English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Jamieson Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a councillor in central Bedfordshire and a local government pensioner. I extend my thanks to the Minister for the time that she has given noble Lords today, as well as for the many constructive meetings that she has kindly hosted outside your Lordships’ House. I am likewise grateful to the many organisations and individuals who have written to us all and provided many submissions to and analyses of the Bill.

One question troubles me: what is the true purpose of the Bill? I remain far from certain. Over many years, we have seen a consistent trend of centralisation in the UK. As a councillor and an ex-chair of the LGA, I am a huge advocate of devolution, and I was looking forward to the Bill delivering real devolution. We have heard support across this House for genuine devolution. But—and there is a but—while “Devolution” is in the Bill’s title, as hard as I try, I find very little devolution in the Bill. Yes, the Bill devolves licensing of micro electric vehicles and removes outdated Secretary of State consent for things such as special event notices, the conversion of footpaths to cycle paths, and the construction of cattle-grids. Given our previous discussion on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, I am pleased to see the partial removal of the need for Secretary of State approval for lane rental schemes. While these are all very helpful, they can hardly be described as real devolution, and would certainly not justify a Bill of this size—well over 300 pages.

In fact, the reality is the reverse, with the Bill seeking to centralise powers in Whitehall. Reading the Bill, there are 43 mentions of “must have regard to”, including regard to guidance from the Secretary of State; 76 mentions of “duty” in relation to local government; and 105 mentions of the “Secretary of State may”. With all this new guidance and new duties that have to be followed, there is no mention of transferring funding for fiscal devolution in relation to, for instance, new duties for health, housing and education. Instead, there is an ability for mayors to increase taxes on hard-working residents, who are already suffering from a £68 billion increase in taxes over the last two Budgets. The Bill clearly risks substantial increases in local taxation from uncapped mayoral precepts that can be used for almost any purpose, no doubt to fulfil new duties and guidance as dictated by Whitehall.

Had the title of the Bill been “local government reorganisation”, this would have been more understandable. The Bill’s focus is on the establishment of mayors and strategic authorities and the transfer to them of powers currently held by existing county, district and borough councils. I ask the Minister: what is the purpose of the reorganisation? In the Bill, it is clearly not about devolving powers from Whitehall.

I will reflect on some comments that were made across the House. The noble Lord, Lord Best, raised development corporations, and I have a lot of sympathy with that, but do we really need mayors to create development corporations? The existing structures could do that. Taxis have been raised by many noble Lords, as has safeguarding—and the alarming statistic on the number of Manchester taxi drivers from Wolverhampton. These issues need to be addressed.

Why is there a delay to the mayoral elections? Why could they not have carried on? The Minister said that these strategic authorities would carry their formation, so why not have a mayor to help that? Also, the issue of town and parish councils is critical, and the Bill is rather reticent on that.

On devolution, there were some interesting quotes. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, called the Bill “constitutionally incoherent”. My noble friends Lady Shephard and Lord Trenchard spoke eloquently on local democracy and local identity. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said the Government should “pause and think” before rolling out. The noble Baroness, Lady Janke, called it a “woeful” Bill. My noble friend Lord Porter made an interesting comment: should we be judging this on how small Whitehall gets? Our suspicion is that it will not get smaller. The noble Lord, Lord Pack, made important comments on commencement, and I ask: why are we having a Bill when many powers that already exist on the statute paper have not been commenced? This should be about local identity, local democracy and real devolution. We should be trusting local people, as my noble friend Lady Maclean said. As the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, said, it should be about place-shaping, which is best done at the local level.

I will reiterate the important questions posed by my noble friend Lady Scott regarding cost and economies of scale. Both my noble friend and I have led councils through reorganisation, and we know the difficulties and the upfront costs involved, as well as the need for scale in certain services, such as social care. How will the Government ensure that any projected savings, potentially in the tens of millions, are actually realised and not frittered away by consequent changes? If such savings do materialise, will they be used to ease the burden on local taxpayers, who are already under considerable pressure? In Committee we will wish to probe in detail the areas of competence that the Government seek to shift, and, crucially, the rationale for doing so.

I must also raise what I consider to be a fundamental issue: what powers are actually coming down from government to local government—local councils and mayors? The Minister suggested that future powers will depend on what mayors demand, but how will these demands be made? Who decides which powers are devolved and which remain tightly controlled from the centre? As drafted, there is no clear pathway by which a mayor may secure the genuine authority needed to effect meaningful change—and, as importantly, funding for the services involved. Annual bidding for funds is not the same as having a guaranteed revenue stream against which you can plan. In this regard, the Government already have form, removing the incentive for growth provided by retained business rates, which are set to be removed by a business rates reset. The Bill does not devolve power; it simply rearranges administrative functions through Whitehall diktat.

Devolution has huge potential. Whitehall does not know and cannot implement holistically at the local level. If we as a nation are to address the issues of social care, health, economic growth and inactivity, it cannot be done centrally; it needs to be done by local partners working together at the local level to get the best outcomes for their communities. As we have heard across the House, whether it is Cornwall and Devon—there is a bit of a dispute about cream and scones, but hey—or Kirklees, Yorkshire or elsewhere in the country, they are all different and need to be looked at separately.

I hope that in Committee the Government will provide the clarity that is presently lacking and explain how they intend to bridge the gap between nominal competence and real power. Only then can we properly assess whether this legislation truly serves the interests of local communities or simply strengthens the hand of central government. For these reasons, I fear the Bill does nothing to empower local communities. Instead, it reduces local democracy through government-imposed restructuring, irrespective of local opinion, local geography or local identity—bureaucratic reorganisation that will cost money, distract from housing delivery and offer no evidential basis for improved services. It risks higher costs for residents through the new mayoral precepts, increasing borrowing powers, higher parking charges and the creation of further layers of mayor-appointed officials. Can the Minister assure the House that this will not lead to higher bills for hard-pressed residents while services are disrupted through reorganisation? These are serious concerns and I look forward to returning to them in more detail at the next stage of the Bill.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Jamieson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

2: Clause 2, page 2, line 18, leave out paragraph (a)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe whether, within a strategic authority’s competence, it would have the power to borrow in order to nationalise local transport.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a councillor in central Bedfordshire. This group of amendments on Clause 2 concerns the areas of competence afforded to strategic authorities under the Bill. The amendments tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook are probing. They seek to test the scope and limits of the powers the Government intend to devolve, and to understand the rationale behind the choices made in drawing up this list.

We have tried to understand the logic that underpins the Bill. Devolution, if done well, can bring decision-making closer to communities, improving outcomes for local people and delivering better value. But ambition must be matched with clarity, legal certainty and a clear understanding of how these powers are intended to operate in practice. Clause 2 is central to that. It is right that this Committee examines it carefully. Of course, this would be so much easier to debate if the Government were being clear on the powers and fiscal capacity that they are devolving to local government. However, as my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook commented, we see little in the Bill of what is actually being devolved.

Amendment 2 in my name would leave out Clause 2(a). This amendment probes whether, within a strategic authority’s competence, there would be the power to borrow to acquire local transport businesses. The Bill as drafted appears to give strategic authorities a broad remit over transport, but it is not clear whether this extends to the acquisition of assets, the taking over of services or the borrowing powers that would be required to do so. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out the Government’s intention here. Is the power envisaged to be purely strategic and co-ordinating, or could it extend to ownership and operational control? If the latter, what safeguards or limitations would apply? Is transport buses and trams, or is it also rail?

Our Amendment 5 concerns the reference to public safety. This is a term that appears in a number of statutes but its meaning is not always consistent. This amendment seeks to determine what is meant by public safety in the context of the Bill and on what legal definition this remit is set out. Do the Government intend this to relate to emergency planning, community safety partnerships, policing or something broader? Clarity is essential, not least to avoid overlap or conflict with existing statutory duties.

Amendment 11 in my name seeks to clarify how strategic authorities will be expected to identify, seek and assume powers in their areas of competence, and how accountability for those powers will be maintained. The amendment proposes that strategic authorities may exercise functions only within a powers framework set by the Secretary of State, who would be required by regulation to specify the scope and limits of powers, identify any functions reserved to central government and impose any conditions or statutory objectives. It would also require strategic authorities to publish a statement setting out which powers they have assumed and how these relate to the functions within their constituent councils. This is intended to ensure clarity over scope, limits, conditions and transparency for both constituent councils and Parliament as to where responsibility lies.

Before I conclude I want briefly to acknowledge the other amendments in this group, which raise important questions about the breadth and ambition of the proposed areas of competence. My noble friend Lord Lansley seeks to include community engagement and empowerment, a reminder that devolution must be rooted not only in institutional structures but in the active participation of the people it is intended to serve.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

The noble Lord knows, because we have had the conversation, that I feel that the order of that wording is a little unfortunate. We will reflect on that because it does look as though it is infrastructure related just to transport. That is not the intention of the Bill. The Bill is intended to reflect that the competences will include local infrastructure and transport. If that local infrastructure relates also to transport, well and good, but it might be other infrastructure. So I will reflect on that and come back to the noble Lord.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this group. What has emerged quite clearly is that there is a huge desire across the Committee for a proper devolution framework that is both ambitious and workable, and one that truly empowers local leaders while ensuring clarity, accountability and coherence.

I want to come back to competence because there appears to be some confusion. My noble friend Lord Porter raised the fact that local authorities already have a general power of competence. Therefore, I want to be clear: what do we mean by competence in the Bill? As the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, raised, what matters for the public is delivery. For that to happen, local authorities, mayors and strategic authorities need to have the responsibility, the powers and the funding. My noble friend Lord Lansley, in helpfully referring to the White Paper, said that a competence is a strategic mandate “to do”, as opposed to the general power of competence. I would really appreciate it if the Minister could clarify—not necessarily now—exactly what we mean by an area of competence and what that means in terms of responsibilities, powers, funding and the ability to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, mentioned energy. Over a century ago the last energy revolution of neighbourhood gas and electricity was rolled out by local authorities because they had the power and the funding—they did not have the responsibility but they took the responsibility—to do so. By the sounds of it, many noble Lords here would like local authorities to be in the same position again to be able to do things at the local level.

The noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, mentioned tourism, which is absolutely crucial to delivering economic growth, particularly in certain areas, such as Bedfordshire, where we have the delights of two national zoos and various other things.

My noble friend Lord Lansley and other noble Lords raised the very important issue of empowerment. It is partly because of the need to try to delve into and understand this that my noble friend Lady Scott and I tabled some of our amendments. Amendment 2 seeks precisely to understand what is meant by the devolution of transport powers; I appreciate that the Minister provided some clarity on that. Amendment 5 is about public safety; that term has significant implications, some of which were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. My noble friend Lady Scott raised the important issue of LRFs and where they will fit in the future. The importance is around how this will work in the future and the clarity as we go through this process. It is not just about what areas people are competent in but what powers, funding and responsibilities they will be given to deliver that.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches very much support the inclusion of this measure—above all because, if it is enlisted as one of the areas of competence, it will strengthen the argument that strategic authorities will have to make with the all-powerful Treasury that this is one of the funding elements that must be included.

I declare an interest: I live in Saltaire, which is a world heritage site. We are an open world heritage site, which means that we cannot charge for entry. The delicacy of our relations with Bradford Council, with a very strapped budget in terms of providing the resources to cope with the tourists and visitors, is very much one of the things we have to struggle with. As other noble Lords have said, Bradford has just had the most successful City of Culture year. It has done a huge amount for social cohesion and morale—indeed, for all the things the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, was talking about earlier, in terms of expanding people’s horizons and bringing people together.

Culture has been funded through a range of different streams. We all know about and remember the battles with Arts Council England about funding areas outside London. We have seen the way in which local councils used to pull cultural elements together through education in schools, local music arrangements and so on. They have dismantled those music hubs, which have been played around with—they have been constructed and put together, then taken apart—and schools have become very separate. If we are to build back to local intervention, local help and regional support, culture needs to be stressed as one of the things that is of enormous benefit to all of us, both socially and economically. It has been squeezed as councils at all levels have had to squeeze their budgets; they have found that culture is one of the things that has to go, as other things seem more important immediately, but it leaves a huge gap in the long run.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, before I speak to these amendments, I have a point of clarification: I believe that my noble friend Lord Parkinson was referring to Bristol, not Ipswich.

The amendments in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, would add the arts, creative industries, cultural services and heritage as an area of competence. The noble Earl has long been a vocal advocate for the cultural and creative sectors; his contributions to these debates and their economic, social and civic value are well recognised by the Committee. The case made by the noble Earl is compelling, as is the case made by the noble Baroness.

Cultural policy is most effective when it is shaped locally, with the flexibility to reflect the distinct histories, assets and ambitions of local areas; we have heard this from pretty much every noble Lord who has spoken today. Taken together, these amendments ask an important question: what role do the Government envisage for culture within the devolution framework? The Bill as drafted is silent on this point. Many combined authorities already treat culture as a strategic priority; local leaders would welcome clarity that they may continue to do so within the new statutory framework.

As with earlier groups of amendments, the issue here is not simply whether culture matters—few in this Committee would dispute that, I think—but whether the Government’s model of devolution is sufficiently flexible and ambitious to allow strategic authorities to support and grow the cultural life of their areas. These amendments invite the Government to set out their thinking and explain whether the omission of culture from Clause 2 is deliberate or merely an oversight. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, for Amendments 6 and 51, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, for Amendment 10. These amendments seek to create a distinct area of competence for culture; and to enable a mayor to appoint a commissioner to this additional area of competence. As noble Lords will be aware, we had long discussions about this matter during the passage of the then Planning and Infrastructure Bill.

When I was thinking about this, I thought I would have a look at what was going on in Hertfordshire, my own county, which calls itself the Hollywood of the UK. That might be disputed territory, but that is what it calls itself. When you look at the economic impact in Hertfordshire, there was film and TV investment of £3.7 billion, and 4,000 direct jobs, but 7,000 to 19,000 jobs if you include supply chain and freelance workers. There were major new investments, such as Sunset Studios in Broxbourne, which brought £300 million a year into the local economy; Sky Studios Elstree has an estimated value of over £3 billion over the first five years; and then there are Warner Brothers, Elstree Studios, and all the rest.

I know that is the economic dimension of this, but the whole ecosystem starts with local arts and grass-roots infrastructure, skills and training, and inspiring a new generation of creatives to go into the industry. Mayors and strategic authorities can, and already do, play a very important role in these areas. That is precisely why the Bill’s existing areas of competence have been framed as they have. They are deliberately broad, enabling a wide range of activity to fall within scope, including cultural, creative and heritage activity.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, for correctly highlighting the power of these activities to tackle some of the divisions we are seeing in society; they play a very powerful role in that respect. My noble friend Lady Griffin highlighted the importance of skills enabling the culture industries to thrive, which illustrates the cross-cutting nature of the competences because skills in the creative industries and elsewhere are included in the competences as we see them.

For example, Clause 41 extends a broad power to strategic authorities to encourage and promote visitors to their area. That power sits under the “Economic development and regeneration” heading. This demonstrates how these activities are intended to be captured without the need to list them in a separate policy area. Indeed, many authorities already fund and support culture and heritage initiatives using their existing powers.

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, made a point about the West Midlands and Birmingham. As we have already had north-west and Yorkshire examples, I will use the example of the West Midlands Combined Authority, which invested £4.1 million into arts and culture projects as part of the legacy funding following the 2022 Birmingham Commonwealth Games.

However, I take the noble Viscount’s point that for local authorities this has been a very difficult time when they are faced with the difficult choice between whether they fund the adult care services and the children’s services or arts services. That is why this Government have started to work on the fair funding of local government so that we can get local government’s confidence back that there is the possibility to invest.

The provisional 2026-27 settlement will make available £78 billion in core spending power for local authorities in England. That is a 5.7% cash-terms increase compared with 2025-26. By the end of the multi-year period, we will have provided a 15.1% cash-terms increase, worth over £11 billion, compared with 2025-26. The reforms ensure that this funding is allocated fairly and that the places and services that need it most are supported. It is for services such as adult care and children’s services, but it will also ensure all areas are able to deliver at the kinds of cultural services that we have been talking about.

In my own area, I hung on to the Gordon Craig Theatre in Stevenage. In spite of successive cuts in funding, we recognised its value to our community, not only in terms of our strong cultural life but to skills and our economy. It is what the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, called recognising the long-term strategic benefit of what that brought to our community. While I am talking about specific places, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, mentioned Bradford, and I congratulate Bradford on its fantastic year as City of Culture. It has done an amazing job, and we look forward to that continuing in Bradford and elsewhere around the country.

On commissioners, I note that they are an optional appointment for mayors to support delivery in a specific area of competence. Mayors are able to shape the exact brief of the role, and it would therefore be reasonable, for instance, for a commissioner focused on economic development and regeneration to also lead on a strategy focused on culture and the creative industries.

However, I note the concerns of all noble Lords who have spoken, particularly the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, who is a great champion in this area, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I would be very happy to meet them and discuss this further before we get to Report. I hope that with these reassurances, the noble Earl feels able to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, I want to clarify one of the statements she made. This is a devolution Bill. She implied that she wants clarity that all functions are done at the same level across the country. To my mind, the whole purpose of devolution is that you do it at the level that is most appropriate. That may be very different, for instance, in Yorkshire compared with Stevenage. My noble friends from Yorkshire and Lancashire have disappeared, so I cannot refer to them. It may be that there is a brilliant parish council that can take on more responsibility—my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook mentioned Salisbury—whereas, in another area, we may say, “Well, no, that’s better done at the unitary or strategic level”. Devolution is about that local determination of how services are delivered at the best level for the best results for residents. I want to make sure that the Minister was not implying that that is not the case.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

We have set out clearly in the Bill—with the competences, for example—where we see strategic responsibilities lying and where local council leaders will be responsible for the services they deliver. As we go through the local government reorganisation process, we will have unitary authorities across the country delivering those services. What we do not want to do is muddy the waters by saying that there will be some areas that have different strategic powers from others. That is why we have set out the competences in the Bill.

It is not about what you deliver at local level because the strategic competences allow that to be flexible across different geographies and demographics. It is about ensuring that the strategic level is delivered by the combined authority and local services are delivered by the local authority. I do not think it would be helpful to muddy those waters by having the picture be different across the country.

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[Baroness Janke (LD)]

My Lords, in echoing my colleague’s comments reflecting on the previous debate, it sounds as though today we are agreeing on uniformity rather than devolution. The Bill gives the Secretary of State sweeping powers to merge, restructure or abolish councils without parliamentary oversight and local consent—all apparently in the name of devolution. A top-down authoritarian approach replaces local choice with a central direction from Whitehall. A single model is to be imposed across England regardless of geography, identity or local preference. It shifts real power away from local councils and into large strategic authorities headed up by regional mayors, with reduced numbers of local councillors serving larger areas and populations.

Civil servants in Whitehall carving up maps is not a process that encourages local participation and people having real powers, as devolution implies. In fact, it is the very opposite of devolution. When its results become apparent, they will fuel further distrust and anger, as local people will find that they have even less chance to influence decisions affecting their lives or opportunities to participate in the governance of their local area. Mayors do not have the confidence of the population all over the country, so imposing a universal model is asking for local dissent. In my area of Bristol, there was a referendum that decisively rejected continuing with an elected mayor, so this actually imposes something on an area that is contrary to what the local population said.

We had some talk about regional assemblies. Having served on the South West Regional Assembly, I dispute that all the RDA money goes into Bristol, as the noble Baroness, Lady Scott—Councillor Scott—said, but that is something that we can perhaps talk about afterwards. Having looked at housing plans for the whole of Cornwall, Devon, Somerset and more, I can tell the noble Baroness that rural affairs were very high on that agenda.

