Lord McNally
Main Page: Lord McNally (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord McNally's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
If the Lord Chancellor said “I want this candidate” and persuaded everybody, none of that would have been apparent. People would doubt the independence of the appointment from the political situation, or the political influences on the position. Do not be under any illusion; if the Lord Chancellor proceeds with this proposal, those people who have had dealings with the constitutional settlement will think that he is, without properly understanding it, going against the basis of the constitutional settlement which the noble Lord, Lord McNally, worked so hard to get through. As he said on Monday, the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was one of the main Liberal Democrat architects of the constitutional settlement, as was, as he also acknowledged on Monday, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. What on earth is the reason for so undermining the political independence of the judiciary?
For these reasons we support the amendments that are being made. If, as I think is unlikely, they are put to the vote today, we will support them. I earnestly ask that the Minister reconsiders the Government’s position on this, and the Lord Chief Justice’s position. It would be a really bad idea if people thought that a Conservative or Labour Secretary of State for Justice, not the Lord Chancellor, had appointed the Lord Chief Justice and the president of the Supreme Court.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have taken part in this, which is an interesting and important debate on a very important constitutional issue. I am not sure that I share the analysis of these proposals. As I said before, the Lord Chancellor is determined to defend the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. We are committed to the constitutional settlement that was brought in by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, when he was in office. But, as I said earlier, we are making proposals which, with the passage of time, improve on that settlement. The debate today is part of that.
Interestingly enough, I was flicking through Hansard for Monday evening. The noble and learned Lord is always passionate and eloquent, but he was particularly passionate and eloquent then. He was urging us not to take the Executive out of decisions on appointments in the lower courts. Well, that is what it says.
Lord McNally
Yes. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord would like to turn to column 112 of the Hansard of 25 June when, as I say, he was quite passionately making the case for the Executive being involved.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Indeed I was. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, was agreeing with me that the way you do it is to have an independent process of appointment which the Executive must endorse, or not, so that there is somebody responsible in Parliament to defend it. Does the noble Lord agree with that approach?
Lord McNally
The noble and learned Lord was saying that the Executive should be kept in the process. The noble and learned Lord is marvellous; he spends half his interventions twisting the words of people who disagree with him, and when anybody tries to put him right, he starts protesting.
Of course the Lord Chancellor is accountable to Parliament. That is central to the settlement. He is responsible to the public for the overall process of judicial appointments and the effective working of the judicial system. It is important, at this very senior level of the judiciary, that as well as possessing first-rate judicial skills, candidates for the leadership roles are alive to the management and administrative issues that affect the administration of justice and are able to work with the Government on developing the system. This is an area where the view of the Lord Chancellor is likely to be of particular importance. This is therefore a legitimate role for the Lord Chancellor to play in the most senior judicial appointment.
I know that the noble and learned Lord has a kind of sense of ownership of the constitutional settlement.
Lord McNally
Well, if he is happy to change it, perhaps he will listen to the argument for making just the smallest tweak in the perfect construction that he left for us. That means that it should be balanced appropriately against judicial and lay input into the process. It should respect, as I have said, the independence of the judiciary.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Lay input is how you get management experience, I agree. What is wrong with the non-legally qualified person, the member of the Northern Ireland commission, the member of the Scottish commission and the member of the English commission? There is a quite substantial balance of lay people already.
Lord McNally
We had a very vigorous discussion about this when we had a second go in front of the Constitution Committee. Looking at those three top jobs—the presidency, the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor—I was struck by the fact that it is not just judicial excellence but a whole fingertip interrelationship that makes those three jobs work. That is why the Lord Chancellor is arguing, and I am convinced of this—it is not just a matter of me saying, “The Government believe”—that an input into the selection process at the selection board—
Lord Woolf
I speak as one of the three the Minister refers to. Does he not agree that there is a danger of those three being too cosy? That would be in a situation where they do not feel that they can take a separate line from the Lord Chancellor, who controls the resources and is particularly powerful. All I can say is that if he does take that view, he should remember that my very distinguished predecessor, on one particular occasion, refused to see the Home Secretary of the day and the Home Secretary was deeply offended. That was because he did not think much of that sort of cosiness, which I know to the Minister is very attractive. With my experience, I am bound to say that he is wrong. He should listen; there are times to be cosy and times not to be cosy. That is something that needs to be taken into account.
Lord McNally
This is my problem as a simple lad dealing with these Silks. I have never used the word “cosy” about the relationship. I have had a chance look at the relationship in the last two years; the last way I would describe the relationship between the Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, is “cosy”. It is businesslike; it is working; but it has an interrelationship which I think is important.
