Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to support my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s Amendment 146, which was supported so ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey.

One measure of a Government’s sovereignty is that they make the law for their citizens—the whole country and their whole territory—and they uphold that law. However, as we have heard this evening, Northern Ireland will not necessarily be included in proposals to deport foreign criminals, as Northern Ireland will be subject to the Windsor Framework arrangements.

We may hold different views about the Windsor Framework. I feel that it was a bad mistake by the Conservative Administration to move from the temporary arrangements of the withdrawal agreement to the permanent acceptance of arrangements that were regarded by both sides—the EU and the UK Government—as transient, pending the best endeavours of both parties to get it right. I am sorry that that did not happen and that we are left with the Windsor Framework, but that is no reason for the arrangements to promote economic EU law in Northern Ireland to apply now to criminal law.

It is a mark of the UK’s sovereignty that it upholds the law for the whole country, and I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment, so that the citizens of Northern Ireland can rest assured that foreign criminals will be deported, no matter from where they come. The amendment would also ensure—as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, mentioned—that Northern Ireland will not become a haven for a disproportionate number of foreign criminals fleeing there because they know they will not be deported. For all these reasons, I heartily support the amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I will very briefly go back to a point about Amendment 122A that I raised at Second Reading. The Minister was kind enough to write to me to explain the pressure on prisons and the need for places, but I have already suggested earlier today a far better solution to that.

I will make two points. First, if someone comes here to commit a crime—for example, a drug dealer or a contract criminal—it is no punishment to be sent back. In fact, it is a bonus for them, because they do not have to pay for the return trip. I hope that the Minister can reassure us that the most rigorous examination will take place before people are deported.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I think that a very valid point has been made. I immediately think of the situation—

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Perhaps I could just finish my second point very quickly. It is simply that, even if the public do not think there is any harm in just deporting someone who has committed a crime, I would caution Government not to rely on public opinion. It does not always stay constant, but I can be sure that, if a serious crime is committed and someone is deported without being punished, this provision will come back to haunt the Government, and I do not want that to happen.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the principle of deportation of foreign national offenders attracts almost universal support. I say “almost” because the cohort of foreign national offenders may not entirely embrace the idea. However, if we introduce a system whereby they are deported without custody or punishment, I suspect that they will come on board with the idea as well.

It occurs to me that the Government are going to approach this with considerable and conspicuous care and take on board the very considered amendment advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and Amendment 142 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. It will, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, come back to bite us if it is discovered by very professional criminals that you can come here, execute your robbery, contract killing or whatever else and then, when you are caught, we pay your air fare home. It does not make an awful lot of sense.

With regard to Northern Ireland, I would take Amendment 146 as a probing amendment inviting the Minister to explore the impact of the Windsor Framework on this proposal.

I note that, if a foreign national offender in Northern Ireland is offered the option of deportation or lengthy custody in Northern Ireland, he might well be inclined to the former, but that is just a practical proposal. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

136: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Management of offenders on probation: devolution to Wales(1) In paragraph 175 (prisons and offender management) of Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006—(a) in sub-paragraph (3), omit “probation”;(b) under the “Exceptions” insert “Probation in relation to offender management”.(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations make further provision under this section to facilitate the transfer of the provision of the probation service in Wales from the Secretary of State to Senedd Cymru and Welsh Ministers.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause seeks to devolve probation services to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I beg to move an amendment that, at this hour of the night, might seem one that could have been moved on another occasion—but that is timing. This is a probing amendment to deal with a matter that is becoming important across many areas of justice, and Wales will return on a lot of Bills that are currently going through Parliament. I raised this issue at Second Reading and the Minister was kind enough to explain to me roughly where the problem is.

I think the problem can basically be described in this way: there are extremely good reasons, to which I shall come in a moment, for the devolution of probation to Wales. But the Government in Wales are anxious to have devolution to Wales, while the Government in London do not regard that as something they want to do—it is certainly not a priority—as they see their job as putting the Probation Service right first, whenever that may happen. What is very important is that what is happening is the subject of public debate, particularly because the elections are coming in Wales in May, and the various aspects of devolution are being highlighted by what one might call “friendly family discussions” between two different parts of the Labour Party: the Labour Party in Wales and the parliamentary party in London. It is so topical that, in fact, yesterday the research unit of the Senedd Cymru published a paper on this matter.

