Renters’ Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 8, standing in my name. At its core, the private rented sector exists only because individuals are willing to invest in property and rent it out to others. The rental market depends on landlords, many of them small-scale, independent operators who choose to let their homes to others. These are not large corporate entities with huge legal teams and financial buffers; they are ordinary people with one or two properties, often let out to supplement their pension or as a long-term investment for their families.

Let us be clear: the most recent English private landlord survey shows that 45% of landlords own a single rental property and a further 38% own between two and four. That means that over four-fifths of landlords operate on a very small scale, far from the image of large institutional landlords. These landlords form the backbone of the rental sector. Yet, under the proposals in the Bill, particularly the removal of Section 21 without sufficient alternative safeguards—this is to answer the question by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley—we risk driving them out of this market altogether.

That is why I rise to speak to Amendment 8, standing in my name. This amendment proposes a targeted and reasonable exception that landlords who let fewer than five properties—those very small-scale landlords we have spoken of—should retain the ability to use Section 21. This is not about denying renters their rights or undermining the central aims of the Bill; rather, it is about recognising the limitations that smaller landlords face. Unlike larger letting organisations, smaller landlords do not have the resources or the legal support to navigate complex procession proceedings. For them, the loss of Section 21 without workable and efficient alternatives could be and will be the final straw. These individuals are not villains of the piece; in many cases, if not most, they are providing much-needed homes in areas of acute shortage. They do not have the resources to engage in lengthy legal proceedings every time they need to regain possession of their property, whether due to personal financial need or a change in family circumstances or to exit the sector entirely. If the Bill removes Section 21 without offering small landlords a workable alternative, the risk is clear: many will simply choose to leave the market. They are already, altogether.

We know this is already happening: the National Residential Landlords Association found last year that one in four landlords were planning to sell at least one property, many citing rising regulation and uncertainty about future reforms. As these landlords exit, we are left with fewer homes to rent, and the tenants feel the consequences most sharply.

The experience in Scotland offers a sobering lesson. There similar reforms were introduced with the intention of improving tenant security. Yet, as we have seen, they had the opposite effect: a sharp increase in landlords exiting the market and the highest rent increases in the United Kingdom as demand rapidly outpaced supply. Research from the Nationwide Foundation has found that 70% of landlords and letting agents lack confidence in the future of the market. The evidence from Scotland demonstrates that the type of over-regulation proposed here will drive landlords out of the market, reducing housing supply and ultimately leaving renters worse off.

Amendment 8 offers a simple, balanced solution. It allows the Bill to move forward with its tenant protections intact, while acknowledging the distinct position of small landlords and giving them the breathing room that they need to continue letting their homes. If we are serious about building a rental system that is fair, functional and fit for the future, we must ensure that it works for tenants and landlords alike. Amendment 8 does not undermine the principles of the Bill; it strengthens it. It recognises the diversity within the landlord community and offers a sensible, proportionate safeguard for those who make up its majority by allowing small landlords to continue using Section 21 when and where no viable alternative yet exists. We protect not only their role in the market but the long-term interests of renters themselves. I urge the Government to take this amendment seriously and consider whether the future of the private rented sector truly lies in squeezing out the very people who keep it afloat.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in this very important debate in Committee and to support my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook on this amendment. The amendment is about fairness between tenants and landlords, and practicality. It is about the alternative that the Government are offering smaller landlords who are in the situation where they feel it prudent to give notice and seek possession of their own property under Section 21 and Section 8 of the Housing Act 1988. In particular, it is about the bureaucratic and onerous burden and court costs that will fall upon smaller landlords.

Let us look at the figures. Almost half of landlords—45%—own only one property. For the avoidance of doubt and for full transparency, I declare myself to be a landlord; I own one property, which was my matrimonial home, as listed in the Register of Lords’ Interests. Some 83% of landlords are small landlords, and so would be covered by this amendment, in that they own fewer than five properties.

We understand the proper commitment by the Government, as outlined in the manifesto, to abolish Section 21 no-fault evictions, for laudable reasons. We are all committed to the same thing—that good-quality private sector housing should be available in a fair way, to as many people as possible— and we accept that the Government have a mandate to make tenancy reforms. Notwithstanding that, unfortunately, as the previous Administration found, much of the efficacy of that policy will fall upon the reliability or otherwise of the court system and its ability to expedite possession claims in a timely and efficient way.

His Majesty’s Government’s own figures, as at quarter 4 of 2024, show that seven months is the average time taken to process and enforce a Section 8 possession case—especially around the thorny issue of rent arrears and anti-social behaviour. The LGA and the Law Society have raised this issue. The Law Society in particular notes the potential

“increase in contested hearings in the short term, as landlords that would previously have used”

Section 21, because it was less costly and less onerous, will now

“have to show good reason for eviction”.

On page 65 of the impact assessment, the Government, rather elliptically, reference “non-legislative changes” to improve the court system, but they do not give any detail. That is an important issue, as we are being asked to support the Government’s proposals. How do the Government intend to manage the increased demand? The Housing Minister in the other place used the word “ready”, saying that the Government would not take any precipitous action until the court system was ready. What does “ready” mean? This is a problem the previous Government faced and, as the Minister knows, they resiled from going ahead too fast with this policy because the court system was not fit for purpose. What specific measures will be used to deal with the existing backlog in Section 8 claims arising from landlords seeking to take possession? Let us make no mistake, the failings of the court system have the potential to undermine what would be laudable reforms and could have the perverse effect of encouraging landlords, especially smaller landlords, to exit the private rented sector.

