Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 399 in the names of my noble friend Lady Pidgeon, who cannot attend today, and my noble friend Lady Doocey. This amendment would enable CCTV systems on the railways to be quickly available to the police and continuously for 30 days, alongside defining the technical standards to support this access. It is about ensuring that investigations on the railways can be carried out efficiently.

The amendment was first tabled by our colleague Daisy Cooper following a spate of bike thefts at St Albans station. In trying to resolve this issue, the correspondence from the British Transport Police was quite revealing. The CCTV system at St Albans station is operated by Govia Thameslink Railway—GTR—as part of a commercial franchise agreement. GTR manages CCTV across 238 stations, with over 6,000 cameras. Although British Transport Police and other forces have established information-sharing agreements with GTR and similar operators, these agreements are designed to govern data management, including storage and access protocols. They do not constitute contracts with commitments to supply CCTV footage within specific timeframes or of specific volumes.

Currently, there are no provisions for rail franchise agreements that mandate specific service levels for supplying CCTV footage—it is not established in law yet. While this may change over coming years, as the franchises may be nationalised, this remains an issue. Unlike council-owned CCTV systems, which often feature integrated platforms allowing direct access, many rail CCTV systems are standalone, not remotely connected. Retrieval often requires physical visits to stations, which can delay access, and sometimes operators impose limits on the duration and length of footage they can supply.

While I acknowledge that these are challenges resulting from the current franchise arrangements, which will gradually be resolved, other constraints are rooted in the operational systems. I am aware that in September, the Government announced that they will be providing funding of almost £70 million so that Network Rail can make some improvements to CCTV. Although this is welcome, Amendment 399 would ensure that a legal obligation exists, and I hope the Minister will look carefully at the issues we are raising today.

Amendment 356A from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, would put a duty on British Transport Police to take steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains. This is a national emergency: one in four women have experienced domestic abuse, and a woman is killed by a man once every three days. Given that fewer than one in six victims of rape or attempted rape report their assault to the police—the reasons cited including that the police would not believe them or could not help them, or that they would not be understood—and given that only 2.6% of rape offences result in a charge or summons, it is crucial we do everything we can to assist in this process.

We fully support specialised teams tackling violence against women and girls in every police station, including British Transport Police stations, and we welcome the Government’s overall work in this important area.

The amendment also raises the issue of rolling stock design. As the railway comes under public ownership, there is a real opportunity for the Government to lead on the right design of the interior of their new fleets of trains; procedures to cut out crime and ensure safety and accessibility for everybody should be the heart of that design. However, it should be noted that the rolling stock would not be publicly owned; rather, it would continue to be leased, as now. That issue may need to be looked at again.

Amendment 356F from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, would create the offence of assaulting a public transport worker, which is similar to the offences of assaulting retail workers and emergency workers. We are sympathetic to this amendment but as the noble Lord himself indicated, the wording may need refining. However, the principle behind it is clear, and it is obvious that protection is needed.

This is an important group of amendments that addresses the safety of our railway networks, systems and travelling public. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the many serious points that have been raised.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

In rising to support Amendment 356A in the name of my noble friend, I recognise that the problem will probably be enforcement, and the answer may have to be a lot more British Transport Police routinely patrolling certain trains.

I also want to raise another issue which affects women. The amendment deals with the big crimes—rape and other sexual offences, stalking, upskirting and domestic abuse—but women and girls also suffer bad behaviour on trains. For example, if a woman or girl gets on to a train and the only seat left has some yob’s rucksack on it, how many would say, “Could you move your rucksack, please?” They would probably stay silent, afraid that if they did speak up, they would be attacked.

The same things happen late at night, when groups of youths have been drinking and are making a noise or playing their music loudly, causing a complete disturbance. A few weeks ago, I had the guts to tell someone to take his feet off the seats, and he did. But I wonder how many women and girls would actually take that action, asking people to turn the music down, behave themselves, stop the swearing and loutish behaviour, and stop throwing their empty beer cans about. Women will not do that sort of thing—they will not take action—and are therefore suffering.

