Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

358: Clause 114, page 145, line 16, at end insert “or virtual subscriber identity module.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that SIM farms would also include devices capable of using virtual SIM cards rather than only physical SIM cards.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, I apologise that I was unable to take part in the Second Reading debate due to a clash with other House business.

Amendment 358 is a very simple extension to what the Bill already does, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for adding their support to it.

I was a member of the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired brilliantly by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, which reported in November 2022. It was a lengthy report—fraud is a huge subject—with many recommendations. One area we raised was the use of SIM farms by fraudsters to send out bulk texts and make bulk calls, so I am very pleased that we are at last bringing in restrictions on the use and supply of SIM farms in Clauses 112 to 117. I am glad that the Bill allows other articles to be added to this. Both technology and the ways in which fraudsters use that technology to make contact with potential victims are constantly changing, so having the flexibility to react is important. It is also important to recognise, as the Bill does, that there are some legitimate reasons for the use of a SIM farm.

Unfortunately, however, the world has moved on since we reported in 2022. Clause 114 defines a SIM farm as

“a device which is capable of using five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably”.

It then goes on to define a SIM card as being

“a removable physical subscriber identity module”.

The problem is that physical SIMs are being overtaken by virtual SIMs, or eSIMs. A number of the latest phones no longer even have slots for physical SIM cards, and the trend is accelerating. The SIM farm restrictions that the Bill introduces are already at risk of being redundant before the Bill is even passed.

Amendment 358 simply attempts to fix this by including virtual SIMs in the definition, so that SIM farms that utilise eSIMs will also be covered from day one. If we do not make this change, the SIM farm restrictions will quickly be pointless. I realise that this might be a little more complicated, as a number of newer phones can store more than five eSIMs—although most only allow two to be active at any one time—so we might need to make some tweaks to the wording of Clause 114 a little further than this amendment does. But the point remains: we know that physical SIM cards are being phased out over time, to be replaced by eSIMs, so we should act now to ensure that this part of the Bill is not redundant as soon as it comes into force. That is the point of this amendment.

However, the use of SIM farms raises a wider issue, on which I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views. We can ban the sale and use of SIM farms in this country, and we should, but fraud increasingly comes from overseas, where a UK ban will have little or no impact. The real problem is that fraudsters are able to acquire an apparently limitless supply of UK mobile phone numbers. I do not know about other noble Lords, but I am currently receiving almost daily calls from UK mobile numbers, where someone who speaks poor English tells me they are calling from O2 and there is a problem with my SIM card. It does not matter how many I block; they just keep coming, each time on a different number, and I am sure I am not alone in that.

In November 2022, Ofcom issued guidance to telecoms companies about the allocation and supply of UK phone numbers. The guide set out the steps that Ofcom expects providers to take when suballocating and assigning numbers. Numbers can be suballocated an unlimited number of times, which makes controlling who ultimately acquires them difficult, and the guidance is only as good as the final link in that chain.

The guide covers three areas: due diligence checks before suballocating or assigning numbers; ensuring continued compliance and reassessing risk after the transfer of the numbers; and responding to incidents of misuse. But despite this guide, it remains almost comically easy to acquire pay-as-you-go SIM cards in bulk. A quick Google search shows myriad websites of varying legitimacy selling bulk SIMs, both physical and eSIMs. The very first listing on an eBay search for bulk SIMs is a package of 1,000 EE pay-as-you-go SIM cards for £999 or best offer. Many of the websites have reseller arrangements where anyone can earn commission by selling SIMs on to further end-users.

There are legitimate reasons why someone might buy SIMs in bulk: internet of things connectivity, company travel or legitimate mass marketing, for example. But they can also be used for mass scam phishing messages or calls, identity theft, SIM swapping, money laundering and creating bulk social media accounts, to list just a few.

It is too easy for fraudsters to acquire large numbers of genuine UK numbers under the current system. This is not about spoofing numbers; these are real numbers. KYC checks on end-users of bulk SIMS appear to be laughably weak and do not appear to be policed in any meaningful way. When was a telco last fined for this? What meaningful monitoring actually takes place of where these numbers end up and how they are used?

The new voluntary UK Telecommunications Fraud Sector Charter, published in November, says only that signatories will:

“Continue to implement existing CCUK guidance on preventing misuse of sub-allocated and assigned numbers and monitoring for fraudulent calling patterns”.


That is clearly not working at present. We need to do more.

In addition to his response to the specific amendment on eSIMS, I would be grateful to hear the thoughts of the Minister on how we might make life more difficult for the fraudsters who are able to operate easily on an industrial scale from foreign countries using real UK phone numbers. Does he agree that it is time to strengthen, monitor and enforce KYC rules on the bulk sale of phone numbers? I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

In essence, we have put in place clauses to the Bill that had cross-party support and were encouraged by the noble Baroness’s committee. We have the power to regulate, subject to consultation, which meets the noble Lord’s objectives, and we will look at issues of international action as a key step in the three-year fraud strategy that will shortly be produced. With that, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but important debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his detailed response. I think I speak for all of us in saying that we look forward enormously to seeing the long-awaited fraud strategy. I think it will be the third one since I have been in this House. Anyway, a lot of what the Minister said definitely moves in the right direction.

On the amendment, I am a little disappointed because, although I hear what the Minister says about the evidence base, which is obviously backward-looking, we know that the situation is changing. Physical SIMs are being replaced by eSIMs at a fairly rapid rate. This is something that we know is changing and it would be better to future-proof the Bill at this stage if we can. I take on board his point that eSIMs are more traceable than physical SIMs. But part of the problem is that that is not always the case in a lot of countries, and eSIMs can be from anywhere. So, I take only a certain amount of comfort from that.

That said, and given the Minister’s assurances that this will continue to be looked at and, if the evidence base supports it, changed, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 358 withdrawn.