Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Hacking Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

As my noble friend will recall, I raised this issue at Second Reading. I support Amendment 14, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and Amendment 15, in the name of my learned friend, if I may refer to him in those terms, the noble Lord, Lord Meston. I add that I have sympathy towards the drafting of Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

As I say quite frequently in this House—the issue of sexual offending arose in the passage of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, and I said it then and I repeat it now—sexual offences in the family environment are appalling. The offence of a father—it is often the father, rather than the mother—sexually attacking, which I think is the right word, his own son or daughter, who are as young as 14 years-old, is absolutely appalling. It is beyond most of our comprehension that any father would do that—it is certainly beyond my comprehension.

The important thing here is the value of the prohibited steps order made in the family court, because that can be carefully fashioned to the particular needs of a family. Therefore, it is welcome that the family court has this provision. The use of this prohibited steps order is most valuable for the protection of children and spouses in the family.

I am a little puzzled by the provision in Clause 3, and I ask my noble friend the Minister to reply to this, under which it is obligatory, within the circumstances set out, for a prohibited steps order to be made. I would be grateful for guidance—I am sorry I have not researched this—on whether the power to make a prohibited steps order is a matter of discretion by the Crown Court, or whether it is the situation that a prohibited steps order can be brought into force only under the drafting of Clause 3? I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could answer that.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a few observations. No one can doubt the revulsion towards sexual offenders who have attacked their own children or have the potential to do so, but there are two practical points that we must bear in mind.

First, the criminal justice system and the criminal courts, and the family justice system and the family courts, have been starved of resources by both Governments—there is no doubt about that. When sentence lengths are increased by both parties, we end up with a situation in the prisons that is a crisis. In deciding what orders to make in this kind of case, it is of paramount importance to have regard to the resource implications. It is no use saying that there is money for this. There is not. The courts system is starved, and the result of that is victims suffering in a whole host of other cases by the tremendous backlog. Both this Government and the last Government are responsible for the position into which the courts have been placed. When we look at this, please have regard to resources.

The second point, a point made by the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Meston, is that it is important that we get correct the balance as to what the Crown Court is to do and what the family court is to do. I am not sure, having listened to this debate, that that is a matter that has been sufficiently addressed. The one thing you cannot have—because it is a waste of resources and does not deploy expertise correctly—is the lines not clearly drawn. I hope very much that, before this comes back, there will be the opportunity for those who have day-to-day responsibility in the judiciary and the Courts Service, together with the ministry, to be sure that we have got the most effective and efficient use of resources and the right kind of drawing the line. It is very difficult, but we cannot ignore the bankrupt state of the courts. It is a regrettable fact, and we must not make the mistake we have made in relation to sentencing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government understand that the aim of this group of amendments is to ensure that the children, who are at the heart of these cases, are protected. We share that objective, but these amendments may cause more problems than they are intended to solve. The amendments are all intended to be made to legislation, either proposed or already enacted, which deals with slightly different situations—convictions for certain serious sexual offences, children conceived as a result of rape and where one parent has been convicted of the murder of the other. However, all these pieces of proposed or enacted legislation have one thing in common. They are not intended to be additional punishments or to replicate—far less, replace—the experience and expertise of the family court. They are intended to protect children who are caught up in these very serious situations as quickly as possible.

In each of these three situations, the Government have identified issues in which the crime for which the relevant person has been sentenced is so serious, with them usually serving a long prison sentence, that it is relatively straightforward to conclude that a prohibited steps order will be in the best interests of the child. These proposals allow the Crown Court judge automatically to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility at the time of sentence. At the moment, following sentence the remaining parent must apply to the family court to do the same thing, but this inevitably takes time and causes distress.

It is known that some perpetrators use their parental responsibility to continue to exercise control, even though they are behind bars. In relation to a parent serving a life sentence for the murder of the other parent, it is axiomatic that there will be no other parent to make the application. What this legislation does not do is automatically restrict the exercise of parental responsibility in all cases forever. The defendant who has had it restricted can apply to the family court to have it restored. It does put the onus on them to do so. These provisions merely provide a quick and convenient method of protecting children and victims. However, restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is an extremely serious thing to do. For this reason, the Government must give serious consideration to how to balance the competing principles that are involved.

Against this background, I turn to Amendments 13, 14, 15, 19, 22 and 27, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie. They seek to broaden the offences that are within the scope of this measure and reduce the minimum sentencing threshold from four years. The Government believe that any individual who poses a serious risk to children should not be able to exercise their parental responsibility. For the avoidance of doubt, I make it clear that the Government’s view is that parents do not have rights. The only rights are those of the child.

However, to create a power allowing the automatic restriction at the point of sentence, we must be sure that to do so would be in the best interest of the child. That is why we have set the threshold at sentences of four years’ imprisonment. In our judgment, if the behaviour of the defendant is sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence of four years or more, it is safe to assume that it would be right to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility. We have set it at four years because this is already a threshold for seriousness used for other purposes in criminal sentencing. For certain offences, including sexual offences, an offender who is sentenced to four or more years serves two-thirds rather than a half of their sentence in prison. It already recognises the particular seriousness.

