Financial Services Bill

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 14th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to support government Amendment 14, and congratulate my noble friend and the ministerial team on listening to concerns expressed across the House, and in particular, in echoing my noble friend Lord Holmes, for introducing the follow-up provisions under the affirmative procedure. I will also address, perhaps more supportively than other noble Lords, my noble friend’s Amendment 35. I must say that I am increasingly envious of my noble friend Lady Noakes and, in particular, the rather splendid account that she had previously with the Bank of England. She must be torn, not wanting to destroy her rather splendid cheque book. For security purposes, she might err on the side of caution and do so.

My noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond has done the House a great service by raising this issue. Yes, we can debate whether it should be a Bank of England account, which I understand no longer exists; perhaps this is not the right time to revisit that. I have become increasingly concerned—as, I know, have many in consumer circles with much greater knowledge than I about this—by the way in which one’s credit score can be disadvantaged. All sorts of extraordinary things seem to be happening at the moment, without us even knowing. We are apparently encouraged to do regular credit checks; I did, and was delighted to see that on one, the Experian account, my credit score was sound. But apparently the Government have discontinued Experian, so I do not know to whom to address that in future.

This raises the issue of those who have a poor credit score and are having trouble finding a bank account. My noble friend Lord Holmes has identified the difficulties in doing so. If it is not the wish of the Government to support the terms of Amendment 35, I hope that the Minister responding to this debate will nevertheless look carefully at the circumstances by which it is becoming increasingly difficult for those with poor credit scores to access even the most basic banking services.

I understand what my noble friend Lady Noakes said about how we are coming under increasing commercial pressure to make banks’ retail services financially viable. This is causing great concern for those of us in rural areas, because it is increasingly difficult to keep small rural branches open. To me, they perform a social function as much as anything, particularly for local shops, in banking their cash, allowing them to access bank accounts and, for example, banking their money when there has been a local mart. My noble friend has identified these very real concerns and I hope that the Government look on them sympathetically.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on government Amendment 14 and say a few words in support of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, because of his ongoing campaigns and successes in making us think harder about financial inclusion and the use that could and should be made of fintech, in reaching out to those who are not provided for by the financial system. Government Amendment 14 has our support because, as seems obvious from the Woolard review and other comments, there is an issue around this new-technology approach to purchasing.

Buy now, pay later has all the ring of a scam around it although, having talked to some providers and looked at their business plans in more detail, it seems to be a well worked-through and carefully crafted approach to the process of trying to buy goods, mainly. It may also apply to other services. Those on reasonable budgets who are unable to pay, with confidence, the amount for the goods that they are purchasing get the benefit of the opportunity to spread the payment over more than one month—the majority are for three months—largely at the expense of the retailer. The amounts are small and the sanctions applied by the providers are severe: you get dropped if you miss a payment or two.

There does not seem to be a sense of some of the fringe approaches that were available in other schemes that the House has looked at and which we have read about in the papers. In a sense, this may not be quite the scam and worry that we thought it was when the Woolard review came out, but the Government are right to ensure that the regulatory book is in order and that there is an opportunity to keep a close watch on this, and to act, as and when required.

Therefore, although it is unusual for the Opposition to offer powers to the Government in this way, we are reassured by the way that they have approached this, having brought us into the discussion and debate. We are aware that any regulations brought forward will, in practice, be under the affirmative basis and therefore open to scrutiny within your Lordships’ House and elsewhere in Parliament. We support this approach, even though to do so is slightly unusual. We think that doing it this way is a good move by the Government and hope that it will not be necessary, in the sense of some of the scare stories that we have read about. But if it is, at least the powers are banked.

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

This is an important Bill and I record my formal thanks to my noble friends on the Front Bench for the way that they listened to the earlier debates. Here, we have evidence in this first set of amendments, certainly Amendment 14, that not only have they listened but we are getting a positive response.

Amendment 14 is good and I support it. I am delighted to hear that we will have a consultation with stakeholders. I wonder whether Her Majesty’s Government could produce a list of those whom they think they are going to consult, because a number of us know a fair amount about the fringes of the financial world and there may be a section missing.

On buy now, pay later, I remember that when I started buying things that I could not afford there was a technique called hire purchase. That was very similar and there were all sorts of arguments when I got into politics, while HP was still active, on the nuances of the HP world. The same applies now, so I say well done on Amendment 14. I look forward to seeing the consultation and hope to take part myself. As someone who has sat in the chair, I will welcome enormously having an affirmative resolution when it comes back. I also ask my noble friend the Minister to make sure that the Financial Ombudsman Service and claims management companies fall within the circumference of this consultation, because they are important to this large market. It is buy now, pay later, in a sense, but not the modern version; it was historically called home-collected credit.

