Lord Howarth of Newport
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Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
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Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, this amendment is designed to probe the reasons for the Speaker having to consult the Deputy Speakers before issuing his certificate. So far as I can see, there are two possible, if incompatible, reasons for the inclusion of this provision. The first is because of the provision of Section 1(3) of the Parliament Act 1911, which requires the Speaker, before certifying that a Bill is a money Bill, to consult, if practicable, two members of the Chairmen’s Panel. The Government may thus see the provision of the Speaker’s certificate as analogous to a certificate under the Parliament Act.
The second reason is that the Government recognise that the situation is not strictly analogous. As I pointed out at Second Reading, there is a statutory definition of a money Bill. There is no definition in this Bill of a motion of no confidence. There is therefore the prospect, as we have already heard, of the Speaker being dragged into political controversy. It is possible at the moment for the Speaker to be drawn into controversy over the certification of a money Bill. We saw a recent example in your Lordships’ House. That arose because some Members were ill informed about the provisions of the Parliament Act. However, that perhaps emphasises the point that the potential for controversy is even greater in a politically charged atmosphere where the fate of a Government may be involved, and there is no statutory guidance that would offer the Speaker a protective shield. It may thus be that, recognising that potential, the Government wish to provide some protective cover for the Speaker by involving the Deputy Speakers in the decision. Because the Deputy Speakers will be drawn from different parties, it provides a modicum of cover.
Whichever it is, neither justifies the provision. Ultimately, whatever consultations are held, the decision will be that of the Speaker and be seen as such, as is the position with money Bills. If one seeks to provide some degree of protection for the Speaker, the answer is not to require him to consult the Deputy Speakers but, rather, to provide a clear statutory definition of what constitutes a motion of no confidence. We shall come in due course to the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Cormack. That is the way we should be going. I appreciate that his amendment is not incompatible with subsection (4) but, whereas there is a clear, and I believe compelling, case for defining what we mean by a vote of no confidence, I am not clear that there is a compelling case for subsection (4). What value is added by consulting the Deputy Speakers? They are not necessarily experts on the subject. What if they disagree with one another? If the Speaker is to consult, why not give him scope to consult those who appear to him to be appropriate to consult? In practice, he could presumably consult whom he wishes, so there is no obvious need for the provision. Ultimately, if there is to be a Speaker’s certificate, it is the Speaker’s responsibility. He cannot pass it on to others. I am therefore unclear why this provision is necessary. I look forward to hearing from the Minister why it is in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I tabled an amendment in exactly the same terms as the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. As he is your Lordships’ leading constitutional expert, I felt very good that I had arrived at the same idea, and I am extremely happy to appear on the Marshalled List as having signed up to his amendment.
The provision is so vaguely drafted as to be almost entirely without meaning. I know that it is borrowed from the Parliament Act 1911 but that does not mean that it is an appropriate precedent, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has just pointed out. In that Act, there is a clear definition of a money Bill, but there is no clear definition of a no confidence motion in this measure. The Clerk of the House of Commons, in giving evidence to the Select Committee in the other place, was of the opinion that the question of whether consultation was practicable would become a legal question. It would be open to legal challenge in so far as anything in the Bill is liable to be open to legal challenge. We had a full discussion of that in an earlier debate.
One observes that judicial reviews have been upheld again and again against the Government on the grounds that Governments had failed to consult properly. If it is a question of whether the Speaker may or may not have consulted properly according to the requirements in the Bill, I suppose that that, if anything, might give an opening to judicial intervention, although I am not seriously afraid that that is the case. The real concern about this provision is that it is almost meaningless. What does “so far as practicable” mean? What would be proper consultation in these circumstances? The requirement to consult does not oblige the Speaker to agree with the Deputies. The Deputies themselves might disagree. In fact, one might surmise that they are rather likely to disagree in the circumstance of a no confidence vote that will occur in the most fraught and complex political circumstances. There will be enormous pressure not only on the Speaker of the House but also on the Deputy Speakers if they are to be involved formally in this process. The Deputy Speakers have disclaimed their party allegiance in their new capacities but, none the less, it is only realistic to anticipate that they would come under immense political pressure from members of their own political parties. They would need to be very sturdy to ignore all that. In the previous debate, the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, described how they would imagine the atmosphere to be in the House on the occasion of a no confidence vote. They gave us to understand something of the sort of pressures that would be brought to bear not only on the Speaker but, if this provision remains in the Bill, on the Deputy Speakers, too.
In the end, the Speaker will be on his own. It seems that this provision gives him no useful cover or protection against the political storm. A very sensible conclusion of the Constitution Committee, contained in its report at paragraph 159, was that, whether or not this turns out to be a legal question, an obligation on the Speaker to consult with the Deputy Speakers should be a matter of internal House of Commons procedure, should not be contained within the statutory provisions of the Bill and therefore should be omitted. Rather regrettably, the Government rejected this advice in their response to the report of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 60. The Government are quite keen to pray the Constitution Committee’s recommendations in aid when they agree with them. They have not done so on this occasion, however. They cite the precedent of the Parliament Act 1911, which, they say, has worked well. As we suggest, it is not a terribly useful precedent; certifying a money Bill is a matter of ascertaining fact and hardly contentious. Certifying a vote of no confidence would be a very different thing.
I hope that the Minister will agree to look again at this sensible recommendation of the Constitution Committee and that he will agree to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and myself.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
On the face of it, this seems an unwise provision. First, the similar provision in the Parliament Act is about the Speaker having to certify whether something is a money Bill. That has become a legal, constitutional issue where there is not much discretion; it is simply a question of law. I can see that assistance is important for this. Secondly, I imagine that the application of the Freedom of Information Act would mean that any document containing the advice given by the Deputy Speakers to the Speaker of the House of Commons in relation to this issue would become available very quickly. Thirdly, it does not help the constitution if there is disagreement between the Deputy Speakers and the Speakers and a doubtful Motion of no confidence. Fourthly, what is the purpose of the provision when the critical issue raised by the Bill is: what is a motion of no confidence? Though the procedure is very tight and closed, the Bill leaves that completely open.
