general level and structure of fares, and it would introduce new subsection (5A), which states:

“If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.”

That is self-evidently sensible, and I look forward to the Minister agreeing with me.

Railways Bill (Fourth sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec. I wish to speak to new clause 15. In doing so, I must ask the Minister for his assistance with either a medical or a political problem—I am not entirely sure which it is, because I cannot get a GP appointment in Didcot as we do not have a GP surgery on Great Western Park, but that is an issue for another time. In the absence of a GP appointment, I really hope that the Minister will be able to save me from sullying my reputation. In speaking to this new clause, I find myself at risk of having to say something positive about the Thatcher Government, which is obviously somewhat politically embarrassing.

New clause 15 proposes adding a rolling programme of electrification to the Bill. The reason that I may need to say something nice about the Thatcher Government is that according to figures that I have looked at, nearly 3,000 km of railway was electrified under that Government during the 1980s, to which the just 170 km electrified under the 1997 to 2010 Labour Government compares very unfavourably. That perhaps comes as quite a surprise, given that there was significant economic growth during that later period, at least compared with today—[Interruption.]

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I think we just heard an Opposition Member ask, “What were they doing?” in respect of the 1997 to 2010 Government. The answer, of course, is that capital investment had to be directed to safety in the aftermath of Hatfield and other disasters. When we look at where exactly that money was spent, it was on the safety improvements necessitated by some of the disasters caused by privatisation. I am a strong supporter of electrification, as I know the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage is, but I thought it was important to place that on record.

[Olly Glover]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I will say two things in response. First, I hope that his Government and the Minister will support the new clause, because, given the strong state of railway safety today, there should not be the same limits on electrification expenditure that he suggests. Secondly, the problem with his point is that very few electrification schemes were authorised between 1997 and 2000, the period before the Hatfield rail disaster, which led to the period of safety recovery that he quite rightly highlighted.

The direction that the Government are taking is a big concern. They have yet again cancelled the midland main line electrification, a scheme that would have happened 40 years ago in any other European country. Our stop-start progress on electrification compares very unfavourably with other countries in Europe. Germany has delivered a steady 200 km a year, or thereabouts, on average for many decades, and in so doing delivers significantly lower unit costs than our boom and bust approach to electrification. It is not just Germany. We often hear excuses about how electrification is too difficult for us because of our limited gauge clearance or our scenery, but that does not explain the fact that the entire Swiss rail network is electrified, including railways in UNESCO world heritage sites and more than 3,000 metres above sea level.

With the exception of the trans-Pennine route upgrade and a couple of other very small schemes, nothing is committed at the moment. That is a real shame, because the benefits of electrification are significant. I feel that we have perhaps lost our way in this country. We have become very focused on electrification as a means of decarbonising our railways, but that is a small part of the enormous benefits of electrification. Electrification delivers more reliable, lighter trains that have far less impact on the track and are also cheaper, because pure electric multiple units are the standard off-the-shelf product across the European rolling stock market. What wouldn’t any other sector—whether it is shipping, which I know the Minister has a keen interest in, aviation or the car industry—give for the ability to provide constant electrical power to get the amazing power-to-weight ratio that electrification delivers?

We constantly talk about the lack of freight on our rail network. A big part of that is that rail freight tends to be diesel hauled, which has far worse acceleration and consumes far more track capacity. On a recent journey across Germany and other parts of Europe, I did not see a single diesel-hauled freight train; they were all electric. That enables so much more to be squeezed on to the network, and would support private sector investment. For example, GB Railfreight has invested in a fleet of locomotives that can haul both diesel and electric. Having visited its Peterborough headquarters a few months ago, I know that it would like to run under electricity far more than it is currently able to because of our electrification rate. We are in a very poor state, and not just compared with western European countries; Poland and India have significantly higher percentages of electrified railways than we do. At the moment, I see no hope of that changing.

Our new clause 15, requiring a rolling programme of electrification, would also significantly reduce unit costs, because the supply chain would get used to doing it, we would become experienced at structures clearance, and so on. That is not my opinion; that is what Sir Andrew Haines, former chief executive of Network Rail and now chair of DfT Operator, said before the Transport Committee.

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[Jerome Mayhew]

The official Opposition, strongly support this amendment because it seeks to increase passenger traffic on the railways, in addition to the welcomed inclusion of an objective to increase freight. We agree with it so strongly because it is almost identical to our amendment 35, which I shall also speak to. Amendment 35 would add a specific requirement to subsection (2) paragraph (b) of clause 18—the duties clause—for GBR Ministers and the Office of Rail and Road,

“to increase the number of passenger journeys”.

This directly addresses the concern raised by the Campaign for Better Transport in the evidence received by the Committee. It is an essential amendment to ensure that GBR has a key focus and aim to increase passenger numbers—something that is essential for a railway. It would ensure that the dominant culture of GBR is not one where passengers are seen as creators of damage to infrastructure.

That is not a loose accusation that I have made; I have been listening to the industry for over a year now. The core structure of GBR is Network Rail. I know that I am bound to be corrected if I get this even a couple out, but I believe that Network Rail has about 41,000 members of staff. Network Rail is the central body to which train operating companies have been added at a rate of about one every six weeks or two months over the last period. An oft-repeated criticism of the culture of Network Rail has been that it sees passengers as a necessary irritation in the correct functioning of the railway. Sir Alec, if your organisation is engineer focused, the condition of the infrastructure is what is most important to you. Passengers demand lots and lots of trains, but lots and lots of trains damage the infrastructure. There is a concern in the wider sector— I am merely passing it on—that the culture of Network Rail has historically been one in which it wants to limit the number of trains to what it considers to be acceptable, so that it has a nice steady state of repair of the infrastructure. If that is the dominant culture that pervades GBR, now that it is bringing everything together, that will be a disaster for passenger services, because there would not be an automatic incentive to focus on an increase in passenger journeys, which is why amendments 133 and 35 are so important.

New clause 42—to go into the detail a little—would require the Secretary of State to set, publish and keep under review a passenger growth target. It would also require GBR to have regard to that target when exercising its statutory functions. In oral evidence to this Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, said:

“It is welcome that there is a duty to promote the interests of passengers and disabled people in the Bill. We think there is a case for strengthening that duty so that it aligns with the duty in relation to freight, which is to promote the use of the network for passengers and disabled passengers. There should also be an equivalent duty on the Secretary of State to set a passenger growth target, as she is required to do in relation to freight, so that, as we picked up on a minute ago, GBR does not end up being incentivised not to grow the network in order to meet its crowding and reliability duties, for example. It seems to us that giving it a statutory incentive to increase passenger use over time would be very helpful to build on the existing duty in the Bill.”––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 24, Q49.]

That organisation was not alone, because John Thomas from ALLRAIL said:

“I think a passenger growth target is really important. At the moment, the duties for GBR only include improving performance. You can improve performance, as we saw during covid, by cutting the number of services, but that is not necessarily in the best interest of customers. We think a balance between a performance target and a passenger growth target is really important.”––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 47, Q78.]

Finally, we heard from Rob Morris of Siemens. He said:

“What we seem to be missing in the Bill at the moment is the ambition for passenger growth, how that will improve the railway and the levels of investment that need to go with it.”––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 64, Q122.]

It is unclear to me why, if the Bill can require a target to increase use of the railway network for freight, the same obligation is not applied to passenger services. The inconsistency suggests a deliberate choice not to mandate passenger growth. And why would GBR care about passenger growth? After all, if it will be dominated by Network Rail, there is at least a risk that its culture will be one of avoiding damage to infrastructure, in excess of looking after growing the number of passengers.

In written evidence to the Transport Committee, Rail Forum said:

“From Rail Forum’s perspective there is nothing specific in the Bill that will guarantee improved travel for passengers. Improvement is predicated on the goodwill of GBR and others driving things in the ‘right direction’. In our view the key to improvement is culture change within those organisations coming together to form GBR. Creating GBR from Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd…will not signal the need for change and creates a risk that the current Network Rail culture will be seen as the norm and hence the status quo will prevail.”

