Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Horam (Con)]

I will follow my noble friend Lord Hannan on this subject of consultation. It really is quite shocking that there is no mention in the agreement of any consultation with the Chagossians—no mention at all. Indeed, as I said at Second Reading, there is only one mention of Chagossians and it is not a right that is put into the Bill or into the agreement: it is the possibility that the Mauritian Government are free to implement a programme of resettlement. It is not something that they have to do; it is simply a permissive measure. It is really quite amazing, given the history of the treatment of the Chagossian people that we are aware of, that they do not feature at all in the agreement or in the Bill.

As we know, due to the parliamentary skill of my noble friend Lord Callanan, we now have a possibility that there will be consultation under the auspices of a Select Committee of the House of Lords. That is very good news, but it is only fair that the Government, at this early stage, set out some idea of how that consultation may proceed. It may not be a referendum but, as my noble friend Lord Lilley says, it is at least some sort of consultation. It should not be too difficult. Although there is a widespread diaspora within the Seychelles, the UK and Mauritius itself, it is a small number of people. If they have a referendum, they should be able to conduct that very easily. Proper, organised consultation done fairly speedily—we do not necessarily wish to delay all this—should be within the Government’s remit. I hope that they can say something on that subject during the course of discussion on this amendment.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendments 37, 49 and 56 in this group stand in my name. These are no ordinary circumstances. As my noble friends have alluded to, a group of Chagossians, totalling more than 650, contacted me in writing and asked whether I would consider tabling some amendments and exploring them on the Floor of the Chamber.

The thought behind the amendments is crystal clear: whether the Chagossian people, who were dispersed from their homeland, should have a meaningful voice, clear legal recognition of their identity and a central place in determining the future of the Chagos Islands. Depressingly, it seems the Government have already given their answer, and it is—shamefully, in my opinion—no. For the avoidance of doubt, let me be frank in saying to the Government that I am unreservedly committed to speaking on behalf of the hundreds of Chagossians in the United Kingdom, some of whom have joined us today in the balconies above.

The Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill is a monumental tragedy of an agreement that declares Mauritius sovereign over the entire Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia—a part of the world to which Mauritius has as much of a historical claim as I do to the throne of France. It is farcical. Parliament has been asked to legislate in support of that treaty and the Government do so consciously aware of core groups that are conspicuously absent from the foundations of the treaty—the Chagossians themselves. Allow me to be clear when I say that the people most directly affected by this Bill are not, and have not been, in the room.

The amendments I present seek only to ensure that any settlement affecting the Chagos Islands reflects the rights, identity and aspirations of the Chagossian people. They do not ask for the unattainable. They want recognition, evidence and a proper assessment of what genuine peace and stability requires. Without these, the Bill risks repeating historic injustices and undermining the very legitimacy it claims to secure.

I do not gain anything from bringing such amendments before the Committee, but I am motivated by people and how they can be best served when I read through their correspondence and look those people in the eye—I have had the privilege of meeting some of them. I hope colleagues know that that is why I do this for those who cannot speak in this Chamber themselves. They need a voice.

Amendment 37, in the first instance, addresses democratic representation. It would require the Government to ensure that a Chagossian representative is appointed or elected to act as a liaison between the Chagossian community and Parliament. This is not a radical proposal or proposition. It is, in fact, the bare minimum that we could expect from a democratic state dealing with a displaced people whose fate it once determined without consultation. The onus is on us as Peers to defend all those British citizens, no matter how far away their home might be.

I am conscious that the history of the islands has been repeated throughout the different stages of the Bill, but for good reason. The impact of the forcible action taken between 1967 and 1973, overseeing the removal of the entire population of the Chagos Islands—some 1,500 to 2,000 people—has had long-lasting consequences for the families of that generation. That removal, its circumstances and its consequences are not contested facts. They are recorded in the archives of this country, acknowledged in Foreign Office documentation, examined by parliamentary committees and recognised by numerous international bodies. The result was a community scattered and broken, separated by thousands of miles in some cases. That is why it is essential that we consider the feelings of the Chagossian community now, in 2025, because the colossal failure to do so all those decades ago is the reason we are here today.

Today, the largest Chagossian community in the world resides here, in the United Kingdom. Crawley Borough Council estimates that it is home to approximately 3,500 Chagossians—around two-thirds of the total UK Chagossian population. The community is sizeable and passionate. Yet, in spite of its size, there is no formal mechanism for its representation in Parliament. There is no statutory liaison, committee or structure within Whitehall through which this community can speak with an authoritative voice.

This is untenable. It means that people who were displaced by past British policy have no guaranteed voice in shaping the policy that affects their future. How can we consciously abide this? They, the Chagossian community, remain permanently marginalised: spoken for but never spoken with, and governed but never genuinely consulted.