There are three options. The first is what I would call the Manchester model, which is a sort of dual commissioning for devolution to Wales. The second is passing executive responsibility to Welsh Ministers but maintaining control over policy in London; and the third is the devolution of both services and policy. There is a lot of information so, rather than trying to go through and explain it all, I will say that an extremely good paper by the Wales Centre for Public Policy and another paper by the Welsh Centre for Crime and Social Justice, through the Probation Development Group, set out many of the complex considerations.

The devolution of probation services was the solution when a commission that I chaired, which reported under the title Justice in Wales for the People of Wales, concluded in its chapter 4 that all penal services, including probation, should be devolved. This was an entirely non-political group. It included people well known in this area, such as Juliet Lyon, Sarah Payne and Peter Vaughan, the former chief constable of South Wales.

Why was it that we all came to the view that there should be devolution? First, and critically, justice in Wales is, for some reason, the one area of domestic policy that is not devolved. This is entirely irrational and is derived from the history of the way in which devolution emerged. In no other country in the world would you think that justice was so unimportant that you could leave it to one side and not devolve it with other services. In Wales, it is important that justice, and particular aspects of it, including the Probation Service, are devolved, so that they can work alongside the other parts of government.

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[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his amendment and his thoughtful engagement on this issue and others. I know he has met my noble friend the Minister outside the Chamber to discuss these things.

The Government committed to undertake a strategic review of probation in their manifesto, and it is still our plan to review the governance of the Probation Service, looking at partnerships across England and Wales. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, mentioned the Manchester model. I hesitate to agree with the suggestion that it is being imposed on Wales, but I have to say that I am rather a fan of the Manchester model. In fact, I regard myself as the progenitor of it—or one of them—when I was at HMPPS as its lead non-executive director. That is part of what is on offer, as it were.

It is important that the recommendations in this Bill are first implemented and that we bring stability to the Probation Service in England and Wales as it currently is before undertaking any structural review. The Government believe that this would not be the right time to consider factoring structural changes into the many changes to probation that will arise as a result of this legislation. I understand that the doctrine of unripe time is often a fairly feeble excuse for inaction, but I am sure that everyone in the Committee recognises that—if I can put it like this—the capacity for change in the Probation Service, with this Bill and the current situation, is pretty much maxed out.

The amendment proposes devolving the Probation Service, but not the equivalent in relation to sentencing or prisons. Devolving parts of the criminal justice system in this way would create a divergence between the management of offenders and the wider criminal justice, sentencing and prison framework across England and Wales. We know that poor handovers, weak communication or gaps in support during the transition from custody to the community are among the greatest barriers to successful resettlement, so we are concerned that some of the changes that might arise as a result of this would create friction in the way that I have suggested. Therefore, any framework in which prisons and probation are separately owned, funded or designed carries a real risk that the two halves of the process might fail to connect, particularly at a time of strain. When that happens, people leaving prison can all too easily fall through the gaps.

That is the heart of the Government’s view at the moment—that this is not a good time to impose structural change on the Probation Service. We want to be sure that we do not create the sort of risks and frictions that I discussed. We will continue to work closely with the Welsh Government to support the local delivery of services by devolved and reserved partners in Wales. I hope that I have given the noble and learned Lord some reassurance, at least sufficient for him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I completely agree with the noble Lord who has responded. It is obviously sensible to devolve prisons and probation together—that is what we recommended—but the political reality of the way in which the Governments in Cardiff and London relate, particularly when they are of the same party, made me think at this stage not to put down prisons and probation. I shall rethink that for the next time.

I wish that people here would realise that there will be no effective change to the Probation Service until we can take some of the money out of prisons and put it into probation. I am sure that most people who think about it realise that the Government do not have any money and realise it has got to come from somewhere, and that imprisoning people for sensible and shorter times is a much better policy. I would like to see that done in Wales, and I am convinced it could be done, so I will think about the suggestion from the Minister that we should put down both on the next occasion.

