Railways Bill (Second sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Argar]

Q Gentlemen, do you have anything to add?

Steve Montgomery: I do not think we have much more to add, other than that, given the way the Bill is written at the moment, how can you be comfortable with what is in the Bill when you cannot see what is in the licence conditions that are going to be set out? As it stands, clause 63 at the moment can override everything. We would need to see how, when you word the Bill in a certain way, and then the licence, we can get more comfortable with it when they write it up in the access conditions.

John Thomas: The licence is a bit of a worry for me, because of all the indications, as we have been discussing, of ORR’s weakened powers. For example, it will not be able to enforce business performance in future. It will be able to advise the Secretary of State, who can then decide whether to take enforcement action or whatever action she deems necessary. That is a far cry from the current licence, which is a much stronger Network Rail network licence. We have not seen it yet, so we cannot really comment, but all the indications are that it would be a much weaker licence for GBR than under Network Rail.

As Maggie said, there has been good communication with DFT and Network Rail on the access and use policy, for example, but what are the checks and balances on GBR to create something that is fair and non-discriminatory? As one example, the charging framework is really good. It is based on the current framework of cost directly incurred plus a mark-up; it says—this is a point of detail—that if the operator can bear it, it needs to revert back to whether the market can bear it. On the whole, the provisions are good, but there are different ways of calculating charges even based on those principles. My worry is this: what is the incentive on GBR not to increase charges to price people off the network in order to support its own services? As long as there is good engagement and GBR, in the future, and Network Rail and DFT now, listen to us, that is all we can do at this point in time.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

Q As I did in this morning’s session, I draw attention to the fact that I am a member of Unite. I have a few short questions, primarily to Ms Simpson to start with. We heard from some of our witnesses in this morning’s panels that they would like to see a passenger growth target in the Bill on an equivalent basis to the freight growth target. I am interested in your reaction to that proposal.

Maggie Simpson: It is not my business to talk about the passenger railway. We see two things as important in having a freight growth target: first, it is a statement of Government commitment to growth, which is hugely powerful; secondly, and importantly, the people who are going to be running GBR are going to spring out of bed every morning and say, “It’s my job to make my trains run on time,” and the freight growth target makes them say, over their Weetabix, “Yes, and I must make freight run on time as well.” It is the incentive effect of having a growth target.

We have seen that effect really powerfully with the freight growth target that the Scottish Government and Whitehall have set, in that it changes the dynamic and the culture. I think—perhaps you would say I am biased— that people think about the passenger railway all the time, so I do not see that that incentive effect is as necessary—but in terms of other factors, I leave that to others.

John Thomas: May I add to that? I think a passenger growth target is really important. At the moment, the duties for GBR only include improving performance. You can improve performance, as we saw during covid, by cutting the number of services, but that is not necessarily in the best interest of customers. We think a balance between a performance target and a passenger growth target is really important.

[Laurence Turner]

Q Returning to freight, I understand there is a problem at the moment with the ORR refusing longer-term applications, which presumably has a dampening effect on investment—at least, I would assume so. Do you think there is least the potential under GBR to take a longer-term view, and hopefully to reflect that in longer-term access agreements?

Maggie Simpson: There are two parts to that question. Certainly, the provisions in the Bill allow for a core contract to be longer, because it removes the cap in law today. For that contract to be meaningful, though, it needs to have some committed capacity in it, because there is no point having a contract to run if you have no paths. That comes back to the access and use policy, the capacity commitments and how they will work out through those capacity plans. We simply do not have the detail on that yet to know whether we will be able to get meaningful, long-term capacity commitments. That is an open point.

[Laurence Turner]

Q I turn to clause 64 on the charging scheme. Subsection (4) allows GBR to levy lower charges for the purpose of introducing new services, including for the carriage of goods. How would your members like to see that power applied?

Maggie Simpson: We very much welcome that clause; it is a broadening of the provision in the current law, which is quite tightly worded. There are some areas where we think it could be particularly powerful, such as incentivising a greater uptick in use of electric traction, where those units exist, and making sure that people are using them wherever they can. We have just seen the first fleet of digitally enabled wagons arrive in service. That is something that can help to reduce track damage, but it is expensive, so helping the introduction of more digital technology would be another area.

We are looking at novel markets for rail freight—moving new fuels, for example, and supporting green energy. Often, it is quite difficult to get new flows up and running in new markets, so incentivising growth through the uptick of those sectors would be another area.

[Laurence Turner]

I have one final question, if there is time.

[The Chair]

Very quickly, please.

[Laurence Turner]

Q I will make it very quick. Mr Montgomery, I saw a document that rail partners published a few years ago called “Working together for a better railway”, which suggested that the ideal mix of passenger contracts would be concessions for commuter services and franchising—I do not think it used the word “franchising”, but maybe something similar—for longer-term services. Is that your personal point of view?

Steve Montgomery: Yes. We believe that the Bill does not give enough power to the Secretary of State to put out contracts and devolved parties—whether that is Greater Manchester, Liverpool, and so on—to give them out. The concession model is something that we have continued to support.

[Laurence Turner]

Q But for inter-city, something similar to franchising?

Steve Montgomery: Yes, you can put it out.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q I have a question about GBR’s licence. What can we glean from the provisions for that licence in the Railways Bill, without having seen a draft of the document?

John Thomas: It is really difficult. As I said earlier, all we can glean is that, given the reduced powers that ORR will have, it will be a slimmed-down licence; ORR will not have the power that it currently has to enforce business performance. Until we see it, we cannot really comment on it.

I am a bit surprised that we have not seen a draft of the licence yet. We have seen the access and use policy discussion document, but not a draft of the licence. It has been a long time in the making, so I am surprised that we have not seen it yet. I was told that we might not see it for some time. It is a key part of the overall framework, so until we see it, we cannot really comment on that framework. We are having to—we are having to comment on the Bill—but until we see the licence it is difficult to determine what our position will be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Francis]

Q I hear the merits of having different retailers, but where you have one operator—as we see in London with the TfL Go app—do you see benefits in having all the accessibility information in one place, because that operator is able to collate it and pull it together?

John Davies: I think it is a bit like there being one central seat reservation system that every train operator uses. Every customer who books a ticket, via whichever operator, accesses the same seat reservation system—there is one definitive record. The same could be true of passenger assistance bookings.

Rail Delivery Group, or its successor, which will be part of the retail industry and management function in the future, could have a system—a definitive record—of all availability of assisted services on offer in the industry. That could be accessed by any retailer, so that customers can book assistance as they need it, for stations or on board trains, and the staff at those stations and on those trains know who to expect and the kind of assistance that is needed. It would all be aggregated in one place, but drawn upon by as many retailers as needed.

[Laurence Turner]

Q In Trainline’s written evidence—possibly to the Transport Committee rather than this one, or possibly to both—there is a reference to a view that there might be some particularly sensitive data within GBR that Trainline believes should be firewalled off from any ticketing function. I think the suggestion is that there may be some operational information to which GBR’s ticketing function should not be given privileged access. I was wondering whether you could expand on that point and explain what types of information we are talking about. John Davies: What we are advocating for is that whatever flows of data or information are necessary for, say, a GBR online retail function to do the work of helping customers engage with the rail industry—to book tickets, to travel and to do all those things—all those sources of information should be made available equally, at the same level and without discrimination, to whoever has a legitimate cause to use them.

One of the things that becomes problematic is this. Thinking about something like the centralised seat reservation system, which is a piece of industry architecture, we are currently able to draw on it at a very granular level. We take a very base level of data and are able to use it in different ways, as are other retailers, to design good customer experiences. For example, a 28-day view of the availability of cheap fares for any given journey is not that straightforward if you are only able to access information that has previously been filtered—let us say by a future GBR—which has decided that all you are going to have available are five single and return journeys for the date on which you have made the inquiry.

[Laurence Turner]

Q So the concern is about potentially losing access to some data flows that currently exist.

John Davies: Potentially. There are already moves within the industry to restrict those data flows. Again, if it goes to the point that this is not entirely a theoretical risk, then yes, we would—

[Laurence Turner]

Q Does that data flow come through Rail Settlement Plan at the moment?

John Davies: It does not. It comes from the Rail Delivery Group, through its provision of RAAS, which is the rail availability and reservation service.

[Laurence Turner]

Q Finally, I will continue a line of questioning from the Transport Committee. As you know, we had an exchange about executive remuneration; in the subsequent written evidence that Trainline provided, it referred the Committee to the annual reports of published information. It also said that that salary or package was set in comparison with similar, comparable companies. Are you able to provide that information and name which companies you are talking about?

John Davies: No I am not, because the benchmarking is done by Trainline’s board, consistent with the processes that it has published.

[Laurence Turner]

So that is privileged information.

John Davies: It is certainly information that I do not have access to.

[The Chair]

Thank you. As there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We move to the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Bill Reeve and Peter McDonald gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Olly Glover]

Q You have both been very clear, and so has Lord Hendy, that a key intention of the Bill and the creation of GBR is to better integrate infrastructure and train operation. If that is the case, why has funding for passenger services been excluded from the periodic review process of GBR’s infrastructure costs? Does separating those funding streams undermine the goal of a truly integrated railway?

Keir Mather: That is a really important point. I hope that you feel that the human side of the equation, in terms of furthering the interests of passengers through the duties, is embedded in clause 18, but I take your point about the funding envelope, and the way that passenger services are funded via the spending review period set by the Secretary of State, as opposed to infrastructure more broadly. The reason for that in the immediate term is that the procurement and delivery of passenger services is a far more complex and changeable process to work through than the delivery of long-term infrastructure, or other functions that sit under GBR.

In the future, we can certainly get into a debate about whether passenger services should be funded in a similar way to other aspects of GBR’s operation, but for the moment, and after GBR is stood up, which let us remember is in quite short order after the passage of the Bill, in around 12 months’ time, the Secretary of State needs to be able to determine that passenger services offer value for money. It is therefore right that she retains more control over the funding envelope for those services at that stage. We can certainly take the debate on how that should change in the future forward as part of this Committee. I would be very keen to explore it further.

[Laurence Turner]

Q I must say, I think I must have been listening to a different set of evidence today than the shadow Minister, but there we are.

I want to raise devolution, and specifically clause 5. There is a lot of history to the clause, and a line of continuity with the old section 20 of Barbara Castle’s Transport Act 1968. A lot of great things were accomplished under that legislation, including the creation of a cross-city line in Birmingham, but then privatisation came along. There was an attempt to do something similar under section 13 of the Railways Act 2005, which frankly did not work; there was never a single agreement signed. What lessons have been learned about what went right in the past and what went wrong with the 2005 legislation, when it comes to clause 5 of the Bill?

Keir Mather: I suppose that, in the 2005 Act, section 13 was not only really narrow in scope, in that it covered only franchised services, but represented a significant watering down of relationships between the rail industry and passenger transport executives. The difference with clause 5 of the Bill is that it is significantly wider in scope, to ensure that partnerships under GBR cover the full rail offer, rather than focusing only on services.

There is an important point around corporate structure. It is right that the corporate structure is not laid out in the Bill—no piece of rail legislation in 113 years has done that—but what has come out quite consistently in the testimony of the mayors, and in the broader points made around devolution, is that, whether it be on the MCA basis or on the local authority basis more generally, people want GBR’s structure to be flat, and responsive to dynamic changes both in demographics around housing and your ability to get to Everton stadium when the rugby league is on, which is of personal interest to me.

I think the point is very well made, and it is certainly taken by me as the Minister, that democratic accountability means that the operational reality of GBR should be diffuse wherever possible. People do not want to see a replication of a centralised model of the past.

[Laurence Turner]

Q Picking up on a point that was made by witnesses on our devolution panel, the geography of, say, West Midlands Rail Executive does not overlap entirely with the geography of the combined authority. Similarly, there might be a case for reaching a clause 5 agreement with more than one mayoral authority at the same time. Does the clause as drafted allow the flexibility to reach an agreement directly with, say, West Midlands Rail Executive, or a combined agreement with the East Midlands combined county authority covering the cross-country service?

Keir Mather: I think we have been really clear, and the provisions in the Bill support this, that GBR needs to be organised locally so that it can work really collaboratively with local leaders, and it is through the business units that it has to devolve that responsibility to as close to decision-makers as possible. MCAs are the right level, in terms of being a catalyst for economic and housing growth, but you are right that the challenges around rail infrastructure and service provision, even though the solution to a lot of them may be set by MCAs, are inherently cross-border. I would expect GBR to be able to fulfil a role in facilitating the ironing out of those differences, for the good of everyone, on a cross-border basis.

[Edward Argar]

Q One of these questions will hopefully allow for a yes-or-no answer; the other might be just a date. First, we have heard a lot from witnesses about how much is in the Bill, but also how much is not, and how it is reliant on the building blocks. Will the Minister commit to publish a draft of the licence before the Bill leaves the Commons so that it can be considered by MPs?

Keir Mather: Yes.