Lord Gardiner of Kimble
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Deregulation Bill
Lord Gardiner of Kimble Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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“Road traffic legislation: use of vehicles in emergency response by NHS
(1) Section 87 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (exemptions from speed limits), as substituted by section 19 of the Road Safety Act 2006, is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (4).
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) omit “, for ambulance purposes”;(b) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) it is being used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service”.(3) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) In subsection (1)(aa), “an NHS ambulance service” means—
(a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.”(4) In subsection (1)(c), after “paragraph (a)” insert “, (aa)”.
(5) If this section comes into force before section 19 of the Road Safety Act 2006, section 87 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (as it has effect until section 19 comes into force) is amended as follows.
(6) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Subsection (1) above applies in relation to a vehicle that, although not being used for ambulance purposes, is being used for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service.
(1B) In subsection (1A), “an NHS ambulance service” means—
(a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.”(7) Schedule (Road traffic legislation: use of vehicles in emergency response by NHS) makes further amendments to road traffic legislation in connection with the use of vehicles in the provision of an emergency response by the NHS.”
Lord Gardiner of Kimble (Con)
In moving Amendment 43, I shall speak also to Amendments 44, 45, 46 and 102. The amendments make some small changes to the wording of various pieces of road traffic legislation. The aim is to enable and empower NHS ambulance services to respond to medical services and emergencies quickly and effectively. As far back as 1967, there have been statutory provisions which exempt vehicles from various rules contained in road traffic legislation when they are being used by the emergency services for fire, police and ambulance purposes. These provisions apply so that our vital services can reach an emergency in time whenever there is one. Therefore, the exemptions include matters that a member of the public could reasonably expect to be included, such as exemptions from rules relating to speed limits, traffic lights, road signs and the fitting and use of sirens and flashing lights.
The problem that we are faced with is that modern practice and technology has outgrown the current law which mainly uses the term “ambulance”. NHS ambulance services now use what are known as fast response units, including cars and motorbikes, to help provide quick response to the most critically ill patients where time is of the essence. They are also using larger vehicles to transport equipment to major incidents to ensure that clinicians are properly equipped.
These types of responses provide a vital part of NHS emergency healthcare. The definition of “ambulance” and “ambulance purposes” in a recent case concerning the use of blue lights and sirens was limited to those vehicles whose primary use is to convey the sick and disabled and did not include other vehicles such as motorbikes used by paramedics. These amendments provide certainty to NHS fast response teams that they can rely on exemptions from road traffic legislation to facilitate their speedy arrival in a crisis situation. They extend the stated exemptions to cover vehicles used,
“for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service”.
This will then cover all fast response units dispatched by the NHS ambulance services. We will have removed an unnecessary, unfair and dangerous legal block in the work of surely one of our most crucial services.
Amendments 44 and 45 to Schedule 8 are simply consequential. Since the introduction of the Deregulation Bill, some of the legislation amended by Schedule 8 has been modified by subordinate legislation made earlier this year, namely the Combined Authorities (Consequential Amendments) Order 2014 and the West Yorkshire Combined Authority Order 2014. I beg to move.
“Road traffic legislation: use of vehicles in emergency response by NHS Traffic Management Act 20041 The Traffic Management Act 2004 is amended as follows.
2 In section 85 (prohibition of double parking etc), in subsection (3), for “for fire brigade, ambulance or police purposes” substitute “—
(a) for fire brigade or police purposes, or(b) for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service.“An NHS ambulance service” means—(a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.” 3 In section 86 (prohibition of parking at dropped footways etc), in subsection (4), for “for fire brigade, ambulance or police purposes” substitute “—
(a) for fire brigade or police purposes, or(b) for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service. “An NHS ambulance service” means—(a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.”Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 (S.I. 1986 /1078)4 The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 are amended as follows.
5 In regulation 3(2) (interpretation), in the Table at the appropriate place insert—
“an NHS ambulance service | (a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.” |
(2) In paragraph (5)(a), omit “, ambulance”.
(3) After paragraph (5)(a) insert—
“(aza) used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”.7 (1) Regulation 82 (restriction on width of loads) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (10)(a), omit “, ambulance”.
(3) After paragraph (10)(a) (but before the “or”) insert—
“(aa) for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”.8 (1) Regulation 101 (parking in darkness) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (2)(a), omit “ambulance”.
(3) After paragraph (2)(a) insert—
“(aa) being used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service if compliance with those provisions would hinder or be likely to hinder the use of the vehicle for the purpose for which it is being used on that occasion;”.9 (1) Regulation 107 (leaving motor vehicles unattended) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (2)(a), omit “ambulance,”.
(3) After paragraph (2)(a) (but before the “or”) insert—
“(aa) being used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”.Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations 1989 (S.I. 1989/1796)10 The Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations 1989 are amended as follows.
11 (1) The Table in regulation 3(2) (which sets out the meaning of expressions used in the regulations) is amended as follows.
(2) In column 2, in paragraph (a) of the definition of “emergency vehicle”, omit “, ambulance”.
(3) In that definition, after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aza) a vehicle used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”. |
“An NHS ambulance service | (a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.” |
(2) Omit paragraph (2)(y)(iii).
(3) After paragraph (2)(y) insert—
“(z) reflected light from yellow or orange retro reflective material fitted to the rear of a vehicle—(i) used for ambulance purposes, or(ii) used for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service.”13 In Part 2 of Schedule 17 (requirements relating to optional side retro reflectors), in the first column of the Table, below “Ambulance” (but in the same row) insert “The provision of a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service but only in respect of a vehicle which is owned by the service or held by it under a lease or hire agreement”.
14 (1) Part 2 of Schedule 18 (requirements relating to optional rear retro reflectors) is amended as follows.
(2) The first sentence becomes paragraph 1.
(3) At the end of that paragraph insert “, subject to paragraphs 2 and 3.”
