Wednesday 7th January 2026
(2 days, 6 hours ago)
Lords ChamberCrime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VIII(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Eighth Marshalled List) - (6 Jan 2026)
Baroness Morgan of Cotes
“Duty to prevent violence against women and girls on trains(1) The British Transport Police must take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains.(2) In subsection (1), “violence against women and girls” means abuse aimed at women and girls including, but not limited to—(a) rape and sexual offences;(b) stalking;(c) upskirting;(d) domestic abuse.(3) “Reasonable steps” in accordance with subsection (1) must include—(a) data sharing arrangements with rolling stock companies in relation to cases of violence against women and girls, and(b) participation in rolling stock design to ensure trains are designed to minimise incidences of violence against women and girls.”
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I had hoped, as the Minister knows, that we might have reached this amendment last month, in the same week the Government published their long-awaited violence against women and girls strategy—which would have been appropriate—but I left him to debate another extremely important issue. It is a pleasure to open the proceedings on the Bill in 2026 with this amendment.
I am sure all noble Lords support the Government’s ambition of halving violence against women and girls. The challenge with any such strategy is of course in its delivery. Securing safer public spaces for women and girls is essential, and safer streets was of course a key demand, and continues to be, following the terrible murder of Sarah Everard. But there are of course many places where women and girls feel unsafe, and that includes trains and public transport.
I noted this paragraph, on page 65 of the Government’s December strategy, which is headed “Every corner of public life will be safe”:
“Women and girls must both feel safe and be safe in every aspect of public life. … Safety is not just about reducing risk, it is about creating environments that foster confidence, dignity, and freedom of movement. Design and planning are critical tools in achieving this. Well-lit streets, accessible transport, and thoughtful urban design can deter violence, reduce opportunities for harm, and send a clear message that public spaces belong to everyone. By embedding considerations of VAWG into planning and transport guidance, we can ensure that safety is built into the fabric of our communities, making public spaces welcoming and secure for all. To support this, we”,
the Government,
“will update national design guidance to reflect a VAWG perspective, ensuring that safety considerations inform how public spaces are designed”.
Turning to this amendment, I think that the Committee should be aware that, since 2021, there has been an alarming rise in violence against women and girls on our railways—it is up 59%. Sexual offences specifically have risen by 10% and harassment is up 6%. To put this in actual numbers, in 2022-23, there were 2,475 sexual offences; that was up from 2,246 the year before. In 2021, 7,561 crimes against women and girls on railways were recorded by British Transport Police; that had risen by 2023-24 to 11,357.
It is therefore no surprise that these crimes are now classed as a national emergency by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Due to this, nearly two thirds—63%—of women say they avoid travelling alone, and even women who continue to use public transport often undertake what is called “normalised behaviour”, like being very choosy as to where they sit or assiduously avoiding making eye contact with any fellow passengers.
Of course, numbers tell only half the story. For each survivor of an offence or an attempted offence, their experience stays with them, as we heard just in the last couple of weeks in the powerful testimony given by Her Majesty the Queen. But there are of course many others who have bravely shared their experiences of vulnerability in a place that they should not feel vulnerable at all. It is clear from the numbers I have just given to the Committee that action is needed to ensure measures can be put in place to reduce this level of crime against women and girls on our national rail network, and the Government need to take a lead on this.
This is, of course, a probing amendment. The wording in subsection (1) would place a clear duty:
“The British Transport Police must take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains”.
Subsection (2) sets out what such abuse could entail but is not limited to those offences. Subsection (3) sets out what “reasonable steps” must include. The reason that this is a probing amendment is that I suspect that the Minister will tell me shortly that this is not the right Bill for such an amendment, so I want to take this opportunity to say that, while I might have some limited sympathy for his argument—
He is looking slightly surprised, so perhaps I have pre-empted his argument or that is not the argument that he is going to make, in which case I will be delighted. But if it is, Ministers will not be able to use the same argument in the forthcoming Railways Bill, where the Government will be accepting a clear responsibility for what happens on trains operating as part of their newly nationalised services.
The reason for subsection (3) is that enforcement after the event for perpetrators is not sufficient if the Government are to stand any chance of cutting violence against women and girls by 50%. Prevention is key to achieving anything like that goal. The suggestion in subsection (3) about what could constitute “reasonable steps” is vital if we are to move to a preventative and safety-by-design model. A crucial first step would be, as the amendment suggests, the sharing of data about cases and levels of violence against women and girls between the British Transport Police and the rolling stock companies. Of course, this is not just about violence against and women and girls in relation to passengers but is highly relevant to female staff operating on the rail network.
Following Royal Assent of the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill 2024, the Department for Transport instructed DfT Operator to assume responsibility for train operators’ ownership in England and provide
“safe, secure and sustainable transport”.
However, since then, there has been no clarification as to how this will occur. These amendments provide a way in which there can be a review of safety issues and standards on trains.
Better and more synchronised technology, subject to government standards and fitted at the point that a train is manufactured, would truly create that safe, secure and sustainable transport. It would also ensure that the Government could have true oversight of this issue and that all modern technology and innovation used by rail operating companies to help drive confidence in passengers, especially women, that are used by manufacturers subject to a gold standard. In addition, as long as manufacturers have the option not to include extra specifications that cost them money but do not seem to bring them monetary benefit, and merely bring societal benefit, they are less likely to install such measures, especially in the current economic environment, where every penny will count.
It is worth remembering that the previous Government created the secure stations scheme, which emphasised collaborative working and station design that deters crime and aids the safeguarding of vulnerable individuals. Using advanced technologies created by innovative companies that provide rolling stock with custom-made parts and technology, these amendments would allow the extension of this scheme to further improve passenger confidence. Just including more CCTV is insufficient. Design features such as improved lighting deployed by companies such as Belvoir Rail are very relevant here.
This amendment is an early opportunity for the Government to show that they are ready to stand behind their December violence against women and girls strategy. It would also demonstrate that delivery of the strategy is a priority across all government departments and is not just being left to the Home Office. I beg to move Amendment 356A.
Lord Hendy (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes. My proposed Amendment 356F is complementary, in a sense, to hers. My amendment would create a specific offence of assaulting a transport worker at work. It would be an equivalent protection to that given to retail workers by Clause 37 of the Bill, and there is of course existing legislation protecting emergency workers. I confess to a certain unease in proposing specific offences for specific groups of workers, but in the case of transport workers there are particular circumstances which justify an offence to protect them.
There has been a marked increase in violence against transport workers. Of course, the situation was highlighted by the multiple stabbings at Huntington on 1 November 2025. But violent offences against rail staff increased by 35% in 2024, according to the British Transport Police Authority. The overall increase in both incidents and the severity of violence against transport workers is to be noted. Of course, it is not just railway workers; transport workers protected would include those on the Underground, the Metro, trams, ferries and buses, and all other transport workers.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I speak particularly in support of Amendment 356A in the name of my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes. I hope that the Minister might see fit to include this in the Bill, as the noble Lord opposite argued for his amendment. It is difficult to find the right Bill. The Railways Bill is one possibility; I have tried to put some aspects into the Crime and Policing Bill but was told that it was not the right place; and now I am told that the English devolution Bill is not the right place—but we will keep seeking it.
I am particularly supportive of the comments that my noble friend made in moving her amendment on protecting public spaces, and not just on the tragic case of Sarah Everard but on one that is closer to home for me: that of Claudia Lawrence. As I mentioned briefly before the House rose in December, Claudia Lawrence disappeared in the most bizarre circumstances, walking from her flat to work as a chef at York University, and has never been seen since. The police inquiries have been intermittent, partly ongoing and partly not, and obviously this is causing extreme regret and anxiety to her family, not least to her mother, who I remain in contact with.
I should declare an interest: I was not the MP when Claudia disappeared, but I tried to help her family subsequently when, for five years, I was the MP for Malton. I believe that this Bill could be the right opportunity to address these issues; in particular, serious and aggravated attacks on women on public transport. It affects every age group—younger women perhaps feel more vulnerable, but as one gets older one thinks about what time of day or night one should be travelling. Elderly men are also affected, but attacks on women are a particular problem that my noble friend is right to address. Might she or the Government seek to expand this to public spaces to make sure that, where there are incidents, there can be closure for families—such as in the case of Claudia Lawrence, so that her mother, Joan, can find some settlement and closure?
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, I am grateful for this short debate. I would like to widen it a little beyond railways. I am blessed in living in Greater Manchester at the heart of a major Metrolink tram network, which has many similarities to the railways. There are often very few staff late at night, particularly on the trams, and women and girls are especially vulnerable on those occasions. This Bill, if it is not just about the rail network, may be the better Bill to cover these issues and ensure that women and girls are safe and protected from violence on our whole public transport network.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, it is Amendment 356F from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, that attracts me to the Chamber, although I do not necessarily share his arguments or reasoning. The main purpose of my speaking, the Minister will not be surprised to hear, is that it affords an opportunity for me to highlight again that the Government’s decision to introduce in Clause 37 a new offence of assault against a retail worker—and only a retail worker—risks creating a new problem.
As I have said before, I know that the Government’s intentions are good and I have no desire to mount a campaign against Clause 37, but the fact that a new offence of assault against a retailer is otiose does not mean that it will have no negative effects if it causes other public-facing workers to believe they are not protected if assaulted. As I have argued before, the workers referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, clearly will be protected without his amendment—because they will be—but I worry about people fearing that they will not be, deterring employees from exercising the delegated authority that we need them to exercise to uphold good order when in charge of a public place or space.
It is because of this that I urge the Minister—he and I will continue to have this discussion, which he knows I look forward to very much—to think again. I find it hard to understand how the Government can legislate for some and not others in this way. While it is not where I would start, we have to be very conscious of the unintended consequences of Clause 37, which the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, has highlighted today.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 399 in the names of my noble friend Lady Pidgeon, who cannot attend today, and my noble friend Lady Doocey. This amendment would enable CCTV systems on the railways to be quickly available to the police and continuously for 30 days, alongside defining the technical standards to support this access. It is about ensuring that investigations on the railways can be carried out efficiently.
The amendment was first tabled by our colleague Daisy Cooper following a spate of bike thefts at St Albans station. In trying to resolve this issue, the correspondence from the British Transport Police was quite revealing. The CCTV system at St Albans station is operated by Govia Thameslink Railway—GTR—as part of a commercial franchise agreement. GTR manages CCTV across 238 stations, with over 6,000 cameras. Although British Transport Police and other forces have established information-sharing agreements with GTR and similar operators, these agreements are designed to govern data management, including storage and access protocols. They do not constitute contracts with commitments to supply CCTV footage within specific timeframes or of specific volumes.
Currently, there are no provisions for rail franchise agreements that mandate specific service levels for supplying CCTV footage—it is not established in law yet. While this may change over coming years, as the franchises may be nationalised, this remains an issue. Unlike council-owned CCTV systems, which often feature integrated platforms allowing direct access, many rail CCTV systems are standalone, not remotely connected. Retrieval often requires physical visits to stations, which can delay access, and sometimes operators impose limits on the duration and length of footage they can supply.
While I acknowledge that these are challenges resulting from the current franchise arrangements, which will gradually be resolved, other constraints are rooted in the operational systems. I am aware that in September, the Government announced that they will be providing funding of almost £70 million so that Network Rail can make some improvements to CCTV. Although this is welcome, Amendment 399 would ensure that a legal obligation exists, and I hope the Minister will look carefully at the issues we are raising today.
Amendment 356A from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, would put a duty on British Transport Police to take steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains. This is a national emergency: one in four women have experienced domestic abuse, and a woman is killed by a man once every three days. Given that fewer than one in six victims of rape or attempted rape report their assault to the police—the reasons cited including that the police would not believe them or could not help them, or that they would not be understood—and given that only 2.6% of rape offences result in a charge or summons, it is crucial we do everything we can to assist in this process.
We fully support specialised teams tackling violence against women and girls in every police station, including British Transport Police stations, and we welcome the Government’s overall work in this important area.
The amendment also raises the issue of rolling stock design. As the railway comes under public ownership, there is a real opportunity for the Government to lead on the right design of the interior of their new fleets of trains; procedures to cut out crime and ensure safety and accessibility for everybody should be the heart of that design. However, it should be noted that the rolling stock would not be publicly owned; rather, it would continue to be leased, as now. That issue may need to be looked at again.
Amendment 356F from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, would create the offence of assaulting a public transport worker, which is similar to the offences of assaulting retail workers and emergency workers. We are sympathetic to this amendment but as the noble Lord himself indicated, the wording may need refining. However, the principle behind it is clear, and it is obvious that protection is needed.
This is an important group of amendments that addresses the safety of our railway networks, systems and travelling public. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the many serious points that have been raised.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
In rising to support Amendment 356A in the name of my noble friend, I recognise that the problem will probably be enforcement, and the answer may have to be a lot more British Transport Police routinely patrolling certain trains.
I also want to raise another issue which affects women. The amendment deals with the big crimes—rape and other sexual offences, stalking, upskirting and domestic abuse—but women and girls also suffer bad behaviour on trains. For example, if a woman or girl gets on to a train and the only seat left has some yob’s rucksack on it, how many would say, “Could you move your rucksack, please?” They would probably stay silent, afraid that if they did speak up, they would be attacked.
The same things happen late at night, when groups of youths have been drinking and are making a noise or playing their music loudly, causing a complete disturbance. A few weeks ago, I had the guts to tell someone to take his feet off the seats, and he did. But I wonder how many women and girls would actually take that action, asking people to turn the music down, behave themselves, stop the swearing and loutish behaviour, and stop throwing their empty beer cans about. Women will not do that sort of thing—they will not take action—and are therefore suffering.
I do not have an answer to this problem, but it has to involve improving behaviour on trains generally. Perhaps, like the US Transportation Secretary, who told people to dress properly on planes and not like scruffs just off the beach, we should say similar about Great British Railways: when you are on trains in future, behave yourselves, because women and girls are suffering.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been an interesting short debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this group of amendments, each of which addresses the issue of safety on our public transport networks, whether of passengers, workers or those tasked with policing them. The amendments before us reflect genuine concern about how effectively our current frameworks protect people from violence, intimidation and abuse in transport settings, and they deserve careful consideration from the Minister.
I begin with Amendment 356A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Morgan, which would place a duty on the British Transport Police to
“take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains”.