I said that the Manchester model was being imposed, but it is really a Hobson’s choice. That is what I mean about it being imposed—“You want something, so we will give you a little bit to keep you quiet”. But it is not the right model, because Manchester is not a country; it is a city in England where people here make decisions on policy. Wales is a different country, a proud and ancient nation. That is the difference, and that is why the Manchester model is good for Manchester but not good for Wales.

In the light of all that has been said, I hope that I may return to this issue, maybe in a slightly different and wider form of amendment, as suggested. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 136 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woodley (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 89 on IPP resentencing, and in support of all the other amendments in this group.

I am genuinely grateful for the opportunity to make the argument for resentencing to your Lordships again, although I am under no illusions that the Minister is ready to announce a U-turn from this Dispatch Box to wipe this shameful stain off our justice system once and for all—at least not yet. I have no wish either to flog a dead horse but, as I said at Second Reading, it is important for us to continue scrutinising the Government’s position on this industrial-scale miscarriage of justice.

Ministers have consistently refused to consider IPP resentencing, which the Justice Committee in the other place called for as the only solution to this terrible injustice. To put it bluntly, Ministers are still defending the indefensible. We must see this for what it is: inexcusable excuses while more people die—yes, die—and more people give up hope. This must stop; action, not warm words, will be the most important thing going forward.

In this debate, I particularly want to hear the Minister’s objections to the kind of IPP resentencing exercise described by my amendment, which has not been presented to your Lordships in this form before. Crucially, what is new is that the resentencing court can impose a secure hospital order if it thinks this is necessary for public protection, and impose any kind of extended supervision post release—again, for the same reason.

It is widely acknowledged that the IPP sentence itself has caused harm, to put it mildly. Too many unfortunate souls have suffered problems between 2005 and 2012. It is understandable that the Parole Board might have concerns about the poor mental health of some of the people whose cases they are considering, but it is simply wrong and a great injustice that this poor mental health, in many cases caused directly by this long-discredited and abolished sentence passed by this Parliament, is being used to condemn anyone to indefinite preventive detention, stuck in prison where their mental health is just going to get worse. As I said, there will be more suicides and more hopelessness.

Noble friends from across the House have previously described this as a gulag sentence, and they are, of course, correct. The Minister has previously claimed that the Parole Board is best placed to decide whether an IPP prisoner should be released, but there is no evidence of this beyond the justification originally used to create this torture sentence in the first place. It is too slow and too laborious, in spite of recent helpful changes.

Natural justice dictates that it should be the courts, not the Parole Board, that are empowered to make this decision for this cohort. That distinction lies at the heart of this injustice and is the reason why IPP sentences were abolished over a decade ago. The Minister and his officials will of course say, “What about public protection?” The secure hospital backstop I am talking about—originally a suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, as an amendment to my Private Members’ Bill—is an elegant solution to this conundrum.

Under my amendment, if the resentencing court considers someone to be too mentally ill to be released, it can transfer them to a secure hospital where they can receive the therapeutic resources necessary for recovery. On release, all former IPP prisoners would have the supervision and support considered necessary by the court—another key safeguard to protect the public that should address the concerns previously expressed to us by the Minister. That is why I am proposing, in a nutshell, an IPP resentencing exercise with a secure hospital backstop and public protection right at its heart. I sincerely look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, the real issue in this debate is: do we persist with the so-called action plan? I pay tribute to what the Minister has been able to do with a flawed idea, but we have to decide now how we deal with this justly and remedy the injustice. It is useful to reflect that there are people who have never been released. For example, one got a nine-month tariff and has served 20 years; another got a 330-day tariff and served 17 years; one got a six-month tariff and served 16 and a half years; and another got a tariff of three years and five months and served 20 years. Those are the realities, and you judge the seriousness of what they did by those tariffs. I shall come to the misunderstanding at the heart of the MoJ about the problem it is facing.

We also have the deaths. It is important to recall that this involves people committing suicide, and we should not walk away from that. There were nine in 2023, and four in 2024. The population was down, but it might be explained by the hope that had been engendered. My concern is that, if we do not act now, we will have—I use this word deliberately—blood on our hands. We cannot shirk the responsibility for rectifying an injustice, and what an injustice this is. Perhaps we should turn in due course to the “two strikes” injustice, but that is for another day; let us concentrate on IPPs.

