Lord Banner

I am informed that the assessment of harm was conducted by the bicameral Strategic Estates department of Parliament and submitted to Westminster City Council as part of the planning application.

Westminster City Council, through the planning process, recognised that the fence would cause some harm to designated heritage assets, but in its design and due to the temporary nature of the proposal, this harm was assessed to be less than substantial and in the low to moderate end of that spectrum.

In circumstances of less than substantial harm, the proposals must be justified and the public benefits of the scheme considered. In this case, the justification of providing a secure perimeter to the palace was considered by Westminster City Council to be compelling and the public benefits of providing a greater level of security to both the building and its users is assessed to outweigh the harm caused.

The need for an effective perimeter was identified during independent reviews of Parliament’s security and the designs were progressed on that basis. The safety and security of all those who work on and visit the Parliamentary Estate is a top priority.

The fence design was endorsed on the balance of all considerations, including security, above and below ground heritage, deliverability, and value for money.

The newly installed fence can be removed for significant state or ceremonial events.

I am informed that Westminster City Council considered whether the planning application relating to the newly installed Abingdon Street Fence was in accordance with relevant policies of the City of Westminster’s City Plan 2019–2040 and the London Plan 2021 as part of the consideration of the planning application for the works.

Westminster City Council determined the proposals were in accordance with its development plan, when considered as a whole.

Throughout the design process, the Parliamentary Authorities carefully considered the proposals, in reference to the policies set out in the statutory development plan.

The planning permission for the ‘siting of a boundary fence’ is temporary and was granted for ten years.

The safety and security of all those who work on and visit the Parliamentary Estate is a top priority. I am informed that Parliamentary authorities carefully considered the importance of improving safety on the Parliamentary Estate alongside their need to protect the Palace of Westminster and its status as a UNESCO World Heritage site. It is vital to ensure that this iconic building is safeguarded for future generations to visit and enjoy.

Historic England is a statutory consultee and was included as part of pre-application discussions and consulted by Westminster City Council, as part of the application.

Neither SAVE Britain’s Heritage nor Buckingham Palace are statutory consultees and therefore were not consulted as part of the planning process.

The United Kingdom has well-developed contingency plans to respond to a wide range of eventualities, including nuclear attacks. The plans and supporting arrangements have been developed, refined and tested over many years.

The scale of these capabilities is driven by classified planning assumptions derived from the United Kingdom’s National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), which is a classified assessment of the most serious risks that could cause a national emergency in the UK. An external publication, the National Risk Register, which excludes some security-related risks, was last published in 2023, but is based on the NSRA.

GOV.UK/prepare, the Government’s website for resilience and emergency planning, is designed to help people plan for potential hazards and equip themselves with the necessary knowledge and resources to respond effectively.

As announced at the UK-EU Leaders’ Summit on 19 May 2025, the UK and EU have agreed to establish a common Sanitary and Phytosanitary Zone, aimed at reducing trade barriers and facilitating the safe and efficient movement of trade and facilitating the safe and efficient movement of terrestrial and aquatic zoo animals. Our aim is to start talks straight away and we want to remove barriers as soon as possible.

Ministers have actively engaged with the zoo and wildlife sector through multiple visits and discussions to understand its challenges and opportunities. This dialogue will continue as we work together to support the zoo and wildlife sector.

Licences for badger culling are issued by Natural England under section 10(2)(a) of the Protection of Badgers Act 1992. The current round of licences, that is, licences that have already been issued, will be honoured. This gives us time to work closely and constructively with farmers and scientists to build an eradication package that will beat bovine TB.

The Department for Transport (DfT) is aware of several third-country airlines which continue to operate to and from Russia, while also separately operating services to and from the UK. The UK’s international connectivity benefits considerably from the operations of third-country airlines, particularly those operating to/from points beyond their home hubs. Any action, in respect of third-countries, must, therefore, be balanced against the consequences for the wider economy, which includes the needs of UK exporters and the travelling public, as well as considering potential reciprocal prohibitions against UK airlines. Where sanctions are specifically being considered, we must consider whether a proposed action meets the stated purposes of The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (“2019 Regulations”).

The Government’s position also has to be considered in the context of the UK’s international obligations under its portfolio of bilateral Air Services Agreements (ASA), which guarantee market access for UK airlines abroad, and for foreign airlines to/from the UK.

