Somalia: Piracy (EUC Report)

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, and I think I agree with everything that he said on this subject. I learnt from him—no doubt there is something wrong with the way that I get information on these kind of incidents but I had not heard about it—about the 950 pirates being amnestied by the Government of Somalia. I totally share his anxiety, indeed his horror, at that news and put it to the Government that it should have consequences. Unless there was consultation with the EU in advance of that decision being made by the Somali President then consequences really ought to flow, because it is quite inconsistent with the kind of collaboration and mutual confidence which one had understood had been developed over the past few months between the EU on the one side and the Somali Government on the other. The consequences should be in terms of aid or other forms of support which will be felt, in measured degree, by the Government of Somalia. If we just allow this incident to go uncommented on and unsanctioned, we shall be encouraging similarly bad behaviour in the future and shall lose that sense that we need to act as a team and keep in close co-operation with the Somali Government—we need to consult them about things but they need to consult us as well, and we expect their support. The cost of capturing these pirates is very considerable and the idea that they should be released in this way is quite horrific.

I will make three points, two of which will be approving—indeed congratulatory—points about the report and one of which will be more hortatory, or perhaps slightly critical. First, although there are other very good examples which I will not mention but which we all have had before our eyes, this seems to be an extraordinarily and particularly good example of the success of the European common foreign and security policy. We have managed to make considerable progress—the figures have already been mentioned—in dealing with this great threat and have managed to do so with tremendous leverage in the case of this country. We have almost not contributed any military units at all. We have contributed one of Her Majesty’s ships, a Royal Naval vessel, for a few months and of course contributed very importantly by providing command and control and logistical management of the exercise from PJHQ. We have obviously done an extremely good job there, and I add my own words to the words of congratulation that have already been spoken. I am of course very familiar with PJHQ—it is a wonderful body and a superb organisation, and it is not surprising to me that it has done such a good job. On top of that contribution, we have got all these vessels together. It would have been nice to have even more resources but we have contributed very considerable resources. It is an example of the leverage that can be generated by the common foreign and security policy and of the success that we can have.

Eurosceptics tend to say that we do not need an explicit EU policy and that we can just have a series of ad hoc coalitions where a lot of countries agree in their assessment of the problem and are prepared to do something about it. That is a very inadequate answer indeed. If you do not have a common foreign and security policy, you do not have the mechanisms and the tried and tested procedures there for, first, evaluating the threat, which is very important, and then for managing the response. You do not have the long-standing commitment and sense of solidarity; everybody just starts off saying, “Is it really in our national interest to do this? Do we really want to do it? How much will we be compensated by allies if we do it?”. You have to start afresh again, negotiating all these things from scratch, and every operation has the weaknesses and dangers of an experiment rather than being an ongoing, tried and tested policy where people have the confidence, know the procedures will work, and are familiar and happy with the decision-making process. This is a very good example of how we need a common foreign and security policy. I do not know that the Government are particularly interested in my contribution to their balance of competences review—they would probably dismiss me as a Europhile and anyway a member of the Labour Party, and so would not be interested in what I say—but I hope that the point gets included in the evaluation of the balance of competences review when it comes to the European common foreign and security policy. In fact, it would be monstrous if this was not taken into account as one of the examples of the success of that policy.

The second point I wanted to make, which is again very much approving, is to congratulate the committee on having been pragmatic enough to review its original position on two matters. One was the attack on the pirates’ land bases and the second was on having armed guards on ships passing through the pirate zone. The committee reviewed its original position in the light of evidence and experience and came up with absolutely the right policy solution. It strongly supports—as do I—the initiative taken to deal with some of the land bases. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, that it may be necessary to take further action. If it is, I hope that the authorities concerned will be encouraged to do so.

Equally, armed guards have proved their worth. It is not necessary to carry heavy armament for this purpose: a couple of general-purpose machine-guns, one on the port side and one on the starboard, will be enough effectively to deter the sort of pirates with whom we are dealing in the Indian Ocean. The committee was very good on that. It did not just come up with an initial response but looked carefully at the developing situation, and its report is the stronger for it.