I do not have an answer to this problem, but it has to involve improving behaviour on trains generally. Perhaps, like the US Transportation Secretary, who told people to dress properly on planes and not like scruffs just off the beach, we should say similar about Great British Railways: when you are on trains in future, behave yourselves, because women and girls are suffering.

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I hope that I have been able to give some comfort to the noble Lords and noble Baronesses who put forward these amendments—

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Will the Minister take this idea to the British Transport Police? By the time one has done a three-hour journey, one is heartily sick of hearing, for the 20th time, “See it. Say it. Sorted”. Could it possibly intersperse between those announcements something like: “This coach has video recording. We will take action against any passengers who harass or cause trouble for others”? That may not be the right wording, but something warning about that might be helpful.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will give consideration to that with my colleagues in the Department for Transport. As somebody who travels every week on the train to this House, “See it. Say it. Sorted” appears on my journey on a number of occasions—in my case, in both English and Welsh. The noble Lord makes a valid point: there should be an acceptance and acknowledgment that the type of antisocial behaviour which he has referred to, at a low level, can be intimidating for individuals. The ability to undertake physical violence in the extreme form that allegedly took place in Huntingdon—I have to use the word “allegedly”—and the low-level abuse that might occur are significant issues. Transport staff on railways, from whichever railway company, and the teams that are operating require the support of the state to give them that back-up.

Under the current legislation, I believe that my noble friend’s amendment is not necessary. However, the general principle that we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and other speakers, including my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, via the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, is absolutely valid and was well worth raising. I hope that I have been able to give assurances on that and that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, will withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 357, first tabled by my party in the other place last year, would extend the operation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act by making explicit reference to GPS equipment or, as the industry now prefers, global navigation satellite systems.

For several years, Liberal Democrats have highlighted the sharp rise in rural crime, with organised gangs systematically targeting farms and rural businesses. Their focus has been on stealing high-value GPS drones, receivers and in-cab screens from tractors and harvesters. This equipment is worth thousands of pounds and is essential for modern precision farming. The loss of these units leaves farmers facing costly delays and crop losses at critical times of the year. These thefts have formed part of a well-organised international trade whereby equipment is stripped, containerised and shipped overseas, often beyond recovery. Crucially, offences spiked as rural policing came under ever-increasing strain. Local stations were closed and experienced neighbourhood teams hollowed out, taking with them the deep local knowledge that underpins effective intelligence gathering.

Organised gangs stepped into that vacuum, criss-crossing county boundaries with little deterrence. We recognise that real progress has been made over the last year, with insurance claims for GPS theft now starting to fall, thanks to greater collaboration between farmers, insurers, police and the National Rural Crime Network, whose invaluable work is now rightly benefiting from strengthened national funding and support. The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act should build on that work, offering a strong framework for prevention, giving the Secretary of State powers to require immobilisers and the marking and registration of agricultural machinery, and to extend these measures to other equipment by regulation.

Amendment 357 would strengthen that framework by naming GPS units explicitly in the primary legislation. This would give a clear signal of intent, ensure momentum and guard against any further delay in bringing the provisions into effect. We welcome the Government’s recent commitment to include removable GPS units in future regulations and I am pleased that Ministers have listened to evidence presented from these Benches and others. The reality, however, is that the key provisions of the Act have not yet been brought into force and the secondary legislation required to implement them is still pending. Our amendment would ensure timely and decisive action, so that farmers and rural businesses see the benefits on the ground sooner rather than later. This is a simple, practical step that would support the Government’s aims and help stop the theft and resale of vital agricultural technology. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.

The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.

Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.

Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses an issue that will be immediately recognisable to many people across the country: the theft of essential equipment from those who rely on it for their living. Turning first to Amendment 357, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, we broadly support the intention behind extending the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023. This was an Act brought in by the Conservative Government to protect businessmen and tradespeople, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would ensure that it explicitly includes GPS equipment. Technology becomes ever more central to commercial activity, particularly in agriculture, construction and logistics. It is therefore right that the law keeps pace with the evolving nature of equipment theft. GPS units are high-value, easily resold and frequently targeted. Bringing them clearly within scope of the Act is a sensible and proportionate step to help disrupt illicit resale markets.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this debate and raising these important issues. Turning first to Amendment 357, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I can confirm that the Government remain committed to the implementation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 and fully support the intentions behind its introduction. Informed by responses to the call for evidence and direct consultation with industry, the Act will cover the forensic marking and registration on a database of new all-terrain vehicles, quad bikes and, I am pleased to say, removable GPS systems.

The NFU Mutual Rural Crime Report 2025 highlights that GPS theft cost an estimated £1.2 million in 2024. GPS units are particularly vulnerable to theft and their theft massively disrupts day-to-day farming operations, which is exactly why we have included them in the legislation. I am pleased to echo the acknowledgement by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, of the progress that has been made in this important area, with, as she said, falling insurance claims thanks to the concerted efforts of the police and other parties.

The Act requires secondary legislation before it can come into effect and we intend to bring this forward as soon as possible. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, the Government’s response to the call for evidence was published quite recently, in October 2025. We are very grateful to all those who took the time to respond, and we carefully considered the views and evidence provided in those responses. Significant technical concerns were raised and we needed to assess the impact before we committed to introducing secondary legislation. We did not want to introduce regulations that were not fit for purpose or, more importantly, that would adversely impact vehicle safety.

The noble Lord talked about the comparison between smaller vehicles and larger, more expensive farming machinery, such as tractors. We have carefully considered the benefits and implications of including other agricultural equipment in the regulations. The installation of immobilisers into other large pieces of machinery post manufacture poses a similar risk to ATVs, so there is a delicate balance to be struck between the costs to businesses and the achievability of the ends of the regulations.

Should the Act become more effective in tackling rural theft, the legislation would be widened in the future by introducing other large agricultural machinery in a further tranche of regulations. We are looking at the situation and the way the regulations operate, and will see whether we can apply them further.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Can the Minister give a rough timescale for a consultation on extending this to include heavy agricultural machinery or contracting equipment?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not want to commit to any particular timescale. It probably ill behoves me to do so, but I will point out that, having published our response to the call for evidence a couple of months before Christmas, we are obviously trying to motor ahead with it, if noble Lords will forgive the pun.

I turn now to Amendment 368, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which proposes two changes: first, to expand enforcement provisions under the 2023 Act and, secondly, to introduce a statutory aggravating factor for theft of tools from tradesmen under the Sentencing Act 2020. The Government recognise the distress caused by tool theft and its impact on tradespeople and small businesses, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke to. As he said, these tools are essential to livelihoods, and their loss can cause real financial and emotional harm. That is why we are already taking action through the National Vehicle Crime Working Group, which brings together specialists from every police force to share intelligence and tackle emerging trends in vehicle-related crime, including tool theft.

On sentencing, the current framework is sufficient and robust. Courts must follow guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, which already require consideration of harm, culpability and aggravating factors such as financial loss, business impact and emotional distress. Courts also have powers to impose compensation orders to ensure that victims receive financial compensation. Introducing a statutory aggravating factor, as this amendment calls for, would duplicate existing provisions unnecessarily and have limited impact on outcomes. Indeed, I am reminded that a wise man once said,

“I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors”.—[Official Report, 15/12/25; col. 585.]

That was of course the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, speaking just three weeks ago, on 15 December, in response to an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to Clause 102 on self-harm. I could not have put it better myself.

I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we accept the spirit of her Amendment 357 and we are working to give effect to this issue. I hope too that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 368 to be necessary, and forgive my light ribbing a moment ago. For all these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in this Committee and to follow my friend the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who perfectly and proportionately set out the principles in this amendment, which I support to every last sentence. We are now discussing a number of amendments on areas where the existing law, and this Bill as drafted, are clearly out of date and full of gaps—not least when we consider how our nation, our economy and the state itself are seeking to move to digitisation, which has such benefits for citizens and communities, our cities and our entire country. But one key element which enables, empowers and underpins almost every element of that digital transformation is effective digital ID.

