Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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Defamation Bill
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Lord Mawhinney
My Lords, although two days have passed, this is the first debate following that on Amendment 31, which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Chesterton. After we had adjourned, a thought occurred to me which I probably should have put on the record in that debate. In all truth, it did not occur to me then; but it has since, so I wish to do that. In col. GC239 of Tuesday’s Hansard, in summing up his amendment, the noble Lord listed a number of institutions with which he had been in communication in framing it. One of them was the Institute of Physics, which he said has 45,000 members. It was not until I was on my way home that I realised I should probably have said that I am an honorary member of the Institute of Physics. I suspect that does not even remotely influence anything but, for the record, I make that clear.
As regards Amendment 39, I want to point out that it was drawn to the Joint Committee’s attention that when a constituent speaks to a Member of Parliament, that Member, if he then relays the information given to him or her in the House, has privilege as far as Parliament is concerned. However, there was a question mark as to whether the communication between the constituent and the Member of Parliament was also covered by privilege. It seemed to the Joint Committee that it was extremely important that it should be covered by privilege because at the very heart of our democratic process is the concept and the reality that a Member of Parliament acts on behalf of his or her constituents. That ought not to be mitigated or reduced by pressures that would rule out things that the constituent could say to his or her Member of Parliament.
We were also told that the Government intended to bring forward legislation on privilege. We all understood that and the committee took the unanimous view that—how do I put this delicately?—this might be a long, drawn-out process, which started with ministerial statements some time ago that the Government intended to legislate in this area, and various steps have been taken along that path. There was no great confidence that we would soon reach the end of that path. Unanimously, the committee decided to recommend to the House and the Government to clarify the position and to remove any doubt that what is said between a constituent and his or her Member of Parliament should also be covered by privilege. The argument was raised by one witness that these days you cannot necessarily trust every Member of Parliament to behave appropriately in such circumstances, to be careful in the use of what would probably be highly contentious information and to use it in such a way that would be in keeping with the well established standards of the House of Commons.
The Joint Committee took the view that an occasional misuse of information by an individual Member of Parliament was not sufficiently important to offset the fundamental issue that we were addressing. Our thoughts are encapsulated in this amendment, which I beg to move.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I rise in support of the amendment and what I will say briefly has some relevance to my later Amendments 43 and 44, dealing with parliamentary privilege. I am very sympathetic to the idea explained by the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, that we should not wait for some future legislation as a result of the consideration of parliamentary privilege generally, but that where there is an issue that properly falls within the scope of defamation and nothing else, we should take advantage in this legislation to make the necessary amendments. I regard this as one necessary amendment for the reasons given by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill.
The Government stated in their response that this was best left to the forthcoming Green Paper and draft parliamentary privilege Bill. The Green Paper concluded that while some forms of correspondence between constituents were already protected by common law qualified privilege, it would be inappropriate to extend qualified privilege to all forms of correspondence as it would run the risk of potentially encouraging correspondence to MPs intended to circumvent court orders and damage the privacy or reputation of third parties. The Government expressed the view the it would better to continue to enable the courts to determine the boundaries of privilege in individual cases.
I understand that and it is an objection to a wider issue than liability and defamation procedures. It is all about breach of privacy and contempt of court. However, given that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, seeks only to provide qualified privilege in defamation proceedings and that there seems to be agreement that it is already covered by the common law in appropriate circumstances, I see no good reason in principle to oppose it. I note that the Libel Reform Campaign supports it. It suggested adding “Private” at the start of the amendment to distinguish between letters and e-mail and social media.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
On behalf of my noble friend Lord Browne, I thank the Minister—and, even more perhaps, his officials who did the hard work—for bringing so promptly to us the response on Rutland. Perhaps I should declare an interest as someone who is married to a member of the Institute of Physics.
I support the thrust of the amendment, but will the Minister, or perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, clarify whether it would cover all letters from MPs to constituents? We had a case locally where an MP attached to a letter a copy of a letter that they had received from another constituent—a row was going on between two constituents, as often happens. Would attaching that letter be similarly covered by privilege if it was then given, as it was, to the press? However, we undoubtedly support the intention of the amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, as an afterthought on my noble friend Lord Mawhinney’s approach to amendments, I can confirm that officials do wonderful work. However, his approach also reminds me of a story that the noble Lord, Lord Healey, told. When he was Minister of Defence, a man came to him with a solution to the Russian submarine menace: you boil the North Sea, and when the water has evaporated you can see where the submarines are on the seabed. Denis said to the man, “That’s fine, but how do I boil the North Sea?”. The man said, “Look, Mr Healey, I’ve had a good idea. Surely you and your officials should work out the practicalities”. That is just a passing thought.