These are not arguments made up by a cunning Opposition to wrongfoot the Government. This is the Opposition doing our job properly and reflecting the concerns of the wider sector—not just from one organisation but from multiple organisations, right across the sector. They identify the drafting as a problem and the culture as potentially a problem unless the legislation makes it clear that it is a duty of GBR to increase passenger numbers.

[Laurence Turner]

As in this morning’s sitting, I draw attention to the fact that I am a member of Unite. I did not intend to speak in this particular debate, but I wish to respond briefly to some of the things that have been said and to mount a perhaps limited defence of Network Rail and the importance of engineering in such organisations. The comparator, of course, was Railtrack, which outsourced its engineering functions, had only a single engineer on its board of directors and had only one non-executive director from an engineering background, with deadly consequences, which are well understood and do not need repeating. If there is sometimes caution in the organisation, I suggest that the long shadow cast by the events of the late 1990s and early 2000s is why.

There is good and sound logic behind not running too many trains across congested track. The real reason why we do not run as many trains as is theoretically possible is that lack of capacity on the network. Birmingham New Street, for example, will be exhausted once the Camp Hill services start in the spring—any more services simply cannot be safely got in or out on the network. When path allocators have to make decisions on which services to prioritise, freight tends to be squeezed out. That is a long-standing problem.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is right partially to defend Network Rail. It is an issue of balance and of the culture going forward. He also talked about capacity—this is not a party political point—but that is determined by not just the number of trains, but the length of trains, which makes an enormous difference. Just increasing carriage numbers—in particular on the Northern rail network where the majority of trains are just two carriages—by a couple of extra carriages does not require significantly increased capacity on the line, but it does increase capacity enormously for passengers. That would allow a target for increased passenger numbers to be fulfilled, without an increase in line capacity.

[Laurence Turner]

I thank the shadow Minister for the constructive spirit of his intervention. Indeed, in the days of cross-party consensus on High Speed 2, I worked with members of his party exactly to address some of the capacity challenges on the network. I just say to him that the two are linked. As he was alluding to, the length of the trains is related to the signalling blocks and the safe distance between trains, so that they can be run together. If he is right, we should be looking to put on more carriages. When waiting for a CrossCountry train, I can certainly remember the collective groan on the platform when another short formation appeared. There is a hard limit, however, to what can be applied without providing more caps on the network. That is where the passenger versus freight dilemma comes in, because sometimes hard choices just have to be made. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point that this is not always either/or, but sometimes it is. Sometimes one has to be prioritised over the other, and freight has historically been the loser.

[Olly Glover]

I am trying not to make too many interventions or to be tedious, but I cannot resist the temptation of that. Where the choice is either/or, does that not suggest that that particular route line requires an upgrade to provide sufficient capacity for both?

[Laurence Turner]

The hon. Gentleman and I are members of the same Select Committee and we tend to agree on most things, and I think that I agree with him again. In the here and now, however, and in the circumstances in which the Bill will start to apply, I share the fear that if the freight growth target is accompanied by an equivalent passenger growth target, in effect the freight growth target is neutralised; it is no longer the essential correction to the tendencies that have sometimes seen freight services being squeezed off the network. I say to the shadow Minister that the previous Government put in place a freight growth target and not a passenger one at the same time, presumably for exactly the same reason: at times when the two are in tension, freight can suffer the detriment. I thought it was important to put that concern on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

My hon. Friend makes a very interesting point. One of the stand-out moments from Tuesday’s oral evidence was that given by the mayors, Andy Burnham and Tracy Brabin. What it highlighted, apart from their articulate defence of their regions’ interests, was how different things will be, under the current proposals, in mayoral combined authorities: there will be the right to ask or be consulted on the devolution of aspects of rail to those authorities. That is great as far as it goes—they said that it did not go far enough, but it goes some distance in that direction.

However, what if an area is not a mayoral combined authority? I believe that is the point that my hon. Friend is making: without the direct relationship that the Government are anticipating for mayoral combined authorities, at the expense of other parts of the country, the “purpose” clause becomes more important. That is another reason why paragraphs (e) and (f) and others are helpful.

Many Members and constituents across the country were enthused by the restoring your railway fund and the new stations fund, which have unfortunately now been scrapped by this Government. They were set up in the last Parliament and led to a renaissance of interest in local railway investment and a focus on modernising working practices and innovating to improve productivity, efficiency and passenger experience.

Working practices are not really spoken about in the Bill as it is currently drafted. This is not a new start-up—we have to be quite clear about that: it is building a new organisation out of some very old organisations, including Network Rail. The aim of modernisation is to do more for less. That is a good thing because it means that there is more money left over for further investment in improving infrastructure and improving or increasing passenger services and more left in the kitty to reduce subsidies—the taxpayer support—and by extension reduce the tax burden on our hard-pressed constituents. Doing more for less by modernising working practices and innovating to improve productivity efficiency is an unalloyed good. It should be very important and at the heart of any organisation—yet the Bill is silent on it.

Although I can hear the subtext, but the new clause is not intended to be a union-bashing measure. It is intended to make a dynamic organisation that has its passengers—its users—at the heart of its interests and that there is a focus on ensuring that GBR continues to have growth as part of its objectives. That aligns with the Government’s decision to put growth at the heart of their mission.

[Laurence Turner]

The hon. Member particularly mentioned workforce productivity.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Not only.

[Laurence Turner]

Okay, perhaps we will come back to that. However, the hon. Member also mentioned the restoring the your railway fund, which he talked about as a success. When the last Conservative Rail Minister, Huw Merriman, appeared before the Transport Committee he said, of that programme, that

“The challenge was that a lot of people had their expectations dashed. A lot of business cases were, “Let’s move it to this stage so we can keep the dream alive.” That just wastes money and expertise because you know that scheme is not going to get a return. I have mixed feelings on it as a result.”

Does the hon. Gentleman share some sympathy with that perspective?

[Jerome Mayhew]

Yes, I do, but then democracy is really messy, isn’t it? If we listen to passengers and our constituents, we hear all sorts of desires that may not be sufficiently persuasive to obtain Government funding, but the process of asking people for their views should not be shied away from. It sounds as though, in the experience of our former colleague Huw Merriman, some rather weak political decisions—or decisions of expediency—were taken. That does not mean that we should move away from the democratic process; we should listen to people. I do not say that the restoring your railway fund was a failure, because we listened and we heard.

I will pick up on the other point because I was sitting down when I barracked the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield: modernisation is not just about working practice. I want to make that really clear: modernising is about productivity enhancement of at-times-sclerotic organisations. I am a former entrepreneur. I ran a business for well over a decade on a much smaller scale than this. At the end, I employed about 1,000 people; I took it from start-up to about that stage.

Even a fast-growth, highly entrepreneurial and—in the views of other people—highly dynamic business such as the one that I was lucky enough to lead had all sorts of internal inconsistencies and inefficiencies, and needed to focus relentlessly on improving working processes and practices. That was right at the sharp end of the private sector. If it was true for my organisation then, think how true it is for a very large organisation such as Network Rail, which has 40,000-plus staff, and will be much bigger still when it becomes Great British Railways.

Paragraph (h) of new clause 1 states the need to improve and consider

“the experience of disabled and vulnerable passengers”.

Key terminus stations have good systems in place but that could be expanded with investment such as in the cross-party Access for All fund, which did huge work to improve disabled access in stations.

Paragraphs (i) and (j) are on a key theme that we have explored throughout our consideration of the Bill: open access and freight. They would ensure

“fair and transparent treatment of open access, freight and devolved operators”

At times it feels like we speak too much about open access in relation to this Bill. If we look at the capacity—the number of passengers covered by open access operators—we see that in percentage terms it is very small.

[Laurence Turner]

Two per cent.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I was going to say 1.5%, but maybe it is 2%. Let us call it approximately 2%; I leave rail freight in a separate category. But open access operators have a disproportionate impact on driving competitive challenge.