There are a number of arguments that could be made at another time about the correct approach to digital ID. I would suggest that the principles around self-sovereign ID should strongly be considered. Mandation is clearly problematic, while the reasons for introducing a digital ID should be clearly made and the benefits set out. But the specifics of this amendment are clear, proportionate and timely, because a digital ID is critical and essential to availing oneself of the opportunities—and, indeed, to protecting oneself against many of the harms. To not have a digital ID protected by the criminal law would be a huge, inexplicable and indefensible gap.

If the Government want digital ID to be the means of accessing government services and to see greater digital inclusion—and, through that, the attendant and very necessary financial inclusion—action to protect our digital ID is critical. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones effectively set out his amendment, which is proportionate, valid, timely and necessary. I very much look forward to the Minister accepting the principle as set out.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, identity theft, as my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond said, is no longer a niche crime; it is the dominant fraud type in the UK and getting worse. In 2024, over 421,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database and almost 250,000 were identity fraud filings, making identity theft the single largest category recorded by industry partners. CIFAS, the credit industry fraud avoidance system, recorded a record number of cases on the national fraud database in 2024. The organisations themselves prevented more than £2.1 billion of attempted loss, yet criminals are shifting tactics. Account takeovers rose by 76% and unauthorised SIM swaps surged, driven by the rapid adoption of AI and generative tools that let fraudsters create convincing fake documents and synthetic identities at scale.

We have all read of some of the high-profile examples: celebrity impersonation via deepfakes and cloned voices has been widely reported; manipulated videos and voice clones purporting to show public figures from Elon Musk to Martin Lewis, Holly Willoughby and others, have been used to generate investment scams and phishing campaigns. Documented victim losses include large individual losses linked to celebrity impersonation scams. One NatWest customer is reported to have lost £150,000 after responding to a scam impersonating Martin Lewis.

However, I think we are all more concerned with the tens of thousands of ordinary people who are not celebrities and who lose all their savings to these crooks. They are the victims who suffer real financial loss and damage, with long and costly recovery processes, while businesses face rising prevention costs and operational strain. I therefore strongly support the concept of the draft clause and the need for it. While it is well intentioned, I fear that it has some technical difficulties. It is a bit broad and vague about what “obtains” and “impersonate” mean. It also risks overlap with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act and the Data Protection Act, and lacks some clear defences for legitimate security research and lawful investigations. It also needs to address AI and the deepfake-specific methods, and set out what we can do about extraterritorial reach, for example, or aggravating factors for organised, large-scale operations.

We all know that my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond is, as we have just heard, an absolute expert on AI; he recently addressed a top-level group of the Council of Europe on this subject. May I suggest that he and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, get together with the Home Office or other government digital experts and bring back on Report a more tightly drafted amendment? Among other things, it should tighten the definitions of “obtain”, “impersonate” and “sensitive”; ensure that the mens rea is tied to dishonesty or intent to cause loss or gain; include recklessness in enabling others; limit the scope to unlawfully obtained data or use that bypasses authentication; and explicitly include AI/deepfake methods when used to bypass checks or cause reliance. It should also have clear defences for lawful authority and make sure that duplication is avoided, whether it be with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act or the Data Protection Act. Finally—I know this is an impossible ask, and that Governments find it almost impossible to do—something should be done about extraterritorial reach, because that is terribly important.

I say to the Minister: there is a gap in the legislation here. We should plug it, and we may have time to bring back on Report a more tightly drawn amendment that would deal with all the concerns of noble Lords and the possible problems I have just raised.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support strongly the comments of my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the principle of the amendment laid by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This is a timely amendment, possibly timelier than the noble Lord anticipated, because today the Government have announced the promotion of a Minister to promulgate digital IDs among the population.