Violence against women and girls remains an appalling and persistent problem. Just yesterday, the Government and Liberal Democrats joined together to defeat a Conservative amendment to the Sentencing Bill that would have exempted sexual offenders and domestic abusers from the automatic presumption of a suspended sentence. For victims of sexual assault or domestic abuse, the distinction between a custodial sentence and a suspended sentence is not an abstract policy question; it is the difference between knowing that their abuser has been removed from the community, and knowing that they remain at liberty.
That point is reinforced by the Government’s recent recognition of the scale of the problem. Violence against women and girls has been described by the Home Secretary as a “national emergency”. The Government have trialled domestic abuse protection orders to track domestic abusers. But the most effective way to protect victims is to ensure that offenders face custodial sentences for their crimes. A Government who oppose that principle are not a Government who can claim to hold violence against women and girls as a priority.
In the year ending 2024, police recorded more than 106,000 sexual offences in England and Wales—an increase of around 10% on the previous year. Women continue to report feeling unsafe on public transport, particularly during off-peak hours and at night. This amendment recognises that prevention must go beyond enforcement alone. Its emphasis on data sharing and engagement with train design reflects the reality that safety is shaped by visibility and co-ordination. These are practical, forward-looking measures that deserve serious engagement from the Government. I hope the Minister considers them carefully.
Amendment 356F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, proposes a new offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Abuse and violence directed at front-line transport staff has increased markedly in recent years, with British Transport Police data showing a significant rise in assaults on railway employees. Public transport workers perform an essential public service, often in challenging circumstances, and they should be able to do so without fear of violence or intimidation.
Amendment 399, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, addresses a long-standing operational problem: inconsistent and delayed access to railway CCTV footage. Timely access to high-quality CCTV is often critical to identifying suspects, supporting victims and securing prosecutions. Establishing clear legal requirements for accessibility and technical standards would help to remove the barriers that currently frustrate investigations and undermine confidence.
Taken together, these amendments highlight a broader concern. Although the Government have articulated ambitions around tackling violence against women and girls and improving safety on public transport, there remains a gap between aspiration and implementation. Too often, victims, police and front-line workers encounter fragmented responsibilities, inconsistent standards and slow operational responses. What is needed is clear leadership, stronger co-ordination between agencies and a willingness to embed prevention into the everyday operation of our transport networks.
We on these Benches are clear that public transport must be safe and accessible for all, and that violence, whether against women passengers or workers, must be actively prevented, not merely responded to after the fact. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that the objectives reflected in these amendments are delivered in practice and how they will translate stated commitments into real-world safety improvements.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for Amendment 356A, and I am glad we have reached it today. We hoped to reach it prior to Christmas, but time did not permit. I know that she has championed this issue in the House before, and I welcome her contribution pressing the Government today. I also welcome the slight widening of the debate by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester to look at metro services.
I note the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and the terrible case of Claudia Lawrence. She has written to me separately on that. I have already instigated with my colleagues in the Home Office a response to the issues that she has raised. I hope she will forgive me if I concentrate on other matters today, but that is not off my agenda.
I know the whole Committee will support the fact that the Government have taken action on violence against women and girls, which is intolerable anywhere, including on the railway. The noble Baroness referenced the Government’s strategy on halving violence against women and girls, which was published in the House of Commons on the last day before Christmas. The Statement repeat has not happened in this House because the Opposition did not want it. That is fine—I understand that—but the commitment from the Government is very clear, and the recently published strategy to halve violence against women and girls is vital.
I also take the points on behaviour made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which is an encouraging comment as part of that because the points he made are valid, and I accept them. The British Transport Police is essential in helping us to deliver that objective of halving violence against women and girls, alongside police counterparts in Home Office forces. It may be helpful to the Committee to say that the British Transport Police, as the police force for the railway, is already required to prevent crime, and that includes the offences set out in the amendment. The British Transport Police undertakes activities across the railway to encourage victims and bystanders to report offences, and indeed poor behaviour, and will relentlessly pursue offenders. In BTP Policing Plan 2025-27, it has given specific commitments to prevent violence against women and girls through:
“Effective and sensitive investigation and robust offender management”,
and:
“Targeted activity to identify and apprehend those intent on offending”.
If it helps the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, I am very happy to provide, through my colleagues in the Department for Transport, a further meeting for her to look at that work and understand it at first hand.
The noble Baroness also mentioned rolling stock companies and the manufacture and leasing of trains to train operating companies. The design of trains is defined not by the rolling stock company but by the train operating company. Therefore, the proposal that the British Transport Police shares data on violence against women and girls with rolling stock companies would not lead to improvements in the design of train carriages, but I take her point. The British Transport Police already shares crime data with train operating companies, which can feed into the British Transport Police policing plans.
The noble Baroness will also, I hope, be aware that the Rail Safety and Standards Board already publishes key train requirement guidance that is used by train operating companies when ordering new trains. This helps detail the features that are to be included in the specification. The content of the document is prepared by a group of rolling stock experts representing train operating companies, manufacturers, leasing companies, industry bodies and the Department for Transport. Following input from security experts in the Department for Transport and BTP, new content has recently been prepared that includes additional measures to do exactly what the noble Baroness wishes, to enhance personal security, including those that seek to reduce violence against women and girls. The content has been included in a draft of the document that will be submitted for consultation with the rail industry. The intention— I hope this is helpful for the noble Baroness—is that it will be published in spring 2026. While it is not the legislative back-up that she is seeking in the amendment, I hope it meets the objective of the very valid points she has made today.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned sentencing. We had a full debate yesterday on the Sentencing Bill and the House made its decisions on it. There is a difference between us on that, but I want to see offenders brought to justice and people caught. That is an important part of our proposals regarding the prevention measures and the performance of the British Transport Police on these issues.
Amendment 356F in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy includes the introduction of a stand-alone offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Before I refer to what he has said, I will address the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. First, I confirm that we are having a meeting. It is in the plan; it will be sorted and is coming down the line very quickly. She referred to Clause 37 and the stand-alone offence on retail workers. We have taken the view that there should be a stand-alone offence because retail workers are upholding the law for the state on sales of alcohol, drugs, knives, cigarettes and a range of other matters. But I agree with her that it is essential that transport workers feel safe going about their job. There is no place for abuse and assault of any worker, and I know we will all agree with that.
The attack in Huntingdon in early November shocked and horrified us all. Tributes were paid at the time to the railway staff who stood in the way of alleged attackers and did their duty, and those matters will come to court in due course. But I must stress the important point—this goes to the heart of what my noble friend said—that if a public transport worker suffers violence or abuse at work, it is essential that they report it to the police so it can be investigated. We take that seriously in the police, the transport police and the railway, and elsewhere in the Home Office. As the dedicated police service for the railway, the British Transport Police is able to provide further reassurance to rail staff that it is there to protect them and will arrest offenders quickly.
The key point I want to make to my noble friend is that transport workers are already protected in legislation, as the noble Baroness touched on. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 makes offences against public-facing workers, in which transport workers would be included, an aggravating factor that the courts must consider in sentencing. As I said earlier in Committee, everybody is protected from assault. It is criminalised under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and that long-standing piece of legislation, the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The key point in this case is that transport workers are covered by that legislation, whereas—to return to Clause 37—retail workers were not covered in the way that public-facing workers are in relation to police and others. They are still covered by the main offences of the Criminal Justice Act, but the aggravating factor that we are introducing under Clause 37 deals with retail workers specifically. I am happy to discuss Clause 37 with the noble Baroness when we have the opportunity to meet very shortly regarding her concerns about the legislation.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister and I look forward to us discussing that at that time. I am not an expert in the law in this area, but I am genuinely surprised by what he has just said about the current legal provisions and protections for retail workers and the need for that which has been included in the Bill on the grounds that he has argued. If, as a result of this short debate, there is any need for him to clarify that further, that would be really helpful.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We are in danger of the Committee revisiting Clause 37. I have an opportunity to meet the noble Baroness, and we can discuss those issues then. I am saying to my noble friend, in relation to his amendment, that the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 makes offences against public-facing workers an aggravating offence. We are strengthening that for retail workers in the context of Clause 37, but we will revisit that when we have our further discussion.
Amendment 399, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway are made immediately accessible to BTP and to the relevant Home Office police force. I say to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that I welcome the aims of the amendment, as historically the lack of immediate access to railway CCTV images has been a significant issue for BTP that can reduce its ability to investigate crimes quickly.
However, and this is where we may differ, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address this issue. The noble Lord rightly said in his contribution that the Department for Transport has secured £17 million in funding to implement a system to provide more remote immediate access to station CCTV to the British Transport Police and the railway industry, and he welcomed that. I can say to him today that the Department for Transport will be funding Network Rail on behalf of the rail industry to deliver the project, which will cover the whole of the railway in England, Scotland and Wales, and prioritise stations where there are most passenger journeys.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Will the Minister take this idea to the British Transport Police? By the time one has done a three-hour journey, one is heartily sick of hearing, for the 20th time, “See it. Say it. Sorted”. Could it possibly intersperse between those announcements something like: “This coach has video recording. We will take action against any passengers who harass or cause trouble for others”? That may not be the right wording, but something warning about that might be helpful.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will give consideration to that with my colleagues in the Department for Transport. As somebody who travels every week on the train to this House, “See it. Say it. Sorted” appears on my journey on a number of occasions—in my case, in both English and Welsh. The noble Lord makes a valid point: there should be an acceptance and acknowledgment that the type of antisocial behaviour which he has referred to, at a low level, can be intimidating for individuals. The ability to undertake physical violence in the extreme form that allegedly took place in Huntingdon—I have to use the word “allegedly”—and the low-level abuse that might occur are significant issues. Transport staff on railways, from whichever railway company, and the teams that are operating require the support of the state to give them that back-up.
Under the current legislation, I believe that my noble friend’s amendment is not necessary. However, the general principle that we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and other speakers, including my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, via the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, is absolutely valid and was well worth raising. I hope that I have been able to give assurances on that and that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, will withdraw her amendment.
Lord Hendy (Lab)
My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend the Minister could find time in his busy timetable to see me and the RMT about this, because I did not quite understand what the distinction was between the creation of an offence of assaulting a retail worker at work, in Clause 37, and assaulting a transport worker at work, as in my amendment. I take the point about an aggravating factor in sentencing but the question is really about the creation of an offence. It seemed that there might be room for further discussion outside the Chamber.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My noble friend mentioned his noble kinsman, my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill, who is the Transport Minister. The British Transport Police are the responsibility of and answer to the Department for Transport. My other noble friend Lord Hendy is the Minister responsible for transport. If I may, I will refer that request to the Minister directly responsible for that policy in this Bill, so that they can consider what my noble friend has just said.
There is a distinction between the existing legislation that I have mentioned, which provides security against attack for public-facing workers, and the Clause 37 issue, which we have already debated. We may undoubtedly return to this on Report in several forms but, in the meantime, I would be grateful if the noble Baroness would withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. It is one of those that shows the Chamber at its finest, when there is a genuine discussion of some important issues. This was a deliberately narrow amendment, but I welcome the comments that have been made across the Committee on how it could be widened. I particularly welcome that of my noble friend Lady McIntosh about public spaces more broadly, but also the suggestion relating to other forms of public transport, especially trams. I expect that we could apply this to the Underground, not just in London but in other cities too.
I welcome the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, about behaviour on trains. The list of offences in proposed new subsection (2) is not exhaustive, and I fully take his point. There is an irony to debating this amendment at a rather more civilised time of the day than we might otherwise have done, had we reached it in December. One reason why I wanted to know whether we were going to reach the debate was that, because we sat late previously, I had to get a 10.30 pm train home to Leicestershire. I would describe myself as being rather robust, but I do not want to travel at half past 10 at night and get home to a deserted car park at nearly midnight. I do not think that anybody wants to do that, nor should we ask members of the House staff to do so. However, I will leave that debate about sitting hours for a very different set of noble Lords to consider.
I thank the Minister for his very helpful and constructive comments on my amendment. The Committee has identified that this is an issue about prevention of violence against women and girls, not just enforcement after the event. He rightly took the point that it is not just about British Transport Police but about working with the train operating companies, as he mentioned. I would very much like to take up his offer of a meeting, whether with Department for Transport officials or with the Rail Safety and Standards Board; he mentioned its forthcoming consultation. I think that we will return to this issue in the Railways Bill, so he can let the other noble Lord, Lord Hendy, know to expect such a debate. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“(2A) It is an offence for a person—(a) to have in their possession with intent to supply, or(b) be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply,an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would include a person concerned in the supplying of an electric device for use in vehicle offences within the scope of the offence in clause 110.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 356H is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It seeks to strengthen Clause 110 by ensuring that those who are concerned in the supplying of electronic devices used in vehicle theft are brought within the scope of the new offence.
Vehicle crime remains a persistent and evolving challenge. Organised criminal networks are increasingly turning to sophisticated electronic devices—such as signal jammers, key programmers, and relay attack tools—to bypass modern vehicle security systems. These devices are not sold in back alleys alone: they are traded online, often under the guise of legitimate diagnostic equipment, and then misused to facilitate theft. The law must keep pace with this reality. Clause 110 rightly takes some steps towards addressing this growing problem, and I welcome the new provisions.
However, I have one particular question for the Minister. What is the difference between this new offence and the offence of going equipped for stealing under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968? I note the different maximum penalties, being three years’ imprisonment for the Section 25 offence and five years’ imprisonment for the new offence in Clause 110, but is that the only difference? I ask this not to be overly critical but simply to understand the rationale behind the inclusion of this new offence.
I recognise that electronic devices for stealing vehicles are a new and evolving problem, and, as such, the new offence must be watertight. That is why I have tabled my amendment. I am sure the Minister will have a sense of déjà vu when speaking to this amendment. It is similar in nature to the amendment we tabled in Committee to Clause 13 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill last year. In that Bill, our amendment sought to add possession with the intent to supply to the new criminal offence of supplying an article for use in immigration crime. The Government listened to us and tabled their own amendment on Report to widen the scope of that offence to include being concerned in the supply of a relevant article. Amendment 356H is intended to close the same possible loophole in Clause 110 as existed in the original drafting of Clause 13 of the border security Bill.
Clause 110 contains two separate offences. Subsection (1) states:
“It is an offence to possess an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence”.
Subsection (2) states:
“It is an offence to import, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply”
such a device. That captures quite a wide range of activities, but what is missing from this aspect of the offence is possession with intent to supply such a device, or any other activity relating to the supply of these devices.