(4) The second sentence becomes paragraph 2.
(5) In that paragraph—
(a) omit “But”;(b) omit paragraph (c).(6) After paragraph 2 insert—
“3 The colour of rear retro reflectors fitted to—
(a) a vehicle used for ambulance purposes, or(b) a vehicle used for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service,may be red, yellow or orange (or any combination), provided that, in the case mentioned in paragraph (b), the vehicle is owned by the NHS ambulance service or held by it under a lease or hire agreement.”Zebra, Pelican and Puffin Pedestrian Crossings Regulations and General Directions 1997 (S.I. 1997/2400)15 The Zebra, Pelican and Puffin Pedestrian Crossings Regulations and General Directions 1997 are amended as follows.
16 In regulation 3(1) (interpretation), at the appropriate place insert—
““an NHS ambulance service” means—(a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board;”.17 (1) Regulation 12 (significance of vehicular light signals at Pelican crossings) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (1)(e), omit “, ambulance, national blood service”.
(3) After paragraph (1)(e) insert—
“(eza) when a vehicle is being used for ambulance or national blood service purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service and the observance of the prohibition conveyed by the steady amber or the red signal in accordance with sub-paragraph (c) or (d) would be likely to hinder the use of that vehicle for the purpose for which it is being used, then those sub-paragraphs shall not apply to the vehicle, and the steady amber and the red signal shall each convey the information that the vehicle may proceed beyond the stop line if the driver—(i) accords precedence to any pedestrian who is on that part of the carriageway which lies within the limits of the crossing or on a central reservation which lies between two crossings which do not form part of a system of staggered crossings; and(ii) does not proceed in a manner or at a time likely to endanger any person or any vehicle approaching or waiting at the crossing, or to cause the driver of any such vehicle to change its speed or course in order to avoid an accident;”.18 (1) Regulation 13 (significance of vehicular light signals at Puffin crossings) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (1)(f), omit “, ambulance, national blood service”.
(3) After paragraph (1)(f) insert—
“(fa) when a vehicle is being used for ambulance or national blood service purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service and the observance of the prohibition conveyed by the amber, red or red-with-amber signal in accordance with sub-paragraph (c), (d) or (e) would be likely to hinder the use of that vehicle for the purpose for which it is being used, then those sub-paragraphs shall not apply to the vehicle, and the red signal, red-with-amber and amber signals shall each convey the information that the vehicle may proceed beyond the stop line if the driver—(i) accords precedence to any pedestrian who is on that part of the carriageway which lies within the limits of the crossing or on a central reservation which lies between two crossings which do not form part of a system of staggered crossings; and(ii) does not proceed in a manner or at a time likely to endanger any person or any vehicle approaching or waiting at the crossing, or to cause the driver of any such vehicle to change its speed or course in order to avoid an accident;”.19 (1) Regulation 21 (stopping in controlled areas) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (c), omit “, ambulance”.
(3) After paragraph (c) insert—
“(ca) when the vehicle is being used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service; or”. Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 (S.I. 2002/3113)20 The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 are amended as follows.
21 In regulation 4 (interpretation), at the appropriate place insert—
““an NHS ambulance service” means—(a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services;(c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.”22 (1) Regulation 15 (keep right and kept left signs) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (2)—
(a) omit “ambulance,”;(b) omit “, national blood service”.(3) After paragraph (2) insert—
“(2ZA) On an occasion where a vehicle is being used for ambulance or national blood service purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service and the observance of the requirement specified in paragraph (1) would be likely to hinder the use of that vehicle for one of those purposes then, instead of that requirement, the requirement conveyed by the sign in question shall be that the vehicle shall not proceed beyond that sign in such a manner or at such a time as to be likely to endanger any person.”
23 (1) Regulation 26 (double white lines) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (5)(b), omit “ambulance,”.
(3) After paragraph (5)(b) insert—
“(bza) to a vehicle for the time being used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”.24 (1) Regulation 27 (zig zag lines) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (3)(c), omit “ambulance,”.
(3) After paragraph (3)(c) insert—
“(ca) when the vehicle is being used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”.25 (1) Regulation 36 (light signals) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (1)(b)—
(a) omit “ambulance,”;(b) omit “, national blood service”.(3) After paragraph (1)(b) insert—
“(bza) when a vehicle is being used for ambulance or national blood service purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service and the observance of the prohibition conveyed by the red signal in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) would be likely to hinder the use of that vehicle for the purpose for which it is being used, then sub-paragraph (a) shall not apply to the vehicle, and the red signal shall convey the prohibition that that vehicle shall not proceed beyond the stop line in a manner or at a time likely to endanger any person or to cause the driver of any vehicle proceeding in accordance with the indications of light signals operating in association with the signals displaying the red signal to change its speed or course in order to avoid an accident;”.26 (1) Schedule 19 (bus stop and bus stand clearways and box junctions) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 4 (bus stop and bus stand clearways)—
(a) in paragraph (a), omit “ambulance,”;(b) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aza) a vehicle being used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”. (3) In paragraph 9 (box junctions)—
(a) omit “ambulance,”;(b) omit “, national blood service”. (4) After paragraph 9 insert—
“10 When a vehicle is being used for ambulance or national blood service purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service and the observance of the prohibition in paragraph 7(1) or 8 would be likely to hinder the use of that vehicle for the purpose for which it is being used, then that prohibition shall not apply to the driver of the vehicle.”