One of the very significant concerns of the sector, which I share, is that if the very dominant GBR is created and the operator and open access operators are not supported, even though they represent just 2% of passenger transit what will be lost is the competitive comparator for what good operating processes and customer-focused activities for train operations look like. It is disproportionately important that GBR should be held to account practically by the operations of open access operators, so such operators must receive fair and transparent treatment. That is what paragraphs (i) and (j) set out. They would ensure that the system is transparent where we believe that the legislation as drafted is currently vague.

Paragraph (j) enshrines the growth freight targets that we all agree on and that the Government have outlined. Paragraph (k) states the need to strengthen

“the financial sustainability of the railways”

to reduce reliance on subsidy. That should be an objective, and a purpose, of GBR. The taxpayer has lots of things that his or her money needs to be spent on. If we can reduce, over time, the need for subsidy on the railways, that money is freed up either for tax cuts, which make everyone richer, or to be spent on other important priorities of Government.

Meanwhile, paragraphs (l) and (m) speak to another key aim—integration, both of track and train, and of the mayors, with their local transport integration beyond rail, which are important to have. The lack of explicit inclusion in the Bill feels like an oversight that we are more than happy to shed light on for the Government.

Sir Alec, you will be pleased to know that that is it as far as new clause 1 is concerned, but I do have new clause 2 to entertain you with, which is about key performance indicators. The Government have been asked multiple times over the last few months to provide, even in draft, the KPIs that they intend Great British Rail to operate under. This clause is a first attempt to fill the gap that the Government have left by refusing time and again even to discuss what the KPIs will be, other than to say, using their go-to phrase, that they will be “robust”. What does that mean? We do not know.

The new clause would set a statutory key performance indicator framework, which must include targets for a number of areas, such as reliability, safety, cleanliness, affordability, passenger growth, financial efficiency, freight and others. It is necessary because of the failure of the Government. I would be delighted to withdraw it if the Minister were to stand up and say, “These are the KPIs that the Government have in mind—let’s debate them.”

At the moment, we have draft legislation in front of us—we are a scrutinising Committee and we are here for a month to go line-by-line through the Bill to improve it and understand how GBR will be operated—and yet we have no idea what the Government are even thinking on KPIs, which are a central set of objectives. This new clause seeks not to bind GBR or the Secretary of State to rigid targets, but instead to provide an overall remit for where the Secretary of State and GBR must report within.

Accountability is at the core of public trust in nationally run services, and setting targets in statute ensures there is a positive feedback loop for officials—very importantly—and GBR agents to work against. It helps frame discussions and engagement between the Departments and GBR, and allows a number of different datasets and parameters to be considered. The new clause would also require the Secretary of State to publish these indicators and lay them before Parliament.

The KPIs work as a strong starting position by which GBR can judge itself, and how it in turn can be judged by passengers and the public. Again, the Opposition are having to do the Government’s work for them. We should not be in that position. The Government should have brought forward this Bill with the accompanying documentation, which, as we have heard, is missing— 19 important documents and counting.

Finally, I turn to new clause 5. You will be pleased to hear that it is much shorter, Sir Alec. The new clause would give reporting requirements to GBR, continuing the theme of accountability, which new clauses 1 and 2 also have at their core. The layout of the new clause is self-explanatory. Subsections (2) and (3) link to new clause 2 on key performance indicators, and the clause would enhance accountability further, not just by having targets in place, but by having a clear reporting criterion.

In the same way that a Secretary of State is expected to appear in front of Parliament on a rotating basis in urgent questions, in Committees and through written ministerial questions, it is reasonable to expect that GBR should publish an annual report in which it reports on the targets set by the Secretary of State. Given the eminently sensible and logical outcome of the new clauses, I urge the Government to consider seriously on what basis it would not want to create greater transparency.

Railways Bill (Third sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices off or to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings—but I hope you have plenty of water. We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate.

A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first; other Members are then free to indicate their wish to speak in that debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during proceedings. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call again the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendments in the group, which includes grouped new clauses, that will be at the Chair’s discretion.

My fellow Chairs and I shall use our discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses, following the debates on relevant amendments. I hope that that explanation is helpful, but you may seek advice when we are not sitting.

Clause 1

Great British Railways

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 257, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—

“(2) A body corporate may be designated under this section only if—

(a) it is limited by shares, and

(b) it is wholly owned by the Crown.

(3) Regulations under subsection (1)—

(a) must specify the time from which the designation has effect, and

(b) must be published by the Secretary of State as soon as reasonably practicable.

(4) The designation of a body corporate terminates—

(a) if the body corporate ceases to be wholly owned by the Crown, or

(b) if the Secretary of State revokes the designation.

(5) Any notice of revocation under subsection (4)(b)—

(a) must specify the time from which the revocation has effect, and

(b) must be published by the Secretary of State as soon as reasonably practicable after the notice is given.

(6) For the purposes of this section a body corporate is wholly owned by the Crown if each share in the body corporate is held by—

(a) a Minister of the Crown,

(b) a company which is wholly owned by the Crown, or

(c) a nominee of a person falling within paragraph (a) or (b).

(7) Great British Railways is exempt from the requirements of the Companies Act 2006 relating to the use of ‘limited’ as part of its name.

(8) In this section—

‘company’ means a company registered under the Companies Act 2006;

‘Minister of the Crown’ has the same meaning as in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 (see section 8(1) of that Act).”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 24—Great British Railways Board—

“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a Board to review decisions taken in respect of Great British Railways (‘the Board’).

(2) The Secretary of State must appoint to the Board persons who are employees of, or otherwise represent—

(a) Great British Railways,

(b) open access passenger operators,

(c) freight operators,

(d) The Office for Rail and Road,

(e) The Passengers’ Council, and

(f) an organisation or campaign group representing passengers with accessibility requirements.

(3) The Board must comprise at least six members and no more than half of its membership may be employed by, or otherwise represent, Great British Railways.

(4) Great British Railways must determine the frequency of board meetings in any year.

(5) Any—

(a) decision by the Secretary of State concerning, or

(b) direction given by the Secretary of State to,

Great British Railways must be notified to the Board prior to the making of the decision or issuing of the direction, and such decision or direction may only be made if a majority of the Board approves of it being made.

(6) The Board must publish any decision or direction it considers, and whether it has approved any such decision or direction.

(7) Where the Board has not approved a decision taken by, or direction given by, the Secretary of State to Great British Railways—

(a) the Board must notify the Secretary of State that it has not approved the decision or direction, and its reasons for not doing so;

(b) the Secretary of State may proceed to make any such direction or decision provided that, in their opinion, it is necessary to do so.

(8) Where subsection (7)(b) applies, the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out reasons for proceeding with the direction or decision.”

This new clause would require the creation of a GBR Board, constituted of relevant internal and external stakeholders and regulatory bodies, which the Secretary of State would have to consult on major decisions and changes.

New clause 38—Ministerial statements on functioning of Great British Railways—

“(1) Once every three months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must make a written ministerial statement in each House of Parliament summarising progress towards Great British Railways becoming fully operational.

(2) Should any day on which the Secretary of State must make a written statement be on a day when either House of Parliament is not sitting, the Secretary of State must publish a statement in similar terms.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament quarterly on progress in establishing Great British Railways.

[Laurence Turner]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. At the outset, I wish to declare that I am a member of Unite.

It is a privilege to speak at the start of these proceedings. I do so as a believer in public ownership of the railways not as an end, but as the best means of realising greater economies for taxpayers and improvements for all those who rely on the railways for livelihood and leisure. I am conscious that the Committee has much work ahead of it, so I will keep my explanation of the amendment brief.

Public ownership is the ballast of the Bill, but its clauses make only limited reference to ownership, although the drafting logic for that may be good—the Bill must, after all, be read alongside the previous enabling legislation passed by Parliament, the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 and the now much amended Railways Act 1993. In 2024, Parliament’s decision and intent were clear: passenger services are to come under public ownership as franchises expire. I must admit, however, that I start our proceedings under the shadow of a doubt. On my reading, there is a risk that the requirements of public ownership that sit outside this Bill may be time-bound, designed for the specific circumstances of transition, and dependent on definitions in statutory instruments that are themselves at risk of amendment or repeal without full parliamentary scrutiny.