Giving the Lord Chancellor a role in these appointments is not new. As has been said, he already has a role in deciding whether to accept or reject the recommendation of a selection panel. The question is, therefore, how should that input be realised? I understand the different views put forward in the debate, but the Government’s view is that, for these two most senior appointments, given their significant role in the administration of justice, the most appropriate way of achieving this input is to allow the Lord Chancellor to sit on the panels. He can then consider the views of other panel members, submit his own views and engage with the panel members in a meaningful discussion about candidates.
The current system allows the Lord Chancellor to veto a selection panel’s recommendations. This is in itself a major role, but may be viewed as something of a nuclear option—that is what it says in my briefing notes. I think that that option is the one that could only be used in exceptional circumstances and with potentially a heavy price for the relationship with the judiciary and perception of political interference. I do not necessarily agree that these perceptions would be justified, but they are certainly factors which would inhibit the use of the veto. In place of the veto, Schedule 12 provides for a more effective engagement.
A fear has been expressed that this would give the Lord Chancellor disproportionate influence and that the present Lord Chancellor would dominate the proceedings. Perish the thought. Being on the panel, or even having that Lord Chancellor on the panel, would not necessarily mean that the Lord Chancellor would ultimately get his way on the individual appointed, but it would mean that he would have the opportunity to be engaged in the process and make his views known to the other panel members. We are talking about a panel of heavy hitters—a lay chair, plus senior members of the judiciary and appointment commissioners who are strong and independent-minded individuals. They will not simply fall into line with the Lord Chancellor of the day. The Lord Chancellor would have an opportunity to make his case but could also be persuaded of a contrary case by other panel members. However, where the Lord Chancellor does make a persuasive case of the merits of a particular candidate, this could be weighed in the balance in the same way by other panel members.
There are, of course, other possible ways of securing the input of the Lord Chancellor, but we do not consider that any are as effective as our proposal. We could, for example, allow the Lord Chancellor to select a candidate from a shortlist, or through some form of parliamentary hearing. However, we consider that the risk of politicisation of the process from these options is far more acute.
Another option would be to consult the Lord Chancellor at the start of the process. There is nothing wrong with that, but we consider that this is not as effective as having the Lord Chancellor be a member of the panel and be able to put forward his views, listen to the views of others and engage with them in a meaningful way.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
I wonder whether the Minister could answer a point that he has not yet answered, which has been made by several people. There is a perception that if the Lord Chancellor is on the panel, the appointment will be politicised. For those who do not know the process but see that the Lord Chancellor has been one of those who has appointed the Lord Chief Justice, there will be a perception, certainly among lawyers and much more widely, that the Lord Chancellor has had a very large part to play in making that person the Lord Chief Justice and that it would be the sort of person who would suit him.
Lord McNally
I was about to come to the interventions of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I do not think that my noble friend Lady Falkner got it wrong at all, despite her being bullied by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, who I have never thought of as someone who it was possible to bully. However, if the noble Lord, Lord McNally, was under that impression, that just goes to show how wrong perceptions can develop.
Lord McNally
Turning to the other noble Baronesses, to get them going as well, there did seem to be a suggestion of, “Don’t worry, because the present system already has the nudges, nods and winks that will get”—
Baroness Prashar
I do not want to go into detail but, as the noble Lord knows, I had the privilege of being involved in some of these selection processes. When a selection panel is set up, there is a proper, transparent way of consulting at the appropriate time. There were no nudges and nods. In my initial submission, I said that I think that the present system works because, if there is a rejection or a reconsideration, it focuses the mind and is done in an open way. It is the inability of the people to be discreet that muddies the water. It is a most gossip-ridden world. In other worlds, when appointments are made, people respect confidentiality. However, the process was very open and transparent. Therefore, there is no question of nudges and nods.
Lord McNally
If it is such a gossip-ridden world, the better it would be to have the Lord Chancellor fully and transparently in the process. I am afraid that all that one can say is that strong opinions are held.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
I am a non-lawyer who, I am glad to say, was not part of the constitutional settlement in 2005. If the noble Lord described himself disingenuously as a simple lad, I am even worse as a simple laddess. I am trying to get a vision of this construct that the Minister has explained of either my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer or the present holder of the office of Lord Chancellor, the right honourable Kenneth Clarke, being subdued members of a totally egalitarian panel on which the merits of the candidates are discussed in a constructive and totally relaxed way, and the subdued and reticent Lord Chancellor finds himself in a minority. Should the panel recommend that Judge X becomes a member of the Supreme Court, the Lord Chancellor, having been this subdued and reticent member of the panel, could feel that it is wrong. What, then, are the prospects for effective working between them?