Lord Davies of Oldham (Lab)
I have a question about this new schedule. As noble Lords, including Ministers, will recognise, it is a fairly lengthy addition to the Bill. I can see entirely the argument for the exemption of emergency vehicles carrying out an essential role, and why they need to be absolved from certain legal constraints in order to carry out their duties. However, I have the anxiety that the Government have provided for all bodies related to the National Health Service and vehicles driven on their behalf, in Wales and Scotland and so on—but what about other vehicles which are driven in emergency circumstances? If, for example, an accident occurs at a football ground and a St John Ambulance immediately springs into action, because one is always present, I have no doubt at all that it would seek the help of the nearest hospital. It could well have a vehicle and be able to expedite the matter more effectively. Would the driver be breaking the law if he or she exceeded the limits in seeking to get a trauma patient to hospital as rapidly as possible in a clear emergency, similar to those to which public vehicles respond?
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, the amendments are designed to ensure that the definitions of “ambulance” and the way in which ambulances are used include the new vehicles that might well be used. I think that I will need to write to the noble Lord to make sure that all his points—I will look in Hansard at what he has said—are covered precisely.
I may have some assistance coming my way. These amendments relate, as at the top of Amendment 46, to emergency response by the NHS. They are to ensure that—because of case law, where there has been a particular problem with paramedic motorbikes—this is about an emergency response by the NHS. The noble Lord raises an interesting point, particularly about people going to emergencies. However, this legislation is to ensure that those who come out in response from the NHS are properly protected.
Lord Skelmersdale (Con)
I notice, reading the amendment rather more carefully thanks to the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that paragraph 8(3) of the proposed new schedule talks about,
“a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service”.
In theory, going along the lines of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, anybody who happened to be around with a suitable vehicle could surely be requested by the NHS ambulance service to get on with it and remove the potential patient from the football ground. The noble Lord has a point, but I think that it is covered by this amendment.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, I understand that in practice this relates to a call which would be from an NHS ambulance only. My officials have speedily passed me a note on this. One may ask why these amendments do not cover, for instance, all private organisations responding to emergencies. Our priority in this legislation is to allow NHS ambulance services to provide emergency responses. Those private organisations which have arrangements with NHS ambulance services to be dispatched by them to emergencies will be covered. Bringing other types of vehicle purposes within speed exemptions is part of a wider piece of work being carried out by the Department for Transport in relation to its commencement of Section 19 of the Road Safety Act 2006. I am most grateful to the noble Lord and my noble friend for their comments which have given me the opportunity to provide clarity—I hope—on the matter.
Lord Davies of Oldham
The noble Lord has certainly clarified the matter. I only hope that if vehicles are brought into use in this way they will act with due promptness, as did the Minister’s officials in providing an answer to a rather tricky question. I apologise for not giving notice of it. However, we wanted to clarify that regular support services which are not National Health services—St John’s Ambulance is the obvious one that springs to mind—would without doubt be covered by the legislation as the Minister described it.
“(1) A permit scheme may be prepared by—
(a) a strategic highways company,(b) a local highway authority in England, or(c) such a company or authority acting together with one or more other such companies or authorities.”
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, in moving Amendment 47, I wish to speak to the other government amendments in this group. Part 2 of Schedule 9 removes the current requirement for the Secretary of State to approve local highway authority permit schemes. A permit scheme allows for better control of works in the street that can cause traffic disruption. That includes works in roads and pavements by utilities and authorities’ own works. The changes would remove only the requirement for the Secretary of State to approve schemes, enabling highway authorities to bring into operation their own schemes to their own timetable by council order.
Government Amendments 47 to 58 to this part are technical in nature and deal with the relationship between the Infrastructure Bill and this Bill. The Infrastructure Bill will create a new strategic highways company and will allow the new arrangements for permit schemes to apply to the strategic highways company as well as local highway authorities. In relation to Part 3 on road humps, this measure essentially removes the Secretary of State’s powers to place road humps on roads he does not control, mainly local authority roads. In practice, this has not been done for some time so this is a tidying-up measure. The powers of Welsh Ministers under this section are retained. However, there are two roads in Wales for which the Secretary of State remains the highway authority, and that is the two Severn crossings. The purpose of Amendments 59 to 61 is to ensure that the changes proposed to Section 90B of the Highways Act 1980 by Schedule 9, Part 3, do not apply to these two roads. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, this is a long schedule. The Minister will be relieved to hear that we are in broad agreement with it. However, we have some difficulties because some real consequences need to be considered. Our Amendments 61A and 61B would improve the schedule by introducing further transparency into the process of issuing exemption orders. I am concerned about the extent of the Government’s powers to introduce accessibility standards for rail vehicles, established by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. We, in fact, introduced the first set of rail vehicle accessibility regulations in 1998. In 2005, I and one or two other noble Lords who are present in the Room, contributed to updating that Act by making it unlawful to discriminate against disabled people using public transport or transport facilities. We introduced minimum accessibility standards for all new carriages and light rail, and placed a requirement on rail operators to develop a disabled persons protection policy.
We are obviously proud of our record in government, and are concerned that it should be continued in the amendments to the legislation that this Bill represents. All new stock must be compliant with the regulations, and all vehicles that fall under their scope will have to be compliant by 2020. However, we recognise that some heritage systems use vehicles that can never be compliant in these terms, and they deserve exemption. The Government’s proposals would remove the requirement for exemption orders to be made by statutory instrument, thereby reducing the time it takes to issue an exemption.
We appreciate the principle of reducing the time it takes to issue such an exemption, but we are concerned that the Secretary of State’s power to limit exemptions could be undermined. Our amendments seek to ensure that the Secretary of State retains full freedom to impose conditions on exemption orders, such as on length, rather than just issue blanket exemptions. The Department for Work and Pensions figures show that more than one in five people with a disability has experienced difficulty using transport and, on several occasions at Question Time, disabled Peers have indicated that they still face some transport difficulties, not least when the trains are longer than the platforms at some halts, and the train does not stop where the ramp is provided. In any case, fewer than one-fifth of rail stations have full step-free access via lifts or ramps.