On my third point, about ransom payments, I take issue with the committee. I have spoken on this in the Chamber, so noble Lords may be familiar with my views, which have not changed. The committee’s recommendation comes in paragraph 51 on page 18, which states:

“We reiterate our previous conclusion in our 2009 report that those involved in assembling ransoms in the United Kingdom have a duty to seek consent for its payment and that not to do so, if necessary by filing a Suspicious Activity Report, may result in the commission of a criminal offence. We request that the Government now respond substantively to this recommendation”.

This is woefully inadequate and thoroughly pusillanimous. It does not even begin to address the reality of the situation, which is that these are criminal payments. They are rewards to criminals for criminal activity that endangers life.

They are also very substantial—not that that makes a difference to the principle—and run into tens of millions of dollars on a regular basis. It has become something of an industry and is now a regular feature of the insurance market in London. Lloyd’s makes ransom payments that are transported by all sorts of dramatic means to the pirates in Somalia. This is simply not a situation about which we as legislators should be complacent. It is quite clear that these are criminal offences. They are payments to criminals for criminal purposes and they should be illegal. It should not be a question of reporting the matter through a suspicious activity report. The payments should be seized by the Serious Fraud Office or whichever arm of the police is responsible for monitoring illegal payments of this kind, and we should make sure, if the law is not robust enough to deal with the matter in this way and does not make it a criminal offence to make ransom payments to terrorists, pirates or any other form of criminal, that we change the law to make sure that it does exactly that.

I am very disappointed and very sorry that the committee did not come to that conclusion. It does not explain why it did not, and in its report did not even examine the suggestion that I am making—unless I missed it, and I hope I did not. I would be very interested during the rest of the debate to hear from Members of the Committee about why they feel that the present legal situation is adequate, and why a suspicious activity report is the furthest they envisage going in dealing with this matter—which after all, if it is not dealt with effectively both by the physical measures about which we have been talking and by measures controlling flows in the financial markets, will become a criminal industry affecting commerce throughout the world.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the quality of the contributions to this debate. Noble Lords have demonstrated a keen and impressive grasp of this very complicated issue. I praise in particular the excellent work of my noble friend Lord Teverson and the other committee members in compiling the report on Operation Atalanta.

Operation Atalanta has successfully contained, constrained and deterred acts of piracy. None the less, the UK’s longer-term aim is to eradicate the underlying causes of the instability that affects Somalia and gives rise to acts of piracy, and several noble Lords have made that point today. This can be achieved only by addressing the root causes of the problems in Somalia. EUTM Somalia and EUCAP NESTOR, launched as part of the EU’s contribution to an overall strategy for the Horn of Africa, aim to provide a comprehensive solution to Somalia’s problems. In time these missions, alongside AMISOM, will create a secure and stable Somalia, remove the incentives for piracy and develop the capacity of coastal states in the region to police their own coastlines.

The UK remains fully supportive of Operation Atalanta’s mandate and is committed to the continued command of Operation Atalanta from Northwood for the current mandate, which expires in December 2014. International pressure on the pirates must be maintained in order to prevent a significant resurgence of activity. While any formal decision to extend Operation Atalanta’s mandate beyond 2014 is unlikely to be taken in the immediate future, the EU has demonstrated a firm commitment to its counter-piracy efforts, including through enhancing the mandate with agreement on the use of autonomous vessel protection detachments and the disruption of pirate logistics dumps. Additionally, the launch of EUCAP NESTOR and a growing EU diplomatic role send further strong signals of increasing EU engagement.

The degree of maritime co-operation between the three core international counter-piracy forces—the EU’s Operation Atalanta, the US-led Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151 and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield—is among the best that we have ever seen. The three operations provide a variety of effective framework opportunities for third-state contributions to anti-piracy efforts to further enhance international co-operation, evidenced recently when Royal Thai naval forces commanded a Combined Maritime Forces task force from a UK vessel. The shared awareness and deconfliction mechanism has also helped to ensure that military efforts in the region are effectively co-ordinated between international partners.

The threat from piracy remains a serious problem, but results and trends suggest that Operation Atalanta, in conjunction with other measures to counter piracy, is proving effective. For example, as of 7 March this year, two vessels and 60 hostages were being held off the Somali coast, the lowest levels held by pirates since September 2009. I hate to correct my noble friend but two vessels and 48 hostages were released over the weekend, so the figures that I have quoted are the accurate ones. This compares favourably with May 2011, when 23 ships and 503 hostages were held. Attacks and pirating of vessels are down by over 75% during the past 12 months. However, I emphasise that these gains remain reversible and it is vital that we do not relieve any of the considerable pressure that is currently being brought to bear on the Somali pirates.