I understand why the amendment has been tabled. I hope that my reply will clarify matters; I am not sure, given the presence of some very informed noble and learned friends. What I say at this Dispatch Box is of assistance to judges and courts when they make such decisions. I think so anyway, as a non-lawyer. Is it called Pepper v Hart? You see, I am learning on the job here.
Clause 7(4) extends the provision in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Schedule 1 to the Defamation Act 1996 on qualified privilege attaching to information published by legislatures, Governments and authorities exercising government functions. The changes ensure that the provisions also cover fair and accurate summaries of material and that the scope of the defence is extended to the relevant publications no matter where in the world they occur.
Amendment 39A amends the definition of governmental functions used in subsection (4) and in the 1996 Act to include a reference to local authorities as well as to police functions. We do not believe that this is necessary. We consider that local authorities are already covered by the reference to,
“any authority performing governmental functions”.
The Defamation Act 1952 covered information published,
“by or on behalf of any government department, officer of state, local authority, or chief officer of police”.
The 1996 Act was intended to extend this coverage. We are in no doubt that the reference to,
“any authority performing governmental functions”,
should be read as embracing the specific bodies referred to in the 1952 Act.
There is no indication that the absence of a specific reference to local authorities has caused any difficulty in practice. However, to take the specific point, we also believe that the devolved administrations would fall within the term “legislature”, which is used in the amendment to the 1996 Act made by subsection (4) of Clause 7 and elsewhere in relation to qualified privilege.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
It is unusual to speak after the Minister, but there is nothing to prevent any noble Lord speaking.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am grateful to the deputy chairman. I am sorry to be unusual, but I normally am. Not only do I agree with what has been said but, in my mind, extending statutory qualified privilege in the schedule is one of the most useful things that the Bill does. We are dealing there with clearly prescribed situations, of which this is one, where, if the press gives a fair and accurate report, it will be protected, as will the public interest. The fact that this has been extended extremely broadly, as my Bill sought to do, whereas the 1996 Act did not do so, is a matter for congratulation.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
I was going to use two words I now know I should not: they were simply “thank you”. I am not allowed to say that. I thank the Minister for his answer and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bew
The noble Lord makes a very good point, one that I was actually aware of. While I fully understand the ambiguity to which he referred, the reason why I am more open to the provision as it stands for press conferences is that in recent time we have had, to my knowledge, at least one celebrated case where a particular government department gave a press conference and people subsequently wrote perfectly legitimate articles on the basis of what was said by that department but none the less, the case went to court and substantial payments were made.
I cannot bring myself to say that it is reasonable that if a department of government holds a press conference and people actively report or elucidate on what is said there, there should subsequently be libel actions, which there have been in recent times. That is the reason why at the moment I am living with the press conference issue.
I am open to persuasion on this question of conferences, but those of us on the Select Committee want to know that the Government have thought enough about the fact that some academic conferences are not very well run and are somewhat chaotic, and that they have some way of thinking that responds to that. A fundamental thinking of our committee was that the deepest problem is that academics, in the sciences or in the humanities, can be driven by their research to certain conclusions, and at this point there is a chill point that means they would discover it was difficult to find an academic outlet because a journal might say, “Our budget is so small that if there is a libel action here, even though your research looks very interesting to us, we can’t possibly publish it”. We know that this is currently going on, and that seems to be the greatest single evil in this field that needs to be addressed. I feel less concerned in principle about defending the rights of someone who may be spouting off a little at a conference.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I had not expected to need to reply about press conferences but, in the light of my noble friend Lord Phillips’s intervention, I better had. This question was dealt with by the House of Lords in a case that I was involved in called McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers, 2001 2 Appeal Cases, 277; the noble Lord, Lord Bew, may remember it.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
What happened was that a soldier was found guilty of murder for, I think, killing a woman at a roadblock in Northern Ireland and sentenced to imprisonment. He was represented by a firm of solicitors in Northern Ireland. A group of senior military men had a meeting in a castle in, I think, Yorkshire in order to accuse the solicitors of negligence in the way that they had gone about defending the soldier. The meeting in the castle was open to the public, but very few members of the public were in fact able to get in. The law firm sued for libel and the defence was that it was a public meeting and therefore covered by statutory qualified privilege. The argument was that it was not really a public meeting but a press conference; they gave out a press statement and it was in a castle.