The House of Commons Transport Committee suggested last year that the department involved disability organisations and charities in prioritising stations for improvements in a future “access for all” programme. Ministers dismissed the views of disabled people by saying that that those organisations’ involvement would add little value.
In the context of our amendment, as we live longer, increasing numbers of us will be living with some kind of disability. It is therefore essential to adapt the public transport system and ensure that it fits the needs of disabled people. Amendment 61B requires the Secretary of State to,
“produce a report detailing the nature”,
of any exemptions issued,
“including the conditions or restrictions made as part of that order”,
and to publicise it.
Currently there are no requirements to publish any details when exemptions are issued; only the statutory instrument itself is published. How will this shift from a statutory instrument to an administrative regime make the documents more accessible and the process more open for a wider range of UK citizens? I do not say that they will not be—I am not accusing the Government of causing a deterioration in the position—but I seek some reassurance from the Minister that this has been fully considered in this fairly lengthy amendment to the schedule.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord for his broad agreement on Part 7. I agree that we are dealing with some lengthy paperwork. We have made much progress in making rail vehicles more accessible to disabled people since accessibility standards were introduced in 1998—and rightly so. More than 8,100 rail vehicles now meet modern accessibility requirements, and the law requires all rail vehicles to be accessible by 2020. However, it is occasionally not appropriate, or proportionate, for those access standards to apply fully, so the Secretary of State retains the right to exempt specified vehicles from all, or parts, of them.
Originally, all such exemptions were made by statutory instrument. However, in 2008, the domestic rail vehicle accessibility regime covering mainline trains was replaced by an EU regime, whereby exemptions are issued administratively. As a result of implementation of the EU regime for mainline trains, the number of vehicles which remained within the scope of the domestic regime was reduced to just over one-quarter of those originally covered. These are the vehicles which are still subject to the use of statutory instruments for exemptions. Such vehicles include trams, underground, metro, airport people movers and even brand new vehicles for use on heritage railways. That brings the domestic regime more in line with the European regime, which the majority of vehicles are subject to, and is more proportionate than the current situation whereby, if sought, exemptions for the hundreds of trains serving Gatwick, Stansted and Birmingham airport stations would be subject to an administrative process, while any for the 17 small vehicles shuttling passengers between terminals would remain subject to a process involving statutory instruments.
I highlight to the Committee the fact that the vast majority of responses from stakeholders to the Government’s public consultation were in favour of these proposals. In particular, the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee, the Government’s statutory adviser on the transport needs of disabled people, was involved as the proposals were developed and is strongly in favour of these changes. In this respect I am also pleased to note that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is now of the view that these proposals have merits and finds the arguments for consistency with the European regime compelling.
The practical effect of this measure will be to shorten the period between when an application is made and the outcome is given, so reducing uncertainty for the rail industry. It will also reduce the resources required within government to handle each application. I emphasise that it will not reduce in any way the strength of argument that any applicant will need to make to justify an exemption; no exemptions will be granted in future that would not have been granted under the existing arrangements. I also assure the Committee that we will continue to consult the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee, and others as necessary, on the merits of each application. The final decision on whether to grant an exemption will remain with Ministers, and the Government will continue to report annually to Parliament on the use of the exemption powers over the last year. This will allow Parliament to call Ministers to account if they feel that the powers have been used excessively or inappropriately.
Given the overwhelming support from stakeholders that this proposal received, we believe that this reform makes sense. Proceeding with this proposal will mean that applicants for exemption receive a decision sooner, so reducing uncertainty for them, and will reduce administrative burdens on government, but without lessening protection for disabled passengers, or reducing transparency on the use of exemption powers. That is why we have concerns about the noble Lord’s first amendment.
Turning to the noble Lord’s second amendment, the Government recognise that members of the public and Parliament will wish to know that the Secretary of State has used his powers to grant exemptions from the rail vehicle accessibility regulations. That is important. However, this amendment is unnecessary as transparency is already provided through two new routes, both of which will continue. First, the Equality Act 2010 already requires the Secretary of State to make an annual report to Parliament on the use of exemption powers. The Secretary of State will continue to report annually to Parliament on those exemption powers. This will enable Parliament to call Ministers to account. Furthermore, the department already publishes on its website details of applications received for exemptions, the outcome of consultation on the merits of each application and the outcome, including the exemption order itself, if granted.
I assure the Committee that the Government’s intention is that openness must continue. Although I understand the position that the noble Lord has taken, it is for those reasons that we feel his amendments are not necessary.
Lord Skelmersdale
My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Davies, decides what to do with this amendment—indeed he does not have much option in Grand Committee—would my noble friend go back to the draftsmen about the proposed new subsection (7) inserted into the Equality Bill by Schedule 9? The Bill provides that,
“such an order is as capable of being amended or revoked as an order made by statutory instrument”.
From my experience on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, I know that a statutory instrument can amend or revoke another one and regularly does, but the way this clause is worded suggests that the statutory instrument itself can be amended. To my mind, only a super-affirmative procedure can be amended in that way. I do not expect my noble friend to answer this now, but if he could get this looked that, I would be extremely grateful.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend. His experience is invaluable and I will certainly discuss this with officials so that we can come to a mutually satisfactory conclusion.
Lord Davies of Oldham
As ever, the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, is to be congratulated on his eagle eye. We shall see that the Minister gives a satisfactory reply. I listened carefully to the Minister and was grateful for his remarks, which were reassuring. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s acceptance of the position was enough for me, so I assure the Committee that when the time comes I will not move my amendment.
“(2) The Secretary of State may direct—
(a) a strategic highways company,(b) a local highway authority in England, or(c) such a company or authority acting together with one or more other such companies or authorities,to prepare and give effect to a permit scheme which takes such form as the Secretary of State may direct.”
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his amendment, and all who spoke in this debate. I think the word “minefield” was used by one of my noble friends; there may be some more extreme language.