These are British citizens, as British as the people of Belfast, Cardiff, Edinburgh and London. They are ignored and sidelined in every conceivable form of representation and consultation. Amendment 37 would remedy this democratic deficit. It would ensure that this community had a recognised representative—not imposed, not chosen by government, but selected by the community itself—to liaise directly with Parliament and ensure that their views, concerns and aspirations are considered. If we are to claim moral legitimacy in legislating over the Chagos Islands, we must begin by ensuring that they themselves are heard.

Amendment 49, concerning civic identity and self-determination, would require the Government to publish a report evaluating the credibility of any claim that the Chagossians share a civic identity with Mauritius without a self-determination vote. Additionally, it would direct that the report should consider the historical involvement of Mauritius in the removal of the Chagossian people. This amendment is necessary because the Bill and the treaty on which it rests make a crucial and untested assumption that Mauritius is the rightful and natural representative of the Chagossian people. That assumption underpins the treaty’s logic, the Bill’s purpose and the Government’s narrative.

However, that is simply not the case. It is a historical narrative that has been conjured up by those intent on pushing this forward at all costs. Those of us who understand history will know that, at the time of the 1965 Mauritian-UK negotiations, the Chagossian population was still excluded from any involvement in discussions. Even after the displacement, Chagossians did not prosper under Mauritian administration. Many experienced poverty, discrimination and lack of support, as documented by innumerable NGO reports, parliamentary inquiries and human rights organisations. We have heard testimonies from Chagossians: I was speaking to some of them even today. They describe life in Mauritius as one of hardship and neglect, not solidarity or cohesion. The lives of these people have been shaped not only by geography but by the trauma of displacement and the struggle to preserve a distinct cultural heritage in exile.

I think of the many natives still alive, some of whom wrote to me, including Jenny, Roseline, David, Christof, Marie, Louis and many more, some of whom have joined us in Parliament today. The United Nations has repeatedly stressed that the Chagossian people must be recognised as central to any settlement. In 2024 and 2025, UN human rights experts stated plainly that Chagossians had been excluded from negotiations between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, and that the new agreement failed to guarantee their rights, including the right to participate meaningfully in decisions about sovereignty.

It is ironic that many of the most zealous cheerleaders of this deal are infatuated by notions of internationalism and international law, yet, when it comes to protecting the interests of British sovereign citizens, as emphasised by the UN, the call seems to fall on deaf ears. Amendment 49 simply obligates the Government to gather evidence before taking irreversible decisions.

Amendment 56 directly pertains to peace, stability and the long-term future of the US-UK defence facility on Diego Garcia by ensuring that the Government commit to the publication of a report on whether the goal of peace and legal certainty is better served by the Mauritius treaty or by

“granting self-determination and resettlement to the Chagossian people as a self-governing British Overseas Territory”.

It is not an overstatement to say that this is the central strategic question of this Bill. It seems that this Government are more concerned with the appeasement of foreign states than with the maintenance of our alliances and the protection of our sovereign British citizens.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

I am coming to a conclusion. I understand what it is like to feel ignored and sidelined; to have someone in Government tell you that your identity is second class; that you cannot really be a full British citizen. I know what it is like to have fought for your rights to represent your people when a foreign state wades in against you. I understand the struggle to be heard more than most. Parliament therefore has a responsibility to correct that course. These amendments do not ask for much.

[Baroness Meyer (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 14 and 25. This treaty and the Bill that will enact it is bad for our country, for our security and for British taxpayers. As we have already discussed, it will leave Britain poorer, weaker and strategically exposed.

This treaty is also bad for the Chagossian people. Half a century ago, they suffered the terrible injustice of forced removal. This treaty compounds that injustice by offering no guaranteed right of return, no legally binding resettlement plan and no meaningful protection of their rights. This is truly shameful. For a Government who claim to uphold human rights, it is an extraordinary moral failure.

Dr Al Pinkerton, the Liberal Democrat spokesman, said at Third Reading in the House of Commons that

“we cannot allow the Bill to pass without ensuring that Chagossians themselves are sovereign over their citizenship, the governance of their islands and the prospect of return”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.]

He is right, and I am surprised that no Liberal Democrat in this House has put down any amendment in support of a referendum. To deny the Chagossians their right of self-determination and to shape the future of their homeland is unworthy of a country that champions justice, fairness and democracy. This amendment would give them a chance, but it would also give us, a nation that prides itself on a centuries-old democratic—

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that important correction. This would not be the first time this has happened. The sums that were disbursed to Mauritius in the 1970s, supposedly to be spent on the welfare of the Îlois exile community, were hung on to. They were disbursed very late, and their value had been significantly eroded by inflation in the meantime. Indeed, given that record, there is little wonder that there should be bad feeling from a lot of Chagossians towards the Mauritian Government.