It is not something that the courts will want to get involved in. However, it is not good for Parliament that divisions will become apparent and technical processes that need to be gone through might not be. Quite separately from the issue of whether this is a motion of no confidence—on which view there is wide discretion—the phrase, “so far as practicable”, is one to which any reasonable person can give a very substantial meaning. Two reasonable people can take two entirely differing views as to what is practicable and what is not.
I ask, in parenthesis, what do the Government envisage as making it impracticable to consult a Deputy Speaker? Is it only the illness or incapacity of one of the Deputy Speakers or do the Government have something else in mind? It seems to be extraordinarily unlikely that, apart from illness or incapacity, the tabling of a motion that might be one of no confidence, the indication by the Speaker or the debate on the motion, will happen so quickly that there will be no possibility of getting to speak to a Deputy Speaker. Perhaps the Minister can help us on that.
Like my noble friend Lord Howarth and the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, I ask what the purpose of this is once it is accepted, as it is by everybody, that an exercise of judgment may well be required by the Speaker. The judgment is his and his alone, and who he or she consults is inevitably a matter for him or her. For example, one would reasonably expect that if there is any room for doubt, he or she should consult senior representatives of all the political parties about what they think in relation to it, yet the Bill specifies only one group of statutory consultees. I can see the precedent in the Parliament Act, but the way that this is drafted is much more suitable, almost, to the exercise of a discretion by a Minister, which is then challengeable, rather than to the exercise of difficult judgment by a Speaker in the context of the House of Commons where to specify statutory consultees, apart from in the Parliament Act, is extraordinarily unusual. I do not know of any other example, and I would be interested in the other examples that the Government relied on apart from the Parliament Act, which is very different.
It feels as if this has not been thought through, and I invite the Minister, having heard the debate, to ask what we are getting out of this provision. Does it make it worse rather than better? The superficial attractions of asking the Speaker to get advice are, when you think about it, probably not real, particularly when there is nothing to stop the Speaker getting that advice if he wants to, yet here it is made compulsory. Why? What is the benefit? There does not seem to be any, and there seems to be quite a lot of disbenefits.
“( ) If an early parliamentary general election occurs under any of the provisions of this Act an order approving the next review of parliamentary constituencies shall not be submitted to Parliament until after the fourth anniversary of the start of the new Parliament.”
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, the amendment seeks to ensure that in the event of an early general election the constituency boundary review would remain synchronised with the cycle of general elections, and new constituencies would be approved by Parliament only at the latest practicable time in the life of a Parliament.
We were told when we were debating the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill that this was a sacred principle for the Government. They made great play of the importance of the provision in that legislation to ensure that there were boundary reviews every five years and that their timing should bear a sensible relationship with the date of the next general election. Although many of us argued that there were other factors that the Government ought to bear in mind about registration and the undesirability of destabilising constituencies and political parties at such frequent intervals, the Government stuck to their guns and said that it was very important to have a five-yearly cycle of boundary reviews.
However, on this legislation the Government take a very different position. When the Minister, Mr Mark Harper, appeared before the Constitution Committee he was asked:
“Do the Government envisage amending the review period if the two cycles move out of synch in the future?”,
I was struck by what he said:
“We thought about this carefully … We did not think that it was absolutely necessary to synchronise them. You will know that the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill sets out that we want boundary reviews once every five years—broadly once per Parliament—but I do not think that it is that important that they are absolutely synchronised. We will see how it works … we did not think it important to align them or make provision in this Bill or in the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill to tie the two together”.
It is fairly odd that such contradictory positions have been taken by the Government in two concurrent pieces of constitutional legislation. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us more. I beg to move.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I am not at all surprised to be advised that my amendment is defective, as these are indeed knotty matters, and it takes specialists to formulate legislation to get it right. However, if the Government think—and I have much sympathy with that point of view—that it is desirable to align the boundary reviews with the cycle of elections, maybe they would go back and think a little bit further about this and see whether they can find a better means to do it. I do not think that the Minister’s optimism that primary legislation from time to time in Parliament to get the relationship back in to a reasonable synchronicity would be straightforward, because whenever Parliament debates boundary review matters, a lot of Members become intensely interested in that and these proceedings are never very short or straightforward. If the Government wish to hold consistently to the principle they articulated in the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, I hope they will go back and do some more work on this. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, my amendment to the new clause tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and his very distinguished co-signatories would delete subsections (3) and (4) of his new clause, which require the Speaker to issue a certificate and assert that the Speaker’s certificate shall be conclusive.
I have three grounds for proposing to the Committee that we should delete these provisions. There is the difficulty of defining a vote of confidence or of no confidence. The noble Lords’ new clause goes some way to achieving this but I do not think that it is the whole story. Notwithstanding the reassurance that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, just offered, I believe that there is a risk to the Speaker that he would be placed in a damagingly contentious role. There is the risk of intrusion by the courts into parliamentary proceedings, which we debated very fully on Amendment 42, and I do not propose to say any more about that in this debate. I do question the wisdom of the attempt, made with the very best of intentions by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and his co-signatories, to specify and define in this new clause the varieties of no confidence vote that there could be. I fear that the more we try to write down the constitution, the more specific and detailed we need to be. We shall be chasing our own tails in more and more circles, yet the task is impossible to accomplish.