I will explain why Clause 38 is, in the Government’s view, important. New Section 78A to be inserted in the Traffic Management Act 2004 will allow for regulations to be made, the effect of which will prevent local authorities from issuing parking tickets in the post based solely on the evidence of CCTV cameras. Once the regulations are in place, traffic wardens will need either to affix tickets physically to the vehicle, or hand the ticket to the person who appears to be in charge of the vehicle, so that drivers are made aware of an alleged parking contravention at the time. This might be an appropriate time to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, about what the phrase,
“begun to prepare a ticket”,
means. My understanding is that it is the point at which the traffic warden begins to prepare the ticket in a physical sense. I hope that that is helpful; that is my understanding of the matter.
The Government accept that sole reliance on CCTV evidence in enforcing on-street parking regulations is suitable in certain circumstances, and will therefore set out in secondary legislation four exemptions where CCTV will continue to be used: bus lanes, bus stops, red routes and around schools. My noble friend Lord Tope mentioned this in particular about schools. I can well understand this because I have had direct experience of it in the past 10 days. Noble Lords of a political persuasion may have gone down to Rochester. I was there in a street that had a school, and one of the issues that was raised was parking.
The description in the draft regulations of what constitutes “around schools” follows that used elsewhere in DfT legislation. There is nothing to prevent local authorities using traffic wardens to enforce in other areas. I should, however, like to look into that in a little bit more detail.
Lord Tope
I should be grateful if my noble friend would look into it. With deference to my noble friend the former leader of Kensington and Chelsea, most local authorities do not have the income from parking that enables them to employ large numbers—I think she referred to armies—of traffic enforcement officers. It is simply not practical to put civil enforcement officers—I think that they are called parking attendants now—outside every primary school throughout that local authority area where there is a parking problem. I am sorry to say that the Minister confirmed my understanding from a quick read of the regulations, that a camera can be used for 10 yards outside the school but if you go further than 10 yards you have got to employ a human being at consequent cost for enforcement. That simply will not happen in most areas. There is neither the money nor the demand to do it. Frankly, it is ludicrous.
Therefore I thank the Minister for his willingness—even, I suspect, his enthusiasm—to look into this and to have it resolved before we get to the next stage of the Bill. I am not sure that he has already noted that by far the strongest opposition to this clause has come from his own side.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, I am fast becoming aware of that. I do not want to provoke my noble friends, but since local authorities took on responsibility for parking enforcement the income from parking has gone up significantly. Local authority surpluses from parking income have more than doubled from £223 million to £512 million between 1997 and 2010. There are obviously some local authorities that are increasing surpluses—clearly not the local authorities with which my noble friends have been associated or which they may know. I pass those figures on as a matter of record.
The Government believe that these proposals are necessary as a matter of principle. People should be able to see what they are accused of when they return to their vehicle, so that they have the opportunity to examine the area for themselves. It is not reasonable for drivers to receive a ticket in the post up to two weeks after the incident has taken place.
The Government also believe that some local authorities are ignoring operational guidance and using CCTVs in areas in which they should not do so. The Traffic Penalty Tribunal told the Transport Select Committee that adjudicators have found cases where camera enforcement is used as a matter of routine where the strict requirements for use in the guidance do not appear to be present. By bringing forward this legislation the Government are seeking to ensure that parking practices are fairer for people.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
What is the difference between getting a ticket through the post as a result of camera activity two weeks after the event and getting a ticket in the post as a result of camera activity two weeks after the event when you are whizzing up the M40 and there has been a police car on one of the bridges?
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, used the word “whizzing”. I am not sure that anyone could start placing the ticket on a vehicle going at 80 or 90 miles an hour on the motorway. However, I take his point more seriously than perhaps is suggested by making that instant judgment as to why it would not be possible to adhere to these principles for someone going at 80 or 90 miles an hour on the motorway.
Lord Deben
Does this not give my noble friend the opportunity to go back to the department to explain why there is unhappiness? It was said that the reason why you cannot affix the notice is that the car is travelling too fast, but there are other reasons, too. In the part of the country from which we both come, a village school may have real problems with people parking in the wrong places. The ideal answer in that distant place, where it is difficult to have someone on duty all the time, may be to have a camera. The idea that Suffolk Coastal District Council or Mid Suffolk District Council is capable of having people standing outside every village school—and many of them have this problem—is not sensible. Is that not the same sort of issue as dealing with people travelling at 60 or 80 miles per hour? There is no other way of doing it, but we have to do it.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My noble friend is always extremely persuasive. Clearly, the record of these discussions will go back to the department.
In his amendments, the noble Lord seeks to place in the Bill the list of exempted areas where local authorities can continue to use CCTV to issue tickets in the post. The department does not think that it would be expedient to set the exemptions in primary legislation. It is conceivable that exemptions could be increased or reduced in the future, so it might be more desirable to include them in secondary legislation. Everyone will have their own view on what is the right balance for the use of CCTV, whether that is in parking, as your Lordships are debating today, or more widely. The Government have given careful consideration to the list of exemptions and, in particular, have reflected the views of those who responded to the consultation.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, also seeks to introduce a requirement for impact assessments to be carried out for the provisions. As I am sure he will know, the Government have been clear in their determination to reduce the impact of rules and regulations on businesses and policymakers. Indeed, the Government’s Better Regulation Framework Manual, which was published in July 2013, states that impact assessments are required only for measures that regulate or deregulate business or concern the regulation of business. This clause applies only to local authorities that carry out parking enforcement, so we believe that no impact assessment is required.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
Will the Minister remind me what the criteria are for an equality impact assessment?
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
I think that I might need a little assistance on that, but I will return to it.
The noble Lord also suggested the insertion of a new clause that would prevent the measures in the Bill from affecting off-street parking. However, the measures in the Bill already apply only to on-street parking, so we consider that the noble Lord’s suggested new clause is not necessary.