My amendment would address this gap by including two further offences. It explicitly includes possession with intent to supply an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device would be used in connection with the theft offence. It contains the same language that the Government brought forward for the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill. Proposed new paragraph (b) in the amendment therefore states that a person commits an offence if they are
“concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply”
such an electronic device. This would, I believe, capture those who are knowingly involved in the chain of supply: those who broker deals, advertise devices or otherwise facilitate their distribution.
Without this amendment, there is a risk that individuals who play a crucial role in enabling vehicle theft will escape liability simply because they are not the final supplier. That is a loophole we cannot afford to leave open. Given that the Government accepted that this was a gap in what is now the Section 13 offence in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, I hope the Minister will agree that it is a loophole in this offence that should be closed. I beg to move.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, we support the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. He has hit the nail on the head with this amendment about the intent to supply electronic devices for car theft, which has become an epidemic in this country. Data assessed by colleagues in the other House revealed that, in 2024, 75% of vehicle thefts were unsolved and only 2% resulted in a suspect being charged or summonsed, with 95,000 cases being unsolved. In November 2025, a BBC report showed that keyless car theft devices used by criminals can be found online and retail for around £20,000. According to that report, video guides and devices can be easily found online, allowing access to high-end cars such as Jaguars and Range Rovers and upwards. The Bill provides an offence for owning such a device. This amendment would address the potential loophole for those supplying the device.
I wait with interest to hear the Minister’s response. Motorists are taxed to the hilt, and pay road charges and congestion charges. I do not think it is unreasonable that the Government try to do something to protect motorists’ vehicles. All the money goes in—we pay our road taxes and our insurance. The numbers are staggering, with 95,000 cases last year unsolved. If you own a reasonably priced car, after working hard, there should be something to protect you from the people supplying the equipment rather just than the person using the equipment. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, briefly, I support my noble friend’s amendment, which seeks to fill a lacuna in Bill. It seems that the Government and my noble friend will be very close in what they trying to achieve, which is to remove these devices from sale and use and to make it more difficult for the criminals.
When the Minister responds, can he take the opportunity to say a word or two about enforcement? As the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said, these devices are advertised for sale online. I think the Committee would like to know what efforts the authorities will take to try to pursue proactively those suppliers—we heard an awful lot in another Bill about smashing the gangs. The Committee would benefit from some explanation of how this provision will be used. Clearly, if a criminal in a stolen motor vehicle has a device on them when they are arrested, that is pretty straightforward: they are on their way to do that. However, I am interested in tackling the root of the problem and the pursuit of the individuals who are supplying these devices. What measures can be taken to prevent that at source? I would be very grateful to know.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for explaining the purpose of this amendment. He is right to highlight the importance of the issue that it raises. The Met estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle theft, so I am glad that we have the opportunity to debate Clause 110 and the important measures it takes in relation to vehicle theft.
I certainly understand the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to make the offence in Clause 110 as tight as possible, but I hope to persuade him, and your Lordships’ Committee, that the amendment is unnecessary. In particular, I do not believe that there is a gap in the offences provided for in Clause 110. Further, the amendment would require the police and prosecution to prove intent, rather than the burden being on the defendant to do so. This would have the effect of weakening the offence, as it would place a higher bar on the prosecution to secure a conviction.
By way of background, Clause 110 provides for two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply these devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or the theft of anything in a vehicle.
This amendment seeks to extend those offences to include a person concerned in the supplying of an electronic device for use in vehicle offences. However, Clause 110 already makes provision for it to be an offence to possess a device where it appears that there could be an intention to supply. It outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it was on the premises at the same time as the accused, or on the premises of which the accused was the occupier or a habitual user other than as a member of the public. I point out that the amendment would require the prosecution to prove intent to use the device to commit theft. As I have already said, this is a higher bar than the clause as drafted.
Clause 110 outlines:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence … to show that the person did not intend or suspect that the device would be used in connection”
with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. A court can therefore infer that the articles in question are intended for use in vehicle theft. This reflects the fact that there are likely to be few legitimate uses for those specified articles. It is appropriate to expect that those who are involved with such articles should be alert to the possible use of the articles for criminal purposes. The amendment states that it would be
“an offence for a person to … be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, an electronic device”.
I am not sure that such wording materially expands the scope of the offence. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine who may be captured by such wording who will not already be captured by the existing wording in the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked a specific question around whether offenders could be charged with going equipped to commit theft under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968. These existing offences put the burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s intention to steal a vehicle or something from inside the vehicle. This new offence places the burden on the defendant to prove that they were not intending to steal a vehicle, or that the device would not be used to steal a vehicle or commit vehicle crime.
I note that, in his contribution, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, asked about the online sale of devices. Under the Online Safety Act 2023, there is a new duty placed on social media and tech companies to prevent the advertisement of stolen goods and devices that facilitate crime. Online sales platforms will block adverts and listings for items that are illegal to sell; sales platforms already do this for other illegal items.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, with respect to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, it is fair to say the offence deals with a different set of circumstances from the offences in that Act. However, we will take away the comments and ensure that there are no gaps in the offence. I appreciate him raising the point.
For all these reasons, I am not persuaded that the amendment is required, and I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw it.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Goschen and to the Liberal Democrats for their support for this amendment. The purpose of the amendment is not to widen the offence indiscriminately but to ensure that Clause 110 operates as Parliament clearly intends. Without explicitly including those who are concerned in supplying these devices, the offence risks capturing only the least sophisticated actors, while leaving untouched those who organise, promote and enable the trade from behind the scenes.
The reality of modern vehicle crime is that it is technologically advanced and often commercially organised, and those involved in supply chains are frequently well aware of the criminal end use of the devices they help distribute. Yet they structure their involvement precisely to avoid possession, and that is a gap that criminals will exploit if we allow it to remain. I hope that the Minister will reflect on the constructive nature of this proposal, given that the Government are aware of and have acknowledged the potential gap in the legislation. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Prevention of resale of stolen GPS products(1) The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) In Section 1(2)(b), after “commercial activities” insert, “including GPS equipment”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause extends the Equipment Theft Act 2023 to specifically include the theft of GPS equipment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 357, first tabled by my party in the other place last year, would extend the operation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act by making explicit reference to GPS equipment or, as the industry now prefers, global navigation satellite systems.
For several years, Liberal Democrats have highlighted the sharp rise in rural crime, with organised gangs systematically targeting farms and rural businesses. Their focus has been on stealing high-value GPS drones, receivers and in-cab screens from tractors and harvesters. This equipment is worth thousands of pounds and is essential for modern precision farming. The loss of these units leaves farmers facing costly delays and crop losses at critical times of the year. These thefts have formed part of a well-organised international trade whereby equipment is stripped, containerised and shipped overseas, often beyond recovery. Crucially, offences spiked as rural policing came under ever-increasing strain. Local stations were closed and experienced neighbourhood teams hollowed out, taking with them the deep local knowledge that underpins effective intelligence gathering.
Organised gangs stepped into that vacuum, criss-crossing county boundaries with little deterrence. We recognise that real progress has been made over the last year, with insurance claims for GPS theft now starting to fall, thanks to greater collaboration between farmers, insurers, police and the National Rural Crime Network, whose invaluable work is now rightly benefiting from strengthened national funding and support. The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act should build on that work, offering a strong framework for prevention, giving the Secretary of State powers to require immobilisers and the marking and registration of agricultural machinery, and to extend these measures to other equipment by regulation.
Amendment 357 would strengthen that framework by naming GPS units explicitly in the primary legislation. This would give a clear signal of intent, ensure momentum and guard against any further delay in bringing the provisions into effect. We welcome the Government’s recent commitment to include removable GPS units in future regulations and I am pleased that Ministers have listened to evidence presented from these Benches and others. The reality, however, is that the key provisions of the Act have not yet been brought into force and the secondary legislation required to implement them is still pending. Our amendment would ensure timely and decisive action, so that farmers and rural businesses see the benefits on the ground sooner rather than later. This is a simple, practical step that would support the Government’s aims and help stop the theft and resale of vital agricultural technology. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.
The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.
Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.
Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses an issue that will be immediately recognisable to many people across the country: the theft of essential equipment from those who rely on it for their living. Turning first to Amendment 357, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, we broadly support the intention behind extending the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023. This was an Act brought in by the Conservative Government to protect businessmen and tradespeople, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would ensure that it explicitly includes GPS equipment. Technology becomes ever more central to commercial activity, particularly in agriculture, construction and logistics. It is therefore right that the law keeps pace with the evolving nature of equipment theft. GPS units are high-value, easily resold and frequently targeted. Bringing them clearly within scope of the Act is a sensible and proportionate step to help disrupt illicit resale markets.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this debate and raising these important issues. Turning first to Amendment 357, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I can confirm that the Government remain committed to the implementation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 and fully support the intentions behind its introduction. Informed by responses to the call for evidence and direct consultation with industry, the Act will cover the forensic marking and registration on a database of new all-terrain vehicles, quad bikes and, I am pleased to say, removable GPS systems.
The NFU Mutual Rural Crime Report 2025 highlights that GPS theft cost an estimated £1.2 million in 2024. GPS units are particularly vulnerable to theft and their theft massively disrupts day-to-day farming operations, which is exactly why we have included them in the legislation. I am pleased to echo the acknowledgement by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, of the progress that has been made in this important area, with, as she said, falling insurance claims thanks to the concerted efforts of the police and other parties.
The Act requires secondary legislation before it can come into effect and we intend to bring this forward as soon as possible. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, the Government’s response to the call for evidence was published quite recently, in October 2025. We are very grateful to all those who took the time to respond, and we carefully considered the views and evidence provided in those responses. Significant technical concerns were raised and we needed to assess the impact before we committed to introducing secondary legislation. We did not want to introduce regulations that were not fit for purpose or, more importantly, that would adversely impact vehicle safety.
The noble Lord talked about the comparison between smaller vehicles and larger, more expensive farming machinery, such as tractors. We have carefully considered the benefits and implications of including other agricultural equipment in the regulations. The installation of immobilisers into other large pieces of machinery post manufacture poses a similar risk to ATVs, so there is a delicate balance to be struck between the costs to businesses and the achievability of the ends of the regulations.
Should the Act become more effective in tackling rural theft, the legislation would be widened in the future by introducing other large agricultural machinery in a further tranche of regulations. We are looking at the situation and the way the regulations operate, and will see whether we can apply them further.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Can the Minister give a rough timescale for a consultation on extending this to include heavy agricultural machinery or contracting equipment?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not want to commit to any particular timescale. It probably ill behoves me to do so, but I will point out that, having published our response to the call for evidence a couple of months before Christmas, we are obviously trying to motor ahead with it, if noble Lords will forgive the pun.
I turn now to Amendment 368, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which proposes two changes: first, to expand enforcement provisions under the 2023 Act and, secondly, to introduce a statutory aggravating factor for theft of tools from tradesmen under the Sentencing Act 2020. The Government recognise the distress caused by tool theft and its impact on tradespeople and small businesses, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke to. As he said, these tools are essential to livelihoods, and their loss can cause real financial and emotional harm. That is why we are already taking action through the National Vehicle Crime Working Group, which brings together specialists from every police force to share intelligence and tackle emerging trends in vehicle-related crime, including tool theft.
On sentencing, the current framework is sufficient and robust. Courts must follow guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, which already require consideration of harm, culpability and aggravating factors such as financial loss, business impact and emotional distress. Courts also have powers to impose compensation orders to ensure that victims receive financial compensation. Introducing a statutory aggravating factor, as this amendment calls for, would duplicate existing provisions unnecessarily and have limited impact on outcomes. Indeed, I am reminded that a wise man once said,
“I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors”.—[Official Report, 15/12/25; col. 585.]
That was of course the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, speaking just three weeks ago, on 15 December, in response to an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to Clause 102 on self-harm. I could not have put it better myself.
I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we accept the spirit of her Amendment 357 and we are working to give effect to this issue. I hope too that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 368 to be necessary, and forgive my light ribbing a moment ago. For all these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and to the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Davies of Gower, for their support. We all want this legislation to be effective, but we want swift implementation of the Act, not in the fullness of time, and stronger rural crime prevention, including forensic marking, to deter the theft and resale of tradespeople’s tools.
GPS theft cost farmers over £1 million last year. Frankly, this just cannot be allowed to continue. There is legislation ready to go—there is an Act of Parliament—and it needs to be implemented now. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that SIM farms would also include devices capable of using virtual SIM cards rather than only physical SIM cards.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, as this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, I apologise that I was unable to take part in the Second Reading debate due to a clash with other House business.
Amendment 358 is a very simple extension to what the Bill already does, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for adding their support to it.
I was a member of the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired brilliantly by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, which reported in November 2022. It was a lengthy report—fraud is a huge subject—with many recommendations. One area we raised was the use of SIM farms by fraudsters to send out bulk texts and make bulk calls, so I am very pleased that we are at last bringing in restrictions on the use and supply of SIM farms in Clauses 112 to 117. I am glad that the Bill allows other articles to be added to this. Both technology and the ways in which fraudsters use that technology to make contact with potential victims are constantly changing, so having the flexibility to react is important. It is also important to recognise, as the Bill does, that there are some legitimate reasons for the use of a SIM farm.
Unfortunately, however, the world has moved on since we reported in 2022. Clause 114 defines a SIM farm as
“a device which is capable of using five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably”.
It then goes on to define a SIM card as being
“a removable physical subscriber identity module”.
The problem is that physical SIMs are being overtaken by virtual SIMs, or eSIMs. A number of the latest phones no longer even have slots for physical SIM cards, and the trend is accelerating. The SIM farm restrictions that the Bill introduces are already at risk of being redundant before the Bill is even passed.
Amendment 358 simply attempts to fix this by including virtual SIMs in the definition, so that SIM farms that utilise eSIMs will also be covered from day one. If we do not make this change, the SIM farm restrictions will quickly be pointless. I realise that this might be a little more complicated, as a number of newer phones can store more than five eSIMs—although most only allow two to be active at any one time—so we might need to make some tweaks to the wording of Clause 114 a little further than this amendment does. But the point remains: we know that physical SIM cards are being phased out over time, to be replaced by eSIMs, so we should act now to ensure that this part of the Bill is not redundant as soon as it comes into force. That is the point of this amendment.
However, the use of SIM farms raises a wider issue, on which I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views. We can ban the sale and use of SIM farms in this country, and we should, but fraud increasingly comes from overseas, where a UK ban will have little or no impact. The real problem is that fraudsters are able to acquire an apparently limitless supply of UK mobile phone numbers. I do not know about other noble Lords, but I am currently receiving almost daily calls from UK mobile numbers, where someone who speaks poor English tells me they are calling from O2 and there is a problem with my SIM card. It does not matter how many I block; they just keep coming, each time on a different number, and I am sure I am not alone in that.