This amendment seeks to restore the requirements of full local consultation on the substantive changes being proposed, including the geographical area, functions and powers of the new authorities, and governance arrangements including membership representation and accountability. Consultation is also to include funding arrangements, transitional costs and where they will be borne, and the impact on existing local government funding. It is essential for there to be transparency and accountability on funding, and that local obligations and responsibilities are fully funded, with councils enabled to do the job for which they were elected.

It seems deeply ironic that an unelected Chamber such as ours should be party to removing powers and accountability from local communities and riding roughshod over local democracy. This amendment goes some way to restoring the rightful importance of local leadership, local consent and local participation.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I speak on this group of amendments concerning Clause 3, which addresses the creation of single foundation strategic authorities. The amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook are probing in nature, and we have also given notice of our intention to oppose Clause 3 standing part of the Bill.

At the heart of our concerns is the familiar theme that we have returned to throughout the Bill, and I suspect we will again—the balance of power between central government and local communities. Too often the Bill grants the Secretary of State sweeping powers to create, reshape or direct local government structures with minimal checks, consultation and accountability. That is not the model of devolution that we believe in.

I also ask the Minister for clarification on the role of single foundation strategic authorities. Will all unitary and counties not in a combined authority be offered the opportunity to be a single foundation strategic authority? What powers and funding will they be given and how does this compare to combined authorities, mayoral and foundation mayoral authorities? Where will a single foundation strategic authority fit in the landscape? Could it be forced into a combined authority?

Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, is sensible and necessary. It would require the Secretary of State to consult all levels of local government in an affected area before designating a single foundation strategic authority. Indeed, I would go further. Consultation should involve not only local authorities but local residents. If we are serious about localism and empowering communities, rather than simply rearranging governance structures, the voices of the people who live and work in those areas must be heard.

Amendment 15 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook probes whether the affirmative procedure alone is sufficient scrutiny for the Secretary of State’s powers under this clause. Given the scale of the decisions being taken and the potential impact on local governance and accountability, it is legitimate to question whether Parliament should have a more substantial role in overseeing these powers.

Throughout this Bill we have systematically sought to remove or constrain the Secretary of State’s ability to create new authorities or confer new powers without proper consultation or local consent. Clause 3 as drafted continues the pattern of centralisation. For that reason, we have tabled an amendment opposing the question that Clause 3 stands part of the Bill. We believe that the Government must provide far greater clarity about how and when these powers will be used and what safeguards will be in place.

As I said earlier, this is a theme that we will return to later in the Bill. For now, I hope the Minister will reflect on the strong arguments made today for a more genuinely localist approach, one that respects local government, involves local residents and ensures that decisions about local government are not taken unilaterally by the Secretary of State.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Janke, for their amendments on single foundation strategic authorities. Clause 3 provides a power for the Secretary State to designate a single unitary council or county council that is not covered by an existing strategic authority as a single foundation strategic authority. Any future designation of a single foundation strategic authority will be subject to the consent of the council involved. For this reason, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, is not a necessary requirement.

I appreciate the intention behind the proposal. However, it would not be proportionate to impose an additional requirement to consult every level of local government within the proposed area of the single foundation strategic authority. The principal body affected by the designation will be the old unitary county council and no designation can be made without the consent of the relevant council.

The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, probes whether Clause 3 should be included in the Bill. Clause 3 is vital to ensuring that the Bill delivers on its ambition to ensure that everywhere in England can benefit from devolution. The Government recognise that non-mayoral devolution to single local authorities can serve as an important foundational step, allowing areas to see early benefits from devolution, while considering all options for unlocking deeper devolution by working with neighbouring local authorities in combined authorities and combined county authorities, over the longer term.

The second amendment in the group, Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, probes whether the affirmative procedure is appropriate for the Secretary of State’s power to designate a council as a single foundation strategic authority. I should reassure the Committee that this is in line with the long-established practice whereby secondary legislation is used to establish new institutions and to implement agreed devolution agreements within areas.

In addition, the use of the affirmative procedure ensures that no designation can be made without the approval of both Houses. As I said, we want local authority designations to be done at the local level; that is the provision, I believe. However, the Government recognise that, in rare cases, non-mayoral devolution can serve as an important first step. To access further functions available at the mayoral tier, single councils will need to work across a wider geography.

I will let the noble Lord know about the issue of funding in due course in writing, if that is okay. Establishing those single foundation strategic authorities will accelerate the transfer of powers out of Whitehall to local government so that local leaders have a greater say over decisions in those areas.

With these reassurances, I ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Janke, to withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

The Government have made our intention very clear: we want to see unitary authorities established across the country. We want that initiative to come from local areas themselves. Some areas may be more comfortable going into the single foundation authority first, before they take the step to go into a combined authority; that is what the provision in the Bill is about. We want to make sure that there are unitary authorities across the country. In extreme circumstances, I believe, the Secretary of State has a power to make sure that it does happen, but that would be very much a power of last resort; we would not want to use it unless there could be no agreement any other way.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

The Minister kindly said that she would write to me about funding, but I had two other related questions. First, will all authorities be able to say, “I want to be a foundation authority”, or is that going to be limited in some way? Secondly, if you are a single foundation strategic authority, could you still be forced into a combined authority at a later date?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

For most local authorities—I have spoken to a great number of them over the past few months—the attraction of taking your unitary authority and going into a combined authority is the ability to have the greater powers that that level of devolution will accrue to the area and the communities for which you are responsible. I think that it will be the exception rather than the rule that people will want to be a single foundation authority, but they may be more comfortable with using that as a first step then working it out for themselves. This has happened to a certain extent through the whole devolution programme. Where people are in a unitary authority, they will look around them to see which of the surrounding authorities work best in terms of their economy and public services, as well as which model makes more sense to their local community, before they decide which way to go; if they wish to take some time to do that, the Bill makes provision for that.

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Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

16: Schedule 1, page 89, line 15, leave out paragraph (b)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and other amendments tabled Baroness Scott of Bybrook, remove the ability of the Secretary of State to create, or make certain changes to the governance or composition of, combined authorities without the consent of the councils involved.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Wilson, and my noble friend Lady Scott have stolen my first line about the size of this group; that is largely down to the structure of the Bill, which has numerous schedules. Consequently, we have tabled a vast number of amendments to make a relatively simple change.

I thank all noble Lords who tabled amendments on these issues. They are not merely technical adjustments; they are amendments that go to the heart of our concerns about the true purpose and direction of the Bill and the sweeping powers that the Secretary of State is taking in it. As my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook has made clear, we on these Benches firmly believe that devolution must be locally led, rooted in local identities and local democracy, and not imposed by central government. Genuine community empowerment cannot be handed down by central diktat, which imposes structures that override locally elected representatives and residents. If devolution is imposed from Whitehall, it ceases to be devolution in any meaningful sense.

The amendments we have tabled seek to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot exercise powers affecting the governance, composition or boundaries of local authorities without their explicit consent. That consent is not an administrative hurdle; it is a democratic safeguard. Such changes must be based on local identities and local wishes to truly reflect the meaning of community. They should not be abstract or managerial plans drawn up at a distance in Whitehall, however well intentioned.

Communities are not interchangeable units on a map. They have histories, relationships and ways of working that cannot simply be redrawn by statutory instrument. Any restructuring must have a demonstrative benefit for local people, not just for the administrative convenience of central government. Crucially, it is local councils, through elected councillors accountable to their residents, who are best placed to judge what will or will not work for their area. This is a particular concern given the Government’s decision to cancel local elections this year, denying the vote to potentially 4 million people. I look forward to hearing other noble Lords’ thoughts on these timely issues and the other amendments in this group.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group: Amendments 21 and 24. My noble friends on the Front Bench have pretty much all the other amendments, with the exception of Amendment 28 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock. It is a pity that she cannot be here, but I join in sending her our very best wishes and look forward to her return to the Committee.

Amendments 21 and 24 are in the same area of where proposals can be brought forward for the establishment of new combined authorities. Before I go on, I could have tabled—I neglected to table—two further amendments about county combined authorities in exactly the same terms as Amendments 21 and 24, which relate to combined authorities. Therefore, perhaps the arguments I am making on combined authorities can be taken as read-across.

The purpose of my Amendments 21 and 24 is to challenge the process by which the Secretary of State would make a decision on a proposal for a combined authority or a combined county authority that is brought forward by the constituent councils in an area. As things stand under the existing legislation, which was set up in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act but, for the purposes of combined authorities, is in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009—LuRA 2023 has the same for combined county authorities—the way it works is that those proposals come forward for an area and are subjected to tests.

I am interested, in terms of how the tests are currently applied, in whether they are likely to improve

“the economic, social or environmental wellbeing of some or all of the people of the area”.

Additionally, I suggest that the proposal should be required to include the purposes that are intended to be achieved by the establishment of this combined authority or combined county authority. The Secretary of State would have to look at and assess—these are the tests—whether those improvements in economic, social and environmental well-being as well as the purposes included in the proposal are likely to be met.

To me, these are two elements of the test of whether a proposal coming forward from an area should be accepted. The first is an objective test: will it improve the well-being in the area in various ways? The second is more subjective but none the less purposive: the people in this area and the constituent councils have said why they want to have this authority, so the Secretary of State should look at those purposes and say whether they are likely to be met. In this Bill, the question put to a relevant proposal—what purposes are you trying to achieve?—is simply swept away. There is no requirement for such a proposal to have those purposes any more.

Amendment 21 would remove the requirement to have purposes so that they cannot form part of a subsequent test. The test that is to be applied would no longer be the test of economic, social or environmental well-being, which is an objective test related to the benefit to the people living in that area, and would be replaced by a statutory test: is it appropriate to make the order in relation to the area, having regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to the areas of competence? In those words, “convenient” leaps out in particular. It makes one think that what my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook was just saying about the desirability of having conformity is what is actually driving these decisions now, rather than, “What is going to happen to benefit the people who live in this area?”, which should be the objective test.