I should also reply to my noble friend Lord Bradshaw on the issue of traffic flow. Local authorities will still be able to enforce parking. Indeed, the great majority of authorities do this without the use of CCTV. As I said, in those areas where traffic flow is vital, the Government have provided for CCTV to continue.
I promise to write to the noble Lord about equality impact assessments.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, this is an important amendment, and we should thank the noble Lord, Lord Tope, for moving it on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Low. As the noble Lord, Lord Tope, said, we all signed up to the Private Member’s Bill, which has stalled at the other end but is due for a Second Reading in January.
Under the existing legislation, it is illegal to drive on pavements and footpaths, but there is no specific prohibition against pavement parking. The ambiguity in the law means that most local authorities struggle to enforce restrictions, in contrast to London, which has operated a separate system since 1974. I understand that there are also exemptions in place in Exeter and Worcester. As the campaigning charity, Living Streets, said in written evidence to the Transport Select Committee:
“Inconsiderate parking can cause a major barrier to many vulnerable road users. It is clear that the current legislative situation relying on police enforcement isn’t working”.
Of course, there are some areas where parking on the pavement is unavoidable, and there are other legitimate reasons why it might sometimes be necessary—but all too often parking on the pavement obstructs access to pedestrians, forcing them to navigate busy and dangerous roads instead. Some 74% of adults report being forced to walk on the road because the pavement was being obstructed by cars and other vehicles. For some, pavement parking can effectively extinguish their right of way altogether. I refer to elderly people, people with buggies and those with disabilities. For them, cars that block the pavement can be a serious restriction on their freedom of movement.
I know that the measure proposed today has the support of the Guide Dogs UK, Age UK and several other organisations referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Tope. Banks of parked cars can also force cyclists to swerve into dangerous traffic flows, which can be especially dangerous on narrow roads. Pavements are not designed to bear the weight of cars, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, just said, let alone heavier goods vehicles; over time, they can become degraded, posing additional challenges for pedestrians and costs for local authorities.
The reality of the problem is not in contention, I suggest. In 2006, the Transport Select Committee said that the then Government,
“must grip the problem of pavement parking once and for all and ensure that it is outlawed throughout the country … rather than relying on the use of individual Traffic Regulation Orders on specific streets and local Acts to impose”,
a fine. Last year, the Transport Select Committee called for reform to end,
“a confusing patchwork approach across the country”,
and for a clarification of the rules for loading and unloading by haulage companies, and action to rectify the long-standing problems over poor signage. It is important that, even as the Government try to move towards allowing more diverse road signs from local authorities, common national standards can be agreed on this issue.
The status quo brings challenges for drivers as well as pedestrians and cyclists. The British Parking Association and the RAC Foundation all support the calls for change. Inappropriately parking vehicles can interfere with traffic flows for other road users, causing jams and congestion, and drivers are often unsure about restrictions—and which, if any, are in place. Given the growth in congestion on many of our roads, these problems are likely to be magnified in the years ahead.
The Government also seem to be in agreement, on the principle at least, that pavement parking is a problem that needs to be addressed. The amendment gives the Minister and the Government ample opportunity to do so. I urge them to take it.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Tope, for speaking to the amendment; I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for tabling it.
The Government recognise entirely the importance of making the local environment convenient, safe and attractive to walk in, and of keeping footways in good order. I do not think anyone could have failed to be struck by all that my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond has said. However, as I think the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, acknowledged, part of the dilemma is that there are indeed some streets where pavement parking may be inevitable, whether to maintain free passage of traffic, to allow loading and unloading or to allow the setting down of passengers in certain situations. I am afraid that I can think of instances when I have parked on a pavement for an elderly relative to get out safely, which I think was legitimate; it was not in London, either. There are therefore issues with a blanket ban, as the amendment is drafted, that are problematic.
Local authorities already have many powers to ban pavement parking; I have a list of them and they are quite considerable. However, I agree with my noble friend Lord Deben on this occasion. Local authorities are in the best position to decide on local parking restrictions and need to consider all road users when taking such decisions. A national ban of the type proposed would require local authorities to remove all existing restrictions, then to review their urban areas for where footway parking should nevertheless still be permitted, consult the community and erect new signage and markings, which would of course impose a burden on local government.
The amendment also proposes banning footway parking but allowing authorities to permit it where desired by a simple resolution. Circumvention of the traffic regulation order process would take away an important protection for the public. This process requires authorities to undertake consultation and advertise the proposals before councillors take final decisions. The Government’s guidance to local authorities makes clear that, during the appraisal of their parking policies, an authority should consider whether pavement parking is problematic in any part of its area. If it is, and is not covered by an existing traffic regulation order, the authority should consider amending the existing order or making a new one. Indeed, my noble friend Lady Kramer wrote to all English traffic authorities on 27 June this year to remind them of their existing, wide-ranging powers to prevent people from parking on the pavement where it is a problem.
Given the significant issues in managing a change of this scale, and the fact that authorities already have comprehensive powers to ban footway parking, I will ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. However, before that, I want to emphasise that I am not asking the noble Lord to do that because the Government do not understand or accept the concerns that have been expressed. Indeed, the Government consulted the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee on this. Although that body favours having no parking on the footway, it recognised that there would need to be exemptions from the national ban and that issues arise from this.
Although I am sure all noble Lords in the Committee will have every sympathy for what is intended, there are issues, which is why I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, those two powerful speeches have made the case that we wish to make from the Front Bench. We also hope to persuade my noble friend Lord Rooker than objecting to the clause itself is in fact a stronger position than his amendment. I hope the speeches have convinced a very significant number of Members of the Committee, perhaps even the Government, to think again, but they have also reduced the length of my speech because all the issues have been more than adequately covered.