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Moved by

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

17: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Bills of Sale Act 1878 and Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882
(1) The Bills of Sale Act 1878 and the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 are repealed.(2) In consequence of the repeals made by subsection (1), the following are also repealed—(a) the Bills of Sale Act 1890;(b) the Bills of Sale Act 1891;(c) section 23 of the Administration of Justice Act 1925;(d) in Schedule 11 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, in paragraph 4(3), the entry relating to the Bills of Sale Act 1878;(e) in Schedule 13 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, paragraphs 17 to 19;(f) in Schedule 9 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, paragraph 15.”Member’s explanatory statement
Bills of Sale are mainly used for “log book loans”, one of the last sources of high cost credit. They are governed by two Victorian statutes which the Law Commission recommended in 2017 should be repealed. This amendment is to further probe the Government's plans to review that recommendation.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am speaking to Amendment 17, which has been retabled in the same form in which it appeared in Committee. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for her support, and I look forward to her contribution and that of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, in due course. I also thank other noble Lords who have spoken on various amendments we have considered over the passage of this Bill that all relate to the devastating impact that high-cost credit can have on those who borrow from such providers. We are gradually reducing the number of these providers, which is a good thing, but we still need initiatives for the growth of low-cost credit sources, which are urgently needed to replace them.

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[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, again I thank all those who have spoken in this slightly shorter debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, very much for his continued engagement with all aspects of the Bill and with the underlying issues of credit—on which he has long been such a distinguished advocate—and for his interest in this issue. I hope I will be able to give him an assurance that he will find satisfactory.

First, however, I must respond to my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Holmes, who asked about the Law Commission report. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also alluded to it. I set out in Committee the reasoning behind the Government’s decision not to take forward their proposed goods mortgages Bill, which had followed from the Law Commission report, in 2018. That Bill would have repealed the bills of sale Acts and replaced them with a new goods mortgages Act, and it was the result of the Law Commission’s report on bills of sale, to which my noble friends referred.

However, when the Government consulted on the proposed goods mortgages Bill, the consultation responses—not all of them, I confess, but the serious responses—showed that while there was broad support for the proposed approach set out in the Bill, some stakeholders raised significant concerns about the degree of consumer protection afforded by the proposed regime. Furthermore, there was a risk that a more modernised, streamlined regime for consumers could lead to more consumers using goods that they already owned as security for a loan, which is inherently a higher-risk form of borrowing. Given the concerns raised in the consultation and the shrinking size of the market, the Government decided not to take forward the goods mortgages Bill. Still, I highlight again that the use of logbook loans has fallen substantially and continues to decline: the number of bills of sale registered at the High Court has fallen from 52,000 in 2014 to just 3,758 in 2020—and a little higher the previous year. Obviously, we will watch this figure.

A number of other points were also raised in Committee. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, raised the cost of logbook loans. It has been suggested that some of these loans have very high interest rates. There is already a power for the FCA to cap the cost of all forms of credit, including logbook loans. It will use that power where it thinks it is necessary to protect consumers. Most recently, it capped the cost of rent-to-own products in March 2019.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh questioned in Committee why a model that used hire purchase could not be used for logbook loans. Hire purchase is a financing option that allows borrowers to hire a car and then gives them the option to buy it by the end of the contract. This model would be inappropriate for borrowers who already own their vehicle, as ownership of a vehicle should automatically revert to the borrower when they have repaid their loan.

I turn to the amendment itself. As I explained in Committee, it is likely to have unintended consequences that could lead to a greater risk of detriment, particularly to borrowers. The repeal of the bills of sale Acts would not necessarily prevent this type of credit being offered. Rather, it would remove the statutory framework that governs this type of credit, which could inadvertently lead to a greater use of such lending through the removal of some of the frictions to which some who have spoken have alluded—“frictions” is a polite Treasury word—that the bills of sale Acts impose. Given that, the Government do not believe that repealing the bills of sale Acts would be an effective way of increasing protection for borrowers. Furthermore, the Government do not believe that it would be proportionate to introduce new legislation to specifically implement a replacement for the bills of sale Acts, given the continued decline in their use.

