Lord Russell of Liverpool
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(1 day, 4 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I absolutely congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, on her excellently motivated amendment. It is very thought provoking. In particular, this sentence caught my attention:
“The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual”.
That is one of the most difficult challenges. For some years I have been involved in the grooming gangs scandal, and one of the most horrible parts of that was when the police took the decision that the young 14 or 15 year-old, precocious though she—a general “she”—may have been, was somehow actively consenting to her own rape or sexual exploitation. It was about the notion of this being a child, because the young girl may have looked more adult—it was literally as superficial as that—and about the type, if we are honest, in class terms. Therefore, it was said that she could not be a victim and she was accused of being a prostitute, and so on. We are familiar with that. That is the reason why that sentence stood out to me.
However, I have some qualms, and I want to ask genuinely what we do about those qualms, because I do not know where to go. I am slightly worried, because county lines gangs, as the noble Baroness will know, are a young men’s game. Some of the gang leaders are younger than one would ever want to imagine in your worst nightmare. That is a problem with this, in a way, and with how you work it out. If you have a general rule that this is always a child, how do you deal with the culpability and responsibility of a 17 year-old thug, not to put too fine a point on it, who is exploiting younger people or even his—and it is generally “his”—peers? I am not sure how to square that with what I have just said. It also seems that there is a major clash with the age of criminal responsibility. I am very sympathetic with that not being 10, but how do you deal with the belief that someone aged under 18 is a child, yet we say that a child has criminal responsibility? Perhaps I am just misunderstanding something.
My final reservation is that if we say that everybody under 18 has to be a victim all the time, would that be a legal loophole that would get people off when there was some guilt for them to be held to account for? I generally support this amendment, but I want some clarification on how to muddle my way through those moral thickets, if possible.
My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Baroness on how she moved the amendment. It is very nice to see a Government Back-Bencher introducing an amendment and taking part; I wish we had slightly more of it.
To bring one back to Professor Jay’s review of child criminal exploitation, she made several important recommendations, of which the first and arguably most important is at the heart of what we are talking about at the moment. She called for a single, cohesive legal code for children exploited into criminal activity, and detailed what that needed to contain. The noble Baroness’s amendment goes to the heart of that matter. Having well-meaning explanations put into advice or regulation is not enough. There needs not only to be a common understanding across all government departments and agencies involved in dealing with these children and gangs; it needs to be completely clear for the police in particular, who are clearly looking into the criminal activity, exactly what it is and what it is not.
With the next amendment, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, and I shall speak, we will talk about ways in which a child who is both a victim and perpetrator can be defended—but we will discuss that in the next group. As for this group, I think that I probably speak for all noble Lords who are concerned about this issue in saying that absolute clarity about the definition, so there is no argument about it whatever, would be a giant step forward. The best-meaning attempts to deal with child criminal exploitation over the past decade have been hindered severely by the lack of consistency.
I ask the Government to listen very carefully to what the noble Baroness has asked for. She has said clearly that her wording may not be perfect—I think that in many Bills the wording is not necessarily perfect, even in the final Act—but we have a chance to get this right. I look forward to what the Minister says in response.
I appreciate my noble friend’s comments. If she will bear with me, I will come on to that point in a moment. I am doing this in a structured order to try to address the points that are before the Committee today.
I say to my noble friend Lady Brown that, within the Bill, we are also taking the power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers. The noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend have looked at that, and I will return to it in a moment. The guidance will include a descriptive definition of CCE, setting out in lay person’s terms the conduct captured by the offence, and will provide practical guidance on how the CCE offence and orders should be applied.
An important point, to go particularly to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, is that in Clause 60—which we will come to in later considerations—the Secretary of State has power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise of their functions in connection with the prevention, detection and investigation of CCE offences and CCE prevention orders. I hope that the Committee will recognise that, importantly, the relevant police officers will be under a legal duty to have due regard to that statutory guidance when exercising functions in relation to the CCE offences and the CCE prevention orders. On the question of the statutory guidance, which my noble friend and others have touched on, the guidance has not been issued yet because the relevant legislation has not yet received the consent of this House or indeed Royal Assent. On the applicability of both of those conditions, statutory guidance under Clause 60 will be issued, which will place a legal duty on police officers to adhere to it.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned a very important point. There is a clear difference in what my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown has put forward, supported by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I hope this helps: the forms of conduct that are likely to enable a child to commit criminality are expected in most cases to also meet the test of conduct by an adult intended to cause, or facilitate the causing of, a child to commit a future crime. The nature of the offence, which is broad and large, will ensure that it captures offenders who will use children for crime. I believe that that is the right format. Both my noble friends have said that “enable” is a critical word. I believe that a separate definition is unnecessary, as it would have no legal impact over and above what is already in the Bill. It could cause confusion among police and prosecutors about which definition they should be applying.