The ability to prosecute and detain convicted pirates is an important element of our strategy to combat piracy and is an effective deterrent. Over 1,200 suspects or convicted pirates are being held in 21 states across the world. The Seychelles currently holds 101, representing some 20% of its prison population, while Kenya holds 147. We continue to support regional partners in developing local prosecutorial capacity.

Capacity-building assistance is being provided to the Seychellois justice sector by the international community. For example, the UK has provided funding to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime for the work of its counter-piracy programme, which has included work with Montagne Posée prison in the Seychelles. A new 60-cell block was opened there in September 2011 to help with the detention of suspected and convicted pirates. The UK has provided assistance to the Attorney-General’s Office by seconding two prosecutors from the Crown Prosecution Service to assist with the prosecution of suspected pirates.

A longer-term solution to develop Somali capability and ownership of the piracy problem is being implemented by the UNODC’s post-trial transfer programme, which returns pirates convicted in regional jurisdictions to Somalia to serve out the balance of their sentences. The programme has so far transferred 59 convicted pirates from the Seychelles to Somaliland under the terms of a bilateral memorandum of understanding, the agreement of which was facilitated by the United Kingdom at the London conference on Somalia. Further transfers from the Seychelles are anticipated this year.

I turn to the specific questions asked by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Jopling, asked what political progress had been made in Somalia. Real political progress has been made there in recent months. The transitional period concluded on 10 September with the election of a new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. This was a significant moment in Somalia and an important step towards a renewed political process. The London Conference on Somalia in February 2012 brought the international community together to support this process and, for the first time in years, it was run in consultation with the Somali people through their elders. They led a process to draw up a new constitution and formed a new parliament which elected a new president.

It is clear that, after two decades of conflict and instability, the people of Somalia want to usher in a new era of peace, security and democracy. Recent political progress marks a new chapter in their history. The end of the transition is the best opportunity in years to make progress towards peace and stability. Already, people are rebuilding their properties and businesses; confidence is increasing; and the diaspora is returning.

My noble friend Lord Jopling and the noble Lord, Lord Radice, mentioned the 959 pirates who were released. They asked what was the basis of the amnesty and why did this not apply to the “godfathers”. This amnesty referred to the boys who had committed acts of piracy at sea but did not apply to the financial backers or the senior leaders of the pirate action groups. My noble friend Lord Jopling asked for the Government’s response to the committee’s recommendation for an increased contribution from the Gulf states. We are working closely with a number of the Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Bahrain and Oman, and organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The UAE has commanded the Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151 and Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the UAE all provide bases for Royal Navy ships. They all share information with coalition forces.

My noble friend Lord Jopling also asked whether, as the number of attacks reduces, there is a temptation to relax our presence there. Military response must remain proportional to the threat until the root causes of piracy have been addressed ashore. This is now occurring via EUCAP NESTOR and other capacity-building initiatives. Meanwhile, Operation Atalanta, NATO and the CTF 151 continue their deterrent patrols which deliver the time and space to allow development activity to take place ashore.

My noble friend asked whether pirates would be returned to Somalia. The committee did not consider this to be sensible given the level of prison security. He asked would the UN prison remain unused. The UN has refurbished a prison in Somaliland which is currently housing convicted pirates returned from the Seychelles. Work is on the way to building additional penal facilities. This is crucial to Somalia’s ongoing development. Building justice and the rule of law is a priority for the new Somali president.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, pointed out that the example of success on Operation Atalanta should be included as part of the balance of competences review. Operation Atalanta will be part of a case study on common security and defence policy activities in the Horn of Africa. The noble Lord said that the committee’s conclusion in respect of ransom payments was wholly inadequate because these are criminal payments. Companies assembling ransoms in the UK must seek consent from the Serious Organised Crime Agency prior to payment. The Government do not make or facilitate substantive concessions to hostage-takers, including the payment of ransom. I would point out that it is not against UK law to pay piracy ransoms.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

On that point, do the Government believe that it is a satisfactory situation that these payments are not illegal?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

We agree with the noble Lord that it is not a satisfactory situation.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, asked whether the United Kingdom continued to strengthen the African Union in Somalia. Support through the EU training mission will continue. The UK continues to support AMISOM in Mogadishu, which is the military arm of the AU in Somalia and was critical to the recent successful retaking of Kismayo that forced al-Shabaab out of one of its key strongholds and away from a key source of revenue. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, as a former ambassador to Paris, for his encouraging words on our support to the French over Mali.

