Defence Reform Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 24th March 2014 Lords Chamber

I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

As the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, said, she also raised the issue of interception capabilities in Committee when she referred to concerns over the relevance of existing legislation in the light of rapid advancements in technology, the level of application of that technology by in particular American forces operating from UK soil and the extent to which UK law did or did not apply to them.

The amendment moved by the noble Baroness does of course refer to,

“officers of other states resident in the United Kingdom”,

and officers of other states acting within the jurisdiction.

I presume, therefore, that the amendment is nation-neutral and is intended to refer equally to other countries, although I am not sure that it is intended to cover any such activities being undertaken by, for example, embassy officials of such other countries.

As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the Interception Commissioner, as I understand it, already monitors intercepted data, including of the Ministry of Defence, so I assume that is not the real issue since that individual reports annually to Parliament and to the Prime Minister. The Government have stated that if visiting forces want to undertake interception activities covered by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act a proper authorisation must be obtained, that such authorisations are overseen by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, and that covert surveillance powers are subject to separate oversight arrangements through the Chief Surveillance Commissioner.

In relation to foreign military personnel, the extent to which they are exempt from local jurisdiction is regulated through status of forces agreements negotiated between the sending and the host nation, which allow a sending state’s military forces to operate within, and at the consent of, the host state.

In 1951 NATO agreed a status of forces agreement covering hosting arrangements between the alliance’s member states, and thus from our perspective applies equally to visiting forces in the UK and to British forces based in NATO countries. The 1952 Visiting Forces Act incorporated the NATO status of forces agreement into UK law. The Act and the agreement provide for foreign laws and military discipline to apply to foreign military personnel in the UK, but such personnel are still subject to UK law, and this arrangement applies equally to our forces when they are overseas. The Armed Forces Act 1996 extended the Visiting Forces Act to third countries by Order in Council.

The Government have said that the US visiting forces are thus subject to both US and UK law. At present I believe that around 9,500 US military personnel and supporting civilian staff are permanently based at various locations throughout the United Kingdom. Most UK military bases involved are used by the United States Air Force, but RAF Menwith Hill is used by the US National Security Agency. The United States visiting force is responsible for internal security at the bases that have been made available to them. The parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee has oversight of the intelligence activities undertaken by RAF Menwith Hill, and the Government have stated that the mission at RAF Menwith Hill is conducted in accordance with UK law and with the knowledge and consent of the UK Government. The United States visiting force also declares its inventory of weapons in the UK annually to the MoD, which ensures that all weapons are appropriately licensed and stored, and the storage of US munitions on bases in the UK is governed by a 1997 agreement between the UK and the US.

I listened to the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, just as I listened to the Minister’s response in Committee, when he gave the Government’s assurance that oversight mechanisms were in place and covered any person subject to UK law performing such activities in the UK. Clearly the Government have a responsibility to make sure that appropriate arrangements are in place to ensure that we know what is going on in our own country in the field of military and security activity, including interception of communications and surveillance, and that what is happening conforms to UK law. That means that the Government have to satisfy themselves that both oversight mechanisms and the law continue to keep pace with increasingly sophisticated technological developments. I hope that in responding the Minister will be able to assure us that that is, and indeed will continue to be, the case, not only because a Government must know what is going on within their own borders in these vital areas, but to address some of the questions and concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, in moving her amendment today.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, for raising and giving an airing to this subject. I can only hope that this will not be the end of the discussion of this important matter. The point was made as to whether this amendment was within the remit of the Bill. I like to think that this is going to be not one that we will necessarily vote on today, but one that we will come back to in greater detail bearing in mind the reply from my noble friend the Minister.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, went into great detail, and I certainly do not intend to repeat his comments, but I share many of his concerns about the assurances that he seeks. Do my noble friend the Minister and the Ministry of Defence believe that, with our reduced Army, Navy and Air Force, we are more vulnerable without such interception? No one likes the breaking of privacy and no one likes secrecy, but with our Army being reduced by 20,000, our Navy by 5,000 and our RAF by 5,000 personnel, and with the increase in the Reserve Forces, which we will deal with later in the Bill, rising very slowly to reach the 30,000 level, how important is that interception, and how important is it that it is reported and transparent, as my noble friend Lady Miller asked?

That is brought very much to the forefront of our minds with the problems in Ukraine. What help or hindrance does such interception cause in the present climate of hostilities? Overall, how should such transparency be effected on forces such as those of the United States operating on UK soil?