I freely acknowledge that some members of the Committee may take a different view of the merits of the ownership question, and I am sure that we will have good and respectful debate on the Bill’s provisions in the weeks ahead, but surely we can all agree on one point: such an important decision as public or private ownership should be taken only through primary legislation. To put it another way, were a future Government to seek to return to a privatised model, they should be obliged to seek majority consent in the full House. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve.

The amendment would require Great British Railways to be a wholly and nationally owned public sector entity. Indeed, it would cease to be GBR if it were sold in whole or in part. The amendment would also, I think, prevent a future Secretary of State from taking the extremely perverse step of removing GBR’s designation as a public sector body and transferring it to a private or semi-private entity.

If the wording of the amendment seems familiar to hon. Members, it will be because they have been paying close attention to other legislation. Clause 1 of the Bill is effectively identical to section 1(1) of the Great British Energy Act 2025. The amendment is a near carbon copy—I am sorry to all members of the Committee, but we are only at the start of our descent; I cannot promise that the puns will improve as we go on—of the subsections that follow in section 1 of that Act. I note that in the equivalent Committee debate for that Act, the sponsoring Minister, the hon. Member for Rutherglen (Michael Shanks), said:

“The clause protects the principle of public ownership by making explicit that the company would terminate if it ceased to be wholly owned by the Crown.”––[Official Report, Great British Energy Public Bill Committee, 10 October 2024; c. 91.]

I accept that we are seeking to build on a complex body of legislation; the railways are the accumulation of two centuries of history, and so are the laws that govern them. If—I emphasise that word—a drafting issue has been identified, we also need to identify the right solution for this specific legislation. I am grateful to the Minister in the Commons and to the Minister of State, the noble Lord Hendy, for their thoughtful conversations on this matter. I am also grateful to the officials who have worked hard to prepare this commendable Bill. My motivation in tabling the amendment is to establish beyond doubt that the Bill will achieve its aim: that Great British Railways will be run by and for the nation. If we can assure ourselves of that, I believe that this legislation will set out a permanent way for reform. I will listen carefully when the Minister responds.

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

It is very nice to have you in the Chair, Mrs Hobhouse. I think this a conversation among Labour Members, and I do not want to get in the way of a private dispute. I might just sit down and listen to what the Minister has to say.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Thank you.

We have this generational change in the organisation of the railways; the Government, with their majority, have taken a political decision to nationalise the sector. We know that nationalisation of the railways has been tried before. They were nationalised in 1950 or 1951—

[Laurence Turner]

It was 1948.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right. From 1950, we had the high point of post-war passenger numbers on the railways—about 1 billion passengers. From that period of nationalisation, the number of passengers choosing—I use that word advisedly—to use the railways started a long and seemingly unstoppable decline. It went from 1 billion in the early 1950s all the way down to about 735 million in the period of privatisation—1993. It seemed like that was due to the public changing the way in which they chose to live their lives. The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Nottingham South, suggested from her seat on Second Reading that it was obvious that people did not want to use the train so much, even during a period of increasing population, because they were increasingly affluent and they bought more cars. That is a possible explanation.

But then something very odd happened. In 1993, the then Conservative Government legislated to privatise the railways. Now, we can debate—and I am sure we will multiple times over the coming days—whether that was a good or a bad thing in principle and whether the way the privatisation was done, through the Railways Act 1993, and subsequently amended was perfect or whether it could have been improved upon, but if we consider that the primary objective of a railway—leaving freight to one side for a moment—is to carry passengers, the data shows that the privatisation of the railways in the United Kingdom was an unqualified success. The seemingly inevitable decline in passenger numbers changed direction immediately. It was not just a slow bottoming out; that long-term decline immediately turned in the other direction, and then continued to grow until covid meant that all bets were off from 2019. Those numbers did not just grow to recover all the lost work of the previous 40 years—they did not go back up to 1 billion customers; they increased to 1.75 billion. That was a period of increased affluence, when the number of cars available to passengers increased enormously. The only explanation for the absolute reversal in passenger numbers is the decisions taken through privatisation—the profit motive and the incentive to focus on passengers rather than on the organisation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

May I draw the hon. Member’s attention to the fact that so far I have not made a single rail pun in the course of this debate—and I intend to keep it that way?

The hon. Member made a really important point about both parliamentary accountability and the general public being able to understand more about how GBR works and what it constitutes. Throughout the establishment of GBR, there are concurrent process that will allow the Secretary to State to outline more properly the long-term future of the railway and GBR’s role in it, including the long-term rail strategy, as well as work that we are already advancing on the accessibility road map and the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy.

Existing parliamentary structures in our Westminster democracy provide ample room for us to hold Government Ministers and the Secretary of State to account on the establishment of GBR. We have oral questions for Transport, as well as the ability to ask urgent questions on GBR’s establishment. Through both Lord Hendy in the other place and Ministers in this House, we have a real ambition to explain GBR’s provisions and ways of working to the general public, because we are confident in its ability to revolutionise how the railway runs on behalf of passengers, but I take the hon. Lady’s point.

Establishing GBR is the primary purpose of the Bill, and clause 1 provides the Secretary of State with the power, by regulations, to designate a body corporate as GBR. The clause enables wider provisions in the Bill relating to GBR to apply to a body corporate, such as the statutory functions and general duties set out in it. Following Royal Assent, a company will be designated as GBR, and it will consolidate Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd, DfT Operator, train operators and parts of the Rail Delivery Group into one organisation to ensure that GBR can be mobilised as quickly as is practicable.

The clause is essential for the Government to deliver our manifesto commitment to reform the railways by establishing GBR as the directing mind, bringing track and train together. I commend clause 1 to the Committee.

[Laurence Turner]

I must start by slightly disagreeing with the Minister on his approach to railway puns. The shadow Minister referred to the discussion on amendment 257 as a dispute; I reassure him that this is not a case of pistons at dawn—[Laughter.] It is going to get so much worse. Before I come to the Minister’s substantive response, I will briefly respond to a few other comments that have been made in the debate.

The shadow Minister spoke about changes in passenger numbers over the years, which is a good illustration of why it is important to look across a whole time series, and to bear in mind the old maxim that correlation is not causation. After all, passenger numbers were already falling by the time that we got to vesting day in 1948. The railways were exhausted after years of war—indeed, passenger numbers halved between 1920 and 1947. In fact, the actual nadir in passenger numbers was not in the early 1990s but in 1983. I thought that Opposition Members might have wanted to take pride in the successful sectorisation experiment under the Thatcher Government, perhaps aided by some benign neglect from that Administration, which was sadly not repeated by the subsequent Major Administration.

We have some good explanations for why exactly passenger numbers rose so dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s. For a long time, I think we could have all substituted our political explanations for why that happened. However, in 2018, a very good study, led by eminent modellers and academics, was published by the Independent Transport Commission on precisely that question. It found that passenger growth was overwhelmingly driven by changes in the job market—the types of roles being created and the areas of the country in which they were being created. It was also aided by changes to tax incentives for company cars in the early 2000s, which led to an additional increase in rail traffic.

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. For my constituents, in the period since the railways were privatised they have twice needed to be brought back under public ownership: once in 2003, when Connex failed, and again in 2021, when Southeastern failed. However, on both occasions, there was no impact on passenger numbers; rather, the factors that my hon. Friend is describing correlated and led to those passenger numbers. Does he agree that over the last 30 years, whether the service has been under national or private ownership has had no impact on the passenger numbers on trains in my constituency?

[Laurence Turner]

I absolutely agree, and we could point to other examples where franchises being taken in-house under previous Governments led to a service improvement. The Opposition’s problem has always been that public ownership works in practice but not in their theory.