I emphasise that the effect of the Government’s legislation would be to downgrade rights that are derived from a duty on the part of the Minister to a mere choice by him, which is the emphatic point that my noble friend Lord Prescott was making. There is an obvious flaw in the Government’s proposals. My noble friend has made his case already but I will show how much we on the Front Bench are concerned about this. It is not clear how the Secretary of State can be expected adequately to assess the existing evidence in order to suspect a miscarriage of justice without investigative help by the very accident investigation branch itself. As my noble friend Lord Prescott has indicated, there are very good reasons why the branch should be reluctant to participate in this. The work will now be undertaken by the branch only if the Secretary of State requests it because he already suspects a miscarriage of justice. That is a long shot in circumstances where he has no or very little evidence before him at that stage. In addition, reinvestigating might unearth difficult truths about the adequacy and focus of previous assessments by officials and the department when making the initial judgment. Any Minister should, of course, be able to process issues without fear or favour, but there is bound to be an inhibition when he is dependent on the department for certain facts.
The justification that Ministers have given for the change is entirely spurious. They have claimed that it is to safeguard the human rights of officers involved in accidents, whose careers could be undermined by an automatic investigation organised by the Minister. It might have that advantage, but it would block off new evidence to support future safety measures and which could tell families what really happened. We know, from the illustrations given today, two things from the “Derbyshire” inquiry. First, the families of those who were lost got to hear what had actually happened 20 years later, as opposed to the original depiction. Secondly, future safety measures were inaugurated by my noble friend in the department as a result of the evidence of why the ship had sunk.
I believe that the clause should be opposed and not stand part of the Bill.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the Secretary of State is obliged to reopen a formal investigation either if new and important evidence that was not available at the time of the original investigation becomes known, or if there appear to be grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice. For any other circumstances, the Secretary of State has a discretionary power to reopen an investigation. There is no time limitation on the current obligations to reopen a formal investigation. This is surely right and proper where there are grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice, and the Bill most certainly does not seek to change this duty in any way. However, in other cases, the potential value of reopening a formal investigation in terms of enhancing safety for today’s mariners may—and I emphasise may—diminish with the passage of time after the loss of a ship.
The design of ships and their equipment, industry crewing and operating practices, continually change and develop. By the time that new and important evidence is found, these matters may be very different from those that applied at the time of an accident. That is not to say that one can draw a specific time limit on the usefulness of an inquiry. Each case is likely to be unique and should be considered on its own merits. This would be preferable to the current blanket imposition of a duty that may not always be beneficial for maritime safety, which is rightly our priority. Therefore, Clause 40 is drafted to enable the Secretary of State to take a considered view on the likely benefits of reopening a formal investigation in circumstances where new evidence comes to light. To be clear, a formal investigation, the subject of this clause, is very different from the safety investigations undertaken by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. The noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Prescott, mentioned that. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch’s sole objective is to determine the causes and circumstances of an accident to prevent a recurrence; it does not seek to apportion blame or liability. I re-emphasise that the clause does not affect these safety investigations, nor situations in which new and important evidence is found from accidents that have been subject only to a safety investigation. Of course, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch acts of its own decision.
In contrast, formal and reopened formal investigations are proceedings which, as well as probing the causes of an accident, can apportion liability and blame, censure ships’ officers, or cancel their certificates of competency. There have been four since 1997: a formal investigation into the loss of the “Marchioness”—the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, spoke very powerfully and with great experience of that tragedy—and reopened formal investigations into the “Derbyshire”, “Gaul” and “Trident”. The three reopened formal investigations all related to accidents that occurred prior to the establishment in 1989 of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. With most accidents since then being subject to safety rather than formal investigations, increasingly any reopened formal investigation would relate to more historic accidents.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
Yes, it was the reopening of the inquiry, and it happened 20 or so years after the accident.
I stress that, even if there were no obligation to reopen an inquiry, I would strongly expect one to be called if similar circumstances to the “Derbyshire” applied. Of course, I acknowledge the importance of the reopened investigation into, for instance, the loss of the “Derbyshire” both in terms of providing answers to the bereaved families of those who lost their lives and in contributing to enhanced maritime safety for the benefit of all mariners.
I understand all the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in tabling this amendment and by the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Prescott. I assure your Lordships that any decision on whether to reopen a formal investigation would be taken very seriously, taking into account the views of all interested parties, including, of course, trade unions.
During consideration of this clause in the other place, the then Solicitor-General explained the principles of how the Secretary of State would approach the decision. My honourable friend confirmed that each case for reopening would be considered on its individual merits. Such considerations would include, although they would not be limited to, the likelihood of lessons being learnt that would improve the safety of current marine operations and ship design; the likelihood of being able to identify the true cause or causes of marine accidents where these had been particularly uncertain prior to the evidence being found; and the likelihood of uncovering information that would provide a deeper understanding of the causes of other marine accidents. In short, Clause 40 would allow the Secretary of State to consider the individual circumstances of a formal investigation when new and important evidence was found, taking a rounded view of the best ways to improve maritime safety.
The noble Lord, Lord Prescott, in referring to his experience, expressed concern about the impartiality of the department and the question of fault. Now, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch must undertake impartial investigations and assess evidence, and indeed it could well criticise any department at fault.
Lord Prescott
On that point, I thank the Minister for his explanation. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch has always had a responsibility to investigate. It did so in the case of the “Marchioness” but the Government would not produce the report.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
I think that I may need some advice from behind on that. While I am receiving that, I should mention that the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, referred to what I would describe as “crimes at sea”, which the Government obviously take very seriously.
The Government have promoted guidance on the preservation of evidence at crime scenes with the International Maritime Organization. In our view, these are matters that we must take forward on an international level, with international agreements. I very much understand the points about preservation of evidence and about offering information and understanding to families with loved ones who are in this position.