Lord McNally
Quite often in politics, in the law and in other parts of life, one finds oneself working with someone whom you do not particularly like. The difference this time is that there would be no political veto to that committee’s decision. It is worth putting on record that this would be a Lord Chancellor withdrawing his veto from those appointments. Yet, with his silken sophistry, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, implies that this is an extension of political power. It is just the opposite of the extension of political interference.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I was not implying it; I was saying it expressly, because that is plainly what is happening.
Lord McNally
It is simply not true, and anyone who is looking at this sees that it is a move away from a politician being able to exercise a veto to a politician transparently taking part in a process. If the Members of this Committee cannot see that, we will presumably withdraw it or take it back.
Lord Beecham
What, in the experience of the past seven years, has revealed defects in the present system?
Lord McNally
It has been the feeling that the retention of a veto in this matter was keeping in the political process.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
So why is a veto being kept for every other member of the Supreme Court, every member of the Court of Appeal and every member of the High Court?
Lord McNally
I have explained before that this unique triumvirate is very important, and that that is why we have adopted a very distinctive way of making this selection. I am not sure how far I can take the Committee, except perhaps to read from the letter that I wrote to the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said he had not had the pleasure of sharing. In that letter I said: “At the present the Lord Chancellor decides at the end of the selection process whether to accept or reject the name put forward by the panel or to ask for the panel’s decision to be reconsidered. In practice, under these current arrangements it may be difficult to make use of the veto in these high-profile cases without risking perception of politicisation of the process. This difficulty was acknowledged by Lord Phillips and others in their evidence to your committee”—that is, the committee of the noble Baroness, Lady Jay. “The Government therefore considers that allowing the Lord Chancellor to sit on the panel will enable his accountability to be exercised in a more direct and effective way. You will, of course, be aware that the Lord Chancellor’s involvement as a member of the selection panel was supported in evidence to the Constitutional Committee by both the Lord Chief Justice and the president of the UK Supreme Court”. So I am not isolated in this view.
Lord Goodhart
My Lords, is it not more difficult for the Lord Chancellor to object to someone publicly rather than to discuss the appointment in a group of which he is a member? Does that not mean, therefore, that if the Minister tries to remove the person, he will do so only if there is very strong evidence to show that it is an unsatisfactory appointment, whereas if he is part of a group, the other members of the group might be more likely to go along with what the Minister says at that point?
Lord McNally
I have to say that if I was a member of a body charged with selecting a Lord Chief Justice or a president of the Supreme Court, no Lord Chancellor, however strong willed, would make me change my views unless his arguments were extremely persuasive; and I would expect the same respect for my views. We are not talking about a group of pussycats; we are talking about some very senior figures with great experience. I can see that those who have attended this Committee do not agree, but the simple fact is that we consider that our proposals strike the right balance in providing both the legitimate accountability for the executive in these roles and an independent and transparent process. They take away a political veto and put in its place a transparent involvement in a selection. I have set that out very clearly for the Committee.
Baroness Neuberger
I am sorry to ask the Minister this, but surely the presence of the Lord Chancellor on a committee of selection is a political statement in itself. It is worrying that the Minister should say that it removes a political presence. It just moves the position from what is a very public veto if, at the end of an independent process, the Lord Chancellor decides that he does not wish to go along with a recommendation to something that is less public but just as political. I find that really worrying, and I know that I am on record as saying that it is a constitutional disgrace.
Lord McNally
That is the noble Baroness’s opinion, but, again, she is suggesting words that I never used. I did not say a “political presence”. What I said was that, to me, the political veto was the intrusion into the process. It has been acknowledged by a number of contributors that if the Lord Chancellor is not in this narrow world where the decision and the selections are made, he will be the elephant in the room. This process gives the Lord Chancellor the chance to have an input in a selection but, as opposed to what the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, suggested, he will not have a veto. When the panel makes its decision, there will be no political veto. I should have thought that that would be welcomed by this Committee.
Lord Martin of Springburn
Perhaps I may ask the Minister about one point on which I would like clarification. It has been fascinating to listen to both sides of the argument. The Minister mentioned a lay chairman or chairwoman. From what walk of life would a lay chairman or chairwoman come?
Lord McNally
I shall have to take advice on that. I should have thought that he or she would come from the court of cardinals. I am not sure, but it would undoubtedly be a chairman or chairwoman of distinction and merit who had experience in these matters.
Lord Woolf
Might I suggest the former chairman of the commission, who is present here today.
Lord McNally
I saw her shifting slightly and thought she was going to volunteer to come back to the job.