I am heartened by what the Minister had to say on my amendment. This is not an issue of dispute; this is sensible scrutiny. I welcome the commitment the Minister made to take the issue away. I recognise that this Committee is probably not the place to resolve this detailed and technical consideration. I am encouraged by his comments and on the basis that we may return to this matter at a later stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Crown status etc

[Keir Mather]

I beg to move amendment 164, in clause 2, page 2, line 3, at end insert—

“(5A) This section is not to be read as preventing the exercise of functions by Great British Railways on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers under arrangements made by the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers.”

This amendment clarifies that the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers may enter into agency agreements for the performance of functions on their behalf. For example, this may be required to assist with winding up of ongoing franchises, as they transition to GBR.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

In which case, I will speak first to amendment 2, as that is first in the grouping, and then proceed to the others.

Amendment 2 would make explicit the duty of Great British Railways to promote a thriving, competitive retail market, and align the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system in which competition drives better outcomes for passengers. The retail market in the UK is currently one of thriving competition, as we can all recognise, and shows UK tech at its best. Trainline is—I think I am right in saying—a FTSE 250 company, and a tech growth story for the United Kingdom, being Europe’s leading train and coach app. The amendment is therefore key to ensuring that the landscape continues to thrive and that we do not drive Trainline and its competitors out of the country.

Members will remember that in written evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline asked that Committee

“to recommend that the Bill be amended to require structural separation of GBR online retail from the rest of the GBR organisation and to publish information that enables the ORR, CMA and other regulators to assess compliance with competition law, subsidy control rules and non-discrimination duties. This should not be left to the Code of Practice alone”—

and, by the way, we have not seen the code of practice.

Trainline also said:

“We ask that the Committee recommend that the Bill include a statutory duty that all retail market participants—including GBR online retail—are treated fairly, equally and non-discriminatorily, and that GBR online retail be subject to the same Code of Practice as all other retailers…We ask the Committee to recommend that these economic parity safeguards, including structural separation of GBR’s online retail business, be written into the legislation and the forthcoming Code of Practice…We therefore ask that the Committee recommends…An explicit ORR power to impose binding orders or financial sanctions if GBR breaches its licence or the Code. ORR’s competition duty should explicitly apply in respect of these functions and GBR’s licence…Provision for an appeal body (for example the CMA or the Competition Appeal Tribunal) to hear merits of disputes…The Code development process must be led by ORR, independent of DfT and GBR. It must ensure full stakeholder consultation, clear timetable, transparent publication of decisions and mechanisms for future amendment.”

Members may say, “Well, they’ve got skin in the game, haven’t they? They’re a commercial organisation trying to compete with the future GBR, so it will be in their interest to try to fix the corporate structure in a way that gives them an unfair advantage.” But if we look at what Trainline is asking for, we see it is not seeking to gain an unfair advantage. It is merely asking GBR to create a level playing field. Trainline is not the only organisation making that argument; it is joined by others.

[Laurence Turner]

The hon. Gentleman said a few moments ago that Trainline and other online retailers are not seeking to make ill use of their market position, but the Advertising Standards Authority has ordered Trainline to amend its adverts, and the ORR ordered it to amend its practice of not showing booking fees at the start of the booking process. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline accepted that its market share was significantly above the 25% test that the Competition and Markets Authority applies for a potential monopoly position. Does that concern the hon. Gentleman at all?

[Jerome Mayhew]

That demonstrates that the current system is working to hold Trainline to account, and that where there are abuses—if what the hon. Gentleman outlined amounted to abuses—effective systems are in position and they have been corrected.

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention did not speak to the overriding point: what do the Government want when they are applying this new structure to retail? Do they want a level playing field? Is that their intention, or do they want a systemically biased system in which GBR retail is given an unfair advantage over independent competition? Both answers are credible—it is possible for the Government to form one decision—but they should not pay lip service to a level playing field but, in design, achieve the opposite, which appears to be the case at the moment.

In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, essentially agreed with Trainline’s position. He said:

“We think that because the independent retail market has produced significant benefits for customers in the time that it has been in existence. It is heavily used by rail passengers. The critical question in relation to the Bill, and the other mechanisms that will be in place once the Bill has been passed, is how we ensure that there is genuine fair and open competition between GBR ticket retailing and the independent retailers currently or potentially in the market.”

This is a key point: the Government need to stop and think about what their intention is. If it is to have a fair market, the evidence, and all the feedback they are getting from the sector, is that they have not yet achieved that objective. They need to put their money where their mouth is and decide what their objective is. I hope the Minister will be clear in his response as to the Government’s thinking on that.

A second concern is that the sector is nervous about the apparent lack of hierarchy and detail in the functions. GBR is assigned multiple duties under the clause, but with no hierarchy, so it paves the way for potential confusion—or, worse, it gives GBR the ability to pick and choose which function it thinks is important in relation to any decision. It can quietly demote the importance of others so that it can serve itself and thereby reduce the power of the clause.

Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said in oral evidence to the Transport Committee:

“To lead from your further question: with the very broad powers for the Secretary of State and a certain lack of specificity on what will happen, what we are looking for is more key performance indicators, like in business. I realise it is a governmental entity, but the quantitative KPIs are not really there.”

I would go further than that: they are not there at all.

As well as amendment 2, which I have spoken to, we have also tabled new clause 3, which sets out GBR retail requirements. As I have said previously, this is a critical issue given the evidence that the Select Committee received, and the oral evidence that we heard on Tuesday, that the Government have built a structural conflict of interest into the Bill as currently drafted.

We also heard on Tuesday about international examples where a similar concern has been addressed in a different manner. SNCF is a state-owned railway in France that has unification of track and train. It also has a retail function, through which is competes with the wider market. SNCF, or, I presume, the French Government—I do not want to claim greater in-depth knowledge that I actually possess—have taken the decision to have a structural separation between SNCF retail and SNCF operations, the equivalent to GBR. The very obvious reason why they did that was for fairness and to have a level playing field. We are not talking about SNCF, but an improvement on the current position, which I fully accept is not perfect.

Railways Bill (Second sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Argar]

Q Gentlemen, do you have anything to add?

Steve Montgomery: I do not think we have much more to add, other than that, given the way the Bill is written at the moment, how can you be comfortable with what is in the Bill when you cannot see what is in the licence conditions that are going to be set out? As it stands, clause 63 at the moment can override everything. We would need to see how, when you word the Bill in a certain way, and then the licence, we can get more comfortable with it when they write it up in the access conditions.

John Thomas: The licence is a bit of a worry for me, because of all the indications, as we have been discussing, of ORR’s weakened powers. For example, it will not be able to enforce business performance in future. It will be able to advise the Secretary of State, who can then decide whether to take enforcement action or whatever action she deems necessary. That is a far cry from the current licence, which is a much stronger Network Rail network licence. We have not seen it yet, so we cannot really comment, but all the indications are that it would be a much weaker licence for GBR than under Network Rail.

As Maggie said, there has been good communication with DFT and Network Rail on the access and use policy, for example, but what are the checks and balances on GBR to create something that is fair and non-discriminatory? As one example, the charging framework is really good. It is based on the current framework of cost directly incurred plus a mark-up; it says—this is a point of detail—that if the operator can bear it, it needs to revert back to whether the market can bear it. On the whole, the provisions are good, but there are different ways of calculating charges even based on those principles. My worry is this: what is the incentive on GBR not to increase charges to price people off the network in order to support its own services? As long as there is good engagement and GBR, in the future, and Network Rail and DFT now, listen to us, that is all we can do at this point in time.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

Q As I did in this morning’s session, I draw attention to the fact that I am a member of Unite. I have a few short questions, primarily to Ms Simpson to start with. We heard from some of our witnesses in this morning’s panels that they would like to see a passenger growth target in the Bill on an equivalent basis to the freight growth target. I am interested in your reaction to that proposal.

Maggie Simpson: It is not my business to talk about the passenger railway. We see two things as important in having a freight growth target: first, it is a statement of Government commitment to growth, which is hugely powerful; secondly, and importantly, the people who are going to be running GBR are going to spring out of bed every morning and say, “It’s my job to make my trains run on time,” and the freight growth target makes them say, over their Weetabix, “Yes, and I must make freight run on time as well.” It is the incentive effect of having a growth target.