We need a just solution. The noble Lord, Lord Woodley, has put forward his amendment. I do not want to add to the time we will take on this by giving my views on resentencing, but that is one option. However, the Howard League put forward another proposal, which I have put into an amendment. Very simply, it is to give the Parole Board the power to direct, and to require it to direct, the release of all these people within two years. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has put forward an amendment to that, suggesting giving the Government the power to apply to the Parole Board. But whether we take the resentencing exercise or this, this must be the last chance of doing anything. If we funk it now, we funk it for ever and we allow the so-called action plan to trundle along for years and years, not remedying an injustice.

Why do we have to do that? There are five points I wish to make. First, the sentence is accepted to be wrong in principle by absolutely everyone. How can we as a nation continue to punish people under a sentence that is wrong in principle and rests on the fallacy of thinking that we can predict human behaviour? There is no justification for continuing this sentence. It is simply unjust.

Secondly, and it pains me to have to say this, there is a complete misunderstanding of this sentence, partly because it was imposed so long ago, and people have moved on. When we are looking at the action plan, it is important to look at what was said in the 2024-25 IPP annual report. The sentence was described in these words:

“It was intended as a means of managing high risk prisoners, who were convicted of an offence where they would be liable to imprisonment for life, but the court did not consider the seriousness of the offence was such to justify the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life”.


That is a complete misunderstanding of the sentence. How can we have any confidence in a plan when people do not understand the sentence they are dealing with? I regard this as a very serious problem with this plan. I have had the privilege of being able to look at a number of cases of recall, and it is plain that those who are dealing with this do not understand the problem.

I recognise that when the error was pointed out, the department accepted the error, but it is important to see the harm that such a statement does. It puts the position of these prisoners on a false basis. They did not commit serious offences of the kind described. Many of them, as illustrated by the tariffs to which I have referred, committed offences that are not in the same league, by any imagination, as those committed by those sentenced to life imprisonment. Some of them were sentenced in respect of offences for which the sentence was no greater than five years—I note that the Government think that five years is the sentence for the kind of crime that does not deserve a jury trial. So please, will we try to understand what we are dealing with and recognise that we have done a great injustice?

Then one turns to another argument: that these people are dangerous. If we look objectively at the problems of many of them, they are not. But the test is high, and we have to accept that if we lock someone up for a very long time for an offence that is not that serious, we are likely to do them damage. That is the accepted psychiatric evidence, which those who will not accept that we must do something about this ignore, for a reason I cannot understand. But it is worse than that. Why are these people subjected to increased risk because they have been locked up under this unjust sentence? In all humility—and I do not seek to blame either political party for this—we made a mistake. In the case of the Post Office, we have done justice. In the case of blood transfusion, we have done justice. What is wrong with our system of justice, that we cannot do justice for those we have unjustly imprisoned? It is something to which we have to address our minds. I very much hope that we will have a cross-party solution. I am open to any suggestion, but the action plan is a failure. It will not deliver justice in time, and we must do something different.

There is a fourth important argument. Had any of these offenders who are locked up had the good fortune—and I say good fortune deliberately—to have been sentenced before this sentence came into effect, or to have been sentenced afterwards, they would not be subjected to this horrendous sentence from which they cannot escape. What conceivable justice is there in discriminating against a group of people and refusing to acknowledge our wrong in doing so?

Those arguments are to do with justice, and one would hope that justice is central to this Bill—we call this part of the criminal justice system. However, the Bill is meant, in a sense, to be a utilitarian Bill and one can praise it for that.

We are going to come later this evening to Amendment 122A—how many noble Lords will stay the course is another question—which deals with foreign offenders. We are intending to deport them so that we have prison places. We will not punish them; they can go free. What justice is there in a system that will seek to allow people who are foreign to escape punishment when we cannot look at the utilitarian advantage of releasing from prison some 2,500 people who have either never been released or are back on recall? The justice should be that we will deal with our own people first, free up the prison places, and if someone comes here to assassinate someone or shoplift, or deal in drugs, they should be punished, and we should use the prison places for them.

