Armed Forces Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence
Thursday 7th September 2023

(8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Risby Portrait Lord Risby (Con)
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My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Soames for securing this most timely debate, deploying his immense experience and knowledge of defence matters. The refreshed integrated review and the 2023 defence Command Paper represent a concerted effort to target Britain’s foreign policy where it is most able to have impact. The documents are forthright in acknowledging the changing nature of the rules-based international system and the myriad threats to it, but we need to step up British efforts to defend this system. However, it would have been inconceivable to have predicted the international environment as it exists today.

I will say just a few words about Ukraine, a country I have visited many times, including Crimea, in my capacity as the former chairman of the British Ukrainian Society. We are aware of the millions of Ukrainians who have sought refuge elsewhere, but let us remind ourselves of the huge internal displacement. Every week I get emails from Ukraine and, despite the economic situation, the splitting up of families and the atrocious Russian drone attacks, Ukrainians never, ever complain. Their stoicism and resilience are astonishing and very humbling for us all. The decision to begin the training associated with Operation Orbital in 2015 and what followed paid dividends, and the gratitude of Ukraine towards us is enormous. The leadership shown by this country, and the role of Ben Wallace, are universally acknowledged there.

President Putin has talked and written about Ukrainians and Russians being effectively one people and one country; this is absolutely not the view of Ukrainians. He argued that he invaded Ukraine because of a threat by NATO via Ukraine. Now, despite all the Russian threats, Sweden and Finland have abandoned their former neutrality; despite a hesitant initial response from some NATO countries, 22 of NATO’s 31 members have increased defence spending; imports of Russian fossil fuels have been dramatically curtailed; and new defence and foreign policy structures have led to much more strategic convergence. But Putin’s major miscalculation has been on the focus and generosity of the United States. It is not the first time that this country thousands of miles away has ridden to the rescue, and thank heavens this has happened again. Far from abandoning Europe, it would have been impossible without the US for Ukraine to have fought back so effectively. Our relationship with the United States today, in intelligence, security and defence matters, is hugely appreciated in Kyiv and must be retained.

Russia’s grotesque war of aggression against Ukraine shows how developments in the Euro-Atlantic area can affect countries in the Indo-Pacific, which the 2021 integrated review tilt has now developed further. As Penny Wong, Australia’s Foreign Minister, said at King’s College in London earlier this year:

“In our modern, tightly-woven world, what happens in Europe reverberates in the Indo-Pacific. And what happens in the Indo-Pacific reverberates in Europe. No region—indeed, no country—is an island”.


Our relationship with Australia has developed exponentially. Its defence strategic review of April this year is particularly focused on naval modernisation and long-range maritime strike forces, reflecting the aggressive activities of China in the region. The initial AUKUS partnership links us to Australia and the United States, reflecting a common analysis of the region’s challenges but also offering greater longevity to our own shipbuilding industries. This new partnership reflects our shared values. We can be pleased that Australia is building important relationships with countries such as India, Indonesia and the Philippines. Just as European countries have re-established common defence objectives—for example, the UK, Japan and Italy’s global combat air programme—so we see the same in Japan and Korea.

However the Ukraine war ends, Russia is likely to retain its sea and air capabilities essentially intact. The United Kingdom is one of its least favourite countries, and we remind ourselves that China does not share our view of international maritime law. Defence spending has at times in the past been seen as lacking electoral appeal. The last few years have been a dramatic wake-up call, to which we now absolutely have to respond.