Lord Bingham gave the lead judgment, making it clear on free-speech grounds that the press are the eyes and ears of the public, and that where the public cannot get in easily on an occasion like that and the press can, the press must be free to make a fair and accurate report—it must be fair and accurate—of what is alleged at the press conference, which is to be treated as a public meeting.
On Article 10 grounds, the House of Lords clarified the meaning of “public meeting” to include press conferences. In fact my memory, although I may be wrong, is that the Faulks committee in 1975 had recommended that press conferences should be included. So I have no difficulty at all with the express words in the Bill making clear that it covers press conferences anywhere in the world, for the reasons given by the House of Lords, per Lord Bingham, in that case. My difficulty is with what is to be done with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney. I was looking at the Joint Committee report about it. Paragraph 48 states:
“The draft Bill goes some way towards tackling this problem by extending qualified privilege to include fair and accurate reports of what is said at a ‘scientific or academic conference’. We welcome this development, provided the conference is reputable”.
The report goes on to deal with peer-reviewed articles and recommends extending it to peer-reviewed articles in scientific or academic journals. Then, as the noble Lords, Lord Bew, and Lord Mawhinney, have done, it explains the definitional problems, and towards the end it recommends,
“that the Government prepares guidance on the scope of this new type of statutory qualified privilege in consultation with the judiciary and other interested parties”.
As I read this, the Joint Committee are saying that it is a good idea, but there are definitional problems, so include it, but with proper guidance.
Lord McNally
I doubt that. We are moving the extra line to where a company has made a decision to change its auditors, which will be reported to the members of the company. There may be a number of reasons for that, but the report will be suitable for the annual general meeting, and other issues, personal or related to performance, may be covered by it. As I have said, in a number of these areas, we are drawing lines. Where there is a relationship between a company and its auditors, I just wonder whether it would be entirely conducive to good working relations between them if a reason for dismissal which was extremely damaging to the auditors was privileged in this way.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I am sorry to say that I cannot understand that. We are dealing with a public listed company; we are dealing with the resignation or removal of directors, which is a very serious step; we are dealing with qualified privilege, quite rightly, to give a fair and accurate report of that. The auditors are officers of the company performing a vital role. If they are mixed up with some wrongdoing that needs to be reported, we are dealing not with some private, contractual, sensitive matter, but with what is in the report to the shareholders about the public listed company. That is already there. I cannot therefore see any good reason for not including the auditors in that. It is nothing to do with an ordinary, private commercial relationship, so I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Browne.
Lord McNally
I will reflect on that but I am also very concerned and do not want to enter a field regarding the professional relationship between auditors—or, perhaps I may respectfully suggest, lawyers—and companies, where there is a barn door left open. I understand, as indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, that the intention of the proposal is to give protection. I am willing to reflect on whether where we have drawn the line is exactly right, and I will listen to expert opinion in this Committee. As a layman, I also feel a slight tingle between the shoulder blades about where we are going in terms of the relationship of professions such as auditors and lawyers with their clients. I, too, would like advice on these matters.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
We are not supporting the amendment. We are urging the Government to accept that the amendment is not necessary because the matter is well within its scope.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Before this mini debate concludes, I would just say that I agree with my noble friend Lord Lester about the particularity of the post of auditor. It is not like the lawyers of the company. They are not officials of the company; they have a unique role, and I simply put it to the Committee that they should be on the same footing vis-à-vis defamation as the directors. They are not as it stands because of the point to which the noble Lord, Lord Browne, referred. Clause 7 refers only to privilege extending to documents circulated by the auditors of the company, but proposed new sub-paragraph (3), where the amendment would bite, refers to documents circulated by the company to the members of the company. At the moment, it gives qualified privilege to those documents vis-à-vis appointments, and so on, of directors but not of auditors. I am saying that it should be there, but it can be reflected on.