That question did not escape the notice of the Lords Constitution Committee. In its 16th report, published on 13 January, it stated:

“We draw this provision to the attention of the House. It should satisfy itself that it is content to grant the Secretary of State this power within Schedule 1 to subject the new arrangements for a combined authority to such a broad and potentially subjective test”.


Of course, in the text at which the committee looked, what the committee means by “broad and potentially subjective” is, by implication, a bureaucratic test—“Is it convenient for us to have a combined authority?”—whereas what we have at the moment, which is what the committee is referring to, is, in essence, a test of the benefit. It is intended to be able to be determined more objectively, and it is certainly more relevant to the people who live in an area whether a combined authority is or is not in their interests.

When we go on with this Bill, I hope that the Government will in each of these respects think whether the statutory test should have perhaps both the bureaucratic element of whether it is convenient and the objective element of whether it can demonstrate that it will bring benefit to the people who live in this area.

My noble friends have two amendments in this group, Amendments 22 and 36, the purpose of which, as far as I can see, is to remove the power for the Secretary of State to direct the establishment of combined authorities and county combined authorities. It seems to me that although the Minister said this is an exceptional power, there is a risk that once this power is available—again, because it will be convenient to do so—we will be instructed to have combined authorities according to the Secretary of State’s proposals rather than the ones brought forward from within the area itself.

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I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for Amendments 21 and 24, which draw attention to the important points raised in the report of the Constitution Committee on the new statutory test for creating and amending strategic authorities. The Bill will introduce a new framework that will standardise powers and make devolution quicker to achieve and simpler to understand, particularly for local areas. As part of these measures, we have introduced a new streamlined statutory test that consolidates core parts of the previous legislation, links to the areas of competence and aligns with the rest of the framework. The old statutory tests were not only more complex and less flexible but did not adequately reflect the new areas of competence. They would make it harder, not easier, for local areas to achieve the benefits of devolution. That is why, in our view, they need to be changed. With that, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, we have had an interesting day debating the Bill. I think there is universal agreement across the Committee that devolution is desirable and that local areas having genuinely devolved powers and being able to deliver for their residents would be a good thing and would deliver better outcomes. However, it is essential that they are part of forming that process and area. The Minister said that the Government believe that devolution can deliver great benefit when led by local leaders who know their areas best. I cannot do anything other than agree with that, but we then talk about a backstop that gives the Secretary of State immense powers to impose solutions on people, and that is the area that we are all concerned about. That is why we proposed these amendments to ensure that that is not done for administrative convenience.

As my noble friend Lord Lansley said, there was a test in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act that very clearly stated that there must be a clear benefit to devolution and that the area seeking devolution must establish why it is doing it, and it was judged on the basis of whether it would deliver it. That has gone, and, as my noble friend Lord Lansley said, the test now seems to be whether it is administratively convenient. We are not here to do administratively convenient things. We are here to deliver real devolution at a local level, determined by local residents, local councils and local leaders. That is our overarching concern. It is all very well for the Minister to say that this is a backstop arrangement so that we do not have islands or things such as that. While I may have some sympathy about that potential issue, we are giving sweeping powers to the Secretary of State to impose. That is the reason for our amendments.

I look forward to hearing from the Minister as we progress through this Bill how we will ensure that that local voice, the voice of residents, councils and councillors, is heard and is not swept under the carpet, so to speak, on the theme of administrative convenience and diktat from Whitehall. With warning that we will come back to this, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Jamieson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said that it would be unhelpful if regional and local government continued doing their own thing. I think that this is an important debate and I look forward to the Minister’s reply, but the Government might look at the powers that existed with regional development agencies until 2012, in terms of spatial development strategies and the land use framework, when a lot was done. They might revisit that to make sure that everyone going off to do their own thing—the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron—is avoided.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his amendments. I think that there has been consensus among noble Lords contributing on this group that this is something that should be explored and looked at further. Amendment 45 rightly links local growth plans to spatial development strategies, ensuring that they are not formed in isolation and do not contradict each other. When a local growth plan is drafted, it should take account of the implications for spatial development. We welcome this amendment and support a more integrated and coherent approach.

However, we also believe that these plans must be informed by neighbourhood plans as well as neighbourhood priority statements, which have yet to be commenced under the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. Amendment 46 seeks to ensure that spatial development strategies take into account national environmental improvement plans and the land use framework. This will help local government at least to have regard to the national Government’s environmental targets and to be aware of the environmental solutions proposed. As for the land use framework, we are still waiting for it to be published. Can the Minister confirm the timeline? As others have asked, will it be imminent?

Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 address the need for spatial development strategies to be aligned with infrastructure projects to identify any that are needed for growth. Again, these should be important considerations to ensure that new developments are supported with the necessary infrastructure rather than treating the two in isolation. As we said in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill debates, the consequences for development of the failure to deliver infrastructure should also be clear.

We agree with the principle behind all these amendments. It is important that combined authorities’ and councils’ various strategies are joined up, co-ordinated and coherent to ensure not only good governance and efficiency across local government but, more importantly, high-quality development. I thank my noble friend for his efforts and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, that was an interesting discussion. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his amendments and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the role of spatial development strategies in the new devolution framework.

Amendment 45 would require strategic planning authorities to identify the policies in their spatial development strategies that are of strategic importance to address the local growth priorities identified in local growth plans. I very much agree with the need for spatial development strategies properly to address the priorities identified in local growth plans where they are of strategic importance to the area, such as the issues that the noble Lord mentioned around skills and infrastructure. There is an expectation in the revised NPPF that that is exactly what will happen.

The Planning and Infrastructure Act, to which the noble Lord also referred—we recently sat through many hours of debate on it—requires strategic planning authorities to have regard to any plan or strategy they have published. This would include a local growth plan. In the draft revised NPPF, which was published just before Christmas, we set out that spatial development strategies should give spatial expression to strategic elements of local growth plans, and that would include all of the issues mentioned by the noble Lord. We also set out in the draft revised NPPF that spatial development strategies should be tested against national policy when they are examined; that will include the industrial strategy, for example, and will shine a light on whether they are meeting the expectations we have of the SDS.

A number of Peers spoke to Amendment 46. I say to my noble friend Lady Young that I found her extrapolation of this through to losing lots of elections in May and then having a whole reshuffle a bit depressing. I hope that will not happen, and I also hope that my noble friend will have a wander through one of her new forests and cheer herself up a bit. Amendment 46 would require a strategic planning authority to have regard to the Government’s environmental improvement plan and the land use framework for England while preparing a spatial development strategy.

I absolutely agree with noble Lords on the importance of these national documents relating to land use and the environment. The provisions detailing the required content of spatial development strategies and the factors to be taken into account in their preparation were introduced less than two months ago in the Planning and Infrastructure Act, following very thorough parliamentary scrutiny. I do not consider it necessary to revisit or amend these requirements before they have even had a chance to be tested in practice. The documents in question are expected to inform the drafting of national planning policies, and strategic planning authorities will be required to have regard to the need to ensure that their strategy is consistent with the current policy.

For example, if we found that the land use framework or the environmental improvement plan were being ignored in strategic development strategies, we would keep that under review. Should any gaps or misalignments emerge between strategic development strategies and these documents, we can consider future changes to the National Planning Policy Framework or planning practice guidance, or even secondary legislation to ensure that they are taken into account in preparing an SDS.

A number of noble Lords asked questions on the publication of the land use framework, which I know is eagerly awaited. The Government consulted on land use in England from January to April last year. The responses, as well as the feedback from supporting workshops that have been held since, are being analysed. The responses will inform the preparation of the land use framework. I cannot give noble Lords an exact publication date today, I am afraid, but I know that my colleagues in Defra want to publish it as quickly as possible.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, about regional plans, I used to be on the regional assembly, so I sat thought the entire process of the east of England regional plan; the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, did so as well, I believe. There were a lot of lessons to be learned from those regional plans, particularly around the co-ordination of data and so on, and I know that officials in the department have taken into consideration how that was done. We need to reflect carefully on those experiences and how they fit in with what we are about to do with strategic development strategies.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, asked about London. The London plan sits outside this Bill, I think, but there is an expectation on London boroughs that this will be done. Indeed, my own borough is quite a way outside London—well, 28 miles; we are in Hertfordshire, so not that far—and we were consulted on the London plan as part of the Ring Around London consultation.

On my noble friend Lady Young’s question about the local nature recovery strategies, it is a requirement that SDSs take account of those; indeed, the London plan has to take account of local nature recovery strategies as well.

Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 would require mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities to set out in their local growth plan what is needed in spatial and infrastructure terms to realise the economic growth opportunities presented in the plan. As with Amendment 45, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, I agree with the need to ensure that places are identifying these needs. Local growth plans will be required to set out an economic overview of their area, shared priorities agreed with the Government, and a pipeline of investment opportunities. Where infra- structure or development presents a relevant investment opportunity, we would expect it to be included in that pipeline. We are clear that local growth plans should provide an overarching framework for growth, identifying actions and investment that can drive economic growth and productivity.

But, when it comes to addressing the spatial implications of local growth plans and identifying the development and infrastructure needs for realising growth, the right vehicle is the spatial development strategy. That is why we set out that spatial development strategies should give spatial expression to strategic elements of local growth plans when we published our proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework. For all those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, will withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

47: Clause 8, page 8, leave out lines 27 to 28
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the new subsection inserting a new section into the LURA to provide the Secretary of State with the power to designate a mayoral strategic authority as an established mayoral strategic authority.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook. Amendment 49 would allow the Secretary of State to make subordinate legislation to cause a mayoral combined authority to cease to be a mayoral strategic authority if, and only if, the combined authority consents for this to be the case. That would allow the structures of local government to be formed locally, according to local needs, priorities and democratic wishes, rather than setting in stone structures that may not be suitable for local communities later down the line.