I do think that the new clause is an improvement on what the Government have provided in Clause 2. The Government’s Clause 2 is vague. It appears to elide a no-confidence motion with a confidence motion. My noble friend Lady Jay asked Mr Mark Harper, when he was before the Select Committee, whether votes in various circumstances could be confidence or no-confidence votes. The Minister replied:
“I think the intention is that the Bill would encompass those examples”.
Yet the Government’s drafting does not make it clear, for example, whether a defeat on a motion or an issue of confidence would count as a vote of no confidence.
The conventional no-confidence vote is entirely obvious. It is what it says on the tin:
“That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”.
No problem would arise with that variety of no-confidence vote, but after that it gets harder. There is an excellent note on confidence motions and votes provided by the House of Commons Library, which I commend to everybody. It says that,
“despite their central importance, there is no certainty about the rules on the form and applicability of confidence motions in the UK Parliament, as it is established by convention rather than by statute or standing order of the House”.
The note goes on:
“Broadly speaking there are three main types of motion which act as tests of the House of Commons’ confidence in the Government: ‘confidence motions’ initiated by the Government; ‘no confidence motions’ initiated by the Opposition; and other motions where because of the particular circumstances can be regarded as motions of censure or confidence … There is no standard formulation for confidence motions”.
Apart from motions of confidence and of no confidence, there are,
“Other motions put down by the Government or the Opposition treated by the Government (whether expressly declared as such or not) as, or because of the particular circumstances can be regarded as, motions of censure or confidence”.
Examples of all the motions and votes of confidence that have taken place over a long period—the whole of the 20th century, I think—are described in that brief. There were, for example, substantive motions of no confidence during the Suez crisis. On 1 November 1956 the Prime Minister, Mr Eden, spoke but the leader of the Opposition, Mr Gaitskell, did not, so you cannot necessarily define a motion of no confidence in the terms that the party leaders speak on it. In the debate on 5 and 6 December of that year, Mr Gaitskell spoke but Mr Eden did not—admittedly, because he was ill and unable to do so. On a much earlier occasion, there was a motion in 1895 to reduce the salary of the Secretary of State for War which led, after a short delay, to the resignation of the Rosebery Government.
There have also been motions to adjourn. On 11 March 1976, following the defeat of the Government on its public expenditure White Paper Mr Wilson, the Prime Minister, did not take defeat on that matter of central importance to the Government’s programme as a vote of no confidence. He used a vote on the adjournment the next day as a device to avert his resignation and during the course of that Parliament of October 1974 to 1979 Mr Wilson, in very specific terms, narrowed the interpretation of confidence motions. He advised the House that the Government would only regard a motion as a confidence motion if every Member was aware in advance of the vote that that was its status. It was as well for him and the Labour Government that they did, because they were defeated 17 times in the short 1974 Parliament and 42 times in the October 1974 to 1979 Parliament.
Practice has evolved and there is not a set orthodoxy in these matters. Previously, historic Governments accepted defeats on major policy items as votes of no confidence. Yet how assured can we now be when it is now the case that only votes specifically stated by the Government to be matters of confidence or by the Opposition to be matters of no confidence count? I think that is the latter-day view.
The Clerk of the House of Commons, giving evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, said:
“I think that what is a confidence motion—other than the very straightforward one, ‘There is no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’—is an ambiguous matter”.
Would not votes on intensely controversial issues such as tuition fees and going to war now be widely regarded by the public as confidence votes, and perhaps the more so with coalitions?
The tendency in our politics appears to be that we shall have more coalitions because of the declining proportion of the vote for the major parties. Certainly, if we get the alternative vote, it seems likely that we will have more coalitions and more minority Governments. At the same time, we are very properly encouraging increased public engagement with and accountability of Parliament. Petitions submitted by members of the public may in certain circumstances now be debated in Parliament in a way that they never were before. The Government are about to introduce legislation to provide for the recall of Members of Parliament.
In these new developing political and constitutional circumstances, can we not expect that the public will take a very much closer interest and that they will not necessarily be content to leave it to the party leaders or the traditional authorities to define a confidence motion? In these much more confused circumstances that I think we can reasonably anticipate, is it fair and sensible to legislate to require the Speaker to adjudicate on whether a particular vote will be, is or has been a vote of no confidence or, indeed, of confidence?
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Perhaps I have this wrong, but my understanding of the present position is that the Government may be defeated on a serious matter such as whether to go to war and may take the view that it is not a confidence motion. However, in such circumstances, the leader of the Opposition would table a confidence motion, which takes precedence over all business. If there is an argument about whether the issue is a confidence motion, it is up to the Opposition to bring forward a confidence motion on which there will be a vote, so why is this such a big problem?
Lord Howarth of Newport
I would very much like to be comforted by the noble Lord’s suggestion, but we are in an evolving state of affairs. I am not as confident as he is that the traditional formulations and conventions will necessarily be the only ones that the public will find acceptable in the future.
We have to think of what the role of the Speaker will be when it is contentious whether a particular vote may have this status. Let us imagine what would have happened if the Speaker had been required to issue a certificate as to whether, on 18 March 2003, the House of Commons had passed a motion of no confidence in Mr Blair’s Government, had that Government been defeated in the vote on the Iraq war. Mr Blair said later that he regarded that vote as a confidence vote, and that had he been defeated he would have resigned. How could the Speaker have certified in advance in those circumstances when the Prime Minister himself had not made it clear in advance that that was to be a confidence motion?
However, that is what the Minister, Mr Harper, confidently expects would happen. He said to the Constitution Committee:
“Our view is that the Speaker would make it very clear before such a vote took place whether it was a vote on which he would issue his certificate”.