Unusually in this House, the noble Baroness and I were on the same side in the 2016 referendum, so we are familiar with the argument that here is a little bit of your money back; we are spending it for you, and you should be grateful. It was an unconvincing argument to the British people in 2016, and I think it will be an unconvincing argument to the British people and to the Chagossian portion of the British family in 2025. I beg to move.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, I will refer to Amendment 24 in my name. I thank the Minister for her gracious remarks earlier in the debate. I can assure the Committee that I will not detain it as long this time. The amendment asks a simple and poignant question. Should the British taxpayer be compelled to fund a treaty that actively undermines our position on the international stage and erodes British sovereignty? I believe the answer is as simple as the question: no.

Article 11 of the treaty places the United Kingdom under financial obligations to Mauritius, including annual payments linked directly to the transfer of sovereignty. We are being asked to underwrite, year after year, a settlement that has not been endorsed by the people most deeply affected. In 2008 the Foreign Affairs Committee noted the “profound poverty” experienced by many Chagossians resettled in Mauritius. The United Kingdom Government have recognised the “hardship and suffering” caused by their displacement in the preceding years.

At a time when families across the United Kingdom are struggling with the cost of living, when public services are stretched and defence spending is under pressure, the Government are willing, and obliged under this treaty, to transfer British funds overseas in exchange for the honour of relinquishing sovereignty over a territory that hosts one of the most strategically important military bases in the world. Why would we pay for an island that we already own?

Without the inclusion of this amendment, we will be in the extraordinary position of financing, on an annual basis, a settlement that ultimately advances arguments that have repeatedly undermined British sovereignty. That is why this amendment is undeniably crucial. It protects not only the taxpayer but the constitutional integrity of this country, as well as relegating the overindulgent aspirations of the Mauritian Government, depriving them of even more British taxpayers’ money.

Let us also consider the native islanders—the Chagos people. Have we ever paused to consider how they might feel as this Parliament considers whether we should pay a foreign Government to take control of a territory in which they have never had a stake, all while ignoring the cry of the Chagos community in the UK?

Beyond that, there is also the question of accountability. Once these payments begin, Parliament loses direct control over how they are to be spent. There is no binding mechanism in the treaty to ensure that the native community will be benefited by these payments in a meaningful way. This arrangement risks repeating the injustice of the past, where funds provided in earlier decades did not reach the displaced communities in Mauritius who were living in poverty. Surely, we must learn from that history and not repeat it. That is essential.

I therefore believe we should not rush into binding financial commitments when so many broader questions remain unresolved—about self-determination, defence co-operation, the protection of strategic assets, and long-term political stability in a region where global competition is increasing and where the UK needs to be assertive and confident. The British taxpayer should not foot the bill for decisions that diminish our sovereignty and overlook the rights of sovereign British citizens. For these reasons, I commend my amendment to the House.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, and I want to speak to my Amendment 23. Before I go into that, the noble Lords, Lord Hannan and Lord McCrea, have put very clearly just how ridiculous it is that we have a territory that is ours and now we are paying to give it away. The whole thing is just such nonsense. I understand, as we all do, the security implications of Diego Garcia, but it is just inexplicable how this could not have been handled differently. Some noble Lords listening to the debate might well be feeling that this is definitely going to end in tears.

It is also very disappointing, particularly for the Chagossians who have sat here all evening—while we had a break as well—to see so few people here. There is one Back-Bencher from the Labour side, one Cross-Bencher, no Lib Dems at all now apart from the Front Bench, and a number—there should have been a few more—from the Conservative side. I am disappointed by that, and a lot of people should feel a little ashamed that those Chagossians have sat here all evening, listening to their future being decided with so few people listening.

My amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report assessing the financial implications of the treaty for the United States of America and the United Kingdom, including the effect on NATO spending and the risk of global instability from uncontrolled leasing of islands. One of the main arguments the Government have advanced for the Bill before us—and for the treaty, which will be ratified if this Bill gets Royal Assent—is that the Americans strongly support the treaty and believe it provides the legal certainty they desire. The purpose of Amendment 23 in my name is to probe the downsides, as well as any potential upsides, to ensure that His Majesty’s Government can fully advise the Trump Administration of both.

There are three critical respects in which I do not believe that the Bill and the treaty are in the interests of the United States. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that they are profoundly contrary to the interests of the United States. It is plain, as we saw from the debate earlier, that the treaty will not be able to provide legal certainty, because it is contrary to international law on self-determination and the Ellice Islands precedent. The legal issue is not going to go away, because we will be signing a treaty if this Bill goes through. However, the points that I want to focus on relate to the costs and international peace and stability.

First, we have to make the point about the cost. This represents a huge sum that, if given to the Republic of Mauritius, cannot be spent on UK defence. The key point is that we must assess the benefit arising from the United States not having to pay for the lease of the islands in light of the fact that, under the current arrangements, we do not charge them anything to lease the islands either, and we do not charge ourselves for the islands because, of course, they are held under UK sovereignty.