On the creation of established mayoral strategic authorities, Amendment 47 would remove the proposed power of the Secretary of State to designate a mayoral strategic authority as an established mayoral strategic authority because we believe that the process should be locally led and not imposed from above. Amendments 48 and 50 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley also address the creation of established mayoral strategic authorities.

The Government White Paper set out the eligibility criteria for accessing the established mayoral tier. These amendments seek to give a basis for deciding whether proposals for a mayoral combined county authority, a mayoral combined authority, or for being designated an established mayoral strategic authority, have substantive merit.

We also know that the scope of integrated settlements for mayoral strategic authorities will be confirmed at each spending review, on the basis of functional responsibilities and their value, by a formulaic process. Can the Minister please elaborate on what those responsibilities are and on the formulaic process? Authorities need to be able to feed back on the amounts and types of funding they receive, so what process will be in place to ensure that funding is based on funding received from authorities?

In addition, how will government ensure that the timeline for this Bill aligns with the timelines for new strategic authorities and the spending review? Will the new mayors have the same powers and financial resources made available to them as the existing mayors? Local government reorganisation should not be undertaken simply for the sake of it; the Government’s plans and timelines need to be coherent and co-ordinated and underpinned by genuine principles for devolution to be meaningful and effective. I look forward to hearing the contributions of noble Lords and the Minister’s response on these matters. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group, Amendments 48 and 50. It is another of those occasions when there are two amendments to achieve one purpose. Amendment 48 relates to county combined authorities and Amendment 50 to combined authorities, and each is on the question of under what circumstances they should be able to be designated by the Secretary of State as an established mayoral strategic authority.

On the purpose of designation, two key things happen when you are an established strategic authority. First, you can have access to an integrated financial settlement. This is quite an important issue, although it is not in the Bill because it is financial; it would be determined by Treasury financial legislation. However, this being established means that it is a gateway to the ability to manage finances with what we would call in departments the power environment between different headings. These would normally not be available to local authorities where they receive delegated funding for one purpose and want to be able to use it for other purposes.

As we progress, if there is to be a significant tourism revenue to strategic authorities, the financial arrangements of strategic authorities will be an important element. We may come back to that in later groups. I do not want to dwell on that. The point is that this is the gateway to an integrated financial settlement from the Treasury. Very few strategic authorities have it now. I suppose that London and Manchester will get it first, in this spending review, then other strategic authorities will get it in the next spending review.

Secondly—we will no doubt come back to this on Clause 51—there is the ability of established mayoral strategic authorities to seek additional powers and functions within the designated areas of competence. That is quite an important additional power. These are two important powers, and Amendments 48 and 50 ask by what means the Secretary of State decides whether they should be established. What is in the Bill sets out a process but no criteria.

Paragraph 2.2.4 of the English devolution White Paper told us that there would be criteria for accessing the established mayoral tier: that the strategic authority has

“been in existence … for at least 18 months … has a published Local Assurance Framework in place … has not been the subject of a Best Value Notice, a MHCLG commissioned independent review, or a statutory inspection or intervention … is not subject to any ongoing (or implementing) recommendations from an externally mandated independent review; and there are no material accounting concerns covering the current or previous financial year”.

These are essentially matters of financial governance and accountability. I do not understand why the Bill makes no reference to the criteria the Secretary of State would apply, given that the devolution White Paper has set them out specifically. If my amendments were accepted, an indication would at the very least be given of the criteria: effective governance, accountability, and specified performance metrics.

It is a good idea that, as this develops, a specific power be provided in the legislation enabling the Secretary of State to publish the criteria that will be applied to the question of designation. It would not be right simply to say that there is a process but no criteria. We should have the criteria established.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

The tourism tax is an interesting step forward because, as far as I know, this is the first time a fiscal power has been devolved. The Government are keen to test out that devolution of fiscal power; I do not have the details at my fingertips so I will write to the noble Lord on the detail of how it is moving forward.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his thoughtful amendments and comments. I also thank the Minister for her feedback, which has certainly provided some more illumination on a sometimes slightly murky area of devolution.

On integrated financial settlements, I know that, when I chaired the LGA, I pushed very hard to move in this direction. I was very pleased that we managed to get a couple of them over the line with the previous Government. They are important and offer huge benefits to the areas that have them. Therefore, this idea of criteria, and being very clear on them, is important; I thank the Minister for being clear that the White Paper is where the criteria are set out.

However, I am quibbling over and slightly uncomfortable with the fact that the criteria are just guidance for the Minister and could, therefore, be changed relatively easily. When you are talking about devolution, with local councils and local government making significant changes in anticipation of something that will potentially make a significant difference to their areas, those criteria must be very clear and not changeable. Councils must know what goal they are aiming for because, as the Minister said, this is not something that happens overnight; it takes several years, potentially, and a lot of effort. I do not want the goalposts to move too much—most local authorities would not want that, I think—so I would like some assurances, though not necessarily today, on how set in stone the criteria are as people go through the process.

I am also quite curious about the “no stepping back” bit. As the Minister said, we set some very high bars. However, the day after, someone might fail those high bars—but they are still there. A little elaboration on that at some later point would be very much appreciated.

With that, I thank noble Lords for the debate and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

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[Lord Freyberg (CB)]

My Lords, I will briefly support the amendments in this group that seek to remove the cap on the number of commissioners and the appointment of special advisers. In doing so, I restate my support for Amendments 6, 10 and 51 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, to add the arts and culture as an area of competence, which would allow a modest increase in the number of commissioners from seven to eight.

I fully recognise that the Government wish to maintain a coherent and settled devolution framework, to limit additional costs that such appointments would incur and to exercise caution around unelected roles. Here I entirely take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answers to those numerous and very important questions.

I also accept the argument that further powers may be pursued within the existing areas of competence. That said, the question here is one of governance rather than architecture. A small degree of flexibility in the commissional model, as the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Bach, have argued for, would allow mayors to organise their leadership teams and their advisers in ways that reflect local priorities and circumstances without altering the framework itself.

Different regions face very different challenges: a dense metropolitan authority and a largely rural combined county authority may reasonably require different internal arrangements. For those reasons, I generally support these amendments and the flexibility they seek to introduce.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. I thank all noble Lords who have participated. It does appear to be the first one today where we are not quite in agreement on things. I assure my noble friend Lord Trenchard that we share his concerns about appointing unelected commissioners to roles that have real political power. However, before I go on to that, this raises an important and enduring question about how leadership is accountable and the flexibility to operate within a system that is devolved.

At its heart, this debate returns to the principles of devolution. It is about not just transferring powers from the centre to the local level but about who exercises those powers. It is about how they are held to account and how clearly responsibility is understood by the public whom those institutions are designed to serve.

On the amendments, while the noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a good case, we have concerns about commissioners holding responsibility for multiple areas of confidence because there is a risk that it could reduce accountability, concentrating authority into too few hands and blurring the lines of responsibility, making it harder for the public to discern who is ultimately answerable for decisions—there may be cases that need further thought in this area. I also accept the noble Lord’s points about police authorities. With the recent announcement in the other place, can the Minister say whether that is being taken into account in the devolution Bill or, even better, whether that announcement is going to take account of the devolution Bill? That is rather important.

On the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, devolution works best when responsibilities are clear, visible and capable of effective scrutiny. I have a real concern here, which has been shared by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. First, I will talk about commissioners. What is the definition of a commissioner? Working in local government, when you say that the commissioners are coming in, while I personally am not used to a failing council, normally you send them in after a best value inspection when one is failing. We have had this issue several times in the devolution Bill, and definitions and consistency of definitions would be helpful.

However, the real concern about commissioners is that we seem to have an expanding strategy. The Bill talks about seven but now we have amendments that talk about political advisers, special advisers and more deputy mayors. My focus in local government is value for money. Local government and mayors should be about delivering services to residents. They should not be about creating an unelected bureaucracy that is appointed and risks political cronyism. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, also raised a number of practical issues such as whether when the mayor resigns all the commissioners go and you lose all that knowledge and so forth. I will not go on to those again, because that would be unnecessary repetition, but we have a real concern.

A number of noble Lords raised an issue around whether we can have commissioners for specific areas. I have sympathy with that, but they do not have to be commissioners. We are talking about political leads for certain areas. There is no reason why an elected councillor cannot be a political lead, whether it is for rural affairs, the environment, culture and so forth. I do not think that we have to focus on commissioners there—that can be a political lead.

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There was a question about why existing elected members cannot do it, as they already lead on portfolios. We expect that commissioners will have detailed knowledge—

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

With voting, the figure required can be either two-thirds or 50:50. Can the Minister clarify what figure is required to remove a commissioner?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

For the overview and scrutiny committee, I believe it is a simple majority vote, but I will clarify that in writing for the noble Lord.

We expect that commissioners will have detailed knowledge and expertise in their assigned area of competence and will be appointed on this basis. Constituent members will not necessarily be experienced in their portfolio subject area. There are also circumstances where it would not be appropriate for a portfolio lead to represent both the borough and the region; there may be perceived conflicts of interest. As I said earlier, the local authority leaders who sit on the combined authority will also be running their councils on a day-to-day basis.

Commissioners will be able to represent the mayor’s authority and policy positions in a given area, including by speaking to the media. They could help make day-to-day decisions that are delegated by a mayor and provide strategic insight and advice for their area of expertise. We also expect commissioners to play a leading role in stakeholder engagement and partnership working, across geographies and organisations, as appropriate. This would include working closely with local councillors, business leaders and public sector institutions, using their advocacy and influence to deliver the mayor’s agenda.

I hope that that has helped clarify some of the points raised by noble Lords and that, with the assurances I have given, they will not press their amendments.

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[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I support the principle of Amendment 191 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill. I observe that, for the first time, we are bringing local, parish and community councils substantially into scope, for I believe that the definitions provided in Amendment 191 will do so. What has not been fully understood is that one of the second-order effects of the Bill is that it will create a significant number of larger community councils as a result.

