Courts and Tribunals Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the Bill for two principal reasons. The first is Clause 17, which brings the courts and tribunals under the leadership of the Lady Chief Justice. We cannot underestimate the importance of firm, single leadership and the long-held need by the judiciary for the reversal of the mistakes that were made in 2003, 2005 and 2006, when the leadership was split. I therefore welcome this change. We can already see the effect of this decision by what is happening in the tribunals. For example, there is a great increase in the number of disposals being made in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber.

Secondly and more importantly, I welcome the commitment to the structural reform to the criminal justice system that is being proposed. I have no doubt that structural reform is needed. Greater focus on good leadership, greater efficiency and, above all, greater resources will make a big difference, but they cannot on their own cure the problems so clearly identified by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, in his independent reports and in the update since then. In short, we would delude ourselves if we thought that structural change was not necessary. Change has been regularly carried out over the centuries of the history of our criminal justice system. We are at a time when structural change is again necessary. Our task in this House is therefore to subject these proposals to careful scrutiny so that we can be satisfied either that the Government have made the right choice on structural reform in this legislation or that we feel modifications need to be made.

There are three areas that I believe should be examined; I will take them in turn. First, there is the choice of the type of court to try the less serious cases that presently go to the Crown Court. This is not an easy question. The difficulty is shown by an examination of the options that have been considered. I am glad that trial by judge alone in the Crown Court was, rightly, abandoned by the Government.

Trial by judge and two magistrates was an intermediate type of court proposed by Lord Justice Auld as long ago as 2001, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, in his reports, and favoured with all the evidence clearly set out by the Times Crime and Justice Commission. I considered that the right solution in 2001, and everything that has happened since has strengthened my view that that was right. I very much hope that this is something that we can examine during the passage of the Bill through this House.

The other option is trial in the magistrates’ courts, either by three magistrates or—I emphasise this—by judge alone. With greater sentencing powers being given to the magistrates’ courts, what we have, in effect, is an increase in the compulsory jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts.

Looking at those options, we also have to take into account the issues that have arisen about who is to make the choice of where the case is to be tried. More importantly, we have to look at the choice of the criteria to be used in making the decision as to where the case is to be heard, and the role of Parliament in setting the criteria and the way the choice is to be made. Should we, for example, reclassify offences such as those that are trialled in the magistrates’ courts, which is not what the Bill proposes? Should we retain the present system of “either way” offences, making the decision principally on the basis of the likely length of sentence, with other criteria taken into account? Are the criteria that should be taken into account clearly set out? And is account to be taken as to whether the trial is to be for three magistrates or judge alone?

I believe that our task is to look at this in some detail, but principally at how the allocation between the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court under the governance proposals is to be made. To fulfil our role, I believe that we need to know much more about the impact of the decisions on the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court, and much more about the criteria that are to govern the decision as to whether the case is to stay in the magistrates’ court or be transferred to the Crown Court. If it is to be retained in the magistrates’ court, we need to know whether there is to be any change in the position as to which cases are to be heard by a district judge—as that will be trial by judge alone—or by three magistrates. These are difficult issues that need our careful scrutiny.

Secondly, I turn to the question of appeals. I have no doubt that a system for appeals where there is no restriction on the right to appeal has rightly been abandoned across the entirety of our system elsewhere and in many other countries in the world. It is now the time to reform that in the interests of efficiency and of victims. The Bill is plainly right in principle in requiring a permission stage. However, we need to scrutinise this reform, about which there is so little detail as to how it is to work.

For example, as the grant of permission will depend on the decision of the judge reviewing the papers on the strength of the argument as to the safety of the conviction or the length of the sentence, what is to be done about improving the way that magistrates and district judges record their decisions? When will the provision of a transcript be properly made? We will also require the provision of an office system for this work. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division could not function without an office and I do not see how this reform can function without such an office. We have no details at all. Also, what is to be done by way of legal aid? Are defendants who are convicted to get the same right to legal aid for advice as they have in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division? All this will take time, and we need to know the timescale. This is a vital change on which too little attention has been focused.