The noble Lord also mentioned west African piracy. The situation there is much more maritime criminality than piracy—the theft of cargo, illegal bunkering et cetera—and should not be seen as similar to that in Somalia. As such, it is clearly the role of national police forces to deal with it. The Royal Navy is taking action where it can, predominantly in terms of training and capacity-building: HMS “Dauntless”, HMS “Edinburgh” and HMS “Argyll” have all recently worked in this area. The noble Lord asked what effect the destabilisation of Mali might have on wider UK interests. It would allow ungoverned space from which terrorists could operate, plan and launch attacks with impunity, and could also destabilise other parts of Africa such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

The noble Lord, Lord Radice, asked what the United Kingdom and the EU are doing to meet the threat in west Africa, whether the Royal Navy will deploy assets to west Africa and whether we will apply the lessons from Somalia to west Africa. Lessons are being learnt from Somalia and applied to west Africa. The UK is supporting the industry initiative to create a regional maritime trade information-sharing centre. The Royal Navy deployment has helped build capacity aboard vessels and it is helping to train maritime law enforcement officers and develop maritime legal frameworks to prosecute maritime crime. Corruption locally is the biggest threat.

The noble Baroness, Lady Young, and the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked how EUCAP NESTOR is progressing. The answer is: as well as can be expected. Building capacity where none has existed for 20 years is a great challenge. It involves preparing assessments of what is required, identifying key leaders who will have to drive forward development on behalf of the Somali Government and people, working in conjunction with various institution-building initiatives and prioritising where EU funds need to be spent.

The noble Baroness asked what the Government’s view is on dumping toxic waste off the coast of Somalia. Historical reports of toxic dumping in the early days of piracy cannot be denied, but it has reduced significantly owing to the naval presence in the area. Recent reports to the UN Security Council have failed to provide evidence of toxic dumping off the Somali coast. This Government remain committed to working with international partners to tackle all the reasons used to justify committing acts of piracy.

The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked me to congratulate Kenya and the Seychelles on their efforts and asked what the Government’s attitude was towards Operation Atalanta. Regional partners are an essential part of the UK’s counter-piracy strategy. The Seychelles are leading the effort, having recognised the threats from piracy to tourism and their fishing and maritime industries. We commend their continuing efforts and those of Kenya.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether there was a change in the department responsible, as I am responding to this debate, and whether it reflects a change in the Government’s approach to piracy. There is no change in the department. The Ministry of Defence led the written response to this committee, and it is therefore fitting that I attend this debate now. This Government remain committed to countering the threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean and to working with our international partners.

The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked whether the Puntland maritime police force would be allowed to resume its activities. The Puntland maritime police force is a local militia trained by a private security company and it received weapons in breach of the UN sanctions regime in force for Somalia. The decision to employ or allow the activities of the PMPF rests with the new Government of Somalia.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the Government’s allocation of ships to Atalanta remains as per the report. The answer is yes. We allocate ships on a case-by-case basis, and it may not be the most effective use of ships to allocate them to Atalanta rather than to other coalitions. This is kept under constant review and plans made accordingly. A Royal Navy helicopter is currently assigned to Atalanta, working from a front ship. The noble Lord asked whether, given the current situation, the Government would support extension of Atalanta’s mandate. The EU is beginning a strategic review of Operation Atalanta, and we remain committed to supporting this mission.

The piracy threat cannot be dealt with through military means alone. It will require a sustained international effort that addresses not only the threat from pirates but institutional incapacity. The UK is ultimately seeking greater coherence between EUTM, Atalanta and Op NESTOR within the overall EU Horn of Africa strategy but also with other international and UK unilateral activity. All the symptoms—terrorism, piracy and migration—are a result of the causes of instability in Somalia. EUTM does not currently link directly to the other CSDP missions but rather to the wider EU strategy as part of the comprehensive approach to Somalia. Linking missions with diplomatic and developmental tools should enable the EU to take a lead internationally in seeking to bring stability and governance to the country and wider region.