In November 2022, Ofcom issued guidance to telecoms companies about the allocation and supply of UK phone numbers. The guide set out the steps that Ofcom expects providers to take when suballocating and assigning numbers. Numbers can be suballocated an unlimited number of times, which makes controlling who ultimately acquires them difficult, and the guidance is only as good as the final link in that chain.
The guide covers three areas: due diligence checks before suballocating or assigning numbers; ensuring continued compliance and reassessing risk after the transfer of the numbers; and responding to incidents of misuse. But despite this guide, it remains almost comically easy to acquire pay-as-you-go SIM cards in bulk. A quick Google search shows myriad websites of varying legitimacy selling bulk SIMs, both physical and eSIMs. The very first listing on an eBay search for bulk SIMs is a package of 1,000 EE pay-as-you-go SIM cards for £999 or best offer. Many of the websites have reseller arrangements where anyone can earn commission by selling SIMs on to further end-users.
There are legitimate reasons why someone might buy SIMs in bulk: internet of things connectivity, company travel or legitimate mass marketing, for example. But they can also be used for mass scam phishing messages or calls, identity theft, SIM swapping, money laundering and creating bulk social media accounts, to list just a few.
It is too easy for fraudsters to acquire large numbers of genuine UK numbers under the current system. This is not about spoofing numbers; these are real numbers. KYC checks on end-users of bulk SIMS appear to be laughably weak and do not appear to be policed in any meaningful way. When was a telco last fined for this? What meaningful monitoring actually takes place of where these numbers end up and how they are used?
The new voluntary UK Telecommunications Fraud Sector Charter, published in November, says only that signatories will:
“Continue to implement existing CCUK guidance on preventing misuse of sub-allocated and assigned numbers and monitoring for fraudulent calling patterns”.
That is clearly not working at present. We need to do more.
In addition to his response to the specific amendment on eSIMS, I would be grateful to hear the thoughts of the Minister on how we might make life more difficult for the fraudsters who are able to operate easily on an industrial scale from foreign countries using real UK phone numbers. Does he agree that it is time to strengthen, monitor and enforce KYC rules on the bulk sale of phone numbers? I beg to move.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, I added my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. Like him, I served on the Select Committee on fraud, ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes, that produced a very substantial document indeed. After we produced our report, the Government published a consultation document headed Preventing the Use of SIM Farms for Fraud. In December 2023, the Government published their response to that document. I want to quote briefly from three paragraphs of that response.
Referring to the responses they got, the Government said:
“A few responses noted that banning physical SIM farms alone is likely to result in displacement to eSIM farms”,
which is the point that has just been made. They went on:
“However they acknowledged that if eSIMs were included to the proposed ban, the Government’s definition of SIM farms should be adapted to ensure it excludes smartphones that can hold more than four eSIMs”.
The Government’s response to that section was:
“Responses noted that the definition could also include eSIMs and mobile apps. However, we did not receive sufficient evidence at consultation to include them in a proposed ban, due to their complexity and ongoing pace of development. This could be further addressed by the proposed powers to extend the ban to other forms of telecommunications equipment and articles used to perpetrate fraud”.
They referred to a further final paragraph headed “Government response”:
“The Government considers it important to ensure that the ban is flexible and can be used to rapidly prohibit other types of technology where these are identified in the future. Some such technologies are mentioned above, whilst others may emerge in future and the Government will continue to review fraud methodologies closely for changing patterns and new technologies being used, such as eSIM farms and others. However, the Government agrees with respondents that any powers to ban through secondary legislation ought to have clear parameters for their use”.
That was the last Administration, of course, and it would be helpful to know whether the Government agree with that line.
The question I want to ask the Minister is this. Referring to the clauses on SIM farms, Clause 114(4) says:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section (other than this subsection)”.
Is that in effect giving the Secretary of State powers to introduce by secondary legislation something that the previous Government said should not be done by secondary legislation? I leave that question hanging in the air while the Government seek advice from the Bench to see what the answer is.
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will briefly speak to Amendment 358. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Young of Cookham. Because we are going to be discussing this and a later amendment on fraud, I declare my interest as a director of Santander UK.
It was a huge pleasure and privilege to chair the Lords inquiry into online and digital fraud, which reported in 2022, and I would like to think that we had some impact in raising the issues, which are of huge importance to the public. Fraud is one of the crimes that people are most likely to be victims of. I know the Minister knows that because he is the Anti-Fraud Minister in the department.
Noble Lords have already spoken about the importance of this amendment, the need for the law to be kept up to date as the technology develops, and the fact that allowing as much flexibility in legislation as possible to enable that to happen is important. The reason we talked about the “fraud chain” in the report is that, obviously, people encounter fraud in myriad ways. Fraudsters are, as we have heard, incredibly flexible, and entrepreneurial—for all the wrong reasons. Of course, telecoms—people’s smartphones or phones—is where many people will first encounter the fraudster, who will then try, as we heard in our evidence, to get them away from technology and strike up some kind of relationship which unfortunately ends in people often losing life-changing amounts of money.
I do not want to pre-empt the debate on Amendment 367, which I hope we will also reach today, but the question, perhaps now or for later, is whether the Minister is confident that the previous Government’s and this current Government’s ask of the telecoms industry is strong enough given the frequency with which the public encounter fraud via their telephones. I will ask the question now, but I am sure we will come back to it. We are all waiting for the forthcoming fraud strategy from the Government, which we understand is—I hope—close. Can the Minister give us a little precursor of whether that will impose tougher asks and potential penalties on the telecoms companies for the reasons that we have already heard?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 358 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, who have made the case extremely well today. I pay tribute to the Fraud Act committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and I shall quote from it extensively in the next group.
This amendment would rightly ensure that the definition of a specified article included devices capable of using virtual subscriber identity modules, not just physical SIM cards. As we have heard, the criminal landscape evolves rapidly. If we legislate only for plastic SIMs, criminals will simply pivot to readily available virtual SIM technology. By incorporating virtual SIMs into the definition now, we will help to future-proof these provisions and make them genuinely effective against highly scalable, technology-enabled fraud.
Clauses 112 to 117 quite rightly seek to address the serious and growing problem of SIM farms being used at scale to perpetrate fraud and other abuses—it was very interesting to hear the quotes of the noble Lord, Lord Young, from the Select Committee’s report, which demonstrates that the problem has been with us for several years now—but, as drafted, Clause 114 risks being a technological step behind the criminals. As we have heard, it refers to devices capable of using physical SIM cards, but the market is already rapidly moving towards virtual or embedded SIMs. Indeed, I have an iPad in my hand that has a virtual SIM inside it—no physical SIM card at all. If the Bill focuses only on the plastic card and not the underlying functionality, it will leave an obvious loophole that organised criminals will quickly exploit.
The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke of “entrepreneurial” but not in a good way. We know that fraudsters are highly adaptive. As mobile operators deploy more robust controls on physical SIMs—I suspect not enough for the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—and as handsets and routers increasingly use eSIMs or other virtual identities, those intent on running industrial-scale smishing and scam operations will migrate to those platforms. If we legislate today for yesterday’s technology, we will simply displace the problem from one category of device to another and be back here in a few years’ time having the same debate. I hope the Minister will be able either to accept the amendment or to confirm that the Government will bring forward their own wording—there is always a bit of “not invented here” with these things. Without that assurance, there is a real risk that this part of the Bill will be lacking in force from the day it comes into effect.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for speaking to this group. On his Amendment 358, I agree that the Government should look to make provisions that account for all forms of SIM cards used in SIM farms. As the noble Lord stated, the current drafting of Clause 114 does not encompass eSIM cards in the devices used for SIM farming. Given the number of mobile phones that now use eSIMs, this really should be amended.
This speaks to the larger issue of defining provisions ahead of legislation coming into force. When changes are being made to the legality of certain products, suppliers and consumers should be made aware well in advance; behaviours will have to change with reform. This is a case of not just courtesy but constitutional propriety. That is the reasoning behind my Amendments 358A and 538A.
Legislating for the criminalisation of specific devices and software related to fraud should not be done on a whim. Individuals should not wake up one day and possess an illegal device or software that was considered legal a day before, with no warning of the coming change. Some notice must be given. Currently, the Bill simply permits Ministers to specify a device whenever they wish. There is no requirement for those regulations to come into force before the new offences of possession and supply come into force. My amendments would ensure, in the interests of fairness and the rule of law, that the new offences could not come into force until at least three months had passed from the making of the regulations defining the articles.
I believe that a period of three months before the possession and supply of certain articles becomes illegal is sufficient for people to change their habits and businesses to change their models. We in this House would be doing the public a disservice if we did not provide them with the necessary time to adapt. I hope the Minister agrees with this reasoning. I hope he will consider the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and, as always, I look forward very much to hearing his reply.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I first give my appreciation to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Vaux of Harrowden, in producing their report on this matter. It was during my enforced sabbatical from Parliament, so I was not party to the discussions at that stage. It is useful to have that continuum of discussion, and the previous Government’s initial intentions have been carried forward by this Government as a whole.
Amendment 358, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, mentioned, would expand the definition of SIM cards. To be clear, the Government’s consultation and evidence gathering as part of the preparation for this Bill focused on physical SIM cards, which are where the current and most significant threats arise and what these clauses seek to address. The provisions in the Bill are designed to tackle the misuse of physical SIM farms, which are widely used for criminal purposes such as fraud and spam. We are all aware of how that manifests on our phones and those of people we know and work with.
Virtual SIM technology is developing, but it is not currently presenting the same scale of risk, and the evidence we have from the consultation does not support extending the ban at this time. Physical SIM farms pose a significant and immediate threat because they enable large-scale criminal activity. Unlike virtual SIMs, physical SIM cards are harder to trace, as they are not inherently linked to a specific handset or verified identity. Their anonymity makes them ideal for fraud, phishing and mass spam campaigns.
Furthermore, the trade in physical SIM cards creates a black market where thousands of cards can be bought and sold with minimal or no oversight. This flow of unregistered SIMs fuels organised crime, facilitates money laundering and undermines law enforcement efforts. Virtual SIM technology, by contrast, is generally more secure and traceable because it requires integration with the device software and often involves stronger identity checks. At present, I say again, there is no evidence of virtual SIMs being exploited at scale for criminal purposes. Our focus therefore remains on the tangible and proven harm caused by physical SIM cards.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but important debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his detailed response. I think I speak for all of us in saying that we look forward enormously to seeing the long-awaited fraud strategy. I think it will be the third one since I have been in this House. Anyway, a lot of what the Minister said definitely moves in the right direction.
On the amendment, I am a little disappointed because, although I hear what the Minister says about the evidence base, which is obviously backward-looking, we know that the situation is changing. Physical SIMs are being replaced by eSIMs at a fairly rapid rate. This is something that we know is changing and it would be better to future-proof the Bill at this stage if we can. I take on board his point that eSIMs are more traceable than physical SIMs. But part of the problem is that that is not always the case in a lot of countries, and eSIMs can be from anywhere. So, I take only a certain amount of comfort from that.
That said, and given the Minister’s assurances that this will continue to be looked at and, if the evidence base supports it, changed, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Digital identity theft(1) A person commits an offence of digital identity theft if—(a) the person obtains, or attempts to obtain, personal or sensitive information relating to an individual, including but not limited to passwords, identification numbers, credit card numbers, national insurance numbers, biometric data, or other unique digital identifiers, and(b) the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “personal or sensitive information” refers to any data, whether digital, physical, or otherwise, that can be used to identify, authenticate, or impersonate an individual;(b) “obtains” includes acquiring, accessing, collecting, or otherwise coming into possession of such information.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of digital identity theft.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 359 would create a new offence of digital identity theft. I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has signed and supports it.
The amendment is deliberately tightly framed. It targets the foundational act that underpins so much modern fraud and serious criminality: the deliberate harvesting of someone else’s personal and sensitive information with the intent to impersonate them and conduct transactions, activities or communications in their name without their knowledge or consent. It is about criminalising the act of stealing and weaponising a digital identity before the fraud or other downstream offending takes place.
As things stand—and I hope the Minister will confirm this and, indeed, that the promised fraud strategy will recognise—the act of identity theft is not recognised in our law as a criminal offence in its own right. The Fraud Act 2006, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Data Protection Act 2018 and subsequent data protection Acts all play an important role, but they are concerned primarily with what happens after the identity has been stolen—after the account has been opened, the loan has been taken out or the money has been moved. They address the fraud, the unauthorised access or the misuse of data. What they do not do is grapple squarely with the initial acquisition of personal and sensitive information with the purpose of impersonation.
Indeed, as the House of Lords Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, heard in evidence, identity theft is still formally regarded in much official material as a social rather than a legal concept. That might have been tolerable in a predominantly analogue world, but it is simply not credible in the age of data breaches, credential stuffing, deepfakes and synthetic identities. Treating identity theft as a mere background condition rather than as a legal wrong in itself leaves people’s most intimate identifiers—biometric data, passwords, national insurance numbers and digital credentials—fundamentally underprotected.
The effect in practice is that law enforcement may feel it has limited tools to intervene at an early stage, even where there is clear evidence that large quantities of personal data have been harvested and traded with a view to impersonation. Instead, the system waits for the fraud, money laundering or other downstream crime to crystallise. By then, the victim’s credit record may be shredded, their bank accounts compromised and their reputation damaged. Yet the initial act of stealing their identity remains conceptually elusive.
The scale and nature of digital identity theft make this gap increasingly untenable. We now know that organised criminals and fraudsters operate, in effect, industrial-scale harvesting operations, feeding on the constant stream of data breaches and leaks from both public and private sector systems. Those databases of stolen credentials are then traded, refined and recombined, very often on the dark web, to facilitate mass impersonation and fraud. This activity is not just an adjunct to fraud. It is, as the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee rightly described it, a “predicate action”—a necessary precursor to a great deal of online financial crime and, in some cases, to other serious and organised criminality, including terrorism financing.
The threat is being turbocharged by new technologies. Large language models enable highly convincing phishing and social engineering communications at scale and with very low cost. Deepfake audio and video systems allow criminals to mimic a person’s voice or image in ways that can be all but indistinguishable from the real thing. When those tools are combined with rich stolen identity data, criminals can construct synthetic identities or impersonate genuine individuals to open bank accounts, obtain credit cards, register mobile phones and pass remote know your customer checks with alarming ease. In that ecosystem, the act of stealing and collating identity data is itself a sophisticated, harmful criminal enterprise, not simply background noise.