I turn to the third aspect, which is trial of fraud and other complex cases. The way in which transactions are effective is almost invariably recorded in written or digital format. The issue in such cases is one of honesty. In complex transactions, it is my experience that the issue of honesty is best determined in the context of a full understanding of a business background. That is why there is so much to be said for the recommendation made by Lord Roskill as long ago as 1985 for a trial by judge and two lay members with business and financial expertise. That would be the ideal solution. In the absence of that, I think justice is better served by trial before a judge, who will have a better and fuller understanding of the business background.

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness; we agree very often on matters of this kind, and I particularly agree with the two amendments that she has tabled and to which I have put my name. I will make two brief preliminary points before I come to the substance. First, I apologise that I was not able to participate at Second Reading. I am sorry about that, but I had long-standing commitments which would have been very difficult to break. Secondly, and quite differently, although I have practised at the Criminal Bar off and on for around 40 years, I have to admit that I have not been in a criminal court since 2010—although I still practise as a legal assessor to regulatory panels connected with healthcare professionals—so I do not have a professional or technical interest to declare.

At the heart of this matter, which I think my noble and learned friend Lord Keen will address at some length, is the stand part debate on Clause 1. I shall support my noble and learned friend if he moves a Division on Report, because my view is that it should not stand part. He will argue the reasons, which he set out very fully at Second Reading, and I will therefore summarise them only with the greatest of brevity.

The right to jury trial in “either way” offences enjoys widespread professional and public support. There is very little appetite for change. To change it therefore requires the most compelling of reasons, and I suggest that they do not exist. There is a backlog, but jury trials are not the principal, primary or, perhaps, only significant cause of it. As my noble and learned friend said at Second Reading, when he posed a number of questions, the backlog was caused by a number of factors which have now passed: Covid, for example, or, I regret very much to say, the industrial action among junior members of my profession, of which I deeply disapproved. But there were other considerations: the failure of Governments, who I supported, to provide adequate funding for judicial time and appropriate courts. Administrative action could be taken to remedy this backlog, but we are taking measures to remedy it to which the backlog is not related. In any event, it is not self-evidently sensible to displace a backlog in a Crown Court to one in a magistrates’ court. That seems to me rather surprising. So I am against Clause 1, but I have to recognise the possibility that this Government will seek to ram it through Parliament. Therefore, it is the Committee’s business to try to remedy the faults in Clause 1 or to correct its omissions.

I come first to Amendment 1, so clearly moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It cannot be right for a disparity to exist between a defendant with a long string of previous convictions, who is likely to get a lengthy sentence, and a defendant without convictions who is a person of good character. The former is likely to get a jury trial; the person of good character is likely to be denied it. That cannot be right. The noble Baroness has put down a very clear amendment to address precisely that point, and I was pleased to support it.

Amendment 3, to which the noble Baroness also referred, concerns the right of appeal. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, shares her views on this. I would like to think that, on Report, we could make common cause together and put it to a Division. However, if the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will forgive me one point, her amendment on appeal is somewhat narrowly drawn. I would prefer to incorporate the concept of fairness and the principles of natural justice, but that is a matter for subsequent discussion.

I am a great supporter of Amendment 2 from the noble and learned Lords. It would be very sensible to introduce the concept of guidelines, because otherwise we are likely to see a judicial postcode lottery. We all know from our experience in politics that a postcode lottery will become deeply unpopular, so the concept of guidelines is a very good one, subject to this proviso: I do not read in the amendment, or in anything naturally associated with it, the suggestion of judicial input. I would like to see judicial input into the guidelines. I shall support all these amendments should they be pressed to a Division on Report.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 2, which stands in my name and those of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Bellamy, who very much regrets his inability to be here today.

As its explanatory statement makes clear, this is a probing amendment. It is made in circumstances where the time has come for some further structural change to the cases that go to the Crown Court and those that go to the magistrates’ court. The backlog in the Crown Court has the effect of denying justice, particularly to victims. I do not believe there is any alternative to dealing with the backlog. When I have encountered it in the past, I have found that it gets worse if it is not dealt with, because it has a spiralling effect as people game the system. There is nothing new in making an adjustment, and it is a question of detail as to how this adjustment is best made. I am very grateful to the Minister for his engagement with us to discuss the various amendments put forward in our names.