We have seen that effect really powerfully with the freight growth target that the Scottish Government and Whitehall have set, in that it changes the dynamic and the culture. I think—perhaps you would say I am biased— that people think about the passenger railway all the time, so I do not see that that incentive effect is as necessary—but in terms of other factors, I leave that to others.

John Thomas: May I add to that? I think a passenger growth target is really important. At the moment, the duties for GBR only include improving performance. You can improve performance, as we saw during covid, by cutting the number of services, but that is not necessarily in the best interest of customers. We think a balance between a performance target and a passenger growth target is really important.

[Laurence Turner]

Q Returning to freight, I understand there is a problem at the moment with the ORR refusing longer-term applications, which presumably has a dampening effect on investment—at least, I would assume so. Do you think there is least the potential under GBR to take a longer-term view, and hopefully to reflect that in longer-term access agreements?

Maggie Simpson: There are two parts to that question. Certainly, the provisions in the Bill allow for a core contract to be longer, because it removes the cap in law today. For that contract to be meaningful, though, it needs to have some committed capacity in it, because there is no point having a contract to run if you have no paths. That comes back to the access and use policy, the capacity commitments and how they will work out through those capacity plans. We simply do not have the detail on that yet to know whether we will be able to get meaningful, long-term capacity commitments. That is an open point.

[Laurence Turner]

Q I turn to clause 64 on the charging scheme. Subsection (4) allows GBR to levy lower charges for the purpose of introducing new services, including for the carriage of goods. How would your members like to see that power applied?

Maggie Simpson: We very much welcome that clause; it is a broadening of the provision in the current law, which is quite tightly worded. There are some areas where we think it could be particularly powerful, such as incentivising a greater uptick in use of electric traction, where those units exist, and making sure that people are using them wherever they can. We have just seen the first fleet of digitally enabled wagons arrive in service. That is something that can help to reduce track damage, but it is expensive, so helping the introduction of more digital technology would be another area.

We are looking at novel markets for rail freight—moving new fuels, for example, and supporting green energy. Often, it is quite difficult to get new flows up and running in new markets, so incentivising growth through the uptick of those sectors would be another area.

[Laurence Turner]

I have one final question, if there is time.

[The Chair]

Very quickly, please.

[Laurence Turner]

Q I will make it very quick. Mr Montgomery, I saw a document that rail partners published a few years ago called “Working together for a better railway”, which suggested that the ideal mix of passenger contracts would be concessions for commuter services and franchising—I do not think it used the word “franchising”, but maybe something similar—for longer-term services. Is that your personal point of view?

Steve Montgomery: Yes. We believe that the Bill does not give enough power to the Secretary of State to put out contracts and devolved parties—whether that is Greater Manchester, Liverpool, and so on—to give them out. The concession model is something that we have continued to support.

[Laurence Turner]

Q But for inter-city, something similar to franchising?

Steve Montgomery: Yes, you can put it out.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q I have a question about GBR’s licence. What can we glean from the provisions for that licence in the Railways Bill, without having seen a draft of the document?

John Thomas: It is really difficult. As I said earlier, all we can glean is that, given the reduced powers that ORR will have, it will be a slimmed-down licence; ORR will not have the power that it currently has to enforce business performance. Until we see it, we cannot really comment on it.

I am a bit surprised that we have not seen a draft of the licence yet. We have seen the access and use policy discussion document, but not a draft of the licence. It has been a long time in the making, so I am surprised that we have not seen it yet. I was told that we might not see it for some time. It is a key part of the overall framework, so until we see it, we cannot really comment on that framework. We are having to—we are having to comment on the Bill—but until we see the licence it is difficult to determine what our position will be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Francis]

Q I hear the merits of having different retailers, but where you have one operator—as we see in London with the TfL Go app—do you see benefits in having all the accessibility information in one place, because that operator is able to collate it and pull it together?

John Davies: I think it is a bit like there being one central seat reservation system that every train operator uses. Every customer who books a ticket, via whichever operator, accesses the same seat reservation system—there is one definitive record. The same could be true of passenger assistance bookings.

Rail Delivery Group, or its successor, which will be part of the retail industry and management function in the future, could have a system—a definitive record—of all availability of assisted services on offer in the industry. That could be accessed by any retailer, so that customers can book assistance as they need it, for stations or on board trains, and the staff at those stations and on those trains know who to expect and the kind of assistance that is needed. It would all be aggregated in one place, but drawn upon by as many retailers as needed.

[Laurence Turner]

Q In Trainline’s written evidence—possibly to the Transport Committee rather than this one, or possibly to both—there is a reference to a view that there might be some particularly sensitive data within GBR that Trainline believes should be firewalled off from any ticketing function. I think the suggestion is that there may be some operational information to which GBR’s ticketing function should not be given privileged access. I was wondering whether you could expand on that point and explain what types of information we are talking about. John Davies: What we are advocating for is that whatever flows of data or information are necessary for, say, a GBR online retail function to do the work of helping customers engage with the rail industry—to book tickets, to travel and to do all those things—all those sources of information should be made available equally, at the same level and without discrimination, to whoever has a legitimate cause to use them.

One of the things that becomes problematic is this. Thinking about something like the centralised seat reservation system, which is a piece of industry architecture, we are currently able to draw on it at a very granular level. We take a very base level of data and are able to use it in different ways, as are other retailers, to design good customer experiences. For example, a 28-day view of the availability of cheap fares for any given journey is not that straightforward if you are only able to access information that has previously been filtered—let us say by a future GBR—which has decided that all you are going to have available are five single and return journeys for the date on which you have made the inquiry.

[Laurence Turner]

Q So the concern is about potentially losing access to some data flows that currently exist.

John Davies: Potentially. There are already moves within the industry to restrict those data flows. Again, if it goes to the point that this is not entirely a theoretical risk, then yes, we would—

[Laurence Turner]

Q Does that data flow come through Rail Settlement Plan at the moment?

John Davies: It does not. It comes from the Rail Delivery Group, through its provision of RAAS, which is the rail availability and reservation service.

[Laurence Turner]

Q Finally, I will continue a line of questioning from the Transport Committee. As you know, we had an exchange about executive remuneration; in the subsequent written evidence that Trainline provided, it referred the Committee to the annual reports of published information. It also said that that salary or package was set in comparison with similar, comparable companies. Are you able to provide that information and name which companies you are talking about?

John Davies: No I am not, because the benchmarking is done by Trainline’s board, consistent with the processes that it has published.

[Laurence Turner]

So that is privileged information.

John Davies: It is certainly information that I do not have access to.

[The Chair]

Thank you. As there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We move to the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Bill Reeve and Peter McDonald gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Olly Glover]

Q You have both been very clear, and so has Lord Hendy, that a key intention of the Bill and the creation of GBR is to better integrate infrastructure and train operation. If that is the case, why has funding for passenger services been excluded from the periodic review process of GBR’s infrastructure costs? Does separating those funding streams undermine the goal of a truly integrated railway?

Keir Mather: That is a really important point. I hope that you feel that the human side of the equation, in terms of furthering the interests of passengers through the duties, is embedded in clause 18, but I take your point about the funding envelope, and the way that passenger services are funded via the spending review period set by the Secretary of State, as opposed to infrastructure more broadly. The reason for that in the immediate term is that the procurement and delivery of passenger services is a far more complex and changeable process to work through than the delivery of long-term infrastructure, or other functions that sit under GBR.

In the future, we can certainly get into a debate about whether passenger services should be funded in a similar way to other aspects of GBR’s operation, but for the moment, and after GBR is stood up, which let us remember is in quite short order after the passage of the Bill, in around 12 months’ time, the Secretary of State needs to be able to determine that passenger services offer value for money. It is therefore right that she retains more control over the funding envelope for those services at that stage. We can certainly take the debate on how that should change in the future forward as part of this Committee. I would be very keen to explore it further.

[Laurence Turner]

Q I must say, I think I must have been listening to a different set of evidence today than the shadow Minister, but there we are.