The Bill is rightly concerned with modernising a range of policing and crime powers for the digital age. It updates police powers in relation to electronic devices and remotely stored data and seeks to equip the criminal justice system to deal with contemporary threats, yet it does not deal with this most basic of digital harms: the theft of a person’s identity. That is why this amendment would define a clear, free-standing offence of digital identity theft.
The test that the amendment proposes is straight- forward and proportionate. A person would commit the offence if
“the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority”.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in this Committee and to follow my friend the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who perfectly and proportionately set out the principles in this amendment, which I support to every last sentence. We are now discussing a number of amendments on areas where the existing law, and this Bill as drafted, are clearly out of date and full of gaps—not least when we consider how our nation, our economy and the state itself are seeking to move to digitisation, which has such benefits for citizens and communities, our cities and our entire country. But one key element which enables, empowers and underpins almost every element of that digital transformation is effective digital ID.
There are a number of arguments that could be made at another time about the correct approach to digital ID. I would suggest that the principles around self-sovereign ID should strongly be considered. Mandation is clearly problematic, while the reasons for introducing a digital ID should be clearly made and the benefits set out. But the specifics of this amendment are clear, proportionate and timely, because a digital ID is critical and essential to availing oneself of the opportunities—and, indeed, to protecting oneself against many of the harms. To not have a digital ID protected by the criminal law would be a huge, inexplicable and indefensible gap.
If the Government want digital ID to be the means of accessing government services and to see greater digital inclusion—and, through that, the attendant and very necessary financial inclusion—action to protect our digital ID is critical. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones effectively set out his amendment, which is proportionate, valid, timely and necessary. I very much look forward to the Minister accepting the principle as set out.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, identity theft, as my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond said, is no longer a niche crime; it is the dominant fraud type in the UK and getting worse. In 2024, over 421,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database and almost 250,000 were identity fraud filings, making identity theft the single largest category recorded by industry partners. CIFAS, the credit industry fraud avoidance system, recorded a record number of cases on the national fraud database in 2024. The organisations themselves prevented more than £2.1 billion of attempted loss, yet criminals are shifting tactics. Account takeovers rose by 76% and unauthorised SIM swaps surged, driven by the rapid adoption of AI and generative tools that let fraudsters create convincing fake documents and synthetic identities at scale.
We have all read of some of the high-profile examples: celebrity impersonation via deepfakes and cloned voices has been widely reported; manipulated videos and voice clones purporting to show public figures from Elon Musk to Martin Lewis, Holly Willoughby and others, have been used to generate investment scams and phishing campaigns. Documented victim losses include large individual losses linked to celebrity impersonation scams. One NatWest customer is reported to have lost £150,000 after responding to a scam impersonating Martin Lewis.
However, I think we are all more concerned with the tens of thousands of ordinary people who are not celebrities and who lose all their savings to these crooks. They are the victims who suffer real financial loss and damage, with long and costly recovery processes, while businesses face rising prevention costs and operational strain. I therefore strongly support the concept of the draft clause and the need for it. While it is well intentioned, I fear that it has some technical difficulties. It is a bit broad and vague about what “obtains” and “impersonate” mean. It also risks overlap with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act and the Data Protection Act, and lacks some clear defences for legitimate security research and lawful investigations. It also needs to address AI and the deepfake-specific methods, and set out what we can do about extraterritorial reach, for example, or aggravating factors for organised, large-scale operations.
We all know that my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond is, as we have just heard, an absolute expert on AI; he recently addressed a top-level group of the Council of Europe on this subject. May I suggest that he and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, get together with the Home Office or other government digital experts and bring back on Report a more tightly drafted amendment? Among other things, it should tighten the definitions of “obtain”, “impersonate” and “sensitive”; ensure that the mens rea is tied to dishonesty or intent to cause loss or gain; include recklessness in enabling others; limit the scope to unlawfully obtained data or use that bypasses authentication; and explicitly include AI/deepfake methods when used to bypass checks or cause reliance. It should also have clear defences for lawful authority and make sure that duplication is avoided, whether it be with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act or the Data Protection Act. Finally—I know this is an impossible ask, and that Governments find it almost impossible to do—something should be done about extraterritorial reach, because that is terribly important.
I say to the Minister: there is a gap in the legislation here. We should plug it, and we may have time to bring back on Report a more tightly drawn amendment that would deal with all the concerns of noble Lords and the possible problems I have just raised.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support strongly the comments of my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the principle of the amendment laid by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This is a timely amendment, possibly timelier than the noble Lord anticipated, because today the Government have announced the promotion of a Minister to promulgate digital IDs among the population.
Digital IDs are going to have a huge vista and connection, not just in linking to personal data but in other areas of life: in the relationship between the state and the individual; and in the payment of parking tickets, road tolls, stamp duty and fishing licences—a different sort of fishing, as it begins with an “f”, not a “p”. So I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the thrust of the amendment, although I accept that some polishing is required.
If the Government are to promote digital IDs, the population at large need to have confidence not just that they will be correctly introduced but that there are safeguards against such impersonation. I strongly support the principle of this amendment and say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that if the Government resist it in principle, what confidence can the man in the street have that the Government are sincere about the safeguards they intend to introduce, alongside their intention for digital IDs—to get that balance right between the state and the individual, coupled together against the criminal?
We need to bring this back on Report. I hope the Minister is prepared to meet the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others to address this principle, so that the Government get off on the right foot, if they intend to promote digital IDs, and not resist this, because there is a world of pain if they do.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling this amendment. I know that the creation of a specific identity offence has been a long-standing concern of his, so I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this debate. I tentatively support the principle behind his amendment, although this issue is deserving of more scrutiny and thought than we are perhaps able to give it as an amendment in Committee.
I recognise the impetus for this amendment. Identity theft has long been the primary means by which criminals commit fraud; and, with a booming online world exacerbated by the introduction of artificial intelligence, digital identity theft is fast becoming a serious issue. CIFAS, the leading non-profit fraud prevention service, has documented the rise in identity theft. Last year, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, over 420,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database, a 13% increase on the previous year. The main driver of this increase was identity fraud, with 250,000 filings, representing a 5% annual increase.
CIFAS cites online fraud as a primary cause of this increase; AI and generative technologies enable criminals to exploit people at speed and scale. Documents and identity cards are being forged at a more sophisticated level than before, with many now able to pass verification checks. Targets are often the elderly, as criminals target the least technologically capable and therefore most vulnerable victims.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling the amendment, which would introduce a bespoke criminal offence of digital identity theft. I know that he has tabled similar amendments—he was persistent on these matters during the Data (Use and Access) Bill. I heard the support from the noble Lords, Lord Holmes of Richmond, Lord Fuller and Lord Blencathra, and note that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, put forward a number of caveats to his broad support. These are caveats I share.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether I would read out a number of amendments to previous legislation. I may disappoint him by reaffirming those issues, as he would expect. Although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, there are, as he recognises, several criminal offences already in existence to cover the behaviour targeted by his amendment. The Fraud Act 2006 made it a criminal offence to gain from the use of another person’s fraud. Cases where accounts or databases are hacked into are criminalised under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I could read him the offences captured in Sections 2 and 6 of the Fraud Act, Sections 1 and 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018. All apply to the online sphere.
My argument, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, might have some sympathy with, is that to create a new criminal offence could be unnecessary duplication. The Fraud Act 2006 captures cases where someone uses another person’s identity and there is an equivalent common-law offence in Scotland. The Fraud Act establishes the offence of someone having in their possession or control an article which includes data or programmes in electronic form. The Computer Misuse Act criminalises unauthorised access and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act covers the deliberate or reckless obtaining, disclosing and procuring of personal data.
That is not to downplay the issue that the noble Lord mentioned. It is important and I recognise the concerns he raised. I hope that the Government will act decisively on these matters. We are currently in the process of transitioning from the Action Fraud service to a new, upgraded platform that will provide a better reporting tool for victims, stronger intelligence flows for police forces and enhanced support for victims. We are looking at doing what the noble Lord wants and upskilling police officers. We have completed a full review of police skills and the recommendations are being delivered through updated police training on this important matter. He will know that this Government have made sure that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has now updated the strategic police requirement. That will be published this year and will drive forces to upskill their staff on wider police reform on fraud matters. We want to try to upscale and upskill capability, to ensure the police keep pace with the challenges that the noble Lord has rightly identified.
It is important to take on board the points that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned in his supportive critique of the proposals in the amendment. The Home Office has commissioned an independent review into disclosure and fraud offences. Part 1 of the review, which addressed disclosure, has been conducted; part 2, with Jonathan Fisher KC leading for the Government, will examine whether the current fraud offences are fit for purpose, and specifically whether they meet the challenges of investigating and prosecuting fraud, and whether existing penalties remain proportionate. I am awaiting that report, which may cover the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned. It is important that we have proper examination of that, and that is currently ongoing.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Without wishing to interrupt the Minister, could he give us an idea of the timescale? Would it be deliriously possibly to see this report before Report?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I should have tattooed on my forehead the words, “due course”. As ever, the commitment I can give is that it will be produced in due course. Report on the Bill will be some significant time away. We have another five days of Committee, with a gap for recess, and we will have a statutory gap before our consideration on Report after Committee has finished. It is some while away. The noble Lord is very adept at tabling further amendments on Report, should he so wish.
Part 2 of the report is being considered by the Government; we want to examine that and will publish in due course. I expect that, in the very near future, we will be producing the newly updated fraud strategy, which will address the evolving threat of fraud, including the harm caused by identity theft. Before the noble Lord intervenes, I cannot yet give him a date for that either, but I will try to help the Committee by saying that it will be soon. I will bring the fraud strategy to the House in due course, which will potentially cover some of the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned.
There is a lot going on, but there is existing legislation. I anticipate and understand that this is a genuine issue, and I very much welcome the fact that the noble Lord has brought it before us. I hope that on the basis of what I have said, he will—today, at least—withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and I will respond in a second.
First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for agreeing with the thrust of the amendment, in his words, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his in principle support. I entirely accept the points that he made—indeed, if the additions are not there, they should be. Any amendment that is brought back on Report should definitely take heed of the reservations he raised.
For the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, I was anticipating that, in a sense, there might be too much continuity. During the Data (Use and Access) Bill, his colleagues pushed back on the idea of a digital identity theft offence in rather more adamant terms than the Minister has today. I am grateful for his in principle support, with all the reservations that he had.
The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, encapsulated quite a lot of this. As we move into the world of digital ID, having your digital identity stolen is an issue of digital and financial exclusion. It is going to be increasingly important. I was very interested that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, dug out the figures on this; the scale of digital identity theft is huge, so the number of people affected by what is effectively financial and digital exclusion is only going to grow.
However, I did take some comfort. There was a glimmer of light coming out of the Home Office, and I am not always used to that. I celebrate that, particularly in view of the fact that a review is taking place that may well report in the near future. Whatever the Minister has stamped on his forehead, I am sure he is impatient to see it, given his specific role as the Fraud Minister.
I agree with the Minister about the need for the police to have specific powers and skills. I welcome what he said about the upgraded platform in terms of understanding the evidence that is going to be under- pinning any move towards creating an offence. I think, almost inevitably, I am going to come back with something more refined on Report in the hope that the Home Office review of current fraud offences will come up with the goods. I live in hope, but often where the Home Office is concerned my hopes are only too frequently dashed. I live in hope, and I beg to withdraw Amendment 359.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 360 seeks to introduce statutory defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, again for his support. He has tabled a number of amendments which are companions to this amendment.
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is widely recognised as outdated. It inadvertently criminalises legitimate and beneficial cyber security research, making the UK a difficult place for cyber experts to operate in. There has been a very vigorous campaign, as I am sure the Minister is aware, the CyberUp campaign, which has made the case very clearly. This anomaly risks undermining our national cyber resilience and the ability of researchers proactively to detect vulnerabilities. This amendment would address this by inserting a statutory defence where unauthorised access was demonstrably necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or carried out in the public interest.
This reform is vital for supporting responsible cyber research and aligning our laws with the needs of the 21st century digital landscape. The CMA was passed in 1990, when cyber security, as we know it today, simply did not exist. At the time, only 0.5% of the UK population regularly used the internet. Critics, including 93% of cyber security professionals surveyed, believe the Act is no longer fit for this century. The current criminal law criminalises unauthorised access irrespective of the good intentions or defensive motivations of the professional.
This has created a perverse situation in which the UK’s cyber defenders are forced to act with one hand tied behind their back. Threat intelligence researchers investigating criminal infrastructure, for instance, are often unable to obtain the explicit consent required under the Act. This has resulted in 80% of surveyed cyber security professionals having worried about breaking the law while investigating cyber threats. This ambiguity and restriction deters a large proportion of the research needed to assess and defend against emerging threats posed by organised criminals and geopolitical actors.
It also limits the UK industry’s capability compared with foreign competitors in countries such as France, Israel and the US, which already offer more permissive legislative regimes. Consequently, the UK cyber industry is held at a competitive disadvantage. This is a clear economic issue, not merely a legal one. Reform of the CMA is essential to securing a robust digital economy. Updating the Act is estimated to unlock up to £2.4 billion in additional annual sector revenue and support the creation of thousands of highly skilled jobs.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure again to follow my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, whose amendment I agree with. I will speak to my Amendments 361 through 364, which are, as he rightly put, companions to the intent of his Amendment 360.
In simple terms we have an opportunity to change the law to benefit our cyber professionals and everything that they do to keep us safe, often—rightly and understandably—in the shadows. They deserve not only our respect but our support, and this is one small way we can support them.
I would also like to put on record my thanks and congratulations to CyberUp. It is an effective campaign because it has taken an issue, understood it at its essence and been clear, consistent and proportionate in its campaigning. It has not only been campaigning around the difficulties but offering practical and proportionate solutions. It is the very model of what a campaigning organisation should be.
We are told that 2026 is going to be the year smart glasses really take off—we will see. In 2007, the iPhone was launched. Yet the Computer Misuse Act still sits comfortably, dustily, fustily out of date on the statute book since 1990, a year when 0.5% of us UKers were online.