The Government remains committed to supporting Ukraine and exerting pressure, through the UK’s sanctions regime, on Russia to cease its war of aggression. The Department for Transport (DfT) is responsible for the enforcement of transport sanctions in place against Russia. Transport sanctions include prohibitions on the movement of aircraft and ships. In respect of the aviation prohibitions against Russia, this includes prohibiting Russian aircraft as defined in The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (“2019 Regulations”), from landing in the UK or using UK airspace. In addition, and as noted in our previous response to your WPQ (HL3716), under the Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Russian Aircraft) Regulations 2022 the Department has imposed a prohibition on any aircraft flying to and from Russian aerodromes from using UK airspace.

The UK has imposed one of the most substantive transport prohibitions under both UK sanctions and aviation law against Russia. This enabled the government to take significant enforcement action under the 2019 Regulations including the detention of aircraft and ships with links to Russia. The Government also prevented key Russian airlines from selling their unused landing slots at UK airports worth millions. Furthermore, ensuring ongoing compliance with UK transport sanctions remains a priority for the UK government and we continue to explore new ways to encourage compliance. These actions have had a material impact on Russia and its aviation sector and has prevented them from profiting from the UK’s aviation and maritime sectors.

We continue to balance these priorities and are working closely with our G7 partners, particularly the US and EU, in our engagement with a range of third-countries. However, this remains a deeply complex area. We continue to review the transport sanctions we have in place and explore additional ways we can support Ukraine.

There is currently a prohibition on any aircraft flying to and from Russian aerodromes from using UK airspace. This prohibition was implemented on 5 April 2022 under the Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Russian Aircraft) Regulations 2022 (the ‘RoF’). Specifically, the RoF prohibits (at regulation 2(1)(c)) flights by any aircraft flying in accordance with a flight plan filed after 8.49 p.m. on 5th April 2022 which includes an aerodrome in Russia.

In addition, the RoF and the UK’s aviation sanctions established under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (the ‘Russia sanctions regulations’) imposes further restrictions on flights in UK airspace by certain Russian aircraft. These include aircraft; owned, chartered or operated by a ‘person connected with Russia’ (as defined in regulation 57O(3) of the Russia sanctions regulations), or which are registered in Russia.

The UK remains committed to applying pressure on Russia through sectors such as aviation and we continue to encourage all our international partners to match our actions and ensure their sanctions’ effectiveness and impact.

On 16 December in a call with the Georgian Foreign Minister, the Minister for Europe, the Americas and Overseas Territories stressed that police violence targeting peaceful demonstrators, opposition figures and journalists is unacceptable. The Foreign Secretary's statement of 9 December condemned the excessive use of force and outlined the suspension of programme support as a result of the violence. Protesters in Georgia are making clear their opposition to Georgian Dream's decision to stall the country's progress towards a European future, undermining the commitments in the Georgian Constitution. We continue to call on the Georgian authorities to realign with European values.

On 16 December Minister Doughty discussed Russian interference in Georgia with Georgian Foreign Minister Botcharishvili. Georgia remains at the forefront of Russian hybrid aggression with Russian military units stationed only 30 minutes from the capital Tbilisi. The UK has been consistently vocal at the UN and OSCE in our support of Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russia regularly exerts pressure. We continue to call on the Russian Federation to cease 'borderisation' activities and withdraw their troops from Georgian sovereign territory. We have consistently supported Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which would support a more secure and stable future for the country.

This Government is clear that Russia must be held responsible for its illegal war. That includes its obligations under international law to pay for the damage it has caused in Ukraine. Working with allies, we continue to pursue all possible lawful avenues by which Russia is made to meet those obligations. Our agreement with G7 partners to provide approximately $50 billion in additional funding to Ukraine, repaid by the profits generated on sanctioned Russian sovereign assets, is an important step towards ensuring Russia pays. Our focus is on delivering this commitment, including the UK's £2.26 billion contribution, as soon as possible.

This Government keeps the UK’s nuclear posture under constant review considering the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries. Our nuclear deterrent can respond to any emerging crises.

The recent announcement that the UK is acquiring 12 nuclear capable F35-A fighter jets, and will join the NATO nuclear mission, is not a decision to acquire a second sovereign delivery system. It complements Continuous At Sea Deterrence, our operationally independent, sovereign deterrent, which remains the ultimate guarantor of our security.

The government is committed to handling planning appeals more quickly, including ensuring there is sufficient resourcing in the Planning Inspectorate to support such activity. We currently have no plans to introduce appeal fees but we will continue to keep the issue under review.

The Government is committed to reforming the planning system, via the new National Planning Policy Framework and the Planning Infrastructure Bill. As part of these reforms, we are also considering which provisions from the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 we will implement and will present more detail on these in due course.