Baroness Prashar
I thank the Minister for giving way. I now want to turn to another point on which I and the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, asked a question. The provision states that the Lord Chancellor “may” sit on the panel. If that is the case, on what basis will he decide to sit on the panel? If he decides to do so, will that not send a different signal? Will it not suggest that there is a reason why he wants to sit on the panel or a reason why he decides not to do so? I think that that will create an unhelpful perception.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, mentioned that I also raised a point on this matter. If the Lord Chancellor decides not to sit on one of these panels, does he not retain the right of veto, and that therefore the disappearance of the veto, on which the Minister has been relying so greatly, is not in fact universal?
Lord McNally
No. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness because I should have clarified this point. The Bill says that the Lord Chancellor “may” be a member, but we intend to bring forward regulations setting out that the Lord Chancellor “will” be a member of the panel. This will not be able to be changed other than by a new regulation, which will be subject to affirmative procedures and agreement and to the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice and the president of the Supreme Court.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I would be rather averse, as would this House, to the constitution being changed in this way by regulations.
Lord McNally
I take note of what the noble and learned Lord says. I am merely saying what the intention is. Clearly—
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I say that it is a deceptive question for the reasons that underlay the question of my noble friend Lady Jay. We thought that sometimes you would and sometimes you would not, but apparently you are always going to be a member of the panel.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
I am sorry—this is only my second intervention but it is my last one. Something as important as this should not be put in a regulation. Why can there not be a government amendment on Report so that we know where the Government stand?
Lord McNally
I shall take that question back. In the mean time, the Government’s case has been set out. The trouble with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is that he listens only to himself and is then convinced by all the arguments that he hears. I have listened to others in the Committee. We are in the debt of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for stimulating such a debate. However, if he wants to divide the Committee, I am reasonably confident that he will lose.
Lord McNally
Try me. I think that the issues that have been raised are such that it would be better to have another run at them on Report.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, before the Committee sat I informed the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that I was fairly relaxed and neutral about his amendment. However, the more I have listened to the argument, the more I have come down on the Government’s side. I recall the very unseemly row when the former Lord Chancellor’s veto was exercised in relation to an appointment, and I believe that I put down a Parliamentary Question. I think that he reversed his decision before I got the Answer, but I certainly tabled a Question about it. There was a furore at the Bar and I was approached by many people to do what I could to defend the reputation of a person who was considered to be the best judge in a particular division. It was extremely unseemly and the Lord Chancellor backed down. What did that say? He had given his veto and then he withdrew it and the appointment went ahead. All these matters should have been sorted out but not in such a public way as to damage the reputation of the person concerned and damage the reputation of the Lord Chancellor, if it needed to be damaged any further. It did not resolve the situation.
I have heard the debate and, as I understand it, the Lord Chancellor does have discussions behind the scenes with the Appointments Commission. That is what was said in terms by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I do not think that that is right. I think we should have an open system. She said that it was open and transparent. It was not—I did not know about it, although I was sufficiently involved to put down a Parliamentary Question about the matter in issue.
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
My Lords, I can be relatively brief with this group of amendments as they are essentially technical in nature. Amendment 123 modifies amendments to paragraph 11 of Schedule 12 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which concerns the appointment of the vice-chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission. As drafted, paragraph 19 of Schedule 12 to the Bill amends the 2005 Act to provide that the Lord Chancellor may, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, make regulations to provide for the appointment of the vice-chairman. On reflection, while we continue to believe that greater flexibility is needed for determining the composition of the Judicial Appointments Commission, provisions about the chairman and vice-chairman are matters which ought to appear in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. This amendment restores the requirement that the vice-chairman must be a judicial member. As now, the vice-chairman will continue to be the most senior judicial member of the commission. Determining which judge is the most senior will be done by reference to regulations made by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice.
Amendment 123 also retains the current restriction that the vice-chairman cannot deputise for the chairman in relation to his or her role on selection panels relating to appointments to the most senior judicial offices. This is because in these instances the role necessitates a lay rather than judicial member. Additionally, the vice-chairman will be unable to exercise the functions of chairman where the function is one specified in regulations to be made by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice.
Amendment 124 amends paragraph 27 of Schedule 12 to the Bill so as to add to the list of judicial appointments below the High Court for which responsibility for making a decision on a selection by the Judicial Appointments Commission is to be transferred from the Lord Chancellor to the Lord Chief Justice. The appointments in question are those for a senior district judge or chief magistrate and a deputy senior district judge or chief magistrate. The other amendments in this group, namely Amendments 119, 122, 125 to 130 and 133, make minor and technical changes to the provisions in Schedule 12. I can provide further details of these amendments if needed. I beg to move.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. It is an important amendment on a matter that is already causing difficulty. The loss of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Collins, from the Supreme Court was a direct result of the reduction in the retiring age. The Government now have an opportunity to do something about that, because this is a legislative opportunity.