What has happened in the intervening 35 and a half years? Has that 0.5% doubled, trebled, increased tenfold or twentyfold? What was 0.5% in 1990 has moved on to 98.7% of the UK being online in 2025. That percentage alone should be enough to make the case for the need to urgently update the Computer Misuse Act. That Act came into being to address the issue of attacks on telephone exchanges. If the Government, or any polling organisation, went on to the streets of our country and asked anybody under the age of that of your Lordships about a telephone exchange, they might get some interesting results, but none of any benefit to the issues that we are discussing. It would be the greatest understatement to say that things have moved on since 1990.
There is a case for change, which the previous Government and this Government have largely accepted. Since 2021, work has been done on reviewing this issue, yet still we await any legislative change. What we are talking about is incredibly straightforward: giving a legal defence to legitimate cyber activities that is clear, concise, precise and proportionate.
The CMA being so chronically out of date would be a good enough reason to update it, but it is not just out of date, it is doing harm—harm to our cyber professionals, who, as I have already mentioned, do so much to keep us safe; harm to the security of our nation; and harm to the UK cyber industry.
I will share some numbers. There are 36.77 million reasons to make a change, because there have been 36.77 million cyber attacks on UK businesses and charities. There are another 27 billion reasons to make this change, because cyber attacks cost UK businesses and our economy £27 billion—not in total but year on year. Since 2021, when these various reviews began, £27 billion has been taken out of our economy year on year.
The changes in these amendments would bring the legal clarity and certainty required by our cyber professionals. If we look at other parts of the Bill, we can see where legal defences and clarity around public interest are being brought in. That would be completely analogous with what we are suggesting here with the Computer Misuse Act.
We are falling behind in terms of security, societal and economic benefits. The United States, France, Germany, Israel, Belgium and more countries already have a more appropriate regime than we do in the United Kingdom. The Government talk about growth, and quite right too. We already have a £13 billion cyber industry in this country. This change could unlock growth in the region of £3 billion, as well as in skills, training, jobs and careers, just by dint of making this very straightforward, clear, concise and proportionate change.
Dan Jarvis—partly in another place and largely at the Financial Times summit on 5 December last year—acknowledged this issue, stating that he understood the points behind it and that it was a priority for the Home Office. I therefore ask the Minister: is this a key, pressing and urgent priority? I suggest that it should be one of the Home Office’s top priorities. To that end, will the Minister agree to meet me and other colleagues across your Lordships’ House to update us on exactly where the Home Office’s thinking is, and where and when it is looking to make this change?
We have the ideal opportunity with this Bill. The time is now. In many ways, we are well overdue for the time being now. I ask the Minister: if not this Bill, what Bill? If not now, when?
Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, especially Amendments 360 and 362, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes.
Like others, I welcome that the Government appear to have seen value in the introduction of a statutory defence for cyber security researchers. I hope that this will result in the updating of the Computer Misuse Act, for which, like others, I have been campaigning for about a decade. When it was passed, that Act was perfectly valid, but the market conditions, which have been described by colleagues, were extraordinarily different. As my noble friend Lord Holmes has rightly said, the Act is now not just neutral in the scene but actively doing damage to our national security.
The Act prevents or discourages those professionals whose work lies in researching things such as vulnerabilities in the system or threat intelligence from doing that work, because of the possibility of finding themselves in trouble with the law. It is therefore very important that we organise ourselves so that such challenges, if they exist, can be defended against as they come forward, and that the activities of our professionals can be both supported and encouraged.
I hope that, in drafting the legislation, the Government will ensure that they cover all aspects of this particular difficulty—not just vulnerabilities in the system but particularly threat intelligence, which, if we think about it for a moment, is becoming increasingly important. We need to know what is wrong with the system, and we need to know it early and before it is capable of doing real damage in each case.
This is an important amendment. When he replies, can the Minister give an assurance that the amendments that the Government will bring forward, I hope, will cover both the question of vulnerabilities and the issue of threat intelligence?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for tabling the amendments in this group.
To start with Amendment 360, I welcome the noble Lord’s aims. When a crime is detected or prevented, it is a sensible principle that the individual responsible for detection or prevention should not be punished. That said, the amendment is perhaps too wide in its scope. It mentions nothing of proportionality, which leads me to worry that it could end up being used as a defence for an individual who has committed a far greater crime than that which they claim to have been preventing. Similarly, “public interest” is broad and undefined, and I would appreciate it if the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, could clarify what would fall under this defence.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, with support from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for raising this topic in the amendments today. I am grateful also to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, for bringing her vast experience in this area to the debate.
I can say genuinely to all the noble Lords that they have a point. It is a point that the Government have recognised today: that we need to ensure that we update the Act accordingly. There is no doubt that UK cyber security professionals contribute greatly to enhancing and protecting the country’s security, and supporting them is vital. The figures that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, gave in terms of growth since the original Act took place are absolutely valid and understood. He mentioned, rightly, that the previous Government—at ministerial or official level; I am not party to how that worked—commissioned the review in 2021. We are now in 2026, and this Government have had custody of this issue since July 2024. It is a reasonable presumption that we need to come to some conclusions on the review.
The Government have listened to the concerns raised by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, mentioned my colleague Dan Jarvis, who is the Minister directly responsible for these areas. They have listened to the concerns and have over the past year made real progress in developing a proposal for a limited defence to the offence at Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act; namely, unauthorised access to computer material. Crucially, this includes safeguards to prevent misuse. However—and this is where my caveat comes in—this is an immensely complex area. Noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, have pointed to that complexity, but engagement is under way, including with the cyber security industry, to refine the approach, and I hope that we shall be able to provide an update at some point.
Further work is required to consider the safeguards that would be needed to accompany any introduction of statutory defences, and my colleagues at official level in the Home Office are working with the National Cyber Security Centre, law enforcement and the industry on this issue to try to come to some conclusions. The Home Office is actively considering wider changes to the Computer Misuse Act. As part of the review that we are undertaking, we are scoping several proposals to update the Act, including the very point that has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords, which is on the Act’s extraterritorial provisions and the maximum penalties that were introduced.
In relation to proposals to increase maximum penalties for computer misuse offences, the Act already provides for a range of penalties, including life imprisonment for offences that cause or create a significant risk of serious damage to human welfare or national security. While the Government share the noble Lord’s concern regarding appropriate sentencing and are considering this as part of the wider review of the 1990 Act, we do not consider the proposal to update the majority of offences and uplift them under the Act to 14 years to be proportionate. However—and I hope this is accepted —and as I have said in a number of areas today, this Government are still just over 18 months into office. A review is being undertaken and I hope it will come to some conclusion on those issues, but at the moment those complexities are still under consideration.
Amendment 364 would introduce personal criminal liability for directors and managers who failed to prevent or otherwise consented to offending under the Computer Misuse Act. Again, I recognise the intent to strengthen accountability. Our current view is that it is unnecessary, given the existing offences applicable to persons who enable or facilitate offending. I know that this will be entirely unsatisfactory to noble Lords, both to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and to the supporters who have spoken in this debate today, but while this review of the 1990 Act is ongoing, I am limited in regard to what I can say about the Government’s plans to reform the Act, but I hope that I have acknowledged that the points that have been raised are absolutely valid.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
Is the Minister able to clarify whether the review is still ongoing, or are the Government currently reviewing the review?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I say to the noble Lord—and I hope that he takes this in the way in which I respond—that the review commenced in 2021, and it is now 2026. That is a long time for a review, and I would want to ensure that we come to some conclusions on the 1990 Act. However, at this stage, I cannot give him a timescale for the reasons that I have mentioned, about the complexity of this matter. I along with Minister Jarvis have had custody in the Home Office of these issues since July 2024; that is still three years into a review that was commissioned in 2021. I cannot give him a definitive timescale today, but I hope that the House can accept that there is active consideration of these very important matters raised by Members and that the Home Office plans to reform the Act. I hope that I will demonstrate that we are progressing this work at pace, but we need to get it right. Sadly, we are not going to be able to legislate in this Bill, but there is scope to examine issues at a later date. With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, unusually, light is flooding through the windows of the Home Office, and I thank the Minister, but I shall come back to what he had to say. First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, for her support. As the Minister said, her huge experience in this area is valuable, and it is really valuable to have her support in those circumstances.
I also say a big thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who thinks these things through in a very eloquent fashion. He more or less reminded me that, back in 1990, the thing that I was using was a dial-up Apple Mac Classic—probably a Classic II—which just shows how long ago the Act was.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not wish to disturb the noble Lord in full flow, but I have just remembered that I missed an important point for the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, who requested a meeting with either me or another appropriate Minister. I will take that request away and get back to the noble Lord in due course about a meeting with me or my colleague, Minister Dan Jarvis—or both of us—and anybody the noble Lord wishes to bring with him.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
That is a very useful offer for those who are involved in or have an interest in pushing this agenda forward. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, also emphasised following the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, it is not just about being out of date; it is positively harmful. The Home Office appears to be aware of that, despite the stately progress on the review. The fact that the Minister has said there is a recognition of the need to update the Act is very helpful. He said that they have made progress in formulating a limited defence, but I am not quite so sure about that—let us see when it arrives. I am sure that he has engraved across his forehead the phrase “an update at some point”. That is not quite as good as “shortly”, but it is perhaps better than “in due course”. One has to take away the crumbs of comfort that one can.
What I take most comfort from is the fact that we have a cyber security and resilience Bill, which will come to this House after hitting the Commons, where it had its Second Reading yesterday. If the Home Office picks up a bit of pace, there might well be the opportunity to produce a clause there to provide the kind of defence that we are talking about today. I understand that the Minister has a rather Trappist vow at this point, in terms of being limited in what can be said, but we very much hope that he can be let loose at some stage in the future. We look forward to that but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Increased penalties for fare dodging(1) Section 5 of the Regulations of Railways Act 1889 (penalty for avoiding payment of fare) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), for “level 2” substitute “level 4”.(3) In subsection (3)—(a) for “level 3”, in each place in which it appears, substitute “level 5”, and(b) for “three months” substitute “six months”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase the penalties for passengers who fail or refuse to pay railway fares and those who travel or attempt to travel without having paid for previous fares.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group addresses two of the most significant criminal challenges facing our railways: fare dodging and freight crime. First, my Amendment 365 seeks to increase the penalties for fare dodging on the railways. It was reported towards the end of last year that one in 20 London Underground passengers was dodging fares. Transport for London has estimated its losses at around £130 million over the last year, with losses across the whole railway network potentially reaching £330 million. This is not a victimless crime. Those losses do not simply disappear into the ether. Every penny not paid in rail fare means less money for improvements to services, less money for infrastructure upgrades and higher fares for the vast majority of law-abiding passengers who do pay their fares.
Often, fare evasion is a crime committed in conjunction with other more serious offences. Some of those who have been stopped and searched by police for fare evasion have been found with knives and drugs. This amendment would increase the maximum fine that can be issued by officers of the railway operators for fare evasion from level 2 to level 4 on the standard scale, therefore bringing the maximum penalty from £500 to £2,500. Furthermore, it would increase the maximum penalties that can be handed out on summary conviction to a level 5 fine or a term of imprisonment of up to six months.
The existing penalties were fixed at the current levels through the Criminal Justice Act 1982, meaning they were set a number of decades ago. Given the scale of the problem, it is clear that these penalties do not reflect either the seriousness of persistent fare evasion or the reality that some offenders treat the current regime as a calculated risk. This amendment would also increase the maximum penalties available to the courts, particularly for repeat or aggravated offenders, while leaving full discretion with magistrates to distinguish between genuine error and deliberate fraud.
This is about not just punishment but enforcement. Railway staff, especially at Transport for London, need to be trained to confront those bumping barriers and take action. It is an all too common occurrence to see staff simply watching as people jump the barriers.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 365 after Clause 117, which would increase penalties for those who deliberately avoid paying rail fares. Deliberate fare evasion undermines the integrity of our railway and costs taxpayers and passengers hundreds of millions each year. We must be firm in protecting revenue that funds services and investment.
However, there is another side to this issue that we cannot ignore. Recent reviews and watchdog recommendations show a system that is complex, inconsistent and at times unfair to passengers who make genuine mistakes. The passenger watchdog has called for a national yellow card warning for first-time errors and a central railcard database to prevent innocent people being prosecuted for technical or administrative errors. I always book advance tickets on the train; they are slightly cheaper than the full-fare ones. A few weeks ago, business here finished early, so I got to Euston early and caught an earlier train than I had booked. When I produced my ticket, I said to the manager, “I’m on an earlier train. Is that all right?” He said, “I’ll let you off on this occasion”. I think what he meant was that he would let me off paying the full fare because I was on an earlier train. But I have heard of people, with a ticket that they have paid for, being accused of fare evasion for being on the train at the wrong time. That is a perfect example of where the yellow card system should be used.
The Office of Rail and Road was asked to review revenue protection practices precisely because enforcement has been uneven and opaque. We have seen the consequences of those failures. Thousands of prosecutions were quashed after courts found that operators had used inappropriate fast-track procedures and many passengers faced the threat of criminal records for minor errors. These are not abstract concerns; they are real harms to livelihoods and trust in the system.
I support the principle of tougher penalties for deliberate evasion, but only if there are clear safeguards. Those safeguards should be: a statutory first-warning step; a consistent published test before any prosecution; improved point-of-sale information and standardised enforcement guidance for all the different train operators; and mandatory staff training and data sharing to identify repeat offenders rather than punishing honest mistakes. I understand that the Government have accepted the ORR’s recommendations and must now legislate to ensure that enforcement is proportionate and transparent.
In short, tough penalties and fairness are not mutually exclusive. We can deter deliberate evasion while protecting innocent travellers, but only if this amendment is paired with the reforms that the ORR and passenger bodies have recommended. I urge the Minister to support the amendment on that basis and to press the Government to enshrine these other safeguards in law.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra has made a very pragmatic speech on the difficulties of fare evasion and the extraordinary complexities of the ticketing and fares system in the UK. Of course, I note that the Government are legislating in this area as part of the broader GB Railways Bill that is coming down the tracks, as it were. I really do not believe that there is a single individual in the United Kingdom who could answer 20 questions about the cheapest fare from A to B crossing C and get it right. It is an extraordinary system, and I quite agree that many people are making inadvertent errors, which should absolutely be taken into consideration.
Equally, the Minister will have heard me talking about enforcement on many occasions throughout the passage of the Bill. The law is brought very quickly into disrepute if the laws that law-abiding people see as absolutely necessary are avoided by a determined criminal element. We have all seen it. We have all seen it on the Tube, with people barging through, tailgating and hopping over the barriers. I have seen two officials of London Underground at Green Park station late in the evening, chatting to one another—someone comes barging past and they do absolutely nothing. If that continues, then I suggest we get ourselves into a very difficult situation indeed. So, when the Minister comes to respond, I ask that he talks about enforcement and about the attitude of the police to combat this serious issue which robs the railways and London Underground of hundreds of millions of pounds and is unsustainable.