The purpose of Amendment 2 is to probe two areas. The first is to work out the way of getting the greatest possible consistency across the country on which cases are retained in the magistrates’ courts and which go to the Crown Court. The second is an issue that has not much been debated so far: are the cases that are retained in the magistrates’ courts to be decided by three magistrates or by judge alone—that is, by a district judge or deputy district judges? Before I turn to that in a little more detail, it is important to explain the background. Because these reforms have been put forward without the very detailed and careful analysis that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, put to his recommendations, at present it is not possible to work out the best way to proceed.

I will briefly explain the present position. The position as to allocation is set out in Section 19 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, which simply requires the court to decide whether it is more suitable for trial on indictment or summary trial on the allocations issued by the Sentencing Council. Those allocation guidelines are drafted against the current sentencing powers of the magistrates. In essence, they say that cases should be tried summarily unless the outcome would clearly be a sentence in excess of the court’s powers, after taking into account personal mitigation and potential reduction for guilty pleas. The guidelines go on to say that cases of unusual factual complexity should be tried in the Crown Court. Those are exceptions—the rest are to be tried in the magistrates’ court, if they are within its sentencing powers —and such exceptions are likely to be narrow and rare. So at the moment the guidelines are structured so that the potential sentence is determinative of the way the case should be tried. The question is: is that the appropriate way to continue?

The second issue is the distribution of work in the magistrates’ courts. The way in which work is distributed in the magistrates’ court is governed by the listing practice direction issued by the Lady Chief Justice last month. That direction followed what was, in essence, the product of work done in 2012 by a group chaired by Lord Justice Gross, with representatives of the magistrates present and the senior district judge in HMCTS. It sets out the presumptions for trial by district judges, including long cases. It also provides for a share of routine business and for the occasional sitting of mixed Benches.

The question that arises is: should we say that these are matters for the Sentencing Council and for the practice direction issued by the Lady Chief Justice, or should Parliament prepare guidelines and issue those through the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor? At the moment it is not possible to be more specific about the way in which the guidelines might operate. We do not know at present the basis of the figures that have been used to calculate the savings in time. Is it assumed that magistrates will operate the existing guidelines, primarily determined by the sentencing powers that they have? Secondly, the distribution of work between the magistrates and the district judges and deputy district judges is not clear, because although large numbers of magistrates are being recruited, there is a substantial recruitment of deputy district judges and district judges. Both those issues are important. We need to decide whether guidelines should be made.

In her Amendment 1, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has proposed that matters such as good character should be taken into account, but there may be other matters that need to be looked at. For example, one needs to bear in mind that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, recorded at paragraph 38 of chapter 5 of his report, there were concerns about how ethnic minorities would view changes of this kind. That would be a very difficult matter, if it was a matter to be taken into account, to be dealt with other than by Parliament.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

4: Clause 1, page 3, line 31, at end insert—
“(7A) After section 22A (low-value shoplifting to be a summary offence), insert—“22B Reclassification of summary offences(1) Within six months of the day on which the Courts and Tribunals Act 2026 is passed, the Secretary of State must carry out a reclassification of summary offences and in doing so must have regard to—(a) whether the offence carries a maximum sentence of two years or less, and (b) the indicative list of offences contained in Annex G to the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts by Lord Leveson, dated 18 June 2025.(2) The Secretary of State must, by regulations to be made by statutory instrument, specify the offences which are triable as summary only offences following the reclassification exercise in subsection (1).(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.””

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I have introduced—at some length, I regret to say—the problems that have arisen because we do not have enough information to decide the best way of dealing with the current crisis in the courts. This is another alternative put forward to your Lordships for consideration. I intended to give an explanation, but it was left out of the printed paper. The amendment would provide parliamentary authority for the transfer of a greater range of specific offences, as well as greater certainty, while reducing the pressure on the Crown Court.

The amendment envisages the reclassification of summary offences. The origins of this lay in a submission made to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, by the Bar Council, which supported the increase of sentencing powers to two years—although, given its confidence in district and deputy district judges, only if such cases were heard by them. The Bar Council also identified a series of offences that it said should be reclassified as summary-only. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, carefully looked at that and came up with his own view, which is set out in chapter 5 of part 1 of his report.