As a result of local government reorganisation, large numbers of cities, such as Oxford, Exeter and Norwich, and former county boroughs, such as Ipswich, Great Yarmouth and King’s Lynn, which have been billing authorities hitherto, will now fall into the lower tier of local authorities. Those authorities have no constraint or cap on the amount of council tax that they can raise. In Salisbury, they have jacked up council tax by 44% in the past four years—they have let rip, and it is not good enough. There has been no scrutiny, there has been cost shunting, and the council tax payers have paid more.

I have laid amendments, which we will discuss later, that will make provision for those larger smaller authorities to fall under the constraints that all the other authorities will have. I do not seek to fetter the smallest parish council, but if you have a population that hitherto has been part of a billing authority, it is right that they should be constrained going forward, as they have in the past.

I am not sure that I entirely welcome all the provisions in Amendment 191 on local public accounts committees, but the amendment shines a light for the first time on where we will go with these smaller community parish councils. There is merit in the thrust of what has been proposed here. I wait to hear how the Minister reacts to what constraints will be placed on this new class of large parish or town council as a result of the changes proposed in the Bill.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I will take a step back to reflect on what this debate is really about. It is not simply about committees, processes or institutional design—it is about trust that power, once devolved, will be exercised well; trust that decisions will be open to challenge; and trust that the public will be able to see how and why those decisions are taken.

Amendment 53, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, speaks directly to that question. The requirement for mayors to establish scrutiny committees for commissioners recognises a simple but important truth: as we add layers of responsibility and delegation within combined county authorities, scrutiny cannot remain an afterthought. If commissioners are to exercise real influence, there must be clear, visible and credible mechanisms through which their actions can be examined, questioned and, where necessary, challenged. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how the Government envisage scrutiny operating in practice where commissioners are appointed and whether they are confident that existing arrangements will suffice.

Amendment 191 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard proposes local public accounts committees. The noble Lord has raised a very important point: there has been a tremendous amount of devolution, just not to local government but to unelected quangos and devolved bodies. Anyone who has led a council will tell you how much difficulty they have trying to get those bodies to do things that are best for the local area because they have to report to Whitehall. This is an interesting proposal to try to oblige those bodies to work together with local government. I do not seek to speak specifically to that design—more to question of principle, because it goes back to the heart of scrutiny as we have more devolution and deal with these other devolved bodies. How will the Government ensure that appropriate scrutiny happens across an area where not only the combined authority but those other bodies are essential to deliver some of those services? As I said, local public accounts committees are one possible solution, and I am very interested in seeing what the Government’s suggestion on that is.

I also press the Minister on a number of broader points. First, has the department assessed whether existing local scrutiny arrangements are adequate for the scale and complexity of devolved expenditure now envisaged? Secondly, what assessment of the fiscal governance risks that arise when large multiyear funding settlements are devolved without strengthened independent financial oversight at the local level? As was raised earlier, how do the Government intend to identify problems earlier rather than having the audit function of explaining what went wrong afterwards?

Thirdly, I would be grateful if the Minister could address the question of cost—not simply its narrow budgetary terms but the strategic ones. If the Government do not believe that local public accounts committees are the right answer, what is the solution? If we are serious about devolving power, responsible scrutiny must sit alongside it, not trail behind it.

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Debate on whether Clause 12 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, the Clause 12 stand part notice, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook, is intended to probe. We recognise that mayors and mayoral combined authorities will, in practice, need the ability to borrow to deliver infrastructure, regeneration and long-term investment. Borrowing can be a sensible and necessary tool. Our purpose today is not to deny that reality but to seek clarity from the Government about how this power will operate in practice and what safeguards will accompany it.

We would welcome further detail from the Minister on a number of points. First, what caps or controls do the Government envisage on mayoral borrowing? Will these mirror existing prudential borrowing frameworks for local authorities, or will a different regime apply? Secondly, what is the Government’s expectation of the purposes for which this borrowing will be undertaken? Are there limits envisaged on the types of projects or expenditure that may be funded through borrowing? Thirdly, who ultimately underwrites this borrowing? In the event of financial difficulty, where does the liability sit? Does it sit with the combined authority itself, with constituent councils or perhaps with central government?

Finally, what checks will be in place to ensure that borrowing decisions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and transparency, locally and nationally? Devolution must go hand-in-hand with accountability. Granting borrowing powers without clear safeguards risks storing up problems for the future—for local taxpayers and potentially for the Exchequer. I look forward to the Minister’s response and reassurance on these important points. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for raising some very crucial issues on the levels of borrowing powers. I add to that my concern—made even more so by the fact that constituent councils will not be able to scrutinise the work of the mayor or commissioners.

In that situation, I hope the Government will not be anticipating that local councils will then be responsible for any overspending by mayors and the combined authorities because, otherwise, there will be a demand on the council tax payer. So can the Minister confirm that overspends caused by poor-quality work by mayoral authorities will not end up with the council tax payer having to bail them out?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her Clause 12 stand part notice, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson.

All existing mayoral combined and combined county authorities have the power to borrow for all their functions. Unlike local authorities, the current process requires making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. This process is highly inefficient. The Bill streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities for purposes relevant to their functions. The power to borrow is still subject to safeguards. Clause 12 requires authorities to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue.

I will cover some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked me about. First, in relation to agreeing a debt cap, in general the exercise of power will remain subject to consent from the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, before it can be used for the first time, as I said. That would follow any internal processes, such as a debt cap agreement. The only exception will be where the new mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities inherit fire, police or transport functions. In this instance, the power to borrow can be exercised immediately for these functions to ensure that ongoing financial arrangements are not disrupted.

In terms of how borrowing is agreed, any borrowing by a mayoral strategic authority is agreed through the annual budget-setting process and is subject to approval by the combined and combined county authority, operating within existing legislative, financial and prudential controls. While the mayor proposes the budget, borrowing cannot be undertaken unilaterally. Under the Bill, most budgets will be approved by a simple majority, which must include the mayor.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, the budget, like all other matters, will be subject to the overview and scrutiny process, so there can be scrutiny of the budget in the same way that you would expect in a local authority.

The noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked about underwriting. Like the rest of local government, strategic authorities must also operate within the prudential framework. This framework comprises statutory duties and codes intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. It provides robust mechanisms for oversight and accountability. For those reasons, I ask that the noble Lord does not press his clause stand part notice.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response. If I may, I will delve a little deeper into some of her comments. She said that the first time an authority borrows, it will have to get consent from the Secretary of State, with an implication that, at that time, guidelines or parameters would be set up. I think that is what I heard. I want to make sure it is not the case that, the first time you borrow, the Secretary of State says it is fine, and then thereafter there are no guidelines, or whatever. I appreciate the Minister may not be able to clarify that today, but if she could write to us, that would be much appreciated.

The authority can already borrow for fire and police. The Minister mentioned one other: transport. For those, there would not be any such guidelines, as I understand it from the Minister’s comments. Again, it would be helpful if the Minister could come back to confirm whether that is the case or whether they would be subject to whatever guidelines may be given by the Secretary of State. That would be much appreciated.

We talked about budget controls. I am curious about that because it raises the point that the budget in effect has to be agreed by the mayor. I am intrigued as to what happens when the mayor and the combined authority are slightly at odds. What then happens in that process?

The Minister did not mention, as far as I am aware, the key question that I asked and that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was also concerned about: who in effect is the guarantor in the event that the combined authority cannot pay back its borrowing? I would be grateful if the Minister could come back with a response to that. Anticipating those answers, I will not press my opposition to Clause 12 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 12 agreed.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Jamieson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. In essence, we are debating a philosophical issue here. I firmly believe in democracy. Elections take place; your Lordships would be surprised to know that I do not always like some of the decisions that the electorate make, but I will defend every time the public having the opportunity to elect whom they want to represent them. That is a priority.

Just because I do not like it or just because they have a second job that I may not think appropriate, they should have that opportunity. We need some protections in place for fraud and other things, but I believe in democracy and, in essence, that is what the comments of my noble friends Lord Fuller and Lady O’Neill are about, and I associate myself with them. We should not prevent people standing for election; we should allow the electorate to make their choice. That is what democracy is. We may all have our views about whether a job is too big and therefore we cannot have somebody doing two of them but, if you believe in democracy, you believe that the electorate should have the facts presented in front of them and they should be given that choice. That is my strong philosophical view. We should not be telling the electorate, “No, you cannot have this person because they are already too busy”. Therefore, I genuinely believe my noble friend’s comments and that it is right that we should trust the electorate.

I appreciate that that may not align with certain party rules on different things, but there is no reason that the law has to mirror a certain party’s rules. I have no problem with whatever party having particular rules for the candidates they choose. That is the right thing to do. I know, from my own experience as chairman of the LGA, that the Conservative group had some very different rules from the Labour, Liberal and independent groups for how long people could stand and who was eligible. That is fine; I would not criticise the rules that Labour or the Liberals had, and I hope they did not criticise our rules. That was a choice; we were not imposing them by statute.

I very much support both the amendments of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne and the proposal that this clause not stand part of the Bill from my noble friend Lord Fuller. If Clause 16 stands part, the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Gascoigne would introduce a certain amount of flexibility. Given the amendments that the Government are proposing, what would happen if an election were to take place, let us say, 10 days before the end of a parliamentary term? Would the Government really want to impose a mayoral election? I am not quite sure that 10 days works, but I am sure your Lordships get my gist. If Clause 16 were to stand, a certain amount of flexibility would be beneficial, notwithstanding my previous comments.

I also agree with the Government’s amendments, assuming that eight days is the correct period and would give time for an MP to stand down and so forth, but I have a particular question on this. It may be very unlikely, but what happens if an election for a mayor happens when Parliament is not sitting? My understanding is that an MP cannot resign when Parliament is not sitting. Could the Minister at least consider that? I am not necessarily expecting an answer here, but a written answer would be helpful for everyone.

The fundamental point is why this Government believe that the electorate are not the right group of people to decide who represents them, even if they decide that it is Andy Burnham.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Gascoigne and Lord Fuller, for their amendments, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, for moving the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, on members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority, and for probing whether Clause 16 is needed.