Tenants themselves do not have much faith in the court system. Figures provided in 2023 by Citizens Advice show that only

“23% of tenants feel confident applying to court. 99% of tenants whose landlord has taken an unreasonably long time to complete repairs did not bring a claim for disrepair to court … 54% … said they did not … because of the complexity of the process … 45% … said they were put off by the length of time involved”.

It is also the case that the abolition of Section 21, particularly in respect of smaller landlords, will have an impact on the hitherto good relationship between many tenants and landlords, turning it into a much more litigious and disputatious situation. Many of those landlords will not be prepared to give tenants the benefit of the doubt if they fall on difficult financial times or have less benign economic circumstances. Those are the real-world consequences of this policy and one of the issues that this amendment seeks to address and ameliorate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Truscott (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the erudite speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. I remind the Committee of my interest as a long-standing landlord and former tenant in the private rented sector.

Why do the Government insist that they know best when a majority of both tenants and landlords want fixed tenancies? That is a fact. The Minister quoted surveys earlier, but opinions have been sought and that is the case for both tenants and landlords. The Minister has never really explained why the Government think they know more and better than the people primarily affected. Is it a case of groupthink? I support Amendments 9 and 13, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook. The Government should not, in my view, interfere in an agreement between two or more consenting adults.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook, to which I have added my name. I will make some general observations. This amendment is helpful because it encourages a mutually agreed arrangement, where appropriate, between landlord and tenant, in order to avoid disruption, delay or litigation where they might otherwise arise, to the mutual benefit of both parties.

The noble Lord, Lord Truscott, is right to say that the wider philosophical argument is that the abolition of fixed terms will provide greater security for tenants and retain flexibility, but it is a surprising one, because a number of key issues undermine it. The abolition of a contract of a particular type in this way is an obvious infringement on the freedom of parties to agree such terms as they wish. On principle, it should be implemented only on the most cogent and urgent grounds, and no such grounds exist across the whole private rented sector.

There are also some situations in which tenants as well as landlords clearly benefit from fixed-term tenancies. Examples are student lets, lets related to fixed-term job postings or projects, and moving to be within a particular school’s catchment area. It obviously does not help tenants in these situations to be prohibited from obtaining the security of a fixed-term let. And landlords who are inflexible in their approach to the term of a tenancy and who are prepared to offer only a fixed term will do so at their own cost, as they will find that there is a smaller pool of potential tenants than for landlords who are flexible in their approach. This market-driven discouragement to fixed-term tenancies already exists and will continue to do so.

The stated aim in this legislation of enabling tenants to leave poor-quality properties is poorly thought through. The first point to make in this regard is that it will usually be apparent to a tenant before moving in whether a property is of poor quality. If a tenant moves in full knowledge of that want of quality, the fairness of allowing them to move out mid-term is not obvious. It may be true that, sadly, tenants often do not have a choice, but if it is, leaving mid-term is unlikely to be an option, for the same reason. It is better to find ways to coerce landlords into making living conditions better. However, such cases can be legislated for by the simple expedient of implying into a lease a warranty that a property is fit for habitation—a test already enshrined in statute in the Defective Premises Act 1972. If a tenant can show that that warranty has been breached, he or she may terminate immediately and leave, free of future liabilities.

In any case, parties can and already often do agree break clauses in fixed-term tenancies. There is no reason why they should not continue to do this, particularly if changes in circumstances, such as a job not working out, can be anticipated. This is also fairer to the landlord, since it alerts the landlord to a possible change in circumstances in advance.

Secondly, although circumstances sometimes change unexpectedly, that is true for both sides and giving tenants free rein in this regard while landlords have none is inherently unfair. In practice, if circumstances change unexpectedly—for example, a tenant loses their job or an income-earning partner ceases to be able to work or passes away unexpectedly—few landlords would be likely to insist on a tenant seeing out their term. It is not in their interest to have a tenant who cannot pay the rent. Most will be prepared to negotiate an early exit in such circumstances and instal a tenant who can. The rare residue of cases where a tenant has suffered a change of circumstances and wishes to leave but a landlord is unwilling to allow them to do so can be met by legislation stopping far short of an outright ban on fixed-term tenancies where hitherto there has been mutual agreement between the parties.

Finally, there is a point to be made about the concept of seeking to protect the rights of tenants in residential tenancies without regard to the wider context of how the legislation impacts on the pool of properties available for tenants. The abolition of fixed-term tenancies means that many landlords in the PRS will prefer not to let at all rather than be limited to letting on a periodic tenancy. Preparing a tenancy for a let involves a considerable amount of time and effort. If tenants can simply come and go on a whim, that time and effort will go unrewarded and fewer people will undertake it. That will reduce the size of the sector and so drive down tenant choice—to the detriment, rather than the benefit, of tenants. Tenant protections are worth obtaining only if the sector remains attractive to both landlords and tenants, as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said earlier. The proposed abolition of fixed-term tenancies fails to achieve that balance, particularly if there was agreement previously.