Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 16, 22, 23 and 28. Control and order is a fundamental foundation of prison life. Without it, safety cannot be guaranteed and the rehabilitation of prisoners cannot take place. It is known that the throwing of packages containing contraband, including psychoactive substances—often inappropriately referred to as “legal highs”—is a key method of supplying drugs into prisons. In some cases, it is co-ordinated by criminal gangs involved in a wide range of criminality. The presence of new psychoactive substances in prisons, now drugs of choice among many prisoners, is a significant and growing problem that we must address urgently. These drugs are having an increasingly destructive impact on prison security, order and the welfare of individual prisoners, with increasing evidence of links to mental health problems and violent behaviour.

While it is currently a criminal offence under the Prison Act to convey a number of items including controlled drugs into a prison, non-controlled substances are not covered by that legislation. As such, those caught trafficking a range of new psychoactive substances have been able to evade justice. This is not acceptable.

Commons Amendment 9 will create a new offence of throwing or otherwise projecting any article or substance into a prison without authorisation. The clause will criminalise the trafficking of new psychoactive substances into our prisons and also captures the throwing of other articles into prison that could pose a threat to prison staff and prisoners. We must not tolerate those who damage prison health and order by throwing items such as new psychoactive substances into prisons. This new offence will help to stop this harmful practice.

Commons Amendment 10 seeks to prevent the unauthorised use of mobile phones in prison. The unauthorised use of mobile phones presents serious risks to prison security. They have been used to plan escapes and support the commission of serious crimes by organised criminals. In January, we saw the sobering reports of the conviction of a prisoner in Wandsworth prison who had used his mobile phone to arrange the importation of machine guns into this country from Germany. I am sure that we all agree that such use of mobile phones in prison is completely unacceptable.

The National Offender Management Service uses a range of techniques to detect and seize phones in prisons. However, despite the success of these methods, as mobile phone technology advances and the size of handsets decreases, it is becoming easier for prisoners to conceal illicit phones in prison. Disconnecting phones would be a cost-effective and future-proofed method to prevent the unauthorised use of phones in prison. Mobile network operators have asked for a clear legal framework to support disconnection. Amendment 10 will therefore enable the Secretary of State—or, in Scotland, Scottish Ministers—to make regulations conferring a power on the civil court to make a telecommunications restriction order. Such an order will require a mobile network operator to disconnect those SIM cards and handsets that are found to be in use in prisons without authorisation, effectively putting those devices beyond normal operational use.

In the unlikely event that a genuine customer’s phone is disconnected in error, NOMS will advise the mobile network operator that the telecommunications restriction order no longer applies. This will allow the network operator to expedite the reconnection of the service. This will be done quickly, without the need to return to court to vary the order. The customer’s phone can still be used to call the emergency services, should that need arise. As an additional safeguard, NOMS will report annually to the Interception of Communications Commissioner, providing the details and frequency of any erroneous disconnections for scrutiny by the commissioner’s office.

It is unacceptable that prisoners should continue to use mobile phones to carry out criminal activity outside prison. Having the power to disconnect illicit phones in prison will help to tackle that flagrant disregard for the restraints of their incarceration. Our view is simple: we must constantly seek ways to improve prison security. These new offences will do exactly that. The other amendments in this group are consequential on these two new clauses. I commend these amendments to the House.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, this is pure curiosity on my part but, in relation to Amendment 10, might I understand how it would be possible to tell the communications providers that they should apply a telecommunications restriction order to a specific SIM card unless said SIM card had already been seized and obtained by the prison authorities—in which case, why would it be needed? Also, what steps have been taken to look at technological systems that would jam the signals inside prisons?

[Lord Bates]

Those are very reasonable points to make. On general jamming in the prison compound, I recognise of course that some individuals working within that compound need to have mobile devices, which can be used to communicate. By that, I am referring to the staff prison officers.

On the specific issue of SIM cards, the National Offender Management Service currently uses a range of different techniques to detect and seize phones already in prisons, including the use of detection technology and regular cell and prisoner searches. However, despite the success of these approaches, as mobile phone technology advances and the size of handsets decreases it is becoming easier for prisoners to conceal illicit phones and move them around the prison estate. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether to prosecute an individual for possessing a mobile phone in custody. Due to the way in which mobile phones are typically used in prisons, with multiple prisoners potentially sharing one phone, it is often not possible to attribute handsets and SIMS to specific individuals.

In many ways, I agree with the noble Lord that identifying the number on the SIM card is tremendously difficult when you are still searching for the device. However, in the light of experience, we are simply trying to make it as difficult as possible for the individuals concerned to do this. NOMS uses a range of measures to stop phones and SIM cards getting into prisons. However, due to the high number of deliveries, post items and individuals entering and leaving prisons each day, it is impossible entirely to prevent SIMs and handsets making their way on to the prison estate.

Those are the points that I have, which I hope have been some help. There might just be some communications data on their way to help me. The signal of an unauthorised phone or SIM card can be detected without physically seizing the phone SIM in question. Blocking has a role but can be expensive to use. The answer is therefore probably quite straightforward—it is now, anyway. Through the detection devices we can identify a SIM, even if we have not managed to locate it, and block it in the process. I hope that with that general reassurance, the House will accept these amendments.