Digital IDs are going to have a huge vista and connection, not just in linking to personal data but in other areas of life: in the relationship between the state and the individual; and in the payment of parking tickets, road tolls, stamp duty and fishing licences—a different sort of fishing, as it begins with an “f”, not a “p”. So I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the thrust of the amendment, although I accept that some polishing is required.

If the Government are to promote digital IDs, the population at large need to have confidence not just that they will be correctly introduced but that there are safeguards against such impersonation. I strongly support the principle of this amendment and say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that if the Government resist it in principle, what confidence can the man in the street have that the Government are sincere about the safeguards they intend to introduce, alongside their intention for digital IDs—to get that balance right between the state and the individual, coupled together against the criminal?

We need to bring this back on Report. I hope the Minister is prepared to meet the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others to address this principle, so that the Government get off on the right foot, if they intend to promote digital IDs, and not resist this, because there is a world of pain if they do.

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Tackling this is hampered by the lack of a consistent national framework for recording or investigating freight crime, leaving major gaps in data and enforcement. This is all against the backdrop of the Government’s target to increase rail freight by 75% by 2050, a target set by my noble friend Lord Harper when he was Secretary of State for Transport, to which this Government remain committed. But that growth in the rail freight sector cannot materialise if the sector faces such high levels of theft. My amendment does not seek any new offences but would require the Home Secretary to establish a new freight crime code. The aim is to ensure that incidents of freight crime are properly recorded and investigated across the country. Among the issues with current data collection is the fact that freight theft is currently recorded as theft from a vehicle. This does not reflect the seriousness or the specific nature of freight crime. I look forward very much to what the Minister has to say in relation to this.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 365 after Clause 117, which would increase penalties for those who deliberately avoid paying rail fares. Deliberate fare evasion undermines the integrity of our railway and costs taxpayers and passengers hundreds of millions each year. We must be firm in protecting revenue that funds services and investment.

However, there is another side to this issue that we cannot ignore. Recent reviews and watchdog recommendations show a system that is complex, inconsistent and at times unfair to passengers who make genuine mistakes. The passenger watchdog has called for a national yellow card warning for first-time errors and a central railcard database to prevent innocent people being prosecuted for technical or administrative errors. I always book advance tickets on the train; they are slightly cheaper than the full-fare ones. A few weeks ago, business here finished early, so I got to Euston early and caught an earlier train than I had booked. When I produced my ticket, I said to the manager, “I’m on an earlier train. Is that all right?” He said, “I’ll let you off on this occasion”. I think what he meant was that he would let me off paying the full fare because I was on an earlier train. But I have heard of people, with a ticket that they have paid for, being accused of fare evasion for being on the train at the wrong time. That is a perfect example of where the yellow card system should be used.

The Office of Rail and Road was asked to review revenue protection practices precisely because enforcement has been uneven and opaque. We have seen the consequences of those failures. Thousands of prosecutions were quashed after courts found that operators had used inappropriate fast-track procedures and many passengers faced the threat of criminal records for minor errors. These are not abstract concerns; they are real harms to livelihoods and trust in the system.

I support the principle of tougher penalties for deliberate evasion, but only if there are clear safeguards. Those safeguards should be: a statutory first-warning step; a consistent published test before any prosecution; improved point-of-sale information and standardised enforcement guidance for all the different train operators; and mandatory staff training and data sharing to identify repeat offenders rather than punishing honest mistakes. I understand that the Government have accepted the ORR’s recommendations and must now legislate to ensure that enforcement is proportionate and transparent.