I think that, on the ticketing issue and the fare issues, the answer really lies in technology. I think that apps have made this much more straightforward. It is absolutely a task for computers to find the best ticket from A to B, but there are plenty of people who do not use those, who are not particularly computer literate and who prefer a paper ticket. So, it is perhaps more complex than it seems from the outside, but I really think we have to put more effort on enforcement in this difficult area.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, briefly, because very good points have been made, I am tempted to say, yes, we need to increase penalties or threaten people with prison, because fare dodging does drive me mad, particularly on the Tube. It is partly the brazen, quite violent and intimidatory way that it happens for ordinary people: you are pushed out of the way and you just do not know what to do. We are not all Robert Jenrick with a camera: you want to intervene, you want to say something, you want to have something happen, but it does not happen. What has occurred is a normalisation of anti-social behaviour. The difficulty is whether we can legislate against that, because it seems to me that, partly at least, this is cultural and we have a situation where members of the public look away.
But I do think there is a problem with staffing. Whether TfL staff in particular are intimidated or whether they are indifferent, it is hard to tell, but I can assure noble Lords that they are not intervening very much. Despite the fact that this has had a lot of publicity recently, I have seen that it carries on, it seems to me, all the time. Even if you talk to the staff, they look the other way. It is one of those things: you do not want to be a grass and so on—by “you” I do not mean the noble Viscount—but I can see people feeling “I don’t necessarily want to go and report on that person, and I’m not sure what to do”. In other words, the public are stymied and are not quite sure how to respond. It is ironic, because we are constantly told that we should respect public-facing staff, and that is absolutely right, but if the public-facing staff do not respect us as members of the public, it makes it difficult. So, I am not convinced, despite the good intentions of this amendment, that it is the solution, because I am fed up with laws being added to the statute book that nobody enforces—it seems to me to bring the law into disrepute.
I want to add a note about the difficulties of buying tickets on national rail and knowing whether you are using the right ticket. I can assure noble Lords that I have made mistakes, but one reason that you can make a mistake is if you have a ticket for a fixed time and the train is late and you get on another train, you can actually be reprimanded for being on the wrong train when in fact it has just arrived at the time that the train that you were going to get should have arrived or has not arrived. I will not bore noble Lords with the details, but anyone who has travelled on trains regularly will know what I am talking about—and then to be sneered at by a member of staff. It seems to me that the danger here is that the innocent could indeed find themselves at the receiving end of a more draconian enforcement, whereas the culprit, as it were, gets away with it.
I also want to draw attention to the dangers of fast-track court processes. I really hate this single justice procedure, and it is worth noting that TfL are the people who use it most to prosecute people. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made the point that you can appeal to magistrates. Well, not in that instance, because you are not in the courtroom; it is all happening behind your back. I just worry about injustice occurring. On the other hand, I would like to hear from the Government what strategy they have: not relying on one person with a video camera to expose this, but a campaign about fare dodging would do no harm, because it is public money and the public get very irritated by it. I do not think we need an amendment, but I would not mind some action being taken.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments, although I think we have strayed slightly away from the intentions of the mover of the amendment. Amendment 365 is another amendment from the Conservative Benches increasing penalties for fare dodging. As other speakers have said—and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, acknowledged this—the key to enforcement is consistency in how these regulations are applied and, currently, that is not the case. I hope that Great British Railways, when it takes over the franchises, will guarantee some common training and work in that area, which will stop the blindingly obvious things that we see. I have seen it at Westminster station here, where three people have just burst a barrier and there have been two staff members there with their arms folded almost waving them through: “It’s not my job, go”, and off they went.
I will just make one comment. I do not think the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said it with any intention, but I have never found any staff on British railways to be sneering and offensive, but we have to understand that sometimes they are dealing with people who make a professional life of travelling on the railways without paying. I have been on a train down to London, and sitting across from me was a gentleman with a son who looked about 10 years of age with a little iPad. When we had got almost to Milton Keynes, about two miles out, a ticket collector came through and the man had a single off-peak ticket to Macclesfield, which is the next station from Stockport. He was not going buy another ticket—“I’m not buying a ticket. You can’t throw me off this train. I’ve got a child with me”. That is the dilemma that the train manager faces. It is emotional blackmail, and how often does this happen? But the train manager was very polite. He dealt with him, and just asked him to either buy a ticket with his credit card, or he would have to get off at Milton Keynes and there would be a policeman waiting for him there. That seemed impossible to do, but he made a quick phone call, we pulled into Milton Keynes and the chap had to get off, because there was some peer pressure from other passengers, I must admit, and there was a policeman waiting for him. That sends a real message about the connectivity of what guards can do without having to get into a confrontation with passengers.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I want to comment on something the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said and endorse it. I regularly travel to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and I use the marvellous level-access tram system. There are no barriers or gates, but periodically four people come on in a team with their little electronic machines, go between one station and another, and check we all have our little “aller simple” travelcard. If someone does not have it, they are hauled off. It is only one team of about four people in all of Strasbourg, but everyone is terrified of not having a valid ticket. That may be the solution: check people on the trains rather than at the barriers.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this short but important debate, and raising these important issues. As we are discussing rail issues, I should first draw noble Lords’ attention to my interests, as declared in the register. I am former employee and current shareholder of a transport operator, FirstGroup, and a former employee and current member of a rail union, the Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association. So I am both staff side and management: it balances out.
I turn first to Amendment 365, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seeks to increase the fines for fare dodging. The Government are committed to ensuring that everyone who travels on the railway pays the correct fare for their journey, and train operating companies have multiple mechanisms in place to prevent passengers travelling without the correct ticket. This includes the provisions set out in the Railways Act, but also use of the civil enforcement regime for penalty fares. In 2022, the penalty was raised from £20 to £100, and this has had a positive impact on reducing fare evasion and preventing fraud on the railway, which of course we all want to see.
Issuing penalty fares is one way of tackling fare dodging, but other measures can be taken. I am pleased to say that we had quite an extensive debate on these. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, acknowledged, the Office of Rail and Road has been asked to consider improvements to the industry’s revenue protection practices. Last year, it published its review setting out five recommendations, which my colleague the Secretary of State for Transport accepted in full.
It is probably worth very quickly going through the recommendations, which were: make buying the right ticket simpler and easier, strengthen consistency in how passengers are treated when ticket issues arise, introduce greater consistency and fairness in the use of prosecutions, make information and revenue protection easy to access and understand, and provide greater co-ordination, oversight and transparency of revenue protection activity. I hope, to an extent, those address the very valid concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, expressed about complexity, which were shared by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. We all want to encourage rail travel; we do not want to discourage it by making the system too complex, and we do not want to penalise those who are truly acting in good faith. At the same time, it is important that we prevent fare dodging and make sure that there is a proper regime to prevent it.
Fare simplification is at the heart of this, as many noble Lords said in the debate on these amendments. I can confirm that this is very much part of the Government’s plans for rail reforms as part of the creation of Great British Railways. It is probably up to individual train operators and other public transport operators to promote their own campaigns on fare dodging but, to pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is the case that whether you are travelling on the Tube or national rail, you cannot go far without seeing posters and public information about fare dodging. This is about the balance between promoting responsible behaviour and a penalising and enforcement regime.
The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and others talked about enforcement. On TfL, I share his experience. Maybe I use the Tube a little more than he does, but multiple times I have seen plainclothes crews both on Tube trains and at ticket barriers. I saw one at King’s Cross Tube station ticket barrier just last week. There was a large gang of enforcement officers waiting to catch people trying to get in by tailgating those who were paying fares through the automatic gates. So transport operators are very much aware of their responsibilities.
To be clear on the ORR review, a number of contributions focused not on national rail but on the Tube, and obviously that is operated by Transport for London, a devolved body that is overseen ultimately by the Mayor of London. I want to inform noble Lords that the ORR spoke to TfL as part of its review and it is of course up to TfL whether it takes on its recommendations. When it comes to national rail operators, the ORR has a full purview.
On Amendment 368A, the Government are very aware of the rising frequency of freight crime and the significant and damaging impact it can have on businesses and drivers. We are determined to crack down on it. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, talked very much in the context of rail freight, but of course this is a problem for road freight as well. The incidence of cargo theft, where criminals are ripping the sides of lorries and taking the goods inside, is frightening for dedicated HGV drivers across the UK, and the perception that this crime is low-risk and high-reward is unacceptable and one that we want to change. Whether it is on the rail or the road, we share the noble Lord’s determination to do something about it.
Working with the police, the Home Office has agreed to create a freight crime flag which will be attached to any applicable crime, whether it is on the road or on rail. It will apply across all police forces, including the British Transport Police, which of course polices the railways. The data will be collected as part of the annual data return to the Home Office. The flag is currently being piloted in a small number of forces and, following this, the intention is to roll it out across all forces. The benefit of using a flag, as opposed to creating new crime classifications, is that in a case where, for instance, a driver has their vehicle or load stolen and violence is used or threatened against them, the crime that would be recorded would be robbery, as opposed to vehicle crime. The flag, however, would identify the robbery as a freight crime.
However, we will monitor the implementation of the flag. We are about half way through the six-month pilot, so we will keep a close eye on how this is panning out and consider whether further steps are required in the future. We know that having a code or a flag would not of itself solve the problem. Victims should always report crime to the police, and we expect police to investigate. However, as noble Lords would expect me to say, it is for chief constables to allocate resources for such investigations in line with local policing priorities.
I also acknowledge the worrying involvement of serious and organised criminals in committing freight crime. These individuals are damaging this country’s global reputation and are costing us billions each year. The Government are committed to tackling serious and organised crime in all its forms and are working with policing to that end. We are working closely with the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service and with Opal, the police’s national intelligence unit focused on serious organised acquisitive crime, including a vehicle crime intelligence desk which covers freight crime.
I hope in my response I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord, Davies, that we accept the spirit of his Amendment 368A and are working to address the issues he has raised in tabling the amendment. I hope too that the noble Lord will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 365 to be necessary. For all of these reasons, I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions: my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Goschen, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, for his very interesting examples.
I hope we have been able to impress on the Government the importance of tackling railway crime. I have travelled for over 50 years now on the London Underground, and things have improved immensely with the new security gates, et cetera, but still we see people avoiding payment by tailgating, which is something we have to challenge and stop. I hope the Government will look at addressing these issues, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Cloud service access restrictions: lost or stolen mobile phone devices(1) A provider of cloud-based services that support smartphone functionality must, upon receiving verified notification from a registered user that their device has been lost or stolen, take reasonable and timely steps to prevent that device from accessing its services, in order to discourage the resale of illegally-gained devices.(2) The provider must block access to cloud services from the identified device, including but not limited to—(a) data synchronisation services,(b) remote storage access,(c) account authentication services, and(d) app store or software update services.(3) The provider must inform, as soon as practically possible, the National Crime Agency and the police service in the area in which the theft or loss of the device was first reported.(4) Providers must, subject to appropriate safeguards, establish a process for users to appeal or reverse a block on a device in cases of error, fraud, or device recovery.(5) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—(a) the technical standards required to enforce the steps outlined in subsection (1),(b) the implementation timeline for providers, and(c) sanctions for non-compliance.(6) In this section, “the provider” means a provider of cloud-based services to mobile phone users.” Member's explanatory statement
The amendment seeks to ensure that technology companies use technical measures such as cloud-based blocking and IMEI linked device locks to make the resale of stolen mobile phone devices abroad more difficult and thus reduce the incidents of phone thefts in the UK.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 366 and speak to Amendment 538 in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, who has commitments overseas today. I am particularly delighted to have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with his experience as Met Commissioner and the wisdom he showed when we served together on the Cabinet Office Board, and also of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, not a Conservative but my partner over the last decade in the defence of intellectual property.
Given its importance in cutting crime, this is rightly a cross-party amendment, and we have drawn heavily on the work of Dame Chi Onwurah MP, her Select Committee on Science, Innovation and Technology and her well known tech expertise.
There is a serious problem. Politicians, spurred on by their advisers, boast far too often that they are “world-leading”. Unfortunately, we are a world leader in the sphere of phone theft. We are the phone theft capital of Europe with a horrific 70% of UK thefts in London, many of them from tourists so important to UK growth. In 2024, around 80,000 smartphones were reported as stolen compared with just 64,000 in the previous year; just the sort of growth we do not want to see.
On the streets, the value of a phone is roughly £300 to £400, and because they are the most valuable, about 80% are iPhones, Apple’s brilliant device. According to the Met, stolen phones had a street value of around £20 million in 2024. But the replacement value of these phones—members of the public and insurance companies having to pay out to replace them—was estimated by the Met at around £50 million last year.
Commander Conway of the Met told the Select Committee in June that 65% to 70% of our knife crime is produced by our robbery problem, and that it also drives a significant chunk of our violence challenge in the capital and across the UK. In that space lies the exploitation of young children and young people, into gangs; and this is largely an international organised crime phenomenon driven by criminal economics and the difficulty of getting hold of smartphones legitimately in some parts of the world.
Analysis of data relating to an industry sample of some 4,000 Apple devices stolen in London in 2023 shows that Algeria, with 22%, is the most common internet address of connected devices, followed by China, at 16%. In total, 78% of the stolen devices were connected to overseas networks. This means that the devices are, for the most part, being sold to be used as devices in other countries—not as parts, a current focus of Apple.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendments 366 and 538, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and introduced so cogently by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I thank her for the reference to my honourable friend Martin Wrigley, who helped to identify this particular issue, which addresses the growing problem of mobile phone and device theft, often fuelled by the profitability of reselling these stolen goods overseas.
We are currently facing an epidemic of mobile phone theft, as the noble Baroness said, with reports indicating that phone snatches have increased by as much as 150% in certain areas. Every single day, approximately 200 mobile phones are stolen across the country, with many being destined for a lucrative resale market abroad. These stolen devices remain valuable criminal assets, because, currently, they often can still be accessed or resold even after being reported.
We support Amendment 366 because it seeks to strike at the heart of this criminal profit model. The amendment would ensure that technology companies actively employ technical measures, specifically cloud-based blocking and IMEI-linked device locks, as the noble Baroness described, to deter the resale of stolen mobile phone devices. Without compulsory co-operation from cloud service providers and manufacturers, stolen data and devices will remain valuable criminal assets, even if the physical device is recovered. This is an essential step towards forcing technical solutions from technology companies to counter the incentives for theft.
