Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my own congratulations on the four maiden speeches we have heard this afternoon. All four maiden speakers not only are well known to me but have been colleagues and indeed friends of mine for decades. I commend them to the House as the ideal candidates for coming to this place, because they are men of great integrity, they are all people of very considerable experience and knowledge of the world, and they have always been committed, as I am sure they will remain committed here. We will therefore have very valuable contributions from them for, I hope, a very long time.

I do not want to say much about the SDSR itself. I thoroughly agreed with the brilliant analysis delivered by my noble friend Lord West and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, on that subject, but just add one thought, which I might repeat from time to time to make sure the Government do not forget it. Although of course I am delighted at the purchase of the P-8s, the Government would have saved an awful lot of public money and avoided an awful lot of risk if they had kept the Nimrod MRA4. It was a great mistake to cut those aircraft up in the vandalistic fashion that they did when they came to power in 2010.

I have a good announcement for the House, which is that I think we have solved the long-standing problem of the black hole—the alleged deficit in the MoD’s programme, which it is said the Labour Government left in 2010 to their coalition successors. I have been conducting correspondence with the noble Earl about this for some weeks. Buried in his latest letter to me is a single sentence telling us that the Government went through our programme, which was based on resources being increased at 1.5% in real terms per annum, to see what would happen if resources had no real-terms increase at all but were flat in real terms for the 20 years of the programme. Of course, they came up with a deficit, and my maths showed that that deficit was even greater than the £19 billion or so in the equipment programme which is mentioned in the noble Earl’s letter to me. I wanted to put all our correspondence in the Library of the House but, when I tried to do so, I discovered that Back-Benchers could not put correspondence in the Library. Ministers of course can, and I invite the noble Earl, if he would be so kind, to put our correspondence in the Library so that colleagues can follow this matter in detail. I hope we will not need to speak about it any more because this particular myth will be put thoroughly to rest.

I want to just say a little about Russia, which the last two speakers both touched on. Mr Putin must be congratulating himself on having carried off a brilliant coup. He has succeeded in getting away with changing frontiers by force, with annexing the Crimea and, in his own estimation, with ensuring that Ukraine can never join either NATO or the EU—partially because we have always said, since the Cyprus problem, that we would not have another state in either organisation which was split, and partially because it is quite difficult to extend an Article 5 guarantee to a country when a part of it is already occupied. He has guaranteed that the future of Ukraine will be very difficult and unstable. No one will have any incentive to invest there, and therefore the great poverty and very high unemployment in that country will continue indefinitely. I am sure that Putin thinks and calculates that that can in itself only lead to one of two things. One is that eventually the poor Ukrainian population will give up, throw in the sponge and vote in a pro-Russian Government, who will join the Eurasian Economic Union and do whatever else Putin tells them to do. The other is that the West will give up, and do a shameful thing and tear up its commitments to Ukraine on both NATO and the EU. The West will say that Ukraine cannot come into either organisation and will do some deal involving other parts of the world.

I am all for doing deals with the Russians, I must say, but not at the expense of good faith and the guarantees that we have given to Ukraine. Of course, the result of that would be more or less the same for Ukraine, but it would be a devastating blow to the morale of NATO, the EU and, particularly, the east European countries. It would be a terrible betrayal: something that we would regret for decades and perhaps centuries.

My final thought is therefore that we need to think carefully about how we can avoid that scenario. I think that the only way that we can is by thinking how we can extend an Article 5 guarantee to that part of a territory which is not occupied. That is a matter on which we should focus and which we should discuss with our allies over the coming months, despite the other very important issues which we also have to determine during that period.