Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

It is a very good point. I think there is a divergence, exactly as in this country, between the permanent apparat and the rest of the country, which would explain why my noble friend Lord Kempsell and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, are speaking to very different sets of people. As the German ambassador to London in 1914 said to his French counterpart, “You have your information, we have ours”. It seems that there is at least a debate in the United States about this, and you can see why. As my noble friend Lord Bellingham said, there is a real prospect down the line that a future Mauritian Government may take a very different attitude towards the presence in the outer atolls of powers that are unfriendly to us. We have no assurance that we will always be on friendly terms with that republic.

The world is imperfect, I understand that. The world is sublunary. We are dealing with lesser evils, as is usually the case in politics. But when the Minister has justified this treaty and the treatment of the Chagossians, she has always done so by saying, “Our priority was the security of the base”. I just ask noble Lords on all sides to consider how this makes us more secure in an imperfect world than we are at present. We have obvious sovereignty over the entire region at the moment. We have the great advantage of its isolation. There is no prospect of anybody taking a leased island and putting any kind of listening infrastructure or anything else nearby. How does moving from where we are now to what is proposed in this treaty make us more secure, even if we set aside all the wrongs being done to the Brits of Chagossian origin?

I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was on to something when he asked, “What if the Americans were to change sides?” But I am not sure that quite makes the point he intended. I just invite noble Lords to consider the wholly pecuniary terms in which Mauritius has considered this territory: not as part of its own demos, not as part of its own nation, but as an investment and a way of raising money—of paving its streets with gold, as my noble friend said earlier. Would it not be the ultimate humiliation if Mauritius were to trouser the sum of money that we are now paying it and then to turn around and sell the base to the United States? Where would that leave this Government? I would love to hear the Minister’s reply.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to an important set of amendments, and I thank them too for the way in which they have put those amendments. There is clearly some disagreement between us, but there is no disagreement over the fact that every single person in the Chamber is seeking to ensure that we protect the security of the nation and the security of Diego Garcia, and on the importance of that base to us. I start from that point. There were a couple of times when noble Lords almost seemed to question that. I do not question it at all. I do not agree with everything that has been said, but I do agree with the right to challenge how we take this forward, because out of that come better legislation and more clarity. While I do not agree with the need for some of the amendments, some of the comments that those amendments require to be made from the Dispatch Box are important. I wanted to set that context out for noble Lords.

I also just want to say this, because I think it is important. I do not want to have a Second Reading debate again but the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Beamish, and others have made this point: the Government, whatever the rights and wrongs, are trying to bring stability. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, disagrees with the treaty, and it is fair for him to make that point, but the Government’s point of view is that we are trying to bring stability and certainty to an uncertain situation. The noble Lord disagrees with that, as do a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. But that is the Government’s view. The Government’s view, in answer to the challenge the noble Lord raised, is that we are changing it because we are trying to bring certainty to an uncertain situation. We believe we have done that, and we have made certain that we have secured one of the most important military bases—if not the most important military base—for ourselves and the United States. The noble Lord does not accept that or agree with that, but that is the alternative proposition the Government are making.

It is really important, therefore, to say, in answer to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, and others, that we would not have gone forward with this were it not for the fact that the Americans support it. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is right. We can say, “Well, the Americans said this” or “The Americans said that”. I am going to quote this, because I think it is really important. The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that

“the United States welcomed the historic agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius on the future of … the Chagos Archipelago … this agreement secures the long-term, stable and effective operation of the joint US-UK military facility at Diego Garcia. This is a critical asset for regional and global security … We value both parties’ dedication. The US looks forward to our continued joint work to ensure the success of our shared operations”.

That does not mean, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Ahmad, and many others, said, there are not challenges to that and what it actually means in practice. But it is a pretty fundamental starting point for the UK Government to be able to directly quote US Secretary of State Rubio saying that the US supports what this Government are doing and taking forward. I lay that on the table as the context for trying to answer some of the points and considerations that have been made.

Some of the points and comments—I say to the noble Lords, Lord Morrow, Lord Weir and others, and even to an extent to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey—are perhaps better dealt with in some of the other groups, particularly on the rights of the Chagossians. My noble friend Lady Chapman has answered on this at great length and will continue to do so as we move forward. That context is really important for the debate and the discussion we are having.

I will try to deal with some of the amendments. It will take a little while and I hope that noble Lords will bear with me. Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seeks to prevent the presence of non-UK and non-US civilian personnel in the Chagos Archipelago. The treaty gives the UK control over these matters. The security provisions were, as I have said, designed and tested at the highest level of the US security establishment, which supported us in proceeding with the deal.

On Amendment 34 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, let me be clear: the entire treaty is designed to preserve the UK’s ability to take the necessary steps to preserve the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base. Article 3(2)(c) states clearly that the UK has

“the full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia”.

Mauritius and other states should have no doubt—this is the importance of comments made here—about our willingness to exercise our responsibilities in a manner that ensures the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Forgive me for being slightly behind the curve; I was trying to follow the sections in the annex. The Minister referred to Annex 1(11), in particular the definition of “unrestricted”. That paragraph states that

“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification, subject to the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties to meet the requirements of international or domestic Mauritian law or current practice”.

For the sake of clarification, what are these “standing authorisations and notifications”?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

If I am wrong on this, I will write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library so that all Members can access it. My understanding is that the crucial bit of Annex 1(11)(c) is

“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification”.

The phrase,

“the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties”,

refers to things contained within the treaty. I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that. I am grateful to her for pointing it out.

The fundamental point I am trying to make—which I think the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made—is that we have an obligation under the treaty to notify Mauritius of activities emanating from the base but we do not have to seek its permission. “Expeditiously” notifying does not mean notifying before we take any agreed action. Those were the points that I thought the noble Baroness was making, but I will certainly seek to clarify exactly where that takes us with Annex 1(11)(c). I will write to the noble Baroness and provide a copy to others. I thank her for raising that.

The treaty specifically confers on the UK the unrestricted ability to

“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”

in respect of Diego Garcia. Given that there is no question over operational freedom on Diego Garcia, it is unclear what necessary derogations the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, is seeking. The annex gives the UK the extensive rights that we would need in such a situation.

The noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, raised reporting restrictions. His Majesty’s Armed Forces and the intelligence services routinely produce reports for the Prime Minister on all types of security matters. I reassure the noble Lord, and other noble Lords, that this will include operational issues arising on the Diego Garcia base. There is no requirement for this to be made a statutory obligation, as Amendment 81E seeks to do. Additionally, Amendment 81F would represent an unusual interference with the prerogative to conduct international affairs and to make or unmake treaties. Noble Lords will understand that there is often a need for confidentiality in international discussions.

The clock is flashing away and the Whip is getting jumpy next to me. I shall have a look at Hansard and I shall write to noble Lords in the debate with anything that I have not covered and any questions that have not been answered and make sure that the amendments that I have not responded to are responded to. I shall send the letter to noble Lords in the debate. Let me be clear: I shall write to noble Lords about two or three of the amendments that I have not covered, copy the letter to noble Lords and put a copy in the Library. I hope that that is acceptable to everyone.

I thank noble Lords for a really interesting and important debate on the security provisions of the treaty and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.