“Reports etc of certain Parliamentary matters protected by absolute privilege
(1) The following are absolutely privileged—
(a) a fair and accurate report of proceedings in Parliament;(b) a fair and accurate report of anything published by or on the authority of Parliament; and(c) a fair and accurate copy of, extract from or summary of anything published by or on the authority of Parliament.(2) The court must stay any proceedings where the defendant shows that—
(a) the proceedings relate to the publication of anything that falls within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (1); or(b) the proceedings seek to prevent or postpone the making of any such publication.(3) This section also has effect in relation to the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly (and any reference to Parliament is to be read as a reference to the Assembly in question).
(4) The Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 is repealed.”
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
In speaking to Amendment 43, it may be convenient for me to speak also to Amendment 44 as they both deal with privilege. If that is not convenient, I shall speak to Amendment 43 only, but they are grouped together.
There is one defect in Amendment 43, which is that subsection (4) should not repeal the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 for reasons that I shall explain.
I know that the Minister will say in his reply, “Leave it all to the Committee on Parliamentary Privilege”, but I hope that these amendments will eventually persuade the Government that that is not a convenient and sensible course. That will be particularly true when we come to the Neil Hamilton affair and Clause 13, which was being dealt with 13 years ago by the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. There has never been a more authoritative committee, crowded as it was with jurists former law officers of the Crown and with evidence given by every conceivable expert on parliamentary privilege. The idea that we should now revisit what that committee said about Clause 13 of the Defamation Act is not sensible.
However, before I come to that, I need to deal with Amendment 43. The amendment would have the effect of reinstating Clause 7 of the Bill that I produced to provide absolute privilege in defamation proceedings for fair and accurate reports of proceedings in Parliament. Section 1 of the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 prevents any civil or criminal proceedings in respect of a report, paper, votes or proceedings published by order of either House. Section 2 confers similar protection on copies of such publications. Section 3 confers a lesser degree of protection on any extract from or abstract of such publications, which must be published in good faith and without malice.
Newspaper reports which are not taken from Hansard are also protected at common law. The case of Wason v Walter, 1868-69, 4 Queen’s Bench, 73, established that by analogy with reports of court proceedings, a publisher of a report of a parliamentary debate is protected at common law from actions for defamation. If the whole debate is published, the protection is absolute. If less than the whole is published, the protection is qualified by the requirement that it is published without malice, as stated in the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege report 1999, paragraph 356.
Court proceedings now enjoy absolute privilege under Section 14 of the Defamation Act 1996. Section 15 confers qualified privilege on reports of the proceedings in public of a legislature anywhere in the world, as well as material published by or on the authority of a Government or legislature anywhere in the world, which we have just discussed. The report must be fair and accurate and published without malice and in the public interest.
Wason and Walter was decided by analogy with the privilege afforded to court proceedings. Chief Justice Cockburn said that given the,
“paramount public and national importance that proceedings of the Houses of Parliament shall be communicated to the public … to us it seems clear that the principles on which the publication of reports of proceedings of Courts of Justice have been held to be privileged apply to the reports of Parliamentary proceedings. The analogy between the two cases is in every respect complete”.
The same protection should therefore be conferred on fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings as applies to court proceedings.
In 1999, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, described the 1840 Act as being,
“drafted in a somewhat impenetrable early Victorian style”.
It recommended that the,
“protection given to the media by the 1840 Act and the common law itself should be retained.
We consider, further, that the statutory protection would be more transparent and accessible if it were included in a modern statute, whose language and style would be easier to understand than the 1840 Act. We recommend that the 1840 Act, as amended, should be replaced with a modern statute”.
The 1840 Act was considered more recently by the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee in its report Press Standards, Privacy and Libel, at paragraphs 94 to 102. Referring to the 2009 case between Trafigura and the Guardian newspaper, that committee concluded that Parliamentary Questions tabled regarding the case were clearly covered by these provisions and would not therefore be covered by the then existing super-injunction which prevented publication of any reference to the case. That interpretation was challenged by the firm of Carter-Ruck, acting for Trafigura. I do not think that I need to go through that, but the committee concluded:
“The free and fair reporting of proceedings in Parliament is a cornerstone of a democracy. In the UK, publication of fair extracts of reports of proceedings in Parliament made without malice are protected by the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 … They cannot be fettered by a court order. However, the confusion over this issue has caused us the very gravest concern that this freedom is being undermined. We therefore repeat previous recommendations from the Committee on Parliamentary Privilege that the Ministry of Justice replace the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 with a clear and comprehensible modern statute”.