Lord Cormack
The noble Lord is repeating the earlier debate because in this new clause the Speaker does not have that discretion. He may say that what I have put in is superfluous to requirements, but nevertheless it is not a question of putting the Speaker in the invidious position of having to determine the matter because, if one of those conditions is fulfilled, the Speaker has no option.
Lord Howarth of Newport
The noble Lord is assuming that all the circumstances that he has specified in the four categories that he has set out in his subsection (2) would be the only circumstances that would be regarded as a vote of confidence. Subsection (2) states:
“A vote of no confidence will have been deemed to have been passed if the House of Commons”,
passes amendments in the various terms set out. I am suggesting that, in political reality, there may be other votes which are not included in his survey of the possibilities but which would be regarded as votes of confidence.
The situation in March 2003, had the Government been defeated, illustrates the point quite well. I do not see how, as the Government expect, the Speaker could have certified that in advance, nor am I sure that the Prime Minister would have said in plain terms there and then when the result was announced that he treated it as a confidence matter. If he had not, was the Speaker to make a judgment there and then and certify that the Government had lost the confidence of the House, or perhaps some time later was he to issue a certificate that would have had the effect of bringing down the Government? It seems that the Bill as drafted leaves open these possibilities. I am not entirely confident that that would be avoided if it were amended by the noble Lord’s proposed new clause.
Lord Cormack
However, the amendment removes the existing Clause 2. I agree with the noble Lord that that should be removed and that the Speaker should not be put in that position. However, my new clause, imperfect as it may be in other respects, would not put him in that position.
Lord Howarth of Newport
If the provisions of subsection (2) in the noble Lord’s new clause are met, the Speaker is required to issue a certificate to certify that. Therefore, it seems that the certification requirements in the new clause are closely similar to, if not the same as, those already in the Bill. The merit of the noble Lord’s new clause is that it makes a brave attempt to define what would be motions of no confidence.
Let us take the case of Libya. The House of Commons voted with a very large majority to support military intervention in Libya. However, let us suppose that the intervention drags on, that the mood of the country turns sour, that sentiment in the country becomes as hostile to our military engagement with Libya as it has in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan, and that in due course the Government are defeated on a motion relating to the continuation of military engagement with Libya. Mr Cameron insists that it is not a confidence motion and Mr Miliband insists that it is. Is the Speaker to be required to adjudicate between the two of them? Is he to be required to umpire? In another circumstance, which the Committee has certainly recognised could occur under the legislation as the Government have produced it, what is the Speaker to do if the Government engineer a vote of no confidence? Is he to collude with the Government in that process?
Speakers of the House of Commons have to be sturdy people—they are always being shot at—but is it reasonable or realistic to expect such preternatural wisdom, courage and authority on the part of the Speaker if he is placed in what will inevitably be this very invidious position? That was certainly the view of the former Speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, who spoke in our previous debate. I have not only great respect but personal affection for Mr Speaker Bercow, but can we assume that every future Speaker will have this wisdom, courage and authority? I think that laws and institutions are best not predicated on an assumption of individual perfection. Even if the Speaker is such a paragon of all the relevant virtues, I think that the burden that certification places on him is excessive. A decision taken by the Speaker in the best of conscience could still be so contentious that it would damage the authority of the office of the Speaker. How would an individual Speaker who issued a certificate that was contested by the defeated party and resented by that party and its supporters in the country ever recover his personal authority?
I suggest that another consideration is that, if a certificate is issued in advance, as the Government advocate and foresee, that process will in effect pressurise Back-Benchers to rally to their party Whip. The Speaker, contrary to the role that we expect of him, would in effect be suppressing Back-Bench discontent. He would be suppressing the honest expression of individual views on great issues that the House was considering. He would be acting as a recruiting sergeant for the Whips. The Constitution Committee went some way towards recognising that. It foresaw a temptation for a Government in a position of political weakness to press the Speaker to certify that minor issues, or issues that were controversial within the party that came to the vote, were votes of confidence.
The Government assert that there is nothing new in the provisions. In their response to the Select Committee in the other place they talked of the traditional mechanism of no confidence motions and foresaw it as being straightforward. But creating legal consequences of no-confidence motions is new and potentially very important. As to the position of the Speaker, as we have noted, the Parliament Act requires certificates to be issued in quite different circumstances, as does the freedom of information legislation.
This Bill, as presented by the Government, places the Speaker in a new constitutional role which risks being highly politicised and which I believe will have disastrous implications. This all arises out of the Government’s desire to create escape hatches from the trap that fixed-term Parliaments create. It is one more instance of the dangers of making constitutional legislation in a hurry. If we damage the Speaker, who personifies Parliament, more than ever in an age of broadcasting, to the people and the world, we damage Parliament, and the reputation of Parliament is fragile. I do not think that we need this legislation. The evolving conventions have worked well, as they did in 1979. The House of Commons knows an issue of confidence when it faces it and knows how to deal with it, but an issue of confidence depends on the political context; it cannot be defined in advance. At least let us not put the Speaker in an impossible and damaging position.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I seem to recall in one of our earlier debates that there was a suggestion that in the 1970s Mr Harold Wilson indicated that he would not accept as a motion of no confidence motions which on some occasions hitherto had been seen as votes of no confidence. I think that that point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, not on this amendment but in a debate on an earlier amendment.
Lord Howarth of Newport
It was earlier in this debate. It has been going on for so long, it is difficult to remember. The point was that the House accepted, it appears, the redefinition that the Prime Minister had proposed to the House at that time and recognised the political circumstances in which that Labour Government had a tiny majority. It did not really have a workable majority.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Perhaps the House accepted it because it was quite clear that if the Prime Minister had decided that he was not going to go to the country it could have tabled a motion of no confidence. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Forsyth keeps coming back to what seems to be a very straightforward way of addressing this issue: that if there is any doubt, the Leader of the Opposition or someone could table a motion of no confidence. The more one thinks about it, it tends to be the motion which has no ambiguity and is very clear, about which something further might want to be said.