In essence, he suggested the restriction of the right to elect by removing it from “either way” offences that carried a maximum sentence of two years. In addition, he identified a pool of additional offences based on the average custodial sentence length that they typically received, with other factors pointing to the magistrates’ courts being a proportionate forum. The list of those is set out in annex G and includes possession of controlled drugs up to a certain value, making off without payment—for example, the theft of a pedal cycle—breach of an ASBO, and various other matters. The number of offences is very large and I do not want to take up time by reading them all out.

There is, plainly, a block of offences that could sensibly be reclassified. We urge the Government to consider this, for a number of different reasons. The way in which this proposal is put forward rests on the ways it could be done, but there can be no doubt that the limits in the current summary-only system are out of date and that there is a good case for putting into it a value—for example, in relation to drugs or quantity—which could be used in a number of different ways.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, as this is the first time I have got to my feet, I thank all noble Lords for meeting me and for the various discussions we have had. In relation to this amendment, I thank the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Burnett, Lord Phillips and Lord Bellamy, for meeting me yesterday specifically to talk about their amendments. I hope we can continue that conversation.

Amendment 4, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, seeks to reclassify certain triable “either way” offences to summary-only, in line with the recommendations, as he said, of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, in his independent review. The Government considered the recommendations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, but concluded that they would not result in significant sitting day savings and would carry risks for the wider justice system and public protection. I know noble Lords will say in response to that that the Government are obsessed by backlogs and sitting days, and I shall address that point in my remarks in a moment.

Offences that are triable either way are, by definition, treated as sufficiently serious to warrant the possibility of longer sentences and broader police and prosecution powers, including longer investigatory time limits. None of the noble Lords who have spoken to this amendment has addressed this specific point and it is one that we will need to return to in the discussion of reclassification.

Reclassifying offences as summary-only—as I said, the Government have considered this—would restrict important operational powers and reduce maximum sentences for those offences to six months. This would be particularly concerning in domestic abuse cases, including breaches of protective orders. We do not believe that it would be right to constrain the justice system by restricting the investigative period when the protection of the public and victims is at stake. Tackling violence against women and girls remains a top priority for the Government, of course.

Nevertheless, we recognise the benefits of retaining more cases in magistrates’ courts because of their efficiency, which is why, as we discussed on the first group, we are bringing forward measures to remove the right to elect and to increase magistrates’ court sentencing powers, which we will return to later today. This will deliver many of the same benefits as reclassification without undermining the protections and powers attached to offences that are triable either way.

I want to address comments made by several noble Lords, on this group and the previous one, that the Government’s only concern is the backlog. I want to be completely clear, as my noble and learned friend Lady Smith was: of course the Government are committed to fair trials. That principle is completely intact and inviolate in the Government’s thinking on this. Our concern with the backlog is perhaps better expressed as being about waiting times and their impact on victims’ experiences. The backlog is a problem for administrative reasons, but it is much more important for victims of crime.

We do not think, as a matter of principle, that defendants should choose their own mode of trial. However, I am happy to continue the discussion with the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Leveson, and others, on the suggestion for reclassification.

On Amendment 51, I recognise that the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is to increase use of out-of-court resolutions, which can provide an effective and robust alternative to prosecution. I do not think the phrase “out-of-court resolution”—or, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, the word “diversion”—will travel very well on the streets. We want to ensure that, in the circumstances described by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, justice is done rapidly for the vulnerable people he spoke about, including vulnerable parents. My preferred description, for further revision if necessary, is “rapid justice” that addresses the root causes, which was the point the noble Lord made. I agree entirely with his comments about parents.

The Government are not suggesting, and would not support any suggestion, that the use of out-of-court resolutions amounts to decriminalisation or making those offences irrelevant. That is not our view. Keeping your children from school is an offence but we think it can perhaps be addressed in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, suggested.

The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, referred to youth justice. The Minister in the other place, Jake Richards, is concerned about addressing root causes in his work on youth justice. I thank the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, for their reference to restorative justice, which is an important area where much could be done.