Neither committee specifically addressed the question of whether publication of reports of parliamentary proceedings should be absolute or remain qualified. The approach taken in my Bill was endorsed by the Joint Committee on the draft Defamation Bill on the basis that it is of fundamental importance that proceedings in Parliament can be reported upon freely by the press to ensure that people can discover what is being said and done by elected representatives on their behalf. In paragraph 51 of its report, my noble friend Lord Mawhinney’s committee said:
“We recommend adding a provision to the Bill which provides the press with a clear and unfettered right to report on what is said in Parliament and with the protection of absolute privilege for any such report which is fair and accurate”.
The Government’s response left the issue to the Parliamentary Privilege Green Paper. I will not take further the time of the Committee by reading any of that, but some of the issues which they raise have nothing to do with defamation, but with privacy and contempt of court. I accept that the issues raised in their Green Paper on contempt and privacy may be best dealt with in more detail by the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege or the Law Commission in its review, now pending, on the law of contempt of court. However, none of that is any good reason for not giving effect to what the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Nicholls, recommended 13 years ago, what the Commons committee has recommended and what the Joint Committee on this Bill has recommended. That is three committees over more than 13 years concentrating only on defamation, not on privacy or contempt.
Lord McNally
My Lords, just to give some sense of momentum on this, I can tell your Lordships that the Joint Committee that has been established on parliamentary privilege is asked to report by 25 April 2013.
I listened carefully to what my noble friend said. As always, he made an extremely well informed and well researched contribution, but can I just put to the Committee a political reality? We are dealing with probably one of the most sensitive areas of the functioning of our parliamentary democracy; that is, parliamentary privilege. There is not a snowball’s chance in hell of the Houses of Parliament in an area, which is so sensitive and so important, allowing this Committee and this Bill to make decisions which go ahead of what the Joint Committee is going to do.
As the Government’s Green Paper pointed out, the point of parliamentary privilege is not defamation or what is published in the newspapers; it is the right of Members of Parliament to conduct their business in Parliament. That is why parliamentarians are so careful and so jealous about how we should handle this.
Therefore, I am sorry to say that I can give my noble friend no other response than the one that I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney: that the Joint Committee is now in being. Certainly, my noble friend’s contribution today will be well worth reading by that committee, but it is a matter for that committee and I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am grateful. I learnt this appalling word from Europe, comitology, which is the study of committees, and I have gone too much into the past committees. Although I am not surprised by the Minister’s reply, I am deeply disappointed by it, because what my amendments seek to do is extraordinarily important but modest. The first would clarify the 1840 Act on a completely non-controversial issue so far as that Act, which is all about reporting proceedings in Parliament, is concerned. The second amendment would remove what everyone has always agreed was a gross anomaly. We apparently will have to wait for yet another committee to look at this, but I am liable to return to it on Report, because I am not satisfied by the stonewalling. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
I was not proposing to speak to this amendment at all but it seems to me that there is an enormous distinction to be made between person A and person B as to which publication one is being denied by the Limitation Act the opportunity of proceeding in respect of. It is, with respect, not only whether the second publisher may be financially worth suing as opposed to the first publisher which must be catered to in this provision, but surely also the standing and reputation of the publisher. One can very well imagine a situation in which one simply would not be bothered to be defamed by person A because that person’s standing and reputation was itself so low and yet a republication by somebody of real repute and standing would trigger one’s intent to sue. So if this Amendment 44A is to be accepted, that sort of thing should be catered to, whether under the provisions of subsection 4, with a specific provision about material difference lying on occasion in the character and position, financially and otherwise, of the publisher, or in some other way, I leave to others to consider.
As to the other amendments, I agree with the view that Amendments 45, 46 and 47 are a simpler and more elegant fashion of expressing those provisions. As to Amendment 47B and the proposed insertion of new Section 5A, I am neutral as to how desirable it is to spell out these considerations which shall not be regarded as materially different. I would respectfully suggest that the expression should be not,
“shall not be deemed to be”—
it is not a question of deeming—but
“shall not be regarded as”,
but that is a very minor point indeed.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
On my noble friend Lord Phillips’s Amendments 45, 46 and 47, I hardly ever argue with parliamentary counsel as being defective in the way that they approach their work. With respect to my noble friend and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, I do not think that it is an improvement to save two words by twice repeating,
“or a section of the public”,
when it is clear beyond argument in Clause 8(2) that protection to the public includes publication to a section of the public. I therefore oppose what Lord Wilberforce once described as “the austerity of tabulated legalism”.