The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Cormack would replace the entirety of Clause 2 and therefore would not allow the provision of the trigger mechanism of a Dissolution if two-thirds of the House of Commons was voting for a Dissolution. We have had debates on this in the past but if at some date in the future, in a fixed-term Parliament, there is a consensus in the House of Commons that there should be an election—and 1951 has been identified as a possible example when this may have happened—I would rather the option remained for the Dissolution to be triggered on a cross-party, consensual basis rather than having a motion of no confidence brought forward simply to achieve a Dissolution which two-thirds of Members believe is necessary. That option is lost by my noble friend’s amendment, but it is a worthwhile provision to maintain.
On the question of what constitutes a motion of no confidence and whether it should automatically trigger an election, I recall that in our earlier debates my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth indicated that that should not necessarily be an automatic consequence. However, a consequence of the amendment is that there would be an election. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested a way round it and, in introducing his amendment, my noble friend Lord Cormack suggested that if it was after the Queen’s Speech in the first Session there could possibly be other ways.
It is important, therefore, that we reflect on circumstances in which an election should not automatically be triggered, the most obvious one being immediately after a general election when a party does not yet have the confidence of the House and there is still an opportunity for another Government to be formed. Equally—I cannot say this is a Narvik situation because it is not—there may perhaps at a time of extreme national crisis be a view that a Government should not continue and that there is a case to be made for a national Government. Indeed, it occurred to me that the Bill as drafted would provide for that. There could be a motion of no confidence and a period of time—we can debate whether or not it should be 14 days—for a new Government to be established which could in such circumstances enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons. I find my noble friend’s amendment defective in that regard because there are circumstances where the automatic triggering of a general election would not necessarily be the right way to proceed. I will not elaborate on the point about an incoming Government after an election and the fact that we do not want election after election after election.
A number of colleagues have indicated that there are problems with the amendment. As I have indicated, I do not want to take technical issues— it used to annoy me greatly in opposition if Ministers said there were technical problems—unless they are very fundamental.
On the second branch of what would constitute a vote of no confidence—namely, a Bill defined by the Prime Minister of the day as being essential to his or her Administration continuing in office—my noble friend Lord Tyler expressed scepticism; the noble Lord, Lord Martin, felt it would be unwise and was concerned about the Speaker; and my noble friend Lord Forsyth also expressed concern about that. Quite apart from trying to get a definition of what constitutes a Motion of no confidence, a Government facing a problem with their own Back-Benchers could simply decide that they would make a particular vote a matter of confidence—the black arts may well come into play—for the purpose of imposing party discipline. As we are trying to initiate a switch from the Executive to Parliament, that would be a regrettable consequence of that trigger point for a general election. Likewise, as my noble friend Lord Tyler indicated, that would be a decision of the Prime Minister and not of Parliament or the Speaker, and therefore it would be an Executive decision which, in certain circumstances, could conceivably be open to challenge.
I know my noble friend Lord Forsyth has strong reservations on fixed-term Parliaments—I probably understate his position—but he made an important point in his exchange with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. He said that the examples the noble and learned Lord was giving were not operative within the framework of a fixed-term Parliament. If that is the case and we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, the rules will change. As he pointed out, the simplest thing in these circumstances may be to say that a motion of no confidence is what it says. On what constitutes confidence or no confidence in the question of supply, my noble friend Lord Norton said in his article of 1978, Government Defeats in the House of Commons: Myth and Reality:
“The most effective means whereby the House could declare its lack of confidence would be through an explicitly-worded motion of no confidence”.
I did say that we were in listening mode—and, indeed, reading mode. That was an important point.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, spoke of his concerns about the Speaker’s certificate. I do not wish to rehearse our earlier debate; I undertook then to reflect on that. However, what I found difficult was his suggesting that the more we try to write down and define matters, the more difficult it is, yet seeming to have an objection to the Government’s position where they did not seek closely to define. That seemed to be a contradictory view. My noble and learned friend Lord Howe said that we should keep it as simple as possible. That is what we have sought to do by setting a background where it is possible to recognise a motion of no confidence rather than trying to define it. This matter has been looked at many times, including in the other place. Whenever efforts are made to bring some definition to it, other than perhaps a very simple one, one seems to conjure up more difficulties.
I said at the outset that I wanted to hear the arguments about structure and definitions. Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed a number of views. I clarify again that I shall speak with my colleagues on these matters. The principles that we wish to establish are that, within a context of having a fixed term, there should nevertheless be a mechanism to trigger an early election if there has been deadlock in the other place, if a Government lose confidence, and if no Government can be formed who maintain confidence. There is an argument for having consensus about Dissolution and proper provision being made for it, as well as for trying to minimise the potential for abuse of the trigger on the part of the Executive and to get clarity as to what constitutes a vote of confidence. There may well be circumstances in which a vote of no confidence does not necessarily have to trigger a general election. How do we clarify those circumstances in a way which is acceptable? These are the general principles and issues which I want to put flesh on. Various ways as to how we might do that have been suggested. The amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Cormack has been very helpful in suggesting one way. It has a number of problems to it, but the comments that it has triggered will help shape our thinking as we move to the next stage of the Bill.