However, I recognise the strength of the feelings of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on the subject of logbook loans, and I have heard the echoes that his resounding voice has provoked. I understand that he wants to know what plans the Government have to review the regulatory treatment of logbook loans. I have had the opportunity to discuss this issue with the noble Lord. As we look beyond the Covid-19 crisis, the Government are keen that work should progress to consider reform of the broader consumer credit regulatory framework to ensure that it remains fit for purpose. That is a substantial piece of work. As part of it, I can give the noble Lord the specific assurance that he asked for: the Government will consider the extent to which that regulatory framework can provide robust protections for logbook-loan borrowers and third parties who may unknowingly buy a car subject to a logbook loan. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment. I have every confidence that, even if he does, he will continue to knock at the Government’s door.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken on this amendment and those who spoke in Committee on this issue. It must be obvious that I think the case for reform here is unanswerable and that we need to move forward as soon as we can. The Minister made a kind reference to my assiduous pursuance of this over the last four years; I can assure him I have only just warmed up. I have plenty more capacity now that I have stepped back from the Front Bench and this remains one of my main targets—so I will be calling again in the near future.

I was slightly struck by the rather defensive notes in the early part of his speech, because I do not honestly think there is much you can say about bills of sale other than that, ironically, when they were first introduced—although not in Scotland—they were in essence an early form of consumer protection. What has gone wrong, of course, as he mentioned, is that the considerable collateral damage to subsequent purchasers of goods subject to bills of sale has been devastating for many people. Yes, it is true that the numbers are down, but I do not buy the argument that it is okay to let this egregious behaviour carry on simply because there are not very many. Every single person affected by this is affected in a most extraordinary way, and it should not happen.

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[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

Thank you. I think I was talking about Amendment 21 being prescriptive; it sets out exactly what must be done and by whom.

It has two sections. The first reduces the currently usurious SVR paid by mortgage prisoners by capping it at two percentage points above the bank rate. This is what, in the end, Martin Lewis thought was necessary. He said:

“Yet in lieu of anything else, I believe for those on closed-book mortgages it is a good stopgap while other detailed solutions are worked up, and I’m very happy the All-Party Parliamentary Group on mortgage prisoners is pushing it.”


He also said:

“This would provide immediate emergency relief to those most at risk of financial ruin … No one should underestimate the threat to wellbeing and even lives if this doesn’t happen, and happen soon.”


This is all necessary, but not sufficient. SVRs are not the normal basis for mortgages, as I have already mentioned. What is needed is access to fixed-rate mortgages, as provided by normal active lenders to 90% of mortgagees. The second part of Amendment 21 sets out how that is to be done.

This is, of course, all very prescriptive, and we understand the Government’s reluctance to write such details into the Bill. That is why we have also tabled Amendment 37B. This amendment takes a simpler and non-prescriptive approach. It places the obligation to fix the problem squarely on those who caused it—the Treasury. It is explicitly fuelled by the overwhelming and undeniable moral responsibility that the Treasury has for the terrible situation in which mortgage prisoners have long found themselves. The amendment sets out what must be achieved to relieve mortgage prisoners, by whom and by when, but it does not say how. It leaves that entirely for the Government to work out.

Amendments 21 and 37B give the Government a clear choice. Amendment 21 prescribes a detailed method of solution; Amendment 37B says what the Government must achieve but leaves the mechanism to them. The Government caused the mortgage prisoner problem, which has caused and continues to cause much suffering to many families. I hope that the Government will recognise their moral responsibility and adopt Amendment 21 or Amendment 37B.

This has all gone on much too long, and it has caused, and continues to cause, far too much misery and desperation. If the Minister is not able to adopt either amendment, or give equivalent assurances, I will test the opinion of the House. I beg to move Amendment 21.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments just proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which I have signed. One’s heart goes out to him—it must be very difficult to make a speech of this complexity and passion with all these breaks. Despite the technical difficulties, however, he has made the case for action very well, and as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on these issues he is very well briefed on the situation faced by these fellow citizens of ours, and the extra costs that they face. It is indeed a very difficult situation, and one hears a lot of despair when one talks to these people.

I am sure that when he responds the Minister will, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, hinted, dwell at length on the numbers of this group in various categories. There is of course a debate on how the prisoners can be split up—I think that the only thing that we agree on is that the total is probably about 250,000. As with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, however, my argument is not about the numbers. Simply put, it is clear that a significant number of people, through no fault of their own, cannot exercise the choices about their mortgage that the rest of us can. While some would argue that this is the direct fault of the Government, I think that someone needs to take responsibility for providing a fair outcome for those who are in a position to take advantage of it.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, says, this group of amendments offers two options: one that focuses on what the FCA might do within the parameters set by the Bill and another—37B, a late amendment that we drafted for Report—that suggests that the Treasury might wish to take powers to act in the way that is most suitable for it. Both have merits, in their ways. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, they have detailed implications that need to be followed through carefully. My preference would be for Amendment 37B, for the very good reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. If, as he said he might, the noble Lord decides to test the opinion of the House, we will support him.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are misconceived, for a number of reasons that I shall explain. I have much sympathy with the plight of mortgage prisoners, who find themselves in a difficult position as a result of taking on debt when market conditions and regulation allowed mortgage lending in ways that are not generally possible now. We have to remember that many of the borrowers we are talking about would not qualify for a mortgage in today’s environment, either because of the type of mortgage that they have or their own financial circumstances. This is not to blame them, but it is a relevant fact.