I want to raise devolution, and specifically clause 5. There is a lot of history to the clause, and a line of continuity with the old section 20 of Barbara Castle’s Transport Act 1968. A lot of great things were accomplished under that legislation, including the creation of a cross-city line in Birmingham, but then privatisation came along. There was an attempt to do something similar under section 13 of the Railways Act 2005, which frankly did not work; there was never a single agreement signed. What lessons have been learned about what went right in the past and what went wrong with the 2005 legislation, when it comes to clause 5 of the Bill?

Keir Mather: I suppose that, in the 2005 Act, section 13 was not only really narrow in scope, in that it covered only franchised services, but represented a significant watering down of relationships between the rail industry and passenger transport executives. The difference with clause 5 of the Bill is that it is significantly wider in scope, to ensure that partnerships under GBR cover the full rail offer, rather than focusing only on services.

There is an important point around corporate structure. It is right that the corporate structure is not laid out in the Bill—no piece of rail legislation in 113 years has done that—but what has come out quite consistently in the testimony of the mayors, and in the broader points made around devolution, is that, whether it be on the MCA basis or on the local authority basis more generally, people want GBR’s structure to be flat, and responsive to dynamic changes both in demographics around housing and your ability to get to Everton stadium when the rugby league is on, which is of personal interest to me.

I think the point is very well made, and it is certainly taken by me as the Minister, that democratic accountability means that the operational reality of GBR should be diffuse wherever possible. People do not want to see a replication of a centralised model of the past.

[Laurence Turner]

Q Picking up on a point that was made by witnesses on our devolution panel, the geography of, say, West Midlands Rail Executive does not overlap entirely with the geography of the combined authority. Similarly, there might be a case for reaching a clause 5 agreement with more than one mayoral authority at the same time. Does the clause as drafted allow the flexibility to reach an agreement directly with, say, West Midlands Rail Executive, or a combined agreement with the East Midlands combined county authority covering the cross-country service?

Keir Mather: I think we have been really clear, and the provisions in the Bill support this, that GBR needs to be organised locally so that it can work really collaboratively with local leaders, and it is through the business units that it has to devolve that responsibility to as close to decision-makers as possible. MCAs are the right level, in terms of being a catalyst for economic and housing growth, but you are right that the challenges around rail infrastructure and service provision, even though the solution to a lot of them may be set by MCAs, are inherently cross-border. I would expect GBR to be able to fulfil a role in facilitating the ironing out of those differences, for the good of everyone, on a cross-border basis.

[Edward Argar]

Q One of these questions will hopefully allow for a yes-or-no answer; the other might be just a date. First, we have heard a lot from witnesses about how much is in the Bill, but also how much is not, and how it is reliant on the building blocks. Will the Minister commit to publish a draft of the licence before the Bill leaves the Commons so that it can be considered by MPs?

Keir Mather: Yes.

Northern Powerhouse Rail

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Heidi Alexander]

One of the things we have to achieve through Northern Powerhouse Rail is making sure that young people growing up in towns and smaller cities around the big conurbations can easily access the high-quality jobs in places such as Leeds, Manchester and Newcastle. I assure my hon. Friend that this Government’s approach is about investing in skills, investing in transport and investing in opportunities for the future.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

A little more than two years have passed since the last Prime Minister chaotically took the axe to HS2 north and east of Birmingham, and the mayor at the time, Andy Street, failed the test of leadership and failed to stand up for our region. There is an obvious link between the east-west connections the Secretary of State has been talking about, and the south to north connections along the west coast main line. Will she and her Ministers meet and engage with west midlands MPs about the capacity issue she has set out, and can we not lose sight of the importance of the west midlands to east midlands connection, which is as slow as the connections in the north?

[Heidi Alexander]

I would be very happy to meet my hon. Friend and other Members to discuss this matter further. I would also like to pay tribute to Mayor Richard Parker for working collaboratively with us in the west midlands, alongside Claire Ward in the east midlands, to make sure that we can improve not only inter-city connections, but the connections within big cities that are so important.

Railways Bill

Laurence Turner Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

And now we turn, at last, to a fundamental question which has perhaps gone unasked in this House for too long: what is the mass and acceleration of an average-sized peacock? The question does not spring from the pages of a script for “The Goon Show” or “Monty Python”. It is a real case that came before the rail industry’s Delay Attribution Board.

A delay caused by a collision between a train and a small bird is the responsibility of a private operator, which pays the cost of compensation, but if the unfortunate bird is deemed to be large, then taxpayers are on the hook. And so it came to be that one day expensive lawyers gathered to compare calculations and precedent, and argue out whether the unfortunate peacock was more akin to a goose than a duck. Few incidents better illustrate the costly absurdities of rail privatisation.

It is worth reflecting on the fact that the cost of privatisation is borne by all taxpayers, whether they use the railway or not. The railways received nearly £700 million in subsidy in 1990-91. By 2018-19, before the pandemic impaired the industry’s finances, the net subsidy requirement had increased to £4.3 billion—an increase after inflation of some 236%; more than doubling, even after passenger journey increases had been accounted for. To this day, subsidy is lower in Northern Ireland, where the railways remained in public hands.

Everywhere, the railway’s contingent parts are divided and separated by contractual barriers. For passengers, that can mean station staff who cannot even board a train to help someone with mobility issues, because they work for different companies. There is a multiplicity of such unnecessary contractual barriers, and public money and public confidence drains through each one.

We should not expect a complete change of services on day one of operations under GBR, as there was not on the Attlee Government’s vesting day for nationalisation in 1948, but change over time it will, and for the better, including for my constituents who travel from Longbridge, Northfield and Kings Norton. The Bill is the instrument of that transformation.

Tonight’s vote is on the principle of establishing Great British Railways. In the weeks ahead, there will be time for detailed line-by-line scrutiny, to which I look forward to contributing, including through the Transport Committee. But for tonight, I just want to say that there can be no doubt that this is the right policy and the right Bill. It has been a privilege to have had the occasional view of the development of this area of transport policy down the years. I look forward to voting for it tonight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

This has been a very popular debate with a lot of contributions; I congratulate all those who managed to make their points in just three minutes. I will do my best to summarise the debate, starting by noting the excellent contributions from Opposition Members.

My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson) brilliantly managed to discuss a Railways Bill by referring to ferries, but he did make the serious point that we want pragmatism, not ideology, to reform the railways. My hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Immingham (Martin Vickers) made the good point that, through nationalisation, the taxpayer now has to replace private investment.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) made three important points: that the reforms simply advance the sprawling centralisation of powers; that, again, they involve practicality giving way to ideology; and that their drafting puts open access concessions at risk.

My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), who is a member of the Transport Committee, was concerned that this was ideological time travel that takes us back to the 1970s. My hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) said that, post nationalisation, cancellations of South Western trains had increased on his Chertsey-Addlestone loop.

There were also many thoughtful contributions from the Liberal Democrats. It is telling that the Government’s insistence on nationalisation as the only answer has united the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. It is worth noting that we have heard nothing from Members of the fag packet party, who, I think, still support nationalisation. Then again, however, they would not recognise a transport policy if it slapped them in the face.

Then there was Labour, with speech after speech welcoming the nationalisation of the railways—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] Bring it on. In speech after speech, they showed deep suspicion of the profit motive. The tone was set by the Transport Secretary, who said that the current system benefits companies over passenger services—as though the two things are mutually exclusive—and taken up by the hon. Members for Wrexham (Andrew Ranger), for Stockport (Navendu Mishra) and for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey), with claims of profit prioritised over customer experience, large-scale profiteering on the railways and dividends prioritised over people. I could go on.

This is the authentic voice of Labour: the private sector is not good—not good in the way that the state is good. The private sector invests to make a return, not to create unionised jobs. It innovates to make a return, not to satisfy a Government productivity goal. It innovates to beat the competition and make a return, not to satisfy a ministerial target. However, it does invest, it does innovate and it does improve to compete. Nevertheless, Labour clings on to its ideological faith in the efficiency of the state, despite all the evidence to the contrary—and there is evidence. After all, we have tried this experiment before.