Lord McNally
My Lords, this is probably the last Chamber on earth where Ministers should be defending a retirement age of 70. I have listened very carefully to what has been said. I understand and sympathise with some of the frustrations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, just referred to the case where someone comes to senior judicial office for a very short term. I also acknowledge that, in many cases, those judges would be able to continue beyond the age of 70 in terms of their intellectual sharpness. In such cases, they can be a costly loss to the judiciary. I am not sure that I go as far as the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, in advocating no retirement age at all—I have always been a strong supporter of a retirement age for this House. However, that goes into a different issue. I see that the noble Lord is about to come up for air.
Lord Gilbert
I am much obliged to the Minister for making reference to my remarks. All I can say is that I have listened to the debate with great care and I have not heard a single reason put forward for a retirement age for judges. Everyone says 70, 75, 80, 85—just picking figures out of the air. It is a nonsense. I am not a candidate for a position in the Supreme Court, but I see no reason at all why there should be any statutory limit for a candidate aged over 85 like me. Could we have a reason?
Lord McNally
As I said, this is hardly the audience for arguing or expecting support for retirement at 70. Indeed, sometimes when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, tells me about his itinerary for the following week, I realise that his idea of retirement is something quite different from that of most normal people. I am well aware that people can make a contribution.
The amendment is astute in singling out the Supreme Court, as it is in this court—which may be the pinnacle of a long career—where taking up office is more likely to occur when a judge is in his or her 60s. This can give rise to particularly unfortunate individual cases where a judge’s term of office may be rather shorter than we would have liked to see. I understand the arguments and the case that has been made. However, these individual cases need to be balanced against the bigger picture and the advantages of a uniform retirement age of 70 across the whole of the judiciary.
Mandatory retirement ages for judicial office-holders have played an important role in ensuring that the judiciary is, and is seen to be, independent. Quite rightly, once appointed to a salaried position, it is difficult to remove a judge from office before retirement. This, of course, is constitutionally correct and removes any risk of unwarranted interference from the Executive. While many judges may be able to continue to work, and to contribute as fully as ever, beyond the age of 70, that will not always be the case. Without the mandatory retirement age, if a judge beyond 70 insisted on continuing, there would be no way of removing him even where his colleagues considered that he was no longer quite as sharp as he used to be. Therefore, a standard retirement age, set at the right level, is needed. I do not think that anybody disagrees with that principle.
The Government consider that 70 is the right level. Indeed, this is at the higher end of international comparisons. It is also important in this context to consider the impact on public confidence in the justice system. The age of 70 strikes a balance between the desire of judges wishing to serve and the public interest in sustaining a judiciary that is fully effective in discharging its responsibilities. The amendment seeks to make a special case for the Supreme Court, so that the mandatory retirement age should be increased to 75. However, the reasoning for the age of 70 applies to judges of the Supreme Court as it does to other judges. People are people, whichever court they are sitting in. The age of 70 is, in our view, the right one—notwithstanding that it may seem premature in individual cases.
The retirement age also contributes to the need to bring in newer judges. Turnover in the senior judiciary is not significant as many judges remain in post until retirement. Given the statutory limit on the numbers of judges who can sit in senior courts, in particular the Supreme Court which is limited to just 12 judges, the opportunity to promote talented members of the judiciary from the lower courts is limited. Extending the retirement age to 75 in the Supreme Court would further limit movement from the Court of Appeal, which would, in turn, reduce opportunities for promotion to the Court of Appeal and have a trickle-down effect through the courts. This would also have the effect of delaying some of the positive impact on diversity, which that we would otherwise see through promotions from the lower courts.
Furthermore, it would be very difficult in practice to sustain a different retirement age just for the Supreme Court. Court of Appeal judges would be very likely also to make the case for extended retirement. A Court of Appeal judge who considers himself or herself a good candidate for appointment to the Supreme Court may find it difficult to accept that he or she had to retire at 70 if the Supreme Court were made up of judges who would automatically go on for another five years. If the age of retirement for the Court of Appeal were also extended, then why not the High Court and so on? If there is a clear business need, it is still possible for judges to continue to serve over the age of 70. Following retirement, members of the Supreme Court may go on to the supplementary panel. As a member of that panel, they might be asked to act as a judge of the Supreme Court. This enables the court to continue to make use of their experience and knowledge —but on a short-term basis.
I have listened to the contributions of the noble Lords and to the plea of my noble friend Lady Bottomley against ageism. Although the Government will keep this under review, we consider, for the reasons outlined, that the current mandatory retirement age of 70, together with the arrangements for sitting ad hoc after retirement, provide a careful balance between using experience, ensuring that the quality of the judiciary is maintained at all levels and ensuring the advancement of fresh talent. I also consider that differential retirement ages of different courts may be very difficult to sustain. We will keep this under review but, in the mean time, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will keep this matter under review. I hope that that means that it will be actively looked at before we return to the matter, as I am sure that we will, at Report. My answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, about why we should have retirement age at all, is to point out the considerable difficulty of saying that someone is past it—particularly if they have tenure in the post. That is an extremely difficult task to perform in relation to individuals sitting on the Bench. That is why we have a mandatory retirement age. I have no difficulty with that. As I indicated, I am concerned that the retirement age of 70 is too high. However, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, that if he looks at the New York Times of 16 September 2010, he will see that Judge Wesley E Brown was sitting in the United States district court at the age of 103. The article describes how a tube under his nose feeds him oxygen during hearings. Sadly, Judge Brown has since died, but he did continue to an age much greater even than 75.
I do not accept the argument that the retirement age needs to be mandatory across the judiciary. I would hope that we could move to recognising the special position of the Supreme Court for all the reasons given by myself and other noble Lords. I certainly do not accept the argument that public confidence in the judiciary would somehow be undermined were judges to continue to the age of 75. I am not aware of any recent example of the public lacking confidence in our judges on the Appellate Committee—now in the Supreme Court—because they were between the ages of 70 and 75. It has already been indicated that some of the best and most valuable work of those senior judges, led by the late and much lamented Lord Bingham of Cornhill, was done between the ages of 70 and 75. That work would be lost.
Nor do I accept that there is any problem about new talent coming through because there are many vacancies for positions in the Supreme Court. However, the central point is that we are losing the best of our judges at too early an age. I hope that the Minister and the Lord Chancellor will reflect on this matter over the summer, but in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, Amendment 121, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would extend the duty in Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The duty requires the Judicial Appointments Commission to have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments. The amendment would extend this duty so that it applied also to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.
Similarly, Amendment 121AA, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, introduces a new duty on the commission, the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor, albeit in slightly different terms. Rather than a duty to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for appointment, the amendment sets out a duty to promote diversity in the judiciary. In addition, it sets out a requirement for an annual report on performance of the duty.
The Government have given a firm commitment to improve diversity within the judiciary. We consider that a diverse judiciary, reflecting modern society, will enhance confidence in the judicial system. However, we do not consider that the extension of the duty to promote diversity in Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act, or the new duty suggested by Amendment 121AA, would make any difference in practice.
I understood what the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, meant when she said that these matters should not be turned into gesture politics. Since becoming a Minister, I have made it a personal commitment to attend every meeting of the judicial diversity task force in the hope that my presence will put a little speed into the process that we are trying to carry through.
The Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, when exercising their public functions—other than those relating to judicial decision-making in the case of the Lord Chief Justice—are already subject to the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010. This means that when either is exercising public functions in relation to the judiciary, the public sector equality duty applies.
I followed the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and for a time thought that he was on my side in arguing that, where responsibilities already exist, it is not necessary to rewrite them. The duty of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice is set out in Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and provides that a person exercising functions of a public nature must have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by the Act; advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not; and foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not.
It is true that the Equality Act duties are not in the same terms as the duty in Section 64 of the 2005 Act or the proposed new duty in Amendment 121AA. Parts of Section 149 of the 2010 Act refer to persons with protected characteristics. This does not have any bearing on what steps, for example, we should take to encourage more solicitors to apply for judicial office. However, it is also clear that this duty contains the key elements of advancing equality of opportunity that we are normally concerned with when discussing diversity; that is, issues of gender, race, disability and sexuality.
The duty of course applies to the Lord Chancellor not just in relation to judicial diversity but in any functions of a public nature that he exercises. We consider this general duty to be a better approach than attempting to multiply separate legislative duties on the Lord Chancellor in different areas. This debate has already given an indication of that with the various duties proposed by different amendments.
We are often told by this House that we overlegislate, but there is also a tendency to want to put every specific duty in every Bill. We endorse the Constitution Committee’s comments on the importance of leadership and understand the reasoning behind the amendments, but we believe that the existing duties in the Equality Act 2010 are sufficient to keep us up to the mark in this context. Extending the existing duties to include both the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice would add nothing of practical value in increasing the diversity of the judiciary. Nor would it add anything to a commitment clearly made and embedded in the Bill.
Lord Deben
If it is necessary to state these things in particular for some parts of the system and it is not thought to be otiose, why is it not necessary to do it at the top of the system and thought to be otiose in those circumstances? Either you leave it entirely and rely on the general demand or you apply it to both cases.
Lord McNally
I will ponder on that, but I also ask the Committee to ponder on the Pannick amendment. The noble Lord’s proposal to write specific responsibilities into the Bill makes a regular appearance when we are legislating—I think that it is the second time that he has done it anyway and that makes it regular. The argument is usually the same; it is a please-stop-beating-your-wife amendment. These duties are embedded in the Bill and in the roles of both the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
The Minister is making some serious points. I am surprised by the proposition that the Equality Act would already require the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Chief Justice, for example, to promote among young people and black and minority-ethnic groups a greater willingness to apply to be lawyers, because that is partly what trying to increase the pool involves. Is the Minister really saying that that obligation, to get more people to apply at a much younger age to learn to be lawyers, is already covered by the Equality Act?
Lord McNally
The Equality Act invites the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice to apply the principles of the Equality Act to the job that they are doing, which is the point that I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was making: that if one is doing a job that is covered by the Equality Act, one should be carrying out the responsibilities in which those duties are embedded. I think that is true.
Amendment 121A also relates to the duty in Section 64 and to Supreme Court appointments. It would ensure that the Section 64 duty to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection applied to those appointments. The amendment would also provide that Section 63 of the Constitutional Reform Act should apply to Supreme Court appointments. This would have the effect that those appointments would be solely on merit, that the person should not be selected unless he or she is of good character and that where two persons are of equal merit, one can be selected over the other for the purpose of increasing diversity.
Before turning to the detail of the amendment, I should first say that diversity is, of course, important at all levels of the judiciary, up to and including the Supreme Court. In fact, it is particularly important at the higher levels, as female judges or judges from an ethnic minority can act as powerful role models for those at a more junior level in the judiciary. Indeed, due to their higher public profile, they may also act as a role model for younger people considering a legal or judicial career and may be a powerful symbol to the public at large with regard to the perception of the judiciary reflecting our society. We are supporting diversity at this level in the measures that we are taking in the Bill to enable flexible working arrangements at the highest level, including the Supreme Court.
Turning now to the detail of the amendment, and starting with the application of Section 63, the objective here is to apply the tipping-point provision in these cases. Section 159 of the Equality Act 2010 contains a provision to allow a person to be preferred to another on the basis of a protected characteristic, such as gender or race, when they are equally qualified to be appointed. In relation to judicial appointments in England and Wales, our view is that it is not clear that the tipping-point provision in the Equality Act can apply, because Section 63(2) specifies that selection must be solely on merit. This use of “solely” may be seen as precluding the use of the Equality Act test. That is why the Bill brings forward the new tipping-point provision in Section 63(4) so that it can apply to judicial appointments, selection for which is within the remit of the Judicial Appointments Commission, notwithstanding the use of “solely”.
In relation to appointments to the UK Supreme Court, however, there is no provision that appointment must be “solely” on merit. Section 27(5) of the Constitutional Reform Act specifies that appointment must be on merit. However, other considerations apply, in particular Section 25(8), which specifies that in making a selection the selection panel must ensure that the candidate has knowledge and experience of practice in the law of each part of the United Kingdom. As there is no reference to “solely”, we consider that there is no bar to the Equality Act tipping point applying to Supreme Court appointments without the need for further legislative change.
In relation to the application of Section 64 to the UK Supreme Court, I have already set out the commitment to encouraging diversity in the Supreme Court, but for the reason that I have already outlined in relation to Amendment 74, I do not consider that a statutory duty would add anything to this. In addition, in this case any statutory duty would also need to reflect the UK nature of the Supreme Court, so the current amendment, by placing this duty on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and the Judicial Appointments Commission, would not be appropriate.
I understand where the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and other noble Lords are coming from. We have a summer to consider these things, but I also hope that noble Lords who have been involved in legislation will know that these declaratory commitments that overlay existing commitments are not always as helpful as has been suggested. I hope to assuage the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, by saying that we will look at the case that has been made this evening. As I say, at the moment we are not minded to accept the amendments, but with the promise that this debate will be among my summer reading I invite the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, that is a very disappointing response. Promoting diversity is one of the greatest challenges facing the legal system and it is quite unacceptable that when a statutory duty to promote diversity is already imposed upon the Judicial Appointments Commission, that same duty should not be imposed, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, puts it, on those who have leadership roles in the legal profession. I am not persuaded at all that there are other statutory duties under the Equality Act, which do not seem to me to cover the same ground. Indeed, if they did it is incomprehensible why there is a specific statutory duty on the JAC under Section 64.
Lord McNally
I hear the disappointment in the noble Lord’s voice. I would hate this debate to end with any idea that I personally, and the Government, am not committed absolutely to furthering diversity in the legal profession and the judiciary. I have said that I will take the debate away—I may even take it to the individual noble Lords concerned—and consider what we do when we come back.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful to the Minister. I was about to say that I do not doubt for a moment the Minister’s personal commitment to diversity. I have heard him speak about it on a number of occasions, and he feels as passionate about it as others. The question is whether the Government’s position can move. I hope, for all the reasons that have been expressed in this debate around the House, that the Lord Chancellor and the Minister will look at this again over the summer and that progress can be made. I have no doubt that if there is no progress, no movement from the Government, the House will return to the matter on Report, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. There is an overlooked pool of potential future judges—or of what used to be called chairmen of tribunals, who are now judges. It is time that that group in government service of one form or another was seen as a potential. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the numbers of both women and ethnic minorities is significant. I support the amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I am very grateful for the amendment, because it allows me to clarify an important area: those who work in government legal services, the Crown Prosecution Service and other government legal offices. The intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is extremely helpful, because it puts on record what a rich seam there is to be mined in those public appointments, and counterpoints the point that I have made several times from this Dispatch Box: that the public service has managed to make far more progress in promoting diversity over the past decades than has the private. We may learn lessons from that.
The Government are keen that members of the employed legal professions should take up judicial roles for which they are eligible, as like noble Lords, we are of the view that this could be a useful route to increasing diversity as well as ensuring that the Government can attract the best lawyers.
However, it has been the policy of successive Lord Chancellors that Crown Prosecution Service and other government lawyers when holding judicial office do not sit on cases involving their department. For CPS lawyers, this means that they cannot sit as recorders in the criminal courts, as the overwhelming majority of cases are prosecuted by the CPS.
Under the previous Administration, in 2003 the restrictions on applications by government lawyers were relaxed partially, and CPS lawyers became eligible for appointment as deputy district judges in magistrates’ courts. However, this was still on the basis that they did not sit on CPS-prosecuted cases, and therefore few roles are available.
The policy is based on the need to comply with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that litigants are entitled to be heard in front of an independent and impartial tribunal. Given those constraints, we need to think more creatively around the concept of a judicial career and how experience in one area can support subsequent appointment to judicial office in another area.
Opportunities are available for government lawyers to apply for judicial office. The published Judicial Appointments Commission programme for 2012-13 includes more than 300 vacancies for fee-paid office, which would be open to government lawyers to apply for. It is therefore important to communicate those opportunities available to government lawyers and to encourage them to take up judicial roles for which they are eligible—not least as this could be another useful route to increase diversity in the judiciary.
I am personally committed to playing a part in raising awareness of these opportunities. I recently met the Treasury Solicitor to discuss the best way to communicate them. I am also happy to consider any suggestions for changes to the current restrictions that apply to government lawyers to see whether we can go any further than the current practice—without, of course, infringing the rights to an independent and fair trial. When I met the Treasury Solicitor, I said that I was willing to write articles, go to seminars, or whatever, to raise the profile and awareness of those opportunities. As this is a probing amendment, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will believe that we are responding in this area and withdraw it.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I will certainly carefully consider what the Minister said. At the moment, he has given no reason why not to publish guidance that Parliament can consider. I invite him to consider whether guidance could be published regularly so that the issue is looked at with much more of a searchlight than at the moment. I will consider what the Minister said, in exchange for him agreeing—he is nodding—to consider what I said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, this is a short point about the Judicial Appointments Commission. Schedule 12 allows for equality between judicial members of the Judicial Appointments Commission and everyone else. I want to change that to make it clear that the judicial members will always be in the minority. As noble Lords will know, no one holds the judges in more admiration than me. One thing that is clear in the current process is that the judges’ views on appointing judges are very well expressed. Part of the reason for having the Judicial Appointments Commission was to bring in other people to the appointments process. I would like there to be judges on the Judicial Appointments Commission, but I would not want them to be, as it were, a blocking equality. I would be perfectly happy if they were in the most substantial minority. That is what I wish to reflect in the amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, if I could short-circuit debate on this, this is a very interesting proposal. I would like to take it away, consider it and bring it back on Report.
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
“Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate) designated under section 23 of that Act
Deputy Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate) designated under that section
(3A) In Table 1 of Part 1 omit the entries for the following former offices—
Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate) designated under subsection (2) of section 10A of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997
Deputy Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate) designated under that subsection”
Lord McNally
“(b) in paragraph (c) for “(3)(c)” substitute “(3)(d)”.”
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
Lord McNally