Lord Singh of Wimbledon
My Lords, this whole amendment is concerned with protection against those domiciled abroad using their wealth and remoteness to chill freedom of expression in the UK. It could be that the wording is clumsy. I will come back to that. It is intended to be applicable equally to wealthy businesses and religious cults. My concern is with the latter.
Many in this House will be aware of the power and influence of powerful cult leaders who claim deep religious insights denied to the rest of us. They often attract and get large donations from rich businessmen and media celebrities, which they use to acquire property and business interests, and often to fund expensive lifestyles. More worryingly, they also prey on the superstitious and vulnerable, promising to use their influence with God to help people meet life’s challenges or to cure incurable diseases. In one case, a cult leader got a woman to sign over her property in return for a promised cure for cancer. Sadly, the woman died soon after. I believe that it is in the public interest that such activities are exposed.
There are many more such cases in which superstitious and vulnerable people are deprived, sometimes of virtually all that they have. The power and attraction of such organisations is totally dependent on uncritical acceptance of their claims to special powers; they use their might and muscle to silence those who, in the public interest, dare to challenge them. Many such organisations are domiciled in the subcontinent of India, or in the United States and Canada, and use their wealth and power to stifle any public-interest questioning of their activities. They also use their remoteness from the UK to avoid paying the costs of any finding against them.
There are many examples. I will give one of a young journalist, who questioned the practices of an Indian sect and found himself in a ruinous lawsuit. After three nightmare years facing financial ruin, he eventually won his case but has no prospect of recovering some £50,000 spent in doing so, as this would involve further protracted litigation in Indian courts. The attitude of such foreign-based litigants is very much, “Heads I win, tails you lose”. It might be that the amendment’s wording is clumsy but its intention is very clear. I believe it will significantly deter those who use power and remoteness to intimidate those in the UK who are genuinely concerned about their activities..
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I shall speak briefly only to Amendment 50A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Singh of Wimbledon, to bring him good news as to why it is not needed because we have something else in place. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, was Lord Chancellor we dealt with a Bill whose Title was something like the “private international law miscellaneous provisions Bill”—the team behind the Minister will know its correct name. I was concerned that people in countries such as Singapore or Malaysia, which have draconian libel laws and use them to suppress dissent and unpopular views without, I am afraid, any proper respect for the right to free speech, would be able to bring those laws into this country and enforce them here in libel proceedings.
I was concerned about that because the EU was in the process of harmonising tort law, including libel law, and seeking to abolish what is known as the double actionability rule of common law, which provides that if a wrong is committed in another country—a road accident in Gibraltar, for example—the victim could bring a claim for negligence in this country based on what had been done in Gibraltar, but only if it was actionable under the law of this country as well as Gibraltar’s. In other words, domestic British legal standards had to apply and be satisfied. Under the EU harmonisation programme, the danger was that if you abolished the double actionability rule it would mean that someone in one of these other countries could bring in their bad, repressive libel law and rely upon it in this country.
Of course, President Obama did precisely the same thing that I am about to say that we did to the Malaysia and Singapore. In that Act, we kept the double actionability rule in place but only for libel proceedings. The effect is that the Defamation Bill, when it becomes law, will provide the British standard; anybody coming from another country and seeking to use the defamation law coercively will have, under the double actionability rule, to satisfy the standard anyway of the Defamation Act, including the Defamation Act being read with the constitutional and conventional right to free speech. So there will already be very strong reasons in public policy why such a person will not get very far if they seek abusively to bring libel proceedings in those circumstances.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I shall explain in case I was not clear. I was trying to say that all the defences—the requirement of serious harm, the public interest defence, qualified privilege—will be able to be used as a shield against an unscrupulous claimant, and the double actionability rule would require that too.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for the way in which he has just presented the amendment. I do not have the Booksellers Association as my client, although I did some time ago meet it in order to discuss the problem which has been eloquently described. I have, however, acted for Amazon US and Amazon UK and I would like briefly, because it harps back in a way to Clause 5 and the internet, to link that with what we are now discussing because it is quite important. If I walk into Daunt Books in London to buy a book, I am reasonably clear that if the bookseller has no reason to believe that the book is defamatory, the bookseller would have a defence under the defence of innocent dissemination as it was before 1996 and probably under Section 1 of the 1996 Act as well. I agree that there is some lack of clarity about the effect of Section 1 on the common-law defence in that situation.