In short, tough penalties and fairness are not mutually exclusive. We can deter deliberate evasion while protecting innocent travellers, but only if this amendment is paired with the reforms that the ORR and passenger bodies have recommended. I urge the Minister to support the amendment on that basis and to press the Government to enshrine these other safeguards in law.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra has made a very pragmatic speech on the difficulties of fare evasion and the extraordinary complexities of the ticketing and fares system in the UK. Of course, I note that the Government are legislating in this area as part of the broader GB Railways Bill that is coming down the tracks, as it were. I really do not believe that there is a single individual in the United Kingdom who could answer 20 questions about the cheapest fare from A to B crossing C and get it right. It is an extraordinary system, and I quite agree that many people are making inadvertent errors, which should absolutely be taken into consideration.

Equally, the Minister will have heard me talking about enforcement on many occasions throughout the passage of the Bill. The law is brought very quickly into disrepute if the laws that law-abiding people see as absolutely necessary are avoided by a determined criminal element. We have all seen it. We have all seen it on the Tube, with people barging through, tailgating and hopping over the barriers. I have seen two officials of London Underground at Green Park station late in the evening, chatting to one another—someone comes barging past and they do absolutely nothing. If that continues, then I suggest we get ourselves into a very difficult situation indeed. So, when the Minister comes to respond, I ask that he talks about enforcement and about the attitude of the police to combat this serious issue which robs the railways and London Underground of hundreds of millions of pounds and is unsustainable.

I think that, on the ticketing issue and the fare issues, the answer really lies in technology. I think that apps have made this much more straightforward. It is absolutely a task for computers to find the best ticket from A to B, but there are plenty of people who do not use those, who are not particularly computer literate and who prefer a paper ticket. So, it is perhaps more complex than it seems from the outside, but I really think we have to put more effort on enforcement in this difficult area.

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To be clear, this amendment does not change the law. It would not create a new offence. It would require the Home Secretary to establish a freight crime code and ensure that incidents are properly identified, recorded and investigated across all police forces. Recording these high-value crimes differently from a standard theft from a vehicle better reflects the seriousness and economic consequences of freight crime, which creates the groundwork for building a stronger deterrent to the organised and occasional criminals who are taking a huge amount of money out of our economy, threatening drivers and destabilising the logistics industry. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say, considering he is not looking to bring in a new Bill but is seeking to create a code. Surely, it is not beyond the wit of the Government to create a code to record and investigate, and ensure that people understand that these are high-value crimes and not just thefts from vehicles.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I want to comment on something the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said and endorse it. I regularly travel to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and I use the marvellous level-access tram system. There are no barriers or gates, but periodically four people come on in a team with their little electronic machines, go between one station and another, and check we all have our little “aller simple” travelcard. If someone does not have it, they are hauled off. It is only one team of about four people in all of Strasbourg, but everyone is terrified of not having a valid ticket. That may be the solution: check people on the trains rather than at the barriers.

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Finally, I cannot understand why Governments in the past have not called these people to account when they have had them in for meetings and they have said they are going to go away and do something about it. Why have they not? The answer is that nobody is asking them to do it and there is no financial incentive to do it either. That is what Governments are for, it seems to me. This is a real opportunity to do something about it. I support it 100% and I hope the Government will take action on it.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Jackson on the quality of the amendment he drafted. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe on the superb speech she made setting out why this amendment is necessary. As we know, it addresses one of the fastest-growing forms of organised crime in the UK: the theft and rapid export of mobile phones—thousands and thousands of them. These are no longer opportunistic street offences. As noble Lords have said, they are part of a highly profitable, highly mobile criminal market that depends on one thing above all else: the ability to reactivate and resell the stolen devices abroad.

A couple of years ago, I was outside Victoria station, at the end of Victoria Street, waiting to cross the road. I saw a woman waiting for the pedestrian lights to change, holding her mobile phone out—I think she was trying to read the map—almost like a Geiger counter. Then I saw two guys on a motor scooter coming around the corner and I tried to shout to her to put her phone away, but too late—it was snatched in seconds.

That was a couple of years ago, when I think there were motor scooter gangs doing it. Now, as we have seen—we were talking about the e-bike problem in our debates on the Bill before Christmas—there are lots of videos of these guys on their very fast bikes, snatching phones, and I believe the Met now has a response squad on those high-powered bikes chasing the phone thieves. So it is a big problem, particularly in London.