Let me set the position out clearly for the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The Government are committed to strengthening the use of out-of-court resolutions and diverting low-level offenders away from court with conditions that address the underlying causes of crime and therefore reduce the risk of future reoffending. However, the police are already required to assess whether the public interest can be served by an out-of-court resolution instead of prosecution. Prosecutors also make this assessment when making prosecution decisions. Courts also already have the power to inquire about an out-of-court resolution and CPS guidance provides that, where the prosecutor in court concludes that such a resolution is appropriate, the matter should be referred to the police and an adjournment sought.

An additional duty on the court would therefore duplicate these processes—I think this is the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was making—and may add unnecessary delay. However, as outlined in the Government’s response to the recommendations from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, we are urgently examining the legislative and delivery framework for out-of-court resolutions to ensure that it supports our ambitions and that such resolutions are considered whenever appropriate.

Although I cannot at this stage support the amendments in this group, I was grateful for the opportunity to meet the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and others to have a constructive discussion on these issues. Although the Government have, for the moment, reached a different conclusion on these proposals, I look forward to continuing those discussions and to further discussing the question of out-of-court resolution with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. With these reassurances, I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all who have participated in this short debate. There are no easy answers to dealing with the backlog. There have to be compromises along the way, which we have discussed in the previous debate and in this one. We appreciate the problems that arise by classifying as summary-only, as regards the way that the police should be required to act with greater expedition, but we did not intend by this reclassification to suggest a reduction in the maximum sentence, which would be below two years if the Government take those powers under the Bill or one year if they do not. However, I am very grateful to all who have spoken about it and I hope we can look at this again.

I am most grateful to the Minister for our discussions yesterday and our continuing discussions in relation to finding an answer, because what is critical is that we end up with something certain, so that we produce the same result in every postcode, and that we do not get appeals. We cannot have appeals on the question of allocation.

Also, on the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on out-of-court resolution, I think I can recall this subject going back at least 20 years. One of the problems has been in getting some system to bring together the magistrates, the police and the prosecution service. One suggestion—this was probably 15 or 20 years ago —was that magistrates should play a role in looking at the way in which local police forces dealt with out-of-court disposal. That was never proceeded with. There are lots of other ideas, but it is plainly part of the system of justice that we get out-of-court disposals correct. It is not decriminalisation; it is finding a means of an effective deterrent for future criminality, rather than sending people into the criminal justice system. I welcome the proposal raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and hope we can carry it further. With those observations, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

6: After Clause 2, insert the following new Clause—
“Legal aidUnder powers contained in the Legal Aid, Sentencing, and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, regulations made by the Lord Chancellor must provide, no later than the day on which this Act is passed, that—(a) a defendant’s eligibility for legal aid, and(b) the remuneration paid to providers of legal aid services,is calculated on the basis applicable in the Crown Court, irrespective of whether the matter is heard in the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to harmonise legal aid eligibility, and the remuneration of the providers of legal services, irrespective of whether an either way offence is retained in the magistrates’ court or sent to the Crown Court, thus reducing the risk of unrepresented defendants in the magistrates’ court.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I had hoped that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, would have been able to be present today, but unfortunately circumstances have made that impossible, so I am afraid noble Lords are going to have to hear from me again.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, my answers are always unambiguous.

Amendment 6, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, would apply Crown Court legal aid financial eligibility rules and pay Crown Court-level fees to providers for triable “either way” offences, even if that case takes place in the magistrates’ court. Amendments 8, 67 and 75, from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would extend the same financial eligibility criteria which were applied at the Crown Court to proceedings heard at the magistrates’ court, and provide for these changes to come into force before implementation of the Bill’s wider provisions. The noble Baroness laid some emphasis on that, as did the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I heard the strength of feeling on this subject at Second Reading.

These four amendments are not limited to triable “either way” offences impacted by the removal of the right to elect a Crown Court trial. The effect would therefore be to apply Crown Court rules on legal aid financial eligibility to all defendants and cases in the magistrates’ court, including all summary-only cases. Under current financial eligibility rules, the majority of defendants—something that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, referred to—charged with triable “either way” offences would be eligible for legal aid at the magistrates’ court. That tells you something about the social make-up of who appears in our magistrates’ courts.