This pre-existing legislative provision is why we have chosen four years as the indicator of seriousness. If we were to lower the four-year threshold, we could risk moving away from where we can be sure that restricting the exercise of parental responsibility will always be in the best interests of a child into territory where it is less clear. Equally, we must ensure that these measures are not in contravention of a person’s human rights. In particular, we need to ensure that any interference with a person’s right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European convention is a justifiable and proportionate way of achieving a legitimate aim. We have set the threshold at four years for serious child sexual offences as we are of the view that, given the risk of harm to children, this intervention is justified.

That is not to say that the parental responsibility of offenders who have committed sexual offences, whether against their own child or someone else’s, but have received a sentence of less than four years, cannot be restricted. In those cases, an application can still be made to the family court, which is best placed to consider all circumstances, including what is in the best interests of the child.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised a number of issues about shortcomings in the family court. With the greatest of respect to her, this is perhaps not the time and place to expand on those, though they are of course serious points. As I think the noble Baroness knows, I have responsibility for family justice policy within my department, so these are issues that perhaps she and I can discuss on another occasion.

When we met, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, asked about appeals, and it has been raised again today. I promised him a reply. In cases where there is a successful appeal and an offender is acquitted or the sentence is reduced below four years, the Bill provides a clear process for the review of the prohibited steps order. The relevant local authority will be under a duty to make an application within a very short time to the family court, so that the family court can consider, exercising its expertise and experience, whether the prohibited steps order imposed by the Crown Court should be varied or discharged.

I turn now to Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. The offence of having sexual communications with a child carries a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment, so this could not be added to the list unless the requirement of a four-year minimum sentence were removed.

I turn now to Amendment 34 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, put her name and has spoken. This would expand Jade’s law, which provides for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. The noble Lord and the noble Baroness wish to amend the legislation so that it includes cases of attempted murder. I am grateful for being told that that was at the suggestion of the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman, for whom I have the utmost respect.

I entirely recognise that, in order to be convicted of attempted murder, what the defendant has done will have been truly horrific—after all, a defendant can be convicted of this only if they had the intention actually to kill—and nothing I say is intended to minimise that. But I repeat what I said earlier. The automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is not intended to punish the defendant, far less to act as a mark of societal disapproval. It is about children. I repeat that Parliament must be satisfied that restricting the exercise of parental responsibility will be in a child’s best interests.

The sad but determining factor in these killing cases is that the child is going to have only one parent left, and that parent will usually be serving a life sentence. There is no other comparable situation. Where the defendant did not succeed in murdering the other parent, although they intended to do so, they will usually be serving a long sentence, but there will be a surviving parent. In most cases, the surviving parent will be able to make an application to the family court if one is felt necessary. This lessens the need for an automatic referral to the family court.

It would also be difficult to justify why, if attempted murder were included, other serious criminal offences such as Section 18 wounding, which also carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, were not. Your Lordships should also be aware that adding a further measure into Jade’s law at this point will risk delaying its implementation, which has already taken a lot longer than the Government would have wished.

I have been asked for the reasons for that, and I will give them as quickly as I am able to. It is a complicated situation, but this is a unique piece of legislation. There is no existing process that we can import or learn from. There has been significant engagement with various partners that will be involved in the delivery of Jade’s law: local authorities; the Crown Prosecution Service; the National Police Chiefs’ Council; and His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service. The Government also have to make changes to criminal and family procedure rules, and we also have to develop broader guidance for practitioners and families. But we are on it. We must bring Jade’s law into force as soon as possible to protect the children who need it most. We must be cautious about doing anything at this stage that could extend this process.

As with the measures we are bringing in through this Bill, officials are developing a robust system to measure how Jade’s law works in practice. We want to understand how it works in practice, and from there we can properly consider whether other changes can be made to it. For all these reasons, I invite your Lordships not to press these amendments.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

If I understood my noble friend correctly, the protected steps order can be made only if Clause 3 is activated, and there is no discretion in the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order in other circumstances, particularly where the offence did not, as drafted, carry a four-year imprisonment. In fact, I think my noble friend then said that parents can apply to the family court for the protected steps order. I find that rather awkward. Surely, when the Crown Court has all the facts in front of it and is in a position, therefore, to make a prohibited steps order, it should do so because it has the necessary knowledge. Of course, the prohibited steps order could be adjusted in a separate application to the family court.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The short answer to my noble friend’s question is that he is right: there is no discretion. The reason that there is no discretion is because, in fact, the Crown Court is the one court that does not have all the experience and all the knowledge—it will not have Cafcass reports or anything like that. It is simply making an automatic order when there is a certain level of seriousness that has been reached. It is for the family court to consider all the important factors in other cases about whether such an order is in the interests of the child. The Crown Court judge does not have the expertise, and it will cause delay. I have said it once before today—I may have already said it twice—the one thing the criminal courts do not need is any further delays.