If I am not given the information now that I hope I might be about to be given, I will be in touch with the noble Lord. However, given all the circumstances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Prescott
I thank the Minister very much for giving a response to the last point—I could not expect him to have all the details, but at least he is aware of the problem. However, I still believe it is the right of every British citizen to have an investigation or an inquest—if, for example, their daughter has died. We should surely be entitled to report back to the people and have our Government involved in an inquest, as the Americans are doing. Our Government say, “It happened on a ship registered in the Bahamas”—but the authorities there have not had an inquest, so we should do it. I do not expect the Minister to give an answer, as it is a highly technical point, but perhaps he could just write to me with information from the department as to why we cannot have an inquest on a citizen who has gone missing, whatever the circumstances. The Americans have acted on it, and the least we could do is offer an inquest in which our own police are involved.
Lord Rooker
Is the Minister going to get back up with the advice he has got?
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
The advice is not on that particular matter but on another one.
Lord Rooker
My Lords, I sincerely thank the Minister for his response. This is not an area I have any detailed knowledge of whatever, but I understand that over the years there have been considerable improvements, and heaven forbid there is another big loss. Part of the briefing that I have is about the size of ships. The “Derbyshire” remains the largest UK-registered ship to have been lost at sea—I was unaware of that. It was big, with a gross tonnage of 91,000. As my noble friend said, at the time the bulk carriers accounted for only 7% of the world fleet but for 57% of lost ships, so there was clearly something wrong there that had to be looked at. I find it astonishing that it was found on the sea bed at 4,200 metres. That is an astonishing depth at which to locate and recover a ship.
I will refrain from saying too much about the “Trident”, because with my noble friend here I am trying to cut down my material, but the Minister referred to it. The “Trident” was lost for 35 years. Was there not a sniff at one time that because it had been lost for so long, the cost of reopening the case was considered by some people disproportionate to the potential benefits? Only one recommendation came out of that, while 22 came out of the “Derbyshire”. The Government’s argument—my noble friend raised this because of his detailed knowledge—completely ignores the benefit of emotional closure for the families. The Minister did not refer to that at all, but it is a matter which should be addressed. If there is a sniff about cost here, I would like some further and better particulars before Report. No one is making a cost argument, I am just naturally suspicious and it is a factor that I think has to be considered at the back of our minds.
I am on record as supporting the Bill and am very much in favour of deregulation. The Government do not go far enough sometimes, and the Bill introduces regulation to avoid regulation, so it does bits of both. However, the issue here, unlike other parts of the Bill, is that we know that people have died or have been missing for decades. As a result, we know we have the issue of the families, which should be considered. There are very few cases, as has been said.
Finally, my noble friend is quite right about the discretion of argument. Just looking around the Room, I see former departmental Ministers. I do not know about the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, but there is a difference in the coalition between being Whips and being answerable for other Ministers; I fully accept that. My noble friends Lord Whitty and Lord Prescott and I have been departmental Ministers—I was at a much lower level than my noble friend Lord Prescott—but the issue of discretion is interesting. You are allowed, as a Minister, to choose the colour of your car.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, I might agree with a number of points that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, made, but I particularly agree that this is a complicated area. The point of this reform is to remove a power from the Digital Economy Act 2010 to make regulations which would allow the court to grant injunctions requiring service providers to block access to specified sites in order to prevent the infringement of copyright. That is the purpose of this reform. There are wider debates about the importance of the creative industries and the Government’s programme to ensure that the creative industries remain part of our economic revival, which is a point that the Government are working on. I want to concentrate on the purpose of this part of the reform.
The Government have no intention of having regulations following the Digital Economy Act because we believe that access can be, and is in practice, blocked through a simpler mechanism via the legislation that the noble Lord mentioned, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The provisions being repealed were inserted because copyright owners were concerned at the time that, although the legislation provided them with a tool to tackle unlawful peer-to-peer file-sharing, it did nothing to help them defend their copyright against sites dedicated to infringement, which were generally operated outside the UK. Copyright owners made a case that the power in Sections 17 and 18 of the Digital Economy Act should be included to enable them to tackle such sites. They were unable to take action against the sites in the UK and found it difficult to pursue them in their home territory. The solution was to provide a mechanism through which copyright owners could apply to the High Court for an injunction requiring internet service providers to block access to identified sites for the internet service providers’ subscribers.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said, following the Digital Economy Act being enacted, the Government asked Ofcom to carry out a review of the efficacy of such site-blocking injunctions, were they to be made. Ofcom concluded that in practice such injunctions were unlikely to be effective, largely due to the time an application would take. This is stating the obvious: very often people will want to ensure that there is a remedy that is as speedy as possible when time is of the essence. In Ofcom’s view, it would be no improvement on the existing Section 97A provisions under the 1988 Act. On that basis, the Government announced that they had no intention of making such regulations under DEA.
Moreover—this is important because the noble Lord also referred to this—copyright owners began to utilise other provisions in Section 97A of the 1988 Act successfully to apply for site-blocking injunctions. This rendered the regulation-making powers in the DEA unnecessary. Such provisions had not been used before since copyright owners were unsure how the court would interpret them and were worried about potentially being left in a worse position.
I want to emphasise that it is absolutely not the intention of this Government to put at risk the health and growth of the creative economy, an area where this country has a real competitive strength. If I were to take a different view with the noble Lord, I think the record of this Government has been extremely strong during a very exciting time of change in this area which is vital to our economic strength and recovery. However, Section 97A of the 1988 Act is now providing remedies for copyright owners and is doing so in an increasingly efficient and economical way. Economy in seeking redress is important. Copyright owners are content that the provisions work and have now used them to block around 40 sites. That being so, and in light of the doubts about the practical usability of the power in the DEA following Ofcom’s review, we believe there is no need for the DEA power.