For individuals who do not financially qualify for legal aid, there are already measures in place in the magistrates’ court to provide support. The hardship review mechanism can provide legal aid to some individuals who fail the means test but face higher than usual outgoings. In addition, unrepresented defendants may access the free magistrates’ court duty solicitor scheme, which may provide legal representation at the first hearing for those charged with an imprisonable offence.

None the less, we have been listening carefully to the concerns raised at Second Reading around eligibility and the potential impacts of reform on litigants in person, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. We have accepted in principle the recommendation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, to increase the legal aid income thresholds at the magistrates’ court. In so doing, we recognise the importance of ensuring that legal aid is available for those who need it most, and the financial eligibility thresholds reflect this. I think that is fairly unambiguous. Once court reforms introduced by the Bill have been fully implemented, we will be better placed to take final decisions on income threshold levels, subject to future funding decisions and operational considerations. I have no doubt at all that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others will press us on that point, but I am repeating the formulation that I used at Second Reading. We are also examining the measures that are currently in place for litigants in person and considering additional options for support.

I think noble Lords would acknowledge that amendments to align Crown Court and magistrates’ court eligibility would add complexity to the magistrates’ test through the introduction of a contributory system which assesses income and capital. This may negatively impact efficiency in the magistrates’ court and create additional administrative burdens. I spent some time this morning reading about how this works, and it was interesting.

In relation to remuneration for legal aid lawyers in Amendment 6, I am afraid that, with regard to the point made by my noble friend Lord Shamash, I do not think that we will be paying legal aid lawyers the same rates as lawyers in the City are paid—but then the job is much more interesting. I say that as someone who worked in the City for quite a long time.

Fee schemes are specific to the court where the case is heard and are designed to reflect the differing processes and nature of work in the magistrates’ court and Crown Court. The magistrates’ court fee scheme is designed to be simple to administer and for providers to use, reflecting the greater speed and case volumes through that court. There is also a non-standard fee route for cases in the magistrates’ court, which ensures that work on complex cases is appropriately remunerated. I hope I have set out where the Government stand on that and demonstrated that the Government have listened. With that, I would ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken of the importance of this point—the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald, Lord Shamash, Lord Jabbar, and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. Although we welcome what the Minister has said, we all regard it as imperative that, if the more serious work is being transferred, that should be done simultaneously with a change to legal aid. That is critical. We cannot wait, because it will cause problems in the magistrates’ courts and with magistrates’ courts recruitment—a point particularly made by the noble Lord, Lord Shamash. It is getting very much more difficult to find people prepared to do magistrates’ courts solicitors’ work. Of course, the Government could not afford to pay City rates; that is out of the question. But at least pay a decent rate for the hard job people do, to encourage them to come into that part of the profession. I agree with the Minister: much of the work is far more interesting than working on infinitely uninteresting schemes in the City.

I wish also to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her amendments and also for pressing the point about getting eligibility brought into line. Maybe the answer is to look at the complexity and see whether that can be simplified as well. With those remarks, I thank noble Lords and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group is primarily concerned with one central proposition which was raised at Second Reading, not really opposed and notably supported by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew—that it should be open to a defendant to opt for a “judge alone” trial in the Crown Court where the trial would otherwise be a trial by jury.

Amendments 12 and 13 are alternatives. Amendment 12 would prevent an order for a “judge alone” trial being made on the application of the prosecution or by the court of its own motion. We all spoke at length on that in the previous group. Amendment 13 is different: it would permit a defendant to apply for a “judge alone” trial in a case which comes within Clause 3, even if otherwise the trial might have been tried by a jury.

There may be cases—we can all think of some—where a defendant might think that a trial by judge alone might be more objective than a jury trial, notably where there has been extensive pre-trial publicity and the defendant might feel prejudiced by its effects. Amendment 32 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, mentions other factors that might affect the interests of justice. Exceptional complexity is one, although in a sense that is tautologous because within Clause 3 exceptional complexity ought to be a given. Another factor is the risk of jury intimidation. National security considerations may appear far-fetched but, in view of some of the things going on at the moment in the national security field, they may be important. In such a case it is argued, and I think not seriously gainsaid, that it would be illogical to deny the defendant the right to seek a trial by judge alone even where the case would otherwise come under Clause 3. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendment in my name, supported by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Bellamy. Ours is a much simpler amendment: it seeks to enable a defendant, where the conditions are met, to apply for trial by judge alone. If the judge is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice, the defendant should be accorded that right.