At present, our defences are simply not keeping pace. IMEI blocking helps, but criminals now routinely bypass it by altering identifiers or moving devices to jurisdictions where UK blacklists are ignored. What they cannot bypass is the cloud. As noble Lords have said, modern smartphones are useless without access to the cloud-based services that power authentication, updates, storage and app ecosystems.

The amendment therefore introduces a very simple, proportionate requirement. When a user reports their phone lost or stolen, cloud service providers must take reasonable steps to block that specific device from accessing their services. If a stolen phone cannot be reactivated, it cannot be resold. If it cannot be resold, it is not worth stealing. It is as simple as that.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe hinted that the phone companies may possibly have a financial benefit from not co-operating here. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, was more blatant. I will be more blatant still. I am absolutely certain that they are conspiring not to co-operate so that they can sell more phones. We were discussing all-terrain vehicles a couple of hours ago. When the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Bill was going through, the police officers who were advising us said that they had heard from some of the big manufacturers of ATVs—the ones which make motorbikes with locks you cannot penetrate—that they were deliberately putting rubbish locks on the ATVs because when the £8,000 quad bike was stolen, the farmer immediately replaced it. They saw a market in goods being stolen. I think the big phone companies see exactly the same thing: there is a market in replacement phones.

The noble Lord asked: why do the British Government not do something about it? I suspect it is mega US-UK politics. If we said we were going to restrict the ability of Apple, Google and others to sell their phones here, I think we would have Mr Trump seeking to invade us next week, so I suspect there are geopolitical problems there.

The amendment also ensures proper safeguards: verification before blocking, a clear appeals process, and a role for the Secretary of State in setting technical standards. It strengthens law enforcement by requiring timely notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, giving them valuable intelligence on organised theft. This is not about burdening industry. It is about ensuring that all providers meet a consistent baseline of responsible behaviour—one that many already follow voluntarily, but which criminals exploit when it is not universal.

I conclude by saying that we have an opportunity here to collapse the economic incentive that drives mobile phone theft. Cloud-based blocking is practical, proportionate and overdue, and I commend the amendment to the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these excellent amendments, and to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving Amendment 366 on his behalf.

This amendment is driven by a simple proposition: if we are to bear down on the scourge of phone theft, we must remove the profit motive, because it is precisely this incentive to profit that drives the vast industry behind phone theft. Too often, the criminal justice system is left trying to deal with the consequences of crime after the event, rather than addressing the incentives that fuel it in the first place. Phone theft is now a high-volume, high-impact crime, particularly in our cities, and it causes not only financial loss but real fear and disruption to victims’ lives.

What this amendment seeks to do is eminently practical. It asks cloud service providers, which already control the digital lifeline that makes a smartphone valuable, to take responsible and timely steps to deny access to those services once a device is verified as lost or stolen. A phone that cannot access cloud backups, app stores, authentication, service or updates rapidly becomes worthless on the secondary market, whether at home or abroad.

This is not a novel idea nor an untested one. As many noble Lords will know, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has examined this issue in detail. In its recent correspondence with Ministers and technology companies, the committee highlighted both the scale of the problem and the frustrating gap between what is technically possible and what is currently being done. The committee made it clear that voluntary action has been uneven, that existing measures are inconsistently applied across platforms, and that stronger co-ordination, potentially underpinned by legislation, may be required if we are serious about prevention. This amendment directly reflects that evidence-based work and gives effect to its central recommendations.

Importantly, the amendment builds in safeguards for users to appeal or reverse a block where a mistake has been made or a device is recovered. It leaves the detailed technical standards, timelines and sanctions to secondary legislation, allowing flexibility and proper consultation with industry, and it recognises the importance of law enforcement by requiring prompt notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, strengthening intelligence and disruption efforts. Fundamentally, if we can force cloud service providers to implement this provision, we can break the cycle of phone theft. I look forward to the Minister’s response.