They are all powerful arguments; I have no vested interest in any solution, but I do have a vested interest in justice, and this Government are not doing justice.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their helpful comments, which explain why this is such a difficult and important area. We need to keep the public safe, but we also need to keep working as noble Lords to try to do what we can to address this situation.

I welcome the thoughts of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, on the importance of supporting IPP offenders.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Might I say to the Minister that I set the history of all of this out in a judgment? If only his officials would read it and understand, we would not be in the mess that he has been placed in.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I will take the noble and learned Lord’s comments away and read that again, but that is also why our quarterly Peers’ meetings on IPP are so important in discussing all these topics.

We must do all that we can to support all IPP prisoners to reduce their risk and progress towards a release decision, but I would not be doing my job to protect the public if they were to be released without the independent Parole Board deciding it is safe to do so. My hope is that every IPP prisoner gets the opportunity to be released and have a successful life in the community, but we need to do that in a way that sets those prisoners up for success in the community. The Government’s view is that any change that removes the protection of the statutory release test is not the right way to do this.

I am aware of criticism of some parts of the IPP action plan, including those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but it remains my view that the steps we are taking through it are the best way to support this progression. It has contributed to a 10% reduction in the IPP prison population in the 12 months to 30 September 2025. The number of people who have never been released fell by around 14% in the same period. Since the publication of the first action plan in April 2022, the unreleased IPP population has fallen by 39% and is now below 1,000. The focus that I and colleagues have on the IPP action plan means that I need to do more and more work on it, to see where we can add improvements all the way.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blunkett for his amendments, which seek to allow the Secretary of State to make provision for the automatic re-release of those serving an IPP or DPP sentence who are recalled to prison. My noble friend will be aware of the deep respect I have for his ongoing commitment, drive and tenacity to do all he can to support those serving the IPP sentence. I greatly value his contribution to today’s debate, as well as the thoughtful insights and individual cases he raises with me outside the House.

I appreciate that noble Lords have questioned why we are introducing fixed-term recalls for offenders serving standard determinate sentences but do not accept this change for IPP offenders. There are two crucial differences: the threshold for recall and the level of risk that the offender poses. IPP offenders can be recalled only for behaviour or breaches of their licence that are causally linked to their offending. That is a high bar, and one higher than for recalling prisoners serving standard determinate sentences. I must remind noble Lords what that means in practice: that the Probation Service no longer believes that controls available in the community are sufficient to manage that offender’s risk to keep the public safe, and that the public are therefore at risk of further sexual or violent offending.

A fixed-term recall for IPP offenders would not provide sufficient time for an individual to demonstrate that their risk had reduced, or to receive the required support to reduce their risk, before being automatically re-released. This would put victims and the public at risk. While we will return to the question of recall in more detail later in this debate, I must remind noble Lords that we have built significant safeguards into our fixed-term recall changes. These mean that many offenders who pose a similar risk to IPP offenders recalled to prison are also not eligible for a fixed-term recall.

The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 introduced a power for the Secretary of State to release recalled IPP prisoners where it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that they should remain in prison. This is referred to operationally as release after a risk assessed recall review, or RARR. Recalled IPP offenders have already been re-released using this power, when they were due to wait for a number of months before their scheduled oral hearing before the Parole Board.

The revised IPP action plan, published on 17 July this year, now includes a commitment to enable swift re-release following a recall through RARR, where it is safe to do so. This means that HMPPS is considering all IPP offenders recalled for being out of touch, or in relation to allegations of further offences, for RARR, and is trialling an extended referral period to allow more time to consider cases for potential use of RARR before referral to the Parole Board. I respectfully suggest that this power means we already have the ability to do what the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to achieve: a quicker re-release of recalled individuals where it is safe to do so.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for his amendment, for my noble friend Lord Blunkett’s reflections on it and for their ongoing interest in this important issue. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to allow a prisoner whose licence is not terminated by the Parole Board at the end of the relevant qualifying period to make an annual application to the Parole Board for consideration of licence termination. The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 made significant changes to the IPP licence period by reducing the qualifying period for referral to the Parole Board and introducing a provision for automatic licence termination. This automatic provision provides greater certainty to offenders than the annual referrals about when their licence will terminate, which is also important for victims. These changes have resulted in the number of people serving a sentence in the community falling by 65%.