There are parts of the Commonwealth, in particular Canada, where defendants like trial by judge alone. If a defendant wants a trial by judge alone, why should he not be entitled to it, if the judge thinks that it is in the interests of justice? The protection of a jury trial is for the defendant’s protection, by and large; the public interest, if the judge were to give accord to trial by judge alone, would be satisfied by detailed reasons being given. There may be many reasons why a person would like a trial by judge alone.

It seems to us that this amendment should at least be considered, if a defendant wants it and if it is in the interests of justice. The reason for the latter restriction is to counter the point made by the Government that it is for the court to decide the mode of trial. If the court is entitled to decide it by reference to the interests of justice, then it is the court’s decision.

There is a second reason for that. It would be possible, as the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, sets out, to specify a number of circumstances. Generally, in my experience, if we are embarking down a route such as this, it is better not to lay down tramlines or even fairly tight guidelines but to allow the law to be developed by the courts. However, there are cases where someone may properly decide that this is the case they would like heard by a judge and it is not a case where it would not be in the interests of justice for that request to be acceded to. I find it difficult to see why, if someone wants a trial by judge alone and the judge, in accordance with principles that have developed, decides that that is right, he should not be entitled to that if it is in the interests of justice.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

The noble and right reverend Lord has uttered what amounts to blasphemy in this Chamber. He said that tradition must be renewed. Had your Lordships’ Chamber been full, he would have been booed soundly. I think that tradition has to be renewed, but sadly this House tends to resist.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak to Amendment 31 standing in my name and those of other noble and learned Lords. It seeks to add to the category of case that could be tried by judge alone, and we put it forward for consideration. There are offences that take a long time to try in the Crown Court: health and safety at work is one example, and environmental protection is another. We would have added trading standards had the legislation not been so complicated that the amendment would have taken a lot of paper to put all the bits of legislation down. We therefore put forward these two examples as illustrative only.

We restricted this amendment to cases where the defendant is a corporation. These are offences that, in effect, turn on issues of fact and expert evidence. If one is concerned only with a corporate defendant, the concerns about removing trial by jury are much less. As the whole Bill is directed at trying to improve our system of justice, can we look at this as another means of reducing pressure on the Crown Court? It is something that we ought to consider. We put this forward as one of the ideas that ought to be put into the melting pot, because we are surely in a melting pot situation. I will say no more about this amendment, but may return to it at a later stage.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I oppose Clause 3. I am particularly concerned that the Government are presenting it as a practical measure to tackle delays when the evidence suggests that it will make very little difference. The Government’s own impact assessment estimates that these provisions will save just 200 Crown Court sitting days a year—around 0.18% of current Crown Court capacity. That is a tiny return for such a huge change to the way that criminal justice is delivered.

There is also no good reason to assume that removing juries will necessarily make these trials shorter. Judges sitting alone will still have to consider the evidence and, in complex fraud cases, they may have to produce lengthy reasoned arguments. Juries also provide an incentive to keep trials properly focused and evidence clearly presented. Fraud cases often turn on questions of fact, including whether someone acted dishonestly, and juries are well placed to judge dishonesty. The independent review by Jonathan Fisher KC found that juries can deal with complex fraud cases when trials are properly managed and presented. He warned that removing juries from serious fraud trials would send the wrong message about the seriousness of fraudulent misconduct.

There is something else in this clause that really concerns me, which is the power of the Secretary of State to add further offences to the list. In your Lordships’ House we get a little fed up with statutory instruments that bring in more and more power to a Bill that we have already passed. Although these initial provisions cover financial crime and related offences, the scope can be widened through secondary legislation. It is a very real risk that restrictions on jury trial will extend beyond the cases the Government are currently talking about. Jury trial is not an obstacle to be removed whenever a case becomes difficult or lengthy. It is an important protection against the concentration of judicial power and a vital part of public participation in the justice system.