The statutory guidance, which I emphasise will gave a legal bass and will be issued under Clause 60, is the appropriate place to provide the extra detail to understand proposals that are covered by the amendment, but which are already in scope of the clear and simple legal terms of Clause 40. I know that that is the defence that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti expected me to use, but it is the defence: Clause 40 is what it is, and the guidance will also be statutory.
While statutory guidance is welcome, this particular case has similarities to other areas of the criminal law where the motivations and behaviours are complex, such as stalking and various areas of domestic abuse. In every case where regulation has been put in such a way that it becomes statutory, unless that goes hand in hand with appropriate and quite intensive training, you can have as many regulations as you like, as legally watertight as you like, but if the officials who are charged with implementing it do not understand the complexity that they are dealing with and cannot define and understand exactly how to apply the regulations, you are going to have confusion. We have a lot of history of that not happening. Good intentions are one thing; what actually happens when you put it out there and expect that everybody will understand and comply with it is another, and that is a concern that a lot of us have.
My Lords, I was very happy to add my name, alongside that of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, to this amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who indicated that he wanted to speak before me. He has done sterling service by saying a great deal of what I was going to say, so I will not bore your Lordships with that.
I have one or two confessions. On Methodism, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, that I come from several generations of Methodist ministers—the Reverends MacDonald—one of whom was one of John Wesley’s original disciples. At some point, my family slightly lost the plot and became lapsed Anglicans, like I suspect a lot of your Lordships.
If the Minister is kind enough to mention me again in his response, in promoting me to an Earl, he is doing a disservice to the direct descendant of Lord John Russell, an ex-Prime Minister. I call in evidence a letter that my grandfather and the grandfather of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, wrote to the editor of the Times in 1961, saying: “Dear Sir, we would like to point out that neither of us is the other. Yours, Russell, Russell of Liverpool”. I had to say the same thing to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, when she also inadvertently promoted me.
I again point out that this proposed new clause has the absolute support of Professor Jay, who has looked into this issue in more detail than any of the rest of us. I am a great believer that, when trying to argue the case for something, we should not talk about it in abstract or general terms but try to personalise it by talking about a real-life case which perhaps indicates the virtue of having an order such as this. Therefore, I will give a real-life example from the work done by Action for Children.
There is a 16 year-old young man with ADHD who is experiencing significant criminal exploitation, including daily cannabis use, coercion through drug debt and regular threats of violence. His engagement with support services, unsurprisingly, is somewhat inconsistent and is often influenced by the level of control and threats of violence exerted by the exploiters. The police have already made him subject to a youth referral order for drug and weapon offences, but law enforcement has deprioritised his case due to a perceived lack of co-operation. In the circumstances the young man finds himself in, a lack of co-operation with law enforcement is perhaps somewhat understandable. Recent incidents that have occurred to this young man include a violent attack on his home by individuals linked to his exploitation. One of his perpetrators is housed in the same residential block of flats as him, which must be somewhat unpleasant. The young person remains fearful for his and his mother’s safety, but he is unwilling to disclose information, which currently limits statutory intervention options.
If we had this order, it would enable the authorities to protect that young man and his mother by stopping him from contacting certain people. Following what the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, it would mandate him turning up to appointments with support services. It would restrict and monitor his movements to create a distance from the exploiters. In the case of serious threat of harm, or in an instance where a perpetrator is living almost next door, it would also give the authorities the ability to provide alternative accommodation to protect that young person and his family.
For all those reasons, I wish and hope that the Minister and his department will look at this very carefully. A relatively small percentage of child victims and perpetrators may be involved, but to protect them in the way we have described would be effective, proportionate and worth while.
My Lords, I chair a commission on forced marriage. One of the most useful things that the Labour Government did in 2007 was create a forced marriage protection order. That was intended to deal with the perpetrators rather than the victims. However, having listened to the speeches so far, I realised that I had not thought of protection orders being for the victim rather than to prevent the victim being dealt with.
It is an admirable scheme. I was much touched by the story that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, gave to us. One thing that would make it most useful is to deal with parents. My experience is not so much in this area, but when I was a family judge, one of the problems, particularly in care cases, was the inability of the parents to manage their children. Very often, the children were very well meaning, but they absolutely would not do what their parents said. Is anybody who is a parent surprised? As a grandparent, I am even less surprised by the fact that children, if they are told to do something by a parent, will not do it—just out of bloody-mindedness, apart from anything else.
This would offer a genuine ability to look after a child who is being exploited and is extremely vulnerable, but whose parents, trying as hard as they can, cannot manage him or her. This would give them the power, apart from the authorities, to do something useful—and useful not just for the child but for the state.