Amendment 538 would provide the industry with a necessary and reasonable lead-in period, specifying that these cloud service access restrictions will come into force six months after the Act is passed. This would ensure that technology companies have the time required to implement the necessary technical standards and administrative processes.
For too long, the manufacturers and cloud providers have treated device theft as a secondary concern. It is time that they work in a much more customer-friendly manner, in the way that the noble Baroness described, and use their immense technical capabilities to simply turn these devices into mute bricks the moment they are stolen, thereby removing the incentive for the crime altogether. I very much hope that the Minister will accept these common-sense measures to protect our property and safety.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, ably explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I may cover some of the same ground—I was only grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, intervened, because people might have forgotten some of the points made, but if I amplify them too much I am sure that somebody will remind me. I was particularly keen to support the amendment because, in the past, I have criticised the police for a lack of enforcement and detection—but of course, they cannot do everything.
We know that organised crime, which I will come to later, is about money; it is just another form of business. Theft is driven by people trying to make a profit. The amendment is all about the commercial business of mobile phone sales—some of it legal but some of it criminal. Apparently, there are about 88 million mobile phones in this country. They can be about £1,000 each, so that is a market of about £88 billion or something of that order. It is a massive market. In 2023, the purchase of these devices totalled £5.8 billion, and there is another £2.5 billion-worth of services that they provide and that we all pay for, from data to the general use of a mobile phone. This, by any measure, is a massive business.
The value of the phones stolen, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, mentioned, was about £20 million, with a reinsurance value of £50 million. The number of phones stolen in the UK is about 120,000, with two-thirds of this happening in London. It is a big city, and there are an awful lot of targets for the criminals wandering about. As they leave the Tube, people take their phone out to get a signal, as we all want, and to check on the messages they have not received while they were on the Tube. That is where the criminals spot them, and they then follow them to a place where they relieve them of their phone. I suspect that is one reason why we see so much of this in London. Clearly, the business model works very well here.
These are the crimes that are reported. An awful lot of phones that are stolen are never reported. I have talked to people in this place who have not reported their phone as stolen because there has been a level of embarrassment about the fact that it has happened to them on the street—they have just got another phone. We only know about the bare minimum of the number of phones that have been stolen in the course of a year.
On many occasions, violence is used. Just the ripping of a phone from a hand can lead to somebody trying to hold on to it, and we never know where that contest might end. If somebody ends up on the floor, violence can follow and the physical consequences can be quite severe.
As far as the mobile phone industry is concerned, £20 million is a very small number compared to an £88 billion market. More importantly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, pointed out, the industry benefits, because when you have your phone stolen you go back to get another one. So why would it stop this? There is no financial incentive to actually do anything about it. There might be a moral one, but I am afraid it looks as though the moral incentive is not having an awful lot of effect. Of course, none of the manufacturers or the networks tries to lead in the market by saying that if their phone is stolen then it cannot be used. There is no market incentive for one manufacturer to say that its phone is better because it cannot be stolen, or, alternatively, that if it is stolen then it has no value. There is no effect on the market that is helping to prevent the theft of phones.
It is all to do with organised crime. There are some fancy definitions—one or two people in the Chamber may know of them—of organised crime and what is it all about. It is about money. It is about being organised enough to steal things in such a volume and have somebody to buy them which means that they have been worth stealing in the first place. The market they are involved in is enforced by violence. There is no monopolies commission supervision of this market, whether it be drugs or mobile phones; it is enforced by violence to ensure that they succeed and that other people fail. It is therefore really important that we get this right.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, the resale value of a mobile phone that has been stolen is about £300 to £400. The thief does not get £300 to £400, but, by the time it has gone through a few hands, that is the return that they are expecting. To pay everybody out, they need to get £300 to £400 to make sure that it works.
The problem is that 78% of the phones that are stolen are going abroad, as has been said, and we cannot seem to stop them at the border. This is not entirely surprising. Phones are very small items and some 90% of the world’s goods travel by sea, in containers. Without intelligence, the chance of finding mobile phones is very limited. Therefore, we are not able to physically stop the phones leaving the country and going to places such as Algeria and China. At the moment, the police are fighting a losing battle to catch the thieves, who are low down the organised crime chain, and trying to prevent the export of stolen phones. As I said, given the size of a phone, that is quite difficult: they are looking for a very small needle in a very large haystack.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Jackson on the quality of the amendment he drafted. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe on the superb speech she made setting out why this amendment is necessary. As we know, it addresses one of the fastest-growing forms of organised crime in the UK: the theft and rapid export of mobile phones—thousands and thousands of them. These are no longer opportunistic street offences. As noble Lords have said, they are part of a highly profitable, highly mobile criminal market that depends on one thing above all else: the ability to reactivate and resell the stolen devices abroad.
A couple of years ago, I was outside Victoria station, at the end of Victoria Street, waiting to cross the road. I saw a woman waiting for the pedestrian lights to change, holding her mobile phone out—I think she was trying to read the map—almost like a Geiger counter. Then I saw two guys on a motor scooter coming around the corner and I tried to shout to her to put her phone away, but too late—it was snatched in seconds.
That was a couple of years ago, when I think there were motor scooter gangs doing it. Now, as we have seen—we were talking about the e-bike problem in our debates on the Bill before Christmas—there are lots of videos of these guys on their very fast bikes, snatching phones, and I believe the Met now has a response squad on those high-powered bikes chasing the phone thieves. So it is a big problem, particularly in London.
At present, our defences are simply not keeping pace. IMEI blocking helps, but criminals now routinely bypass it by altering identifiers or moving devices to jurisdictions where UK blacklists are ignored. What they cannot bypass is the cloud. As noble Lords have said, modern smartphones are useless without access to the cloud-based services that power authentication, updates, storage and app ecosystems.
The amendment therefore introduces a very simple, proportionate requirement. When a user reports their phone lost or stolen, cloud service providers must take reasonable steps to block that specific device from accessing their services. If a stolen phone cannot be reactivated, it cannot be resold. If it cannot be resold, it is not worth stealing. It is as simple as that.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe hinted that the phone companies may possibly have a financial benefit from not co-operating here. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, was more blatant. I will be more blatant still. I am absolutely certain that they are conspiring not to co-operate so that they can sell more phones. We were discussing all-terrain vehicles a couple of hours ago. When the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Bill was going through, the police officers who were advising us said that they had heard from some of the big manufacturers of ATVs—the ones which make motorbikes with locks you cannot penetrate—that they were deliberately putting rubbish locks on the ATVs because when the £8,000 quad bike was stolen, the farmer immediately replaced it. They saw a market in goods being stolen. I think the big phone companies see exactly the same thing: there is a market in replacement phones.
The noble Lord asked: why do the British Government not do something about it? I suspect it is mega US-UK politics. If we said we were going to restrict the ability of Apple, Google and others to sell their phones here, I think we would have Mr Trump seeking to invade us next week, so I suspect there are geopolitical problems there.
The amendment also ensures proper safeguards: verification before blocking, a clear appeals process, and a role for the Secretary of State in setting technical standards. It strengthens law enforcement by requiring timely notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, giving them valuable intelligence on organised theft. This is not about burdening industry. It is about ensuring that all providers meet a consistent baseline of responsible behaviour—one that many already follow voluntarily, but which criminals exploit when it is not universal.
I conclude by saying that we have an opportunity here to collapse the economic incentive that drives mobile phone theft. Cloud-based blocking is practical, proportionate and overdue, and I commend the amendment to the Minister.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these excellent amendments, and to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving Amendment 366 on his behalf.
This amendment is driven by a simple proposition: if we are to bear down on the scourge of phone theft, we must remove the profit motive, because it is precisely this incentive to profit that drives the vast industry behind phone theft. Too often, the criminal justice system is left trying to deal with the consequences of crime after the event, rather than addressing the incentives that fuel it in the first place. Phone theft is now a high-volume, high-impact crime, particularly in our cities, and it causes not only financial loss but real fear and disruption to victims’ lives.
What this amendment seeks to do is eminently practical. It asks cloud service providers, which already control the digital lifeline that makes a smartphone valuable, to take responsible and timely steps to deny access to those services once a device is verified as lost or stolen. A phone that cannot access cloud backups, app stores, authentication, service or updates rapidly becomes worthless on the secondary market, whether at home or abroad.
This is not a novel idea nor an untested one. As many noble Lords will know, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has examined this issue in detail. In its recent correspondence with Ministers and technology companies, the committee highlighted both the scale of the problem and the frustrating gap between what is technically possible and what is currently being done. The committee made it clear that voluntary action has been uneven, that existing measures are inconsistently applied across platforms, and that stronger co-ordination, potentially underpinned by legislation, may be required if we are serious about prevention. This amendment directly reflects that evidence-based work and gives effect to its central recommendations.
Importantly, the amendment builds in safeguards for users to appeal or reverse a block where a mistake has been made or a device is recovered. It leaves the detailed technical standards, timelines and sanctions to secondary legislation, allowing flexibility and proper consultation with industry, and it recognises the importance of law enforcement by requiring prompt notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, strengthening intelligence and disruption efforts. Fundamentally, if we can force cloud service providers to implement this provision, we can break the cycle of phone theft. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for taking up the cudgels on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I thought I had got away with it when I did not see him in the Chamber, but the noble Baroness turned up at the last minute, like the cavalry, and charged in to raise this very important issue, which I appreciate her doing. She is right to do so because, self-evidently, mobile phone theft is unacceptable. It is a significant criminal operation—as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it involves overseas criminal gangs—and a great inconvenience, cost and discomfort to many people. We need collectively to take action to support the reduction of mobile phone theft.
Amendment 366, moved by the noble Baroness on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, would require technology companies which offer cloud-based services to use technical measures, such as cloud-based blocking, to prevent access to cloud-based services after a device by a registered user has been lost or stolen. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Blencathra—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench of His Majesty’s Opposition—expressed support for that principle and indicated that it is one method of tackling the scourge of mobile phone theft.
I share the noble Baroness’s concern about the theft of mobile phones and other devices that host cloud-based services. The number of thefts is too high and we are determined to get it down. I agree that urgent action is required to make sure that the companies which design these devices—to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—play their part and do absolutely everything they can to ensure that a stolen mobile phone is not a valuable commodity and therefore not worth stealing.
I share the intent to reduce mobile phone theft, but I suggest to the noble Baroness that there are a number of potential practical challenges in the proposed approach that I am uncertain whether we would currently be able to overcome. Many apps on mobile phone devices have some element of cloud access, so the range of companies in scope of the provision would appear to be extremely broad. In addition, disabling all cloud services could, for example, stop tracking and recovery of mobile phones, especially if the tracking function relies on cloud connectivity. That would impede law enforcement’s ability to identify locations to which stolen devices are taken.
As noble Lords will note, there is a measure in the Bill to ensure that tracking of mobile phones is dealt with in a much speedier and more effective way without the need for warrants. The Government are working with industry and law enforcement partners on the delivery of practical and effective measures. As the noble Baroness said, there was a very productive round table in February which brought together police, technology companies and others to look at how we can do what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, recommended: break the business model of mobile phone theft.
The summit resulted in clear commitments from attendees, including data sharing on mobile phone theft to get a comprehensive picture. There was also a range of other measures, including the police stepping up their operational response. Members will have seen this particularly in London, where the Metropolitan Police—I also pay tribute to the City of London Police—has targeted high areas of that activity as an operational response to catching criminals responsible for these crimes. As I have mentioned, the Bill gives police powers to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items, which would be negated if the tracking element was not allowed. That will help in seriously tackling this issue by enabling the tracking down of stolen mobile phones to particular properties.
As a result of the summit, technology companies and policing partners have continued to work together and there have been a number of working groups looking collectively at tech, operational issues of street action by police forces and other issues, although the main committee has not been reconvened. We have had a change of Home Secretary since the summit took place, so I will go back to the Home Secretary’s office about the potential for reconvening the major group, because it is important that that is done and seen through.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I acknowledge that the Minister is trying hard to give a positive response, but I wonder whether he wants to challenge the reasons being offered when he goes back to the Home Office.
For most of these mobile phones, if the thieves have any sense they will turn them off, because the risk of being tracked is not insignificant, although clearly they do not always. That could be managed in two ways. First, there could be a time limit before the phone is blocked, such as 48 hours—the owner will not be looking for this phone for the next six years. Secondly, and probably more importantly, this is a bit Catch-22; if we argue, as I think the Government accept, that it is valuable because it can still connect to the network, once the thief knows it will not be connected to the network there will be no need to track it when it is stolen, because nobody will be stealing it. I know this will not be perfect, but if you could reduce it by 90%, that would have a massive impact.
I accept that the point on tracking is well intended, but if we made this difference, the device would not be reconnected and there would be no need for tracking. If there is a need, perhaps we should just time-limit it. I accept the advice the Minister has been given, but there is a way round that argument.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am content, with the noble Lord’s experience of how these matters can be dealt with, to reflect on what he has said, but it does not get away from the fact that the problems I have outlined with the amendment as drafted would still be present. I cannot accept the amendment today but, in principle, we are all looking for solutions to stopping mobile phones being stolen, either by effective police action on the ground or by use of neighbourhood policing targeting hotspot areas with high levels of mobile phone theft. The noble Lord mentioned Tube exits, for example.
I cannot accept the amendment in this form because the reasons I have given need to be thought through. The noble Lord’s contribution points to another area where thought can be given. In light of what I have said, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment for now, but not the general concern of this Committee and this Government that we need to take action on this issue.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the Minister for his constructive response to this important amendment, and all those who took part in the debate. The powerful combination of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Hogan-Howe, my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Davies of Gower and the Minister himself represent a lot of expertise in this area and concern to tackle this criminal activity. I am very grateful for that.
The former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, was absolutely right to convene interested parties to try to tackle the appalling damage being done to victims of this criminal activity. Theft of phones and their onward sale overseas is a very profitable business. The theft statistics probably understate the problem, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the providers do not at present have an incentive to solve it. It is highly regrettable but, as a result, not enough has been done.
I am not convinced that tracking, data sharing and hotspot enforcement, of which I am very supportive and have spoken in favour of to the Minister before, are quite enough. I am glad to hear that working groups are continuing, and the undertaking to have a further meeting of the Home Secretary’s group is very valuable.
I hope the Minister will also reflect on the debate, think what can be done and perhaps come back with a government amendment or undertakings as to what can be done. But failing that, and probably in any event, I think we will wish to return to this important issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.