It is not the job of this Committee to debate the Labour Party rulebook or decisions of its national executive committee. Your Lordships must trust me that they do not want that job. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for their interventions on that issue.

Clause 16 will prevent individuals being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and a mayor at the same time. This is an important clause for two reasons. First and most critically, the post of mayor is a vital role at the forefront of delivering change—whether that is economic growth, public services, planning for the strategic area, transport or many other issues—and its responsibilities will only increase with this Bill. The role must demand a person’s full attention as a full-time post, rather than being a part-time position done alongside another vital public service role.

Secondly, elected members and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents who elected them. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised the potential issue of having different constituencies. Fulfilling two different roles on behalf of different geographical areas could lead to conflicts of interest or undesirable trade-offs. This is absolutely not party political; it is common sense. Indeed, it is now the case that those mayors who are also police and crime commissioners—Andy Burnham and Tracy Brabin—cannot be Members of a UK legislature at the same time.

I know that this House operates on a slightly different basis, but when I joined it, I was still leader of my council. As a Minister you cannot do both jobs at the same time, but even before I was a Minister, I would not have dreamed of trying to do so. They are different jobs; both carry a heavy level of responsibility, and it was important to me to focus on one.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I apologise; I could have been clearer on that. The noble Baroness is quite right: it is the elected legislature. In view of my comments, I ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.

Government Amendments 77, 80, 82, 85 and 90 will modify Clause 16 to introduce a grace period in which a mayor can hold office and simultaneously be a Member of a UK elected legislature without being disqualified. The period will be eight days. To answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, the eight days enables the Chiltern Hundreds process to happen—that is the period required for going from being an MP to being a mayor. To go from being a mayor to being an MP, it enables the mayor to put their affairs in order before they take up their post as an MP. In the event that a mayor is running to be a Member of a UK legislature, it will be eight days beginning on the day when they are elected to that legislature.

I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, as I do not know the answer to his question. It is important that Members are given reasonable time to get their affairs in order and to ensure their resignation from the respective legislature. These amendments address concerns raised in the other place about ensuring that an orderly transition can occur in the event that an MP is appointed as a mayor. Similarly, mayors running to be a Member of a UK legislature would otherwise be disqualified immediately on election. Introducing the grace period provides a period of transition for the outgoing mayor to get their affairs in order. I commend these government amendments to the Committee.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I raised another point in relation to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne. With a very strict timetable of eight days, one could envisage situations where any sensible person would stand back and ask, “Do we really want to have a mayoral election for the sake of two, three or four weeks?” Will the Government consider a bit more flexibility?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I apologise; I meant to say to the noble Lord that I will write to him about the situation in which Parliament may not be sitting when that election takes place.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I appreciate that the Minister will do that, but I was also making the point that the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, would at least provide some flexibility. The common-sense approach would be to ask, “Why would I have a mayoral election this month when there’s one happening next month anyway?” Can there be a bit more flexibility? As the Labour Party has rightly said, it costs a lot of money to run an election in Manchester.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I will reflect on that question and come back to the noble Lord.

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These are small amendments. They are about making sure that mayors can operate effectively, with clear remits; have strong relationships with councils; and have unambiguous lines of responsibility. For those reasons, I hope that the Minister will accept them, and I beg to move.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to these amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, who asked a number of important and timely questions.

Let me use her first amendment in this group as an example. It would require the Secretary of State, when making regulations, to consider and

“minimise any conflict, overlap, or duplication between the functions of the Mayor and the functions of other authorities or public bodies”.

This is absolutely sensible and common-sense, and it should happen. However, I suggest that, for clarity, this should extend also to Whitehall, from where powers are devolved; then, with the exception of oversight, those powers and the bureaucracy involved should no longer exist within Whitehall.

The Bill amends the 2023 Act through numerous schedules and amendments. It is right, therefore, that we ensure this clarity and avoid unnecessary overlap. I am sure that many Members in this Grand Committee will remember the passage of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill through the House. It was a long and complex piece of legislation—I pay tribute to the excellent work done by my noble friend Lady Scott—and the changes in this policy and space must be approached with care. I am keen, therefore, to hear from the Minister about the Government’s overall approach to avoiding unnecessary and costly duplication and legal uncertainty, in relation not just to this amendment but across the Bill as a whole.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for her amendments on the role of mayors. Before I respond to these amendments, I want to clarify the rationale for Clause 18. The clause will extend an existing power of the Secretary of State to provide that certain general functions may be exercised solely by a mayor. The power currently exists in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 and, as the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. This clause will ensure that it can also apply to general functions conferred under any other regulation or Act of Parliament. The extension of this existing power reflects the broader range of routes through which functions may be conferred on strategic authorities and their mayors, once the current Bill becomes law.

Amendments 91 and 92 seek to amend this clause and prevent the potential for conflict, overlap or duplication between a mayor’s functions and those of other authorities or public bodies. As your Lordships will know, mayors of combined authorities or combined county authorities are not corporate entities in themselves. For that reason, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority rather than directly on to the mayor. However, some functions may be designated as mayoral functions, as they are to be exercised only by the mayor. Where functions have been made mayoral, they typically relate to the management of day-to-day activities.

Key strategic decisions still require approval by the strategic authority constituent members. To give an example, all members will vote on which roads form part of a key route network, after which the mayor will be responsible for managing it. This will allow for swifter decision-making and more effective governance on day-to-day matters.

It will be important that all tiers of local government work together to benefit their communities. This is why principal local authorities will be embedded within the decision-making structures of strategic authorities as full constituent members. This will ensure that they play a central role in drawing up specific strategies and plans, such as local growth plans. Furthermore, before any new function is conferred on a strategic authority by regulations, the Secretary of State will be required to consult the constituent councils of any affected strategic authorities and any other person who exercises the function concerned. This will ensure that the views of those affected are properly considered.

I hope that, with these explanations, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

98: Clause 21, page 23, leave out lines 27 to 29
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment probes the necessity of forcing local partners to respond to meeting requests.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 98 and 99, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook, concern the treatment of local partners in the Bill. While the Bill places a duty on strategic authorities to convene local partners and an obligation for those partners to respond, this falls short of meaningful consultation or genuine co-production. Without an additional requirement to engage substantively, Clause 21 risks becoming little more than a tick-box exercise, as the Local Government Association has warned.

Clause 21 will give the mayor of a strategic authority the power to convene, but what matters is that they can get something done. If a body is competent in an area but does not hold the power to make decisions, allocate resources or change delivery, what is the point of convening a discussion? Is the expectation that those with competence will be able to influence those with power, or that power will in time follow competence? Or is the purpose simply information sharing and having a nice cup of tea?

More practically, how do the Government envisage that these convened meetings will lead to tangible outcomes if those around the table lack the authority to act on what is discussed? I raise this not as a criticism of the clause but as a genuine question of intent. This is a very real issue. As chairman of the Local Government Association, councils continually raised with me the difficulties of getting local partners to genuinely work together to deliver for the local area. I am a huge believer in devolution and think that the local area, whether it is a strategic area or a council, will better deliver for its residents than something directed down from Whitehall.

The propensity of partners is to focus on the short term rather than the fundamental long term. I raise a case in point. On health, we all recognise that prevention, early intervention, health hubs, supporting the vulnerable in suitable homes and a co-ordinated approach to hospital discharge are all the right things to do. However, I recall sitting down at a meeting with my local NHS trust chiefs and they said, “We absolutely agree with you, but on Monday morning the chief executive”—the now noble Lord, Lord Stevens—“will ring me and ask: what is my A&E waiting time? How many discharges do I have today? That is why I have to focus on that”. It is therefore important that the priorities for the area are reflected in those partners.

This is also the case, particularly given their role in economic growth and strategic planning, for things such as drainage boards, utility companies, the DWP and the Highways Agency. Their focus is too often on what matters nationally and what their masters in Whitehall are saying. While they are sympathetic, they will focus on those issues, when there is an important duty to focus on the local.

Fundamentally, if meetings and responses do not amount to meaningful action and outcomes, there is not much point. Genuine devolution is about consent and local leadership. It is not about Whitehall and Ministers sitting behind desks mandating how partners should collaborate. These amendments seek to ensure that partnership under this Bill is real, accountable and rooted in local decision-making rather than some centrally imposed obligation. I beg to move.

[Lord Bichard (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 237 in my name. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Eaton, and the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for adding their names to it. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, wanted to be here this afternoon; she has not been well this week so, on the Committee’s behalf, I wish her well.

My simple amendment seeks to place a duty on local public service partners to co-operate. Many people believe that the governance system in England has two major flaws. The first is that it is excessively centralised—probably the most centralised in the developed world—which this Bill seeks to address. In my judgment, the second major flaw is that statutory agencies have too often failed to work effectively together, a problem which has been exacerbated by the way in which the state has fragmented over many years. Put simply, we have established ever more agencies—some of them single purpose—in the belief that this would bring sharper focus and greater efficiency. In reality, this fragmentation and lack of collaboration has produced more negative than positive consequences.

For example, it has produced disjointed services which do not align with the needs of ordinary people. They just do not recognise them. It has produced policies and services which overlap and, at worst, conflict. As I shall go on to say, that costs a lot of money. The same lack of collaboration has produced waste, additional cost and a failure to share data and information. That has been most tragically evident in the never-ending cases of child abuse. A lack of sharing data and information is at the core of those tragedies. Fundamentally, it has produced a damaging culture of competition between providers when ordinary folk just want to see collaboration, partnership and co-operation to address their needs.

Down the years, various attempts have been made to tackle this silo working. Central government departments have tried to work in a more joined-up way. Noble Lords must form their own opinions as to whether that has been successful; I think it is a work in progress.