Furthermore, at the four-year point after initial release, if supervision is not suspended or the licence is terminated by the Parole Board at the end of the three-year qualifying period, probation practitioners can further consider applying for suspension of supervision at their own discretion. We must also consider the potential effect on victims of going through an additional Parole Board review just a year after the previous one, but I acknowledge that the noble Lord’s amendment would preserve the role of the Parole Board in this process. I am happy to have further conversations with him and other noble Lords on this point in the coming weeks.

I thank noble Lords for their work on this important issue, and I hope that they are assured not only of the work that we are currently undertaking but of our absolute resolve to make further progress for those serving the IPP sentence. I will continue to work closely with noble Lords and look forward to seeing them at the upcoming round table, and to discussing the points raised between now and Report. I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

It thus preserves a safety valve. In the very unlikely event that—despite the research, the publication of a draft, the wide general consultation, the express involvement of the Lord Chancellor, his representative at the council, and the involvement of the Justice Select Committee—the Sentencing Council persists in a guideline that both the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor think completely wrong-headed, they can stop it.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Burnett of Maldon and the proposition in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that Clause 18 should not stand part of the Bill. I have done so because it is important that we see this as a constitutional issue.

It is necessary to go back to the achievement of the last Labour Government. Some still mourn the loss of the position of Lord Chancellor, and tonight is not a time to go into why there had to be change. It is important to go back to those times to see what the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor entailed. In many respects, he—and it was a he, save in the case of Matilda the Queen—acted as the linchpin, a person who could bring together the judiciary, Parliament and the Executive. When that linchpin was taken away, it became necessary to look for a mechanism through which the three separate branches of the state, each with their own independent position, could act and work together reflecting what is inevitable in a state—their interdependence.

Out of the change that was made—which was somewhat hurried, if I recall correctly—there was born a series of mechanisms to balance the constitution. There was the concordat agreed, which dealt with problems such as the appointment of leadership judges, which was a joint and shared responsibility of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. There was then the need to look again at the way the rule committees worked, because sometimes one forgets how vitally important it is that the rules work well, that Parliament has its input and that the judiciary and all those other interested parties have their input in producing rules of procedure that work. When you talk to people in other countries, you see what a huge advantage we have here. I mention these examples—and there are many other instances, which I will not weary your Lordships with at this hour of the night—that reflect what is, I feel, the spirit that was created by the previous Labour Government, which endured very well under the Conservative Government, but which is now being undermined by the particular changes being made here.

My noble and learned friend Lord Burnett and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, have both explained how the Sentencing Council evolved, and I do not think it is necessary to go over that ground again. But it is necessary to say that the Sentencing Council was born in the spirit of needing to create the interdependent relationships between the three branches of government. The great thing about all the reforms that were made is that, by and large, they have worked. Of course, when you have three different bodies, there are bound to be hiccups, and there was a hiccup earlier this year. But one has to look and see what the achievement was and how it worked.

What the Sentencing Council did was to bring together the respective responsibilities. Parliament’s responsibility is setting the framework. Generally speaking, until we had the clauses that we discussed examples of earlier in Committee and which are of a completely unnecessary complexity, Parliament’s function normally was to set the broad brush of sentencing policy; unfortunately, it has gone away from that, much to everyone’s cost. The judiciary then pass the sentences, though they previously had, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and my noble and learned friend Lord Burnett explained, issued guideline cases to achieve consistency. Then the Executive are involved because after all, they have to find the money to deal with the punishments, and they have to administer the system. So, it is necessary to have the input of all three if the sentencing framework is to be set by Parliament, the judges are to do their job and the prisons and penal system are to work as intended. In balancing those three interests, it was essential to have an independent council that could bring everyone together.

The great success of this is that it has worked. Now, why did it work? Why was it successful? Well, I recall, it must have been in 2009 that the then Lord Chancellor, Mr Straw, and the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, working no doubt at about this hour of the night, if I recall it correctly, in their shirt sleeves, were looking at the detailed clauses and agreeing the composition of the council—it went to that level of detail at the highest level. The compromise was made, and a successful institution was created; and successful it has been because it had virtually completed producing the guidelines by the time of the row that occurred earlier this year.