I reflect that perhaps we have got it right because these are very complicated matters, but I undertake to give serious consideration not only to what was said in response to this amendment but also to earlier amendments and those which were heard on the second day of Committee. On that basis—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall)
My Lords, I think that it would be for the convenience of the Committee if the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, were first to respond on his amendment, as it is an amendment to that of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, noble Lords who have spoken in this debate are people of great political experience, experience of government and profound knowledge of the constitution. It has been a very helpful debate. I share the regret of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, that we have to grapple with these issues. The noble Lord, Lord Maclennan of Rogart, caught the sense of the debate very well when he said that at least there is widespread agreement around the Committee that Clause 2 needs careful reconsideration.
The intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, was, as in our earlier debate, of the utmost importance to the House. We should not lose sight of the eminently simple and practical point that he drew to our attention: the Journal of the House records the Divisions of the House. That may well be the authoritative point of recourse that would satisfy the legalistic requirements created by the conception of the Bill. In that way, we might avoid the need for the Speaker to issue certificates. The noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, explained to the House the pressures under which a Speaker may come in the ordinary day-to-day circumstances of modern politics—how very unpleasant and intense they are. That is a foretaste of the pressure that a Speaker might experience were the Speaker to be required, as the Bill proposes, to certify motions of no confidence.
If the definitions in the new clause proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, are clear and comprehensive, certificates might not be needed, but I fear that events might not be as cut and dried or mechanistic as it suggests. I suspect that other votes, beyond those that he itemises in his new clause, might be regarded as confidence votes—in which case, if the Speaker is to issue certificates, it will be contentious and dangerous, as two former Speakers of the House of Commons have warned us this evening.
My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer explained that it is incredibly difficult to tie down a motion of confidence, or of no confidence, in legal terms; I suggest that it is impossible. That is why I like the simpler solution suggested by my noble and learned friend.
I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, for the tone of all his remarks, for his recognition of the reality of the problems that noble Lords have sought to identify, and for his willingness to reflect on whether there may be better ways than the requirement that the Speaker should issue a certificate to enable the Government to pursue their purposes in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“( ) Parliament may otherwise be dissolved if—
(a) Her Majesty appoints another Prime Minister;(b) a Government of a different coalition is formed;(c) the Prime Minister considers it appropriate to seek the endorsement of electors following a change in government policy;(d) the Prime Minister considers a Parliament not to be viable;(e) the number of MPs in receipt of the governing party’s or governing coalition’s whip falls below a majority of 10 over the combined members of the other parties in the House of Commons.”
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I do not detect a huge zest in the Committee for considering the remaining amendments on the Marshalled List at this time of the morning. However, if that is what the usual channels have agreed and wish to insist on, it is not for the rest of us to argue.
In moving Amendment 55, I wish to speak also to Amendment 55A. Both these amendments would widen the range of circumstances in which Parliament may—not must—be dissolved beyond the two contingencies that are provided for in the Bill, which are the eventuality of the two-thirds majority and that of a vote of no confidence. My first suggestion is that if a new Prime Minister is appointed by Her Majesty, there should be the possibility of a general election quickly following that. I do not think that when Mr Major replaced Mrs Thatcher in 1990, and certainly when Mr Callaghan replaced Mr Wilson in 1976, there was widespread public demand that there should be a general election. It was accepted that it was reasonable and appropriate that the Government should be headed by a new Prime Minister without a general election taking place. On the other hand, when Mr Brown replaced Mr Blair in 2007, there was a very discernible feeling in the country that there should have been a general election. Professor Bogdanor has suggested that that may be because our politics had become more presidential by that time, but I think that when Mrs Thatcher was our counterpart to President Reagan our politics were already fairly presidential, so I am not sure that that is the explanation. Be that as it may, there was that feeling in the country.
It is also interesting that before the recent election Mr Cameron proposed that a new Prime Minister taking office should be required to go to the country within six months of doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister was able to cast any light on why that proposal was dropped and is not incorporated in the Bill. Perhaps the Liberal Democrats thought that it was a bad idea for whatever reason—I do not know. However, it was an interesting suggestion and one that should not be forgotten. If we are likely to have more frequent hung Parliaments, and there are indications that that may be so, it follows that there is a greater likelihood that there will be a change of Prime Minister within the Parliament. If we are to have a situation in which one Prime Minister gives way to another but there is no election, that raises questions about accountability, not least in the context of the coalition’s own insistence that its reforms are designed to improve the accountability of politicians to the people. That is one set of circumstances in which it would be appropriate to allow a general election.
I then propose in the amendment Dissolution if a Government of a different coalition are formed, so we are not just talking about a new Prime Minister of the same party continuing in government. However, if we get a new coalition, I suggest that again accountability to the people should require at least the possibility of a new election without having to resort to devices such as Motions of no confidence and so forth, or indeed getting a two-thirds majority in the House of Commons, which might still be difficult.
Thirdly, I have suggested that if,
“the Prime Minister considers it appropriate to seek the endorsement of electors following a change in government policy”,
it should be legitimate for him to go to the country. At this time of night, my memory is rather failing me, so perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, can help me. Did Mr Baldwin go to the country on tariff reform? I think that that may have happened, and in fact I see nods from better informed noble Lords on the other side of the Chamber. Had Mr Heath, when he performed the famous U-turn and adopted an incomes policy in 1972, thought that it was appropriate to go to the country, I do not think that anyone would have objected. If a similar situation were to develop now, surely that, too, would be appropriate. It should be possible for a major change of policy to presage an election in which the Prime Minister seeks the endorsement of the country for that new course of policy.
Fourthly, I have suggested that, if in the view of the Prime Minister a Parliament is no longer viable, again he should be able to seek Dissolution and go to the country. We talked in an earlier debate about just such a judgment made by Mr Attlee in 1951. Had this fixed-term Parliament legislation been in place, that Labour Government might have had to struggle on unable, by the Prime Minister’s own acknowledgement, to govern effectively unless it had been reprieved by a two-thirds majority. I think that there should be a surer way to provide that an election can take place in those circumstances.