The problem becomes much more acute for the international bookseller who is selling via the internet. The case that I was once in—thank goodness it never led to an argument because it was settled—is a very good example. A book published in the United States completely wrongly and in a defamatory way attributes to police officers in Northern Ireland the killing of Catholics. It is completely disgraceful and defamatory. So the police officers go against the author who is made bankrupt. They go against the publisher who is made bankrupt, so they have no recourse at all. So they go against the international bookseller on the basis that it has sold a defamatory book on the internet. When we buy that on our computers online, whether from Amazon US or Amazon UK, that is an act of publication. There is therefore publication by the bookseller of something that is defamatory and therefore Amazon is liable. Amazon, shipping the book from its warehouse in California, has absolute immunity under US law. Amazon does not have immunity under UK law, nor should it, and the same applies to Amazon UK.
The practical problem is: what is the position of the international bookseller? It can try to rely on Section 1 of the 1996 Act. The problem with that is that it is quite narrow and very unclear as to how it applies. It can try to rely on the e-commerce directive and to give new meaning to Section 1 of the 1996 Act. It can try to rely on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights to give clarity as well. But all I can say is that some years ago I had a merry time—well paid—in trying to work out the answer to the puzzle that I just described.
If something like Amendment 50C were included, and the noble Lord, Lord Browne, is quite right in saying how difficult it is to clarify some of this, it would have benefit not only for the home-grown London bookseller but for the international bookseller in trying to resolve what would otherwise be extremely complicated problems that I have probably failed properly to explain.
Lord Mawhinney
If peer-review is one of the principles that we want to hang on to, combating chilling effect should be another that we want to hang on to. I have no idea, and I am not competent to judge, whether the wording of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, is right and precise, but combating chilling effect ought to be deemed to be so.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
My Lords, there can be few occasions, particularly at five past five on a Thursday afternoon, when one feels entitled to tell, so to speak, a story from one’s own experience. However, I believe this to be just such an occasion.
Over a quarter of a century ago, I tried, with a jury, the case of the late Robert Maxwell suing Private Eye. It was a defamation case. The burden of the central complaint that Maxwell was making was that Private Eye had published a piece which insinuated that he had tried, by means of free holidays and the like, to bribe the then leader of the Labour Party—Neil Kinnock—to recommend him for a peerage: plus ça change. The case was opened—as all these cases invariably are—at great length and the witnesses started to go into the witness box. I came back from lunch on the fourth day to find a note from the jury which read, “Please, sir, can you tell us what a peerage is?”. On the fourth day of a case all about peerages they did not know what that meant, which did not increase my faith in, and admiration for, juries.
A later case over which I presided in the Court of Appeal was that of Grobbelaar, who secured a very large award from the jury—I cannot remember the exact amount but I think that it was about £100,000—on the basis that he had been libelled by a newspaper which had accused him of match fixing. Noble Lords will remember that he was a Zimbabwean who I think played for Liverpool at the time. We eventually held—we were upheld in this by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords—that that was a perverse award. Again, that was not greatly to the credit of juries. Therefore, I confess that I am very strongly opposed to juries in defamation cases, not least when important people—celebrities—are involved. Juries tend to be mesmerised by celebrity. Indeed, that is true of defamation cases and there are many other instances—it is perhaps invidious to mention them—where that can be seen to be so in the libel context and perhaps more widely.
Under Clause 11 as drafted, defamation cases will be tried without a jury unless a court orders otherwise. The matter is left to the general discretion of the court. Obviously, only very exceptionally would it be thought a good idea to have a jury trial with all the disadvantages of such a trial in terms of length, expense, unreasoned judgment and all the rest of it. If I may respectfully say so, the problem as I see it in this proposed amendment is that it is, first, too prescriptive and, secondly, may well encourage the use of jury trial. In the original report of the Joint Committee, it was recognised in paragraph 25 that it would be undesirable to restrict this discretion—that is, the court’s general discretion—although it is fair to say that it went on to state that it should be possible to outline general principles. The general principle later referred to was that the circumstances in which the discretion should be exercised,
“should generally be limited to cases involving senior figures in public life and ordinarily only where their public credibility is at stake”.