I would simply say that the idea of a constitutional settlement, carefully worked out in the spirit that was born in our renewed constitution in 2005 and in the actions taken in 2009, is the way in which we should do things if they are to result in success. Now, there was the hiccup earlier this year—I do think it is probably right to call it a hiccup, as it really was not much more than that if one looks at it and stands back. It is a pity it could not have been resolved there and then, but it cannot be any excuse for altering the delicate mechanism created by the previous Labour Government. There is no justification for it whatsoever.

It seems to me that there are two points. First, Clause 18 ought not to stand part of the Bill: it seems an absurd thing to say that the plan of an independent body has to be decided by one of the three parties that is involved. It would be a good idea, maybe, if all three were involved in looking at the plan, but why one of them? It makes no sense, and it tears up the carefully agreed compromise that was struck. Secondly, it would be much better if Clause 19 did not stand part of the Bill, because that is another aspect of this Government’s desire to tear up, for wholly unnecessary reasons, a proper compromise made by their predecessors in 2009.

However, I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Burnett that we should go along in the spirit of compromise, but I regard that as a compromise, and it is one that I would hope the Government would accede to, and not pursue the destruction—because that is what it is—of the careful balance worked out by the late Lord Judge and by Mr Straw.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I oppose Clause 18 and Clause 19, and my preference is, quite definitely, for both clauses to be removed from the Bill. I have not signed the opposition by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, to Clause 18 standing part, because his reasoning is rather different from mine, but Clause 18 is, frankly, very strange. It is certainly pointless, just as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, said, but it is also, with the greatest of respect to the Government and the drafters of the clause, legislatively illiterate.

I can see no reason in practice for the Sentencing Council to submit a business plan to the Lord Chancellor for approval as soon as possible after the beginning of the year—one wonders when that is supposed to be. But if there is to be a business plan, it is a strange imposition of a new duty on the Sentencing Council that it must declare in advance what it proposes to study, research and support during the course of the coming year without knowing what is coming down the track during the course of the coming year.

In any event, a business plan is pre-eminently a document for the body that is responsible for it and producing it itself to decide in its own discretion and to determine what it puts into it. Clause 18 demonstrates a serious lack of trust in the Sentencing Council to manage its business. Why should the Sentencing Council submit any business plan for approval by the Lord Chancellor, a member of the Government—with, certainly, an input into the Sentencing Council, but not a decisive or determining input?

Is it suggested that the Sentencing Council would not be entitled to consider other matters in the year, unforeseen at the beginning of the year, if they were not in the business plan? If that is not so suggested, what is the point of the business plan? It does not delineate the responsibilities that the Sentencing Council will carry out.

The clause represents an attack on the independence of the Sentencing Council. We have heard from both noble and learned Lords that it was set up by statute to be an independent body tasked with advising sentencing judges on the principles they should apply to sentencing—within the terms of the law as provided by Parliament in statute and the common law, of course, but independent in its advice to judges.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling these amendments. I am very grateful for their continued and constructive engagement on the Bill.

Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, proposes to abolish the Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The noble Lord’s prediction is correct: I put on record that we strongly believe that it is right to retain the council, in view of the continued importance of its work in developing sentencing guidelines. He does not look completely surprised.

Over time, the council has developed offence-specific guidelines covering hundreds of offences, alongside a series of overarching guidelines. These guidelines have helped bring greater consistency, transparency and public understanding to the sentencing process. We welcome that.

The council also holds an important constitutional position, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, within the firmament of our justice system. It bridges the interests and responsibilities of Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary on sentencing policy and practice, while protecting the important responsibility of judges and magistrates to make individual sentencing decisions—I think I am reflecting what the noble and learned Lord said. For these reasons, I am afraid we do not support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I urge him to withdraw it.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas. They have indicated quite clearly their opposition to Clause 18 and propose an alternative approach to Clause 19. I am grateful for their careful consideration of this. Their concerns are shared by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I know that they were experts in this field and their opinions therefore carry a great deal of weight with the Government. As the Minister made clear at Second Reading, in bringing forward these clauses we are aiming to maintain public confidence in the guidelines that the council produces, particularly in view of the sustained public scrutiny that the council has been under of late, which is partly reflected in these debