Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Banner Excerpts

Friday 19th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Banner (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Bill, largely for the reasons so eloquently articulated by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London and my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis of Banbury, whose own personal, harrowing experience—following her diagnosis of cancer, and feeling a burden on her family despite all the advantages in life she is lucky to have—speaks volumes to the pressures that those less fortunate will come under if the Bill becomes law.

I will add two points to those already made: first, this is not a debate about the principle of assisted dying. We are not being asked to answer an essay question; we are being asked whether this specific Bill is the right Bill. Many speakers on the opposition side of this debate have drawn attention to a wide range of shortcomings within the Bill. On the whole, the speeches in support have focused instead on advocating the principle of assisted dying, often citing very moving stories of the suffering of those who endured a painful death, or faced prosecution for helping loved ones avoid it. Horrendous though those stories were, they provide no answer to the concerns expressed about this particular Bill. As my noble friend Lord Sandhurst said last week:

“Hard cases make bad law”.—[Official Report, 12/9/25; col. 1855.]


Secondly, I would like to address the contention that any expansion of the Bill’s criteria—to the extent that they are on the face of the Bill at all—would need to come back before Parliament. I remind noble Lords of the interpretive force of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which states in subsection (1):

“So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation … must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”.


There is judicial authority, at the highest level, that this can enable and indeed require a court to twist the words of legislation. For example, in the case of the Queen v A (No. 2) 2002, 2 AC 45, Lord Steyn held:

“In accordance with the will of Parliament as reflected in section 3 it will sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained. The techniques to be used will not only involve the reading down of express language in a statute but also the implication of provisions”.


I therefore caution noble Lords against assuming that the words in the Bill will be interpreted in the literal way. On the contrary, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act is a goldmine for judicial expansionism, without Parliament being reconsulted. Those concerned about considering whether this is the right Bill—as opposed to being swayed by jury speeches about the principle of assisted dying—would therefore do well to treat its wording with a considerable pinch of salt, unless it is amended to exclude Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, as Section 1(5) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 does.

I respectfully invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in winding up this debate, to address whether he would accept such an exclusion. If he cannot, or does not give an unequivocal commitment to do so, that would clearly indicate the scope for mission creep without parliamentary scrutiny.