[Laurence Turner]

When the hon. Member for Orpington (Gareth Bacon) was the shadow Transport Secretary, he was recorded saying that his party would likely not reverse nationalisation because the public would be unlikely to think it was a good idea. If this Bill passes, will it be the policy of the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham (Jerome Mayhew) to privatise the railways all over again?

[Jerome Mayhew]

Let us wait to see if Labour actually nationalises it first; but the Conservatives are here to lead, not to follow.

There is plenty of evidence because we have tried the nationalisation experiment before. The railways were nationalised in 1948. [Interruption.] If Labour Members listen, they might learn something. When the railways were nationalised in 1948, there were a billion passenger journeys a year. Thereafter, the impact of nationalisation was immediate: year after year, fewer customers chose to use the trains; year after year, they voted with their feet because the service did not give them what they wanted and was not focused on them and their needs. There was low investment because the railways were competing with schools and hospitals, followed by poor industrial relations with an organisation more focused on itself than its customers—[Interruption.] The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Nottingham South (Lilian Greenwood), says from a sedentary position that it was because there were more cars—let us just hold that in our minds.

By the 1990s, just 735 million passenger journeys were taking place a year, instead of a billion. In 1993, the system was privatised by the Conservative Government. The unions hated it, and Labour therefore hated it, too. However, every year, more and more passengers were attracted to use the trains—not just a few more, but vastly more. By 2019, 1.75 billion people were using the railways each year—and there were many more cars. Labour cannot explain it; it should not have happened, but it did.

If the purpose of the railway is to carry passengers, any rational observer must conclude that privatisation beat nationalisation hands down. Why? Profit is made only by attracting customers. Train operating companies focused on new and more trains, more services, innovative ticketing and customer service, and people voted with their feet.

The railways are a complex system where capacity is limited and costs are high. It is absolutely crucial to drive efficiency, maximise the scarce resources of track access and drive value for money with dynamic management. Can hon. Members think of a nationalised organisation that is a byword for management dynamism and efficiency anywhere, in any country at any time? I cannot either. If poor railway management is the problem, nationalisation cannot be the solution. Why is it that socialists and the fag packet party are such bad learners?

Heathrow: National Airports Review

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Heidi Alexander]

As I said in answer to a previous question, the work that the UK airspace design service will do to modernise our airspace will start with the London area. It will not be limited to the London area, but we need to make that a priority. I appreciate the case that my hon. Friend makes with respect to Bournemouth.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I draw attention to my chairship of the GMB parliamentary group. As someone who worked on this issue the last time around, I was astonished to hear the Opposition’s flight of fantasy when they accused others of delay. On their watch, the airports commission was artificially delayed until after a general election, with three more years spent producing the current NPS and a further two years tied up in the courts. Can the Secretary of State assure the House that the lessons have been learned from those eight wasted years?

[Heidi Alexander]

I totally agree with my hon. Friend. Let us be honest—it was not just eight wasted years, it was 14. I repeat what I said earlier: it comes to something that the previous Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, went to such lengths to duck these decisions that he ended up in Kabul.

Regional Transport Inequality

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Thursday 11th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I will do my best to speak at high speed, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I want to say a few words about my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham South (Lilian Greenwood): she was an outstanding Minister and the Department’s loss is the Whips Office’s gain. She will be much missed on the Transport Front Bench.

I am grateful, too, to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson) for securing this debate. She and I represent constituencies in the squeezed midlands—regions home to 10 million people that have historically been denied a fair share of funding and political attention. As has been noted already, the east midlands receives the lowest transport funding per head of any region, although the west midlands held that unhappy status until recently. The rail line between Birmingham and Nottingham is slower, mile for mile, than that between Manchester and Leeds. The west midlands has the lowest share of public transport journeys of any English region, followed by the east midlands. That fuels congestion, road safety problems and potholes.

Birmingham’s roads are a special case. We have one of the last private finance initiative contracts in the country. When originally issued, local government austerity and the high inflation of the early 2020s were not foreseen. The previous Government tried to withdraw support for the PFI contract without a clear plan, which was ruled unlawful. I know that the new Minister will be looking at that closely, and I look forward to working with him to get a fair deal for Birmingham.

Most public transport journeys are by bus and half the industry’s income now comes from public funding, yet public accountability lags behind. This summer, National Express announced major changes to the X20 and 61 routes. People in Allens Cross and parts of the New Frankley estate lost their direct connection to Birmingham, and some older residents no longer have direct bus access to the Queen Elizabeth hospital. I am grateful to the hundreds of people who signed petitions, including one that I organised. I have met National Express and Transport for West Midlands, and I hope that we can find a way forward.

Significant investment has been announced for commuter rail. I have spoken frequently in this House about rebuilding Kings Norton station as part of a midlands rail hub. In the interest of time, I will only say how grateful I am that Ministers listened; I hope that we can make progress on restoring that service’s frequency.

Finally, we must be ambitious. Birmingham Corporation Tramways once ran services to my constituency. The original 1984 vision for a revitalised metro included a loop serving Northfield, Longbridge, Frankley and Rubery. That vision was right, and I hope that we can find funding for a feasibility study for a south Birmingham extension.

Regional transport inequality hinders economic growth and denies opportunities to my constituents. I am glad that the House has had the chance to debate this issue. I think this is my stop, so I will.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I commend the hon. Gentleman for his timekeeping and the speed with which he included all that. That brings us to the Front Benchers, remembering that we would like to leave some time for the Member who introduced the debate to wind up. I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention gives me the opportunity to raise the proverbial eyebrow at his claiming credit for securing £200 million for the Thickthorn roundabout when that has been in process for many years before he was elected. As for the £50 million he mentions, I think he means the western link road, which would be a huge improvement. At the moment we have the equivalent of the M25 for Norwich, but it is missing one section of 3.9 miles. The Conservatives are squarely behind finishing it: I am surprised to hear that Labour does not support the residents of Norwich in a similar way.

I will move on to what Labour has done. It has cancelled the further improvements on the A47, particularly at the other end towards Peterborough. That is just another example of where East Anglia has been ignored by Labour. Buses are the most popular form of public transport and the most important one in areas of high deprivation. They are particularly important for poorer members of society, the young, elderly and disabled. The Conservatives recognise that—we recognise that price matters—so the last Government introduced the £2 bus fare cap, and our manifesto commitment at the last election was to maintain it throughout the course of this Parliament because we recognised how popular and useful it was in increasing bus ridership. When Labour came to power, it had a choice: it could back passengers or it could back the unions. One of its first—shameful—acts in government was to give a 15% pay rise to ASLEF train drivers, who are already the best paid in Europe, paid for by a 50% increase in bus fares for passengers around the country. That speaks to a wider truth: when it comes to it, Labour is the party of the unions and not of the people.

[Laurence Turner]

rose—

[Jerome Mayhew]

On that point, I will give way.

[Laurence Turner]

Does the shadow Minister agree with his predecessor—the last Conservative Rail Minister, Huw Merriman—who said this:

“Whilst it’s legitimate to debate the terms of the deal, the demonisation of train drivers and those onboard and at stations, who carry out a difficult and skilled job for the safety of passengers, is completely unfair. These people work hard and should be shown more respect.”?

[Jerome Mayhew]

I have no problem with the unions making demands—after all, they are representing the interests of their members. What I complain about is the Government giving way to them at the expense of the general public.

On trains, we have got the cancelled projects as well. The midland main line electrification has been cancelled, which has led to lay-offs and the loss of expertise. It is also causing problems for the procurement of new bi-mode trains, because we no longer have any certainty as to whether the line will be electrified. At Dawlish, the Conservative Government completed phases 1 to 4 of the improvements and reinforcement of the line. Phase 5 is all that remains. What have the Government done? They have kicked it into the long grass, as was mentioned by the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Martin Wrigley) for which I give him credit.

Back in East Anglia, the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) highlighted the need for the Ely junction and Haughley junction projects in Cambridgeshire and Suffolk to be advanced, yet they have been ignored by the Government.