My final suggestion is a bit arbitrary, if not even possibly whimsical. It is that where,
“the number of MPs in receipt of the governing party’s or governing coalition’s whip falls below a majority of 10 over the combined members of the other parties in the House of Commons”,
again it should be possible for a general election to take place. That is, in a sense, a variant of the situation in which a Prime Minister judges that a Parliament is not viable. However, in this case it would not necessarily be just the opinion of the Prime Minister that would count.
Amendment 55A is a little different. It picks up a suggestion made by Mr Gordon Brown that a Parliament may, not must, be dissolved if the House of Commons approves by a simple majority a Motion that the Prime Minister should request Dissolution from the Queen. This seems to be an elegant and simple solution to what the Government have stated as the key issue that they wish to resolve through this legislation. They think it is objectionable that the Prime Minister of the day should have the power to call the election whenever he wishes. Gordon Brown suggested that the Prime Minister should no longer have the power to seek Dissolution on his sole judgment—a power which I think was originally assumed by Lloyd George and which has rested with subsequent Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister would have to go to the House of Commons and secure a vote there before he could go to the Palace and request Dissolution. This would solve the main problem that the Government have set out to solve. It could be legislated for, although I do not think that it really needs legislation; it could be accepted as one of the conventions under which Parliament operates. I beg to move.
Lord Norton of Louth
I thought that I would speak briefly on the amendment. I can see the argument that it drives a coach and horses through the intention of having fixed-term Parliaments and I can see that it may attract some support in the House for that reason. I have problems with how the amendment is drafted, as it says:
“Parliament may otherwise be dissolved”.
Who determines that? It may otherwise be dissolved if Her Majesty appoints another Prime Minister. Is it the incoming Prime Minister who determines that there should be a dissolution? It also states that,
“the Prime Minister considers it appropriate to seek the endorsement of electors following a change in government policy”.
One can see how any Prime Minister could have a fairly minor change of policy and decide, “I’d rather like to have a general election”, and it could be used as an excuse presumably for triggering the election. There is no requirement here; it has to be a major change in public policy. There are obvious drafting problems because I am completely unclear as to who would be responsible for triggering a Dissolution. That is my problem with it, but some may find that quite attractive since, in effect, it would undo the whole Bill.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, for these amendments. My immediate response was to share the view of my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth; that they do run a coach and possibly some horses though the Bill—although I do not agree with him that that is what should commend it. The other thing I noticed was that there was no certainty as to whether Parliament would in fact be dissolved in these circumstances. Parliament might otherwise be dissolved. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested that it would be the new Prime Minister who would trigger this. If there is a discretion, the Prime Minister taking over in circumstances that might not be propitious for his party might not necessarily exercise it. I think we are back to the situation that the Bill seeks to avoid. My noble friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, recognised that issues such as changing government policy or a very subjective view about the viability of a Parliament would put the power back into the hands of the Prime Minister that this Bill seeks to remove.
I also observe that another Prime Minister may be appointed on the grounds of death or serious illness, and I am not sure that that would necessarily be good grounds for triggering Dissolution. I simply observe that in Wales where there are fixed-term Parliaments, there have been circumstances in which the First Minister resigned and a new First Minister was appointed, and I do not remember the Labour Party clamouring for an election. When subsequently the minority Government became a coalition Government, there was no suggestion then in the context of a fixed-term Parliament that there should have been an election. Nor was there any suggestion that an election would have been appropriate following the death of Donald Dewar in 2000 or the resignation of Henry McLeish in 2001. In circumstances in which we have had fixed-term Parliaments and there has been a change of First Minister, it has not been thought appropriate that there should be an election; rather, the fixed-term Parliament has seen itself out in circumstances in which the Government have the confidence of the Parliament. That is crucial because if the Government do not have the confidence of the Parliament, the provisions elsewhere in the Bill will kick in.
I do not really understand the point about the majority falling below 10. Historically, a majority of 10 could be quite a high number. I do not believe that that would be an appropriate circumstance in which there may be Dissolution.
On amendment 55A, I cannot share the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that it is somehow consistent with the principles of the Fixed-term Parliament Bill. I think it drives more than a coach and horses through the Bill. I have said on a number of occasions that the situation is open to abuse. The Prime Minister of the day could contrive Dissolution by the back door, but I do not think that we should put a red carpet down to the back door or to the front door for him to do it. There would be a degree of opprobrium attached if he was thought to be bending the rules, or indeed if he went to the country on the basis of a vote of no confidence in him that had been expressed by the House of Commons. We all know the reality of this amendment; if the Prime Minister wanted to have the date of his choosing for his party’s best advantage, it would not even need the black arts of the Whips to get his Members to turn out and vote for it. It defeats the object of a fixed-term Parliament. In these circumstances, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I was quite wrong. This has been a very zestful debate—positively sparkling. I congratulate all noble Lords who have spoken on their effervescence at this time of the night.
I tabled these amendments because I think that the Government have restricted the Bill to permitting elections to happen before the end of the fixed term in too limited a range of circumstances. I think there are circumstances in which it would be in the interests of politics and of the country that there should be an election. I apparently differ from the Government in thinking that elections are a good thing. I do not think that it is desirable to stave them off so that they can happen only once every five years, if you can get away with it. A general election is a great moment in the life of the country, and we should be willing to recognise that there will be situations in which an election would be a thoroughly positive thing that would be welcomed by the country and that would be good for our politics, for the quality of government and for our democracy. It may well be that I have not sufficiently tightly defined all these circumstances, and given that the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and the Minister have drawn attention to the palpable inadequacies of drafting in Amendment 55, I beg leave to withdraw it.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, it is me again, but this is the last time. The Bill abolishes the monarch’s power to dissolve Parliament but not the monarch’s power to prorogue Parliament. If the monarch is removed from the dissolution process, should she continue to exercise other prerogative powers, such as the power of prorogation or the power to summon Parliament? It is a question worth pausing on and it would be helpful to hear the Government’s account of why they have sought in this Bill to remove one very important prerogative power but to leave others in place.
