Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

I thank the noble Baroness. I note that my former tutorial partner from Oxford was intervened on, or interrupted, for speaking for too long beyond 10 minutes. I shall endeavour still to be within 10 minutes despite having been doubly intervened on.

The report noted that the committee had not taken evidence from terminally ill people. I will leave it at that in terms of responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. However, we took evidence, as we were requested to do, on safeguarding and procedures, and, within the confines of a very brief committee, we took a wide range of evidence. Should we and could we have taken more? Absolutely, but within the confines of what we were able to do I think we did a job. I certainly did not at any point speak or vote against, or indeed take any view on, the idea that we should not take evidence from terminally ill people, so it is unfortunate that that has become a topic of debate.

The reason I rose to speak is that the question of capacity versus ability is hugely important. There are references throughout the Bill to the Mental Capacity Act, but to suggest that this one amendment is not appropriate is an unfortunate legal point. The amendment says that people should have the ability to make the decision, but “ability” reaches far beyond the narrow confines of the Mental Capacity Act. At various points in Committee, we will talk about capacity. The committee took evidence on capacity, and a key thing to bear in mind about the Mental Capacity Act is that it was never designed for a life or death decision. We need to be very clear as a Committee of the whole House and as parliamentarians—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The Mental Capacity Act is used in life and death issues in healthcare. If someone decides not to have care, the doctor has to ensure that that person has capacity to make that decision, so it is already used in that way.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that the Mental Capacity Act is used for life and death issues, but it certainly was not designed for assisted dying and I suggest that it is not a robust test for these particular purposes. If we are going to pass this legislation, we need to be sure that we have tests that are as robust as possible.

A particular point that we need to bear in mind is that the legislation was not drafted in the way that it is normally drafted; it was done in a way that was described as “on a shoestring”. It is surely up to your Lordships’ House and the other place to ensure that the provisions we have in place do not look as though they have been made on a shoestring. They need to be robust. Decisions about capacity can be taken at a moment in time. We need to ensure that the decision where someone says, “Yes, I think I want an assisted death”, is when they are at a later stage in their illness.

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[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, earlier on in the debate, there was a discussion concerning members of the committee, on who was or was not called, or who was denied the right to be called to it. I suggest that the straitjacket of the time this House allocated probably did not allow the relevant committee the appropriate time to call everyone that it thought was appropriate. It ought to have been given more time, but it seems that it had to be rushed.

Concerning the Mental Capacity Act, Margaret Flynn, chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, said it was designed to protect us

“when others start to make decisions about our lives … Assisted dying was not on the table during the Law Commission’s consultation which resulted in the MCA”.

Therefore, the suitability of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 as a test for a decision to end one’s life is a major source of debate. I believe the many experts and professionals arguing that it is insufficient for this specific irreversible decision.

The MCA was not designed for assisted dying. It was created to safeguard people who lack capacity in decisions about their care, treatment or finances. Assisted dying was not on the table during the Law Commission’s consultation. The Royal College of Physicians, as the noble Lord said a moment ago, said that applying the MCA to the decision to end one’s life is an entirely novel test in uncharted territory with no experience or precedent. It is a very low threshold. The Royal College of Physicians argues that assessing a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their life is an entirely different and more complex determination, requiring a higher level of understanding than assessing capacity for treatment decisions.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I have listened very carefully to the noble Lord and a number of others. I am still struggling to understand what the higher test of ability would be, over and above the Mental Capacity Act. Will the noble Lord let the House know what that higher test is that people would have to go through on ability rather than capacity?

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

The noble Lord knows that I am not a proposer of the change of words. I am dealing with capacity. Therefore, I am also dealing with the fact that professionals within the field have stated that to use the Mental Capacity Act for a decision to end one’s life is an entirely novel test and uncharted territory for which there is no experience or precedent. That is not my statement; that is the statement of professionals within the field. They say also that to decide to use it for the decision to end one’s life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding than assessing capacity for treating decisions.

Capacity can fluctuate in terminally ill patients due to physical fatigue, illness, medication or delirium, making the irreversibility of the decision risky under this framework. Therefore, I ask this Committee to think carefully in trying to base its whole argument on this being good legislation because mental capacity is the deciding factor.

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[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

There is never enough training—let us assess that.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

If I may help the noble Baroness, the answer is that the Oliver McGowan training—which is a statutory requirement for all doctors—is now in place. It is high-level training on both capacity and of dealing with people who are vulnerable.

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal (Lab)]

My Lords, I have hesitated to intervene at this point because we are going to come later to talk about capacity and why the Mental Capacity Act and its definition does not fit well with this Bill. I am disappointed in the way in which the last few comments have turned this debate, not least because all of us belong to professional bodies which express collective views on our behalf and have to be respected. It is disappointing that we should have in this House an attack on a view which is expressed by a professional body in this way.

However, there are real reason as to why the Mental Capacity Act is seen as having deficiency in this context, which it normally does not have. It is a fine piece of legislation that we were very proud to introduce, and it has given liberty, capacity and the opportunity to be heard to many people who had limited capacity in the past. I give quarter to no one about the power of that Act.

But is the Mental Capacity Act perfect when we come to consider this particular issue? It is not. Why is it not? Because you can have and suffer from a mental illness and still have capacity. Yet we know that, when individuals are faced with the terrible diagnosis that they are to die, and their families are distraught, and they themselves have to face that reality, depression is not abnormal; it is normal. The fact is that some of those people, many of whom we know, some of whom are within our families, some of whom have suffered deeply, contemplate whether it would not be simpler, easier, less painful for everyone if they simply ended their lives. But what else do we know? We know that, when that depression bites, there is means of alleviation. We know that, with good palliative care, they can be enabled to make an informed decision. That informed decision may be that they still want to take a step, but the opportunity to get that support is essential.

Yet when we look at the capacity Act, the fact that someone is deeply depressed does not mean that they lack capacity within the meaning of the Act—