The first problem with the proposed amendment is that it limits the discretion of the court because it states that:
“A court may only order a trial with jury”,
in this class of case, and there may be others. For that reason, it also raises in acute form the definition problem of deciding who is properly to be regarded as a senior figure in public life and when that person’s credibility is at stake. Perhaps more fundamentally, the amendment raises the very concerns that the Government in their response to the Joint Committee report refer to in paragraph 62. It was there said that:
“Concerns were expressed that including guidelines in the Bill could be too prescriptive and could generate disputes”.
I have already alluded to that as one of the problems. It goes on to say that:
“There would also be a risk that detailed provisions setting out when jury trial may be appropriate could inadvertently have the effect of leading to more cases being deemed suitable for a jury than at present”,
which would work against the committee’s view, one that the Government share, that jury trials should be exceptional. If this clause is amended as proposed, there is a risk that if somebody who claims to be a senior figure in public life whose credibility is at stake wants a jury or, indeed, the defendants to a claim by someone who is arguably within that description want a jury, then initially you have a dispute and a debate as to whether it is a case where it is permissible to have a jury and, if so, the suggestion would be that Parliament would have implicitly sanctioned the thought that that is indeed a case where it is appropriate, whereas I would suggest through my earlier illustrations that not even in that case would it generally be appropriate for a jury trial. I would respectfully oppose the amendment.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I am so glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has just made that very important contribution. I agree with all of it and therefore I can be extremely brief. I could add recollections from my own casebook of cases where juries were wholly inappropriate. The particular one I have in mind is the Convery case in Northern Ireland, but I will not go into that now.
I want to make only a couple of points. The first is that in the 19th century, Albert Venn Dicey said in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution that the best safeguard of free speech is the English jury, which is far better than all those charters of rights, whether continental or American. That was the view at the end of the Victorian era, and Fox’s Libel Act did of course place great emphasis on the role of the jury. It was that Act, as Sir Brian Neill reminded me, that led judges to be very concerned about not giving rulings on meanings too early because they did not want to interfere with the jury. I was surprised to discover, when acting for newspapers, that they no longer believed that trial by jury was a good safeguard of free speech. They preferred the reasoned judgment of a single judge which could be appealed, because it was a reasoned judgment, to the unreasoned and incapable of being appealed judgment of a jury. In my Private Member’s Bill, with Sir Brian Neill as my guide, I took the step of saying that, not always but normally, trials should be by judge alone and not by jury.
Much to my surprise, the free speech NGOs and others, with the one exception being Liberty for reasons I understand, all supported it, as did the entire press. I note, of course, what Alan Rusbridger has said, but I do not agree at all with making a special case for celebrity public figures. As the Minister will remember, recently in another context the House agreed to abolish the old common law offence of scandalising the judiciary. The Law Commission agreed with that, as did the senior judges. It could not be seen why senior judges should be made a special case to be protected from gross offence, rudeness and attack when nobody else could be. Were we to approve this amendment, we would be saying that there was a special privileged class, called the great celebrity or public figure, who were to be given special point under the legal system. That would create completely the wrong impression.
One of the most important reforms is abolishing a presumption of trial by jury. The reason is that that then enables the Government, in their procedural changes, with the judges’ co-operation, to make all kinds of changes that would not be possible if the normal mode was trial by jury. This is an extremely significant clause and I very much hope that the Government hew to it without amendment.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
Could the noble Lord just inform me, although I am sure I ought to know this: is Fox’s Libel Act still on the statute book?
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I, too, am extremely unhappy with the amendment. To take a literal point, why only a senior figure in public life? Why not a senior figure in the private sector, for example, where the consequences of the substance of a libel trial may be at least as important as for a senior figure in public life?
Above all, this provision—although I perfectly understand that my noble friend Lord Mawhinney did not advance it in any spirit adverse to the principles of our legal system—as my noble friend Lord Lester just said, would create a privileged class of person. It is not compliant with equality before the law. What is more, it trenches on the discretion of the judge, which I believe is the only reasonable way of limiting the right of privilege of trial by jury, given that that judge will be able to take into account all factors that seem to him or her relevant in that particular case. I am also bound to say that I cannot think of another provision in English law that discriminates in this way. I hope very much, although this was persuasively argued by my noble friend, that it will not be given credence by the Government.