After the local government reorganisation in 1974—and I know that it is difficult for noble Lords to believe that I was there at the time—one or two county authorities appointed liaison officers to encourage closer working between districts and county councils. I was one of those. In 2012, health and well-being boards were established to improve working relationships between health authorities and local authorities, particularly on the subject of social care. More recently, health authorities have set up their own integrated care boards—again, with variable success to date. The last Labour Government championed an initiative, in which again I was pleased to be involved, called Total Place, which was enthusiastically embraced by many local agencies. More than 100 places quickly endorsed the concept of Total Place but, when the Government changed, they decided not to continue with Total Place. Now we have this Bill which, as we have heard, includes provisions for strategic authorities to convene meetings that partners will attend, again to ensure better co-operation.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a genuinely useful debate, raising the key issues of the duty to co-operate and co-operation in local areas. As the Bill stands, it places a duty on strategic authorities to convene as partners and an obligation for them to attend. However, as several noble Lords have pointed out, it falls short of requiring meaningful engagement or genuine co-production. Without a clearer expectation of substantive collaboration, there is a real risk, as highlighted by the Local Government Association, that Clause 21 becomes a consultation in form but not in substance.

I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I believe she said that she agreed with the spirit of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon. However, she then seemed to row back a little on implementing them; she had a concern that placing a duty to co-operate on partners would be a burden. As we have all experienced in the past with Total Place and other things, without a solid mechanism in place, we end up with people getting on with what they perceive as their day job and not co-operating together.

I am supportive of the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon. I particularly congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, on his amendment, which we were pleased to sign. Our support that one was a balance of judgment; we did so because we thought that the wording was somewhat clearer and easier to interpret, but we readily accept that, at this stage, the precise wording matters less than the principle. I urge the Minister to look again at the principle of whether the Bill, as currently drafted, is strong enough to deliver the whole-area collaboration that devolution both promises and requires.

If the Bill is to fulfil its promise, devolution must mean more than new structures; it must reshape how public sector services work together on the ground. Will the Government, between now and Report, consider how best that principle can be put more firmly into legislation? It is quite clear that, in this Committee today, there is a feeling that greater firmness is needed to make this happen—rather than just having a talking shop, which we have had in the past to some extent. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 98 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Prashar (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I fully support what the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, and the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, said. To some extent, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, touched on the issue that I wanted to raise about a broader meaning of the word culture. Culture is used to bring people together and bring social cohesion. It is a deliberate action taken by people to build and deepen democratic behaviours and citizenship. I want to register that much broader meaning of the word culture, because if we can use culture as a vehicle for bringing people together, that good practice can be used across regions, which will be beneficial. I elaborated the reasons for that in my previous comments.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I will try to be quick, given the time. This has been a useful debate. I am sympathetic to the principle behind Amendment 100 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty. Culture really is the glue that glues local areas together. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response, because collaboration across boundaries is very important. In a similar manner, Amendment 101 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, is both sensible and welcome, recognising again that economic activity, trade and so on cross boundaries and that we need to establish mechanisms to ensure co-operation.

Moving on, Amendment 102 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, follows the same theme. I shall also refer to “Yes, Prime Minister”, because I watched the same episode. I noted that Sir Humphrey had a huge concern that devolving things to local councils would actually lead to real delivery; his solution was to create a whole series of bureaucratic, cross-regional structures to ensure that nothing happened. That is why I am slightly concerned about this amendment producing additional layers of bureaucracy and additional planning boards that will potentially duplicate or confuse. Although we agree with the thrust behind this amendment, additional bureaucracy is something that makes us feel a little uncomfortable and a bit nervous—hence my referring to the Sir Humphrey situation.

I turn to Amendments 103 and 104 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I am a huge believer in democracy. We should elect people and trust them to get on with the job; if they do not get on with the job, they should be booted out when the next election comes around. The noble Baroness is absolutely right that mayors, councils and so on should engage with their residents and listen to what they have to say—depending on what the subject is and where the place is, that may take a variety of forms —but I am hugely concerned about setting up self-appointed, unelected bodies that then hold democratic bodies to account. I just do not feel that that is the right way round; people should engage, but that engagement should be based on democracy.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

I am sorry but I must interrupt the noble Lord, if he will allow me one second. He said “self-appointed”; the whole idea of people’s assemblies is that they are a representative group of people usually chosen by lottery, lot or similar.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I will take back what the noble Baroness says. In this case, my point is that a random unelected body is not the same as an elected body. I genuinely think that democracy is important. If you wish to engage, you probably need to be a bit more nuanced in whom you engage with, because it should not be random; it should be those people who can really give you the feedback and information you need, depending on the subject and the place. Take central Bedfordshire, for example: a random 100 people from across central Bedfordshire will not be particularly helpful when we are discussing what is happening in my own little village of Maulden; I would rather discuss it with the residents of Maulden.

With that, I shall move on. This debate has made it clear that collaboration is important—in many cases, essential. I hope that it will be taken seriously by the Minister and that she will come back with some flexibility later on in the Bill’s passage.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sorry that we have been pressing on time; the Hansard team and other officers were here until very late last night and we do not want to put them under any further pressure.

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, the noble Lords, Lord Ravensdale and Lord Wallace, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Janke, for their amendments on the duty to collaborate. I shall start with Amendment 100, for which I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty. I completely understand the intention behind this amendment—we have now had many discussions on this issue—but we ultimately think that it is unnecessary, as cultural well-being is captured in the current wording of Clause 22.

Culture underpins our creative and visitor economies; in this way, cultural activity is inherently captured in the meaning of

“economic, social or environmental well-being”.

The formulation is intentionally wide so that mayors can request collaboration on a broad range of matters; it is also intended to avoid an exhaustive or prospective list. Adding “cultural” risks undermining that approach and creating pressure to enumerate further dimensions of well-being without delivering any substantive new effect. Indeed, explicitly singling culture out could invite arguments that other aspects of well-being that are not listed are of lesser importance, or that cultural interests should be interpreted narrowly or separately from economic, social or environmental considerations.

Mayors of strategic authorities can, and already do, collaborate on cultural matters. The Mayors of South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, York and North Yorkshire have come together to sign the White Rose Agreement, committing to work together on high-profile culture and sporting events and to celebrate Yorkshire’s heritage. I hope that the noble Earl and the other noble Lords who raised the issue of culture have been reassured by my agreement to reflect on how culture is treated in the competency framework.

I turn to Amendment 101, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, which seeks to promote greater regional collaboration between mayors and other public and private partners. The Government agree with the value and benefits of regional collaboration. However, while the amendment is well intentioned, we do not think it is necessary. Strategic authorities and their mayors already have a wide range of mechanisms to collaborate across administrative boundaries, and several mayors are already doing so successfully. We heard some examples from the noble Lord.

The powers in Clause 22 are not intended to replace the wide range of positive and informal collaboration that already takes place. They are intended to supplement these existing mechanisms and strengthen mayoral leadership by providing a more formal route for cross-boundary pan-regional collaboration where this can improve outcomes for communities. However, it should be for mayors to decide for themselves how to use these powers rather than for the Government to prescribe or constrain the purposes and form that mayoral collaboration must take. More broadly, under existing legislation, combined authorities and combined county authorities can already enter into joint committees, allowing them to discharge certain powers together and jointly produce legislative documents such as spatial development strategies.

I turn to Amendment 102 from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace; this is not from Sir Humphrey, but from me—I am passionate about devolution and am not letting anyone get in the way of that; it is good programme, though, and I like it. This amendment would require strategic authorities to prepare joint strategic development plans, covering two or more strategic authority areas in certain circumstances. I appreciate the intent behind the amendment to join up strategic authorities, but I do not agree that the amendment is necessary. We already have broadly equivalent powers as a result of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025. New Section 12B of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as inserted by the 2025 Act, enables the Secretary of State to require authorities to work together on spatial development strategies through the establishment of a strategic planning board. The Government intend to use these powers, in particular in areas without a combined authority or a combined county authority. The same Act gives the Secretary of State a wide range of intervention powers in relation to the preparation and adoption of spatial development strategies.

It is worth highlighting that, where strategic planning authorities are working on separate spatial development strategies, they are required by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as amended by the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, to have regard to the need to be consistent with current national policies. The National Planning Policy Framework sets out strong expectations on authorities to work effectively across local government boundaries.

I turn to Amendment 103. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for raising the importance of citizen engagement in local decision-making. The Government fully agree that residents should have meaningful opportunities to shape the decisions that affect their areas. However, as the locally elected leaders in their regions, mayors should have the ability to decide on how best to engage with their local communities. Mayors can convene citizens’ assemblies if they wish to, and, in places such as South Yorkshire, mayors have decided to use these powers. Once the Bill becomes law, all mayors will have general powers of competence conferred automatically on them, which will enable them to convene citizens assemblies should they wish to do so.

Finally, the Bill already includes a provision in this area. Clause 60 introduces a neighbourhood governance duty, requiring all local authorities to put in place arrangements to secure effective neighbourhood governance. That will ensure that communities have meaningful opportunities to inform and influence local decisions.

I turn to Amendment 104, from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and Amendment 196, from the noble Baroness, Lady Janke. Both seek to ensure that mayors and strategic authorities work closely with their local authorities, public service providers and bodies representing local communities in town and parish councils. I recognise the spirit in which these amendments have been made. It is important for all mayors to engage with the wider public sector and the local authority family in delivering their own functions. However, strategic authorities are already expected, through existing legislation and provisions in this Bill, to work collaboratively with local partners and communities when exercising their functions.

Amendment 104 in particular would impose a disproportionate administrative burden on mayors of strategic authorities by placing a new duty requiring them to meet local authorities, public service providers and town and parish councils. As an illustration, North Yorkshire alone compromises 729 individual parishes, organised into 412 town and parish councils. Expecting a mayor to discharge this proposed duty in respect of each body would be impractical and may crowd out some of the time needed for the officer’s other strategic responsibilities. Parish and town councils continue to be supported in their work, and local authorities are strongly encouraged to work with them to understand the contribution they are able to make to the delivery of local services and the management of local assets.