Mortgage prisoners are not the only groups who are facing financial problems. Covid-19 has brought financial stress for many individuals and families, and indeed the problems of mortgage prisoners may have increased during the pandemic. Any solutions for mortgage prisoners need to be put in the context of all who are facing debt problems, and we must be careful that solutions for one category of financial distress are fair and proportionate.

Covid-19 has also caused delays in the implementation of the FCA’s initial solution, which relaxed the regulatory affordability rules. We do not, therefore, know how effective those will be in solving the problems of mortgage prisoners, and we should be wary of leaping to further solutions until existing remedies have had time to take effect.

Although a number of statistics have been cited by the supporters of the amendments, hard data on the mortgage prisoner population are not readily available. This was underlined in last year’s report by the London School of Economics, and the FCA has never claimed to have a perfect picture. Although the report by the group UK Mortgage Prisoners purports to offer a definitive analysis, its membership is only a fraction of the number potentially within the mortgage prisoner net, so its report should be treated with appropriate caution. It is hard to make policy in this environment.

The amendments include a cap on standard variable rates—SVRs—for all mortgage prisoners with inactive or unregulated lenders, plus two approaches for making new fixed-rate deals available to those who are basically good payers. The proposal to cap SVRs responds to a fairly vociferous demand from lobby groups. Amendment 21 would cap SVR rates at 2 percentage points above base rate. The result would be a rate broadly aligned with the competitive rates available in the active mortgage market, but those rates are available only to low loan-to-value ratios, and to borrowers with the most robust financial profiles. The market rates for riskier high LTVs are probably twice that level, even if the personal financial profile of the borrower is resilient. In addition, there is not an unlimited supply of fixed-rate deals. Many lenders simply do not offer fixed-rate deals on high LTV loans, especially when combined with weaker personal financial profiles.

The amendment says that mortgage prisoners with inactive or unregulated lenders should have rates that are available only to other mortgage borrowers who have completely different loan and borrower characteristics, and it would apply to them even if they did have opportunities to switch mortgages, which the FCA estimates is roughly half the total population. It is unsurprising that the LSE did not recommend this, and noted that it could create market harm. The FCA’s own analysis, comparing the rates paid by mortgage prisoners who are stuck on SVRs and cannot switch, indicates that the real problem is only about 40 basis points, if the correct comparator is used. I do not accept the assertion of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that that is an incorrect calculation. Those 40 basis points are no proper foundation for market intervention.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, explained, the proposals for the availability of fixed-rate mortgages for good payers in Amendments 21 and 37B take slightly different approaches. Amendment 21 says that FCA rules should

“make new fixed interest rate deals available to mortgage prisoners”,

while under Amendment 37B the Treasury must provide for them to be offered fixed-rate mortgages. Neither amendment says how this can be achieved.

In the case of Amendment 21, it would be a startling new direction for regulation if the FCA could tell regulated lenders that they were obliged to offer particular deals to people who by definition are not their own customers. As for Amendment 37B, clearly the Treasury will not itself be providing loans, as it is not in the business of retail lending. The Treasury also has no power to tell banks or building societies to make any particular loans. If either of the amendments resulted in regulated mortgage providers being told that they had to lend to certain groups of non-customers, the impact on the financial services industry would be chilling.

It might be possible for the Treasury to procure that regulated lenders offered fixed-rate deals if the Treasury itself guaranteed all or part of the debt, as it does for some first-time buyers. But that is not what Amendment 37B says, and it would not be a plain reading of the proposed new clause to cover such an intervention.

As if telling lenders what products they should offer and to whom were not bad enough, both amendments go on to try to cap the price of these fixed-rate deals. Amendment 21 would do this at a rate to be fixed by the FCA, using LTV ratios and average rates available to customers of active lenders. This ignores the basic fact of life that mortgage prisoners who have not remortgaged are not like other borrowers, and do not satisfy the lending criteria of most mortgage lenders—whether that is because the LTVs are too high or because the other financial characteristics of those borrowers place them outside the risk appetite of active lenders. For some borrower circumstances there is no market rate at all, and it is not right to assume otherwise.