I am not a great believer in consistency in constitutional matters. A constitution breathes and relaxes through its anomalies and is able to be responsive to the complex circumstances of the different parts of a country through the very existence of anomalies. I am rather of the view of Ralph Waldo Emerson who said:
“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen”.
I think that we would all reject such consistency—I hope so.
At a practical level, the Bill leaves a loose end. The continuing power of prorogation is, in principle, open to abuse. If a Prime Minister were to be defeated on a vote of no confidence he could, under the terms of the Bill, ask the Queen to prorogue Parliament to get around the 14-day constraint. There was such an incident in Canada not very long ago. Following his re-election, the Canadian Prime Minister asked the Governor General to prorogue Parliament. The Prime Minister was seeking to avoid losing a threatened vote of confidence. Parliament was prorogued for two months. By the time it came back, the threat of that vote of confidence had pretty well gone away, so his continuing lease on power was ensured. The Constitution Select Committee thought that the likelihood of such an abuse occurring in the circumstances of this country was very low, with which I agree. I think that if any Prime Minister were to attempt to manipulate and abuse the power of prorogation, it would certainly backfire on him politically.
This amendment seeks to provide a safeguard against prolonged prorogation if a Prime Minister did seek to avoid the consequences of a no-confidence vote and get the election deferred to benefit himself or his party. The amendment should probably have been framed to guard equally against an abuse of the power of adjournment. Without such an amendment, the only safeguard that would remain would be the refusal of the monarch to accede to a request for prorogation. I think that we would all take the view that it is not a good idea to place the monarch in a politically contentious position. There is a loose end to be tidied up here and I should like the Minister to explain why the Government have left the power of prorogation as it is. I beg to move.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I have absolutely nothing to say on prorogation but I would like to mention the significant contribution that my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport has made to the Committee stage. I also congratulate the noble and learned Lord who has conducted Committee stage completely alone on behalf of the Government. Although I have disagreed with very much of what he said, he has done an absolutely first-class job.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for his kind remarks. I also thank—as I have done on a number of occasions—the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, for introducing amendments that have allowed us to look at important parts of this legislation. Indeed, I thank in general all others who have contributed to our constructive debates.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked about prorogation. There is a distinction between the prerogative power of dissolution and the prerogative power of prorogation. We have identified that the prerogative power of dissolution, which this legislation seeks to remove, can be used by the Prime Minister, in advising Her Majesty, for partisan purposes. By contrast, the prerogative power of prorogation is different. It is the mechanism that is used to bring to an end a Session of Parliament and determines, subject to the carry-over procedure, when Bills have to complete their passage through both Houses so that they become law; it is also used at times in the run-up to Parliament finishing its business pending Dissolution.
An incumbent Prime Minister, even today, could prorogue Parliament to prevent the other place considering a forthcoming no-confidence motion, as happened in Canada some two or three years ago. That risk exists today but the convention is that the Government and Parliament find time to debate a motion of no confidence tabled by the Official Opposition. It is instructive that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House considered the question of prorogation as part of its examination of the Bill and decided that the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very small. It therefore concluded that Her Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament should remain.
The noble Lord raised the possibility of abuse in relation to the 14 days to frustrate these ends. It is perhaps thought that preserving the prorogation power could mean that a Prime Minister who wants a general election can, after a no-confidence motion is passed, prorogue Parliament during the 14-day Government formation period and thus deny the new Government the opportunity for a motion of confidence in them to be passed. It is highly unlikely that would happen. There are two basic scenarios. The first is that there is no obvious alternative Government and therefore nothing would be achieved by proroguing Parliament. If it was the wish of the Prime Minister of the day to go to an election, he would simply proceed to an election after the expiry of the 14 days. The second is that there are political factors, such as the Prime Minister resigning after a no-confidence motion and Her Majesty appointing a new Prime Minister. In such a scenario the outgoing Prime Minister would have agreed to resign and it is inconceivable that he or she would resign and then not allow the new Prime Minister to test the confidence of the House. Even if the new Prime Minister took office and found that, in the mean time, a prorogation had been slipped through by the outgoing Prime Minister and the House had been prorogued, he or she would be able, through the Queen, to recall Parliament under Section 1 of the Meeting of Parliament Act 1797.
These are hypothetical examples but it is right that we should examine them. The power of prorogation can still be used properly and sensibly and is not in the same category as the power of dissolution. I hope that with these reassuring words the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I draw much comfort from what the Minister has just said. Indeed, we need not be too scared of the possibility of an abuse of the power of prorogation and, subject to what my noble friends consider in the mean time, I anticipate that we will not need to return to this issue on Report.
I am grateful for what my noble and learned friend said and for the tolerance of the House. If I have been a little overzealous it was because, very shortly before the first day of Committee on the Bill, only a small handful—perhaps not more than eight—amendments had been tabled. As we have all acknowledged, this is a constitutional reforming measure of first-rate importance. We attach great importance to the role of this House as a revising Chamber and it is appropriate that we have had a good range of amendments to consider and have given the measure useful scrutiny in Committee. I apologise that the House has had to put up with the sound of my voice for far too long. However, we have done a good job, as we shall again when we get to Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.