Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2017

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Tuesday 21st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, in addition to adding to the tributes to the noble Earl, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, on his persistence in trying to persuade the Government to hold this debate—the first one in which I have taken part whose title comprises three separate subjects.

I declare an interest as a former council member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, because the starting point of my contribution is the conclusion reached in the most recent publication in its Adelphi series, entitled Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Charter of War, in which, as a former soldier, I found it sad to read:

“In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and its allies came extremely close to strategic defeat, due to inadequate leadership, reconstruction efforts, political strategy, military strategy, operational concepts, tactics and equipment. These shortfalls combined with failures, at every level, to adapt quickly enough to unforeseen circumstances, provided opportunities that were exploited by insurgents and militias”.


These are harsh and sobering words, particularly in the context of today’s uncertain world, when the United Kingdom, whose Armed Forces are now weaker than at any time in the last 200 years, has embarked on leaving the Union of its closest geographical allies.

The other interest that I must declare is as a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, in which capacity I have already voiced my concern that—despite the lessons of the imperfect 2010 strategic defence and security review, and in defiance of their undertaking to base SDSR 2015 on the national security strategy—the Government published both at the same time. I submit that, in the light of Brexit, SDSR 2015 is now out of date and ought to be reviewed. Of course, we remain a member of NATO, but it is feeling the draught of President Trump’s variance from the long-accepted wisdom that the provision of a large NATO commitment is vital for the security of the United States, and not merely a favour to Europe.

The most visible evidence of that membership is the 2% of GDP that we guarantee to spend on defence—to the inadequacy of which, in real terms, I am not surprised that so many noble Lords have drawn attention. I note, too, that, in this year’s Military Balance, the IISS has suggested that spending amounted only to 1.98%, because the actual amount is blurred by pensions and other associated, rather than actual, costs. In this connection I must repeat what I have said many times in this House: namely, that, like the noble Lord, Lord West, I regret the coalition Government’s decision to lay the cost of the nuclear deterrent on the defence budget. I have also mentioned Field Marshal Lord Carver’s two definitions of affordability: whether you can afford something, and whether you can afford to give up what you have to give up in order to afford it. I suggest that the question of whether you can afford to give up capabilities such as the size of the Army or the number of surface ships needs to be re-examined in the context of today’s uncertainties.

Currently, the West, including both NATO and the EU, are preoccupied with the production of cohesive responses to the various challenges being posed by Russia. In theory, this should encourage European states, including the United Kingdom, to increase their focus on defence, including defence spending. However, rather than just spending more, they need to spend more smartly. Boosting R&D and equipment spending, and driving industrial collaboration, will prove, in the long term, to be much more useful than simply aiming to meet arbitrary financial targets.

Post Brexit, I hope that the United Kingdom will still be able to play a part in EU security structures. Europe’s defence R&D has long been fragmented, with only minimal co-ordination and collaboration. But, in light of the European Commission’s plan—as part of the European Defence Action Plan—to boost defence procurement and establish a European defence fund for defence technology and equipment R&D, I hope that we will also maintain access to EU-wide science and technology developments.

The only word one can use with certainty about the future is “uncertainty”. Currently, the NSS Joint Committee is conducting an inquiry into the national cybersecurity strategy, in the context of which I have been thinking about the whole concept of deterrence, to which cyber adds a new factor. Deterrence must have a strategic goal of preventing crisis, not just responding to it. But what is required to wage deterrence today is more complex than in the days of the uncertain stability of the Cold War. It includes not only operational analysis, strategy development, planning and execution, but understanding and achieving the integration of hard and soft power. In addition, Governments need to understand the potential uncertain regional and global effect that deterrent actions may have on actors other than the adversary, including allies. More significantly, the rise of non-state threats and the pursuit of offensive cybercapabilities and long-range precision conventional capabilities by some nuclear-armed states bring further risk and uncertainly to the efficacy of nuclear deterrence.

In addition to nuclear and cyber, we must not forget that conventional levers play an essential part in promoting our defence and security interests. As so much has happened in the interim, it is easy to forget the so-called revolution in military affairs and its presumption that,

“greatly improved surveillance, communications and precision-strike weapons would produce superior knowledge of the enemy and better-targeted and more effective strikes and manoeuvre, allowing a modernised and networked force to defeat a larger but less modernised one”.

That was announced only in 2001, before the burgeoning of wars among the people. Sadly, it will be some time before British forces are modernised sufficiently for our contribution to NATO’s readiness action plan to allow a credible full-time spectrum combat capability against a peer competitor such as Russia.

Returning to my earlier point about the size of the Army, any plans to increase the size of the forces we can deploy overseas—and the speed with which they can deploy—as many other noble Lords have pointed out, are more likely to be limited by personnel numbers than equipment availability. If we are to meet the challenges to the international rules-based order, and increase our preparedness to satisfy defence and security interests, I agree entirely with my noble friend Lord Hennessy that we should take a cold, hard look at the future, starting with an examination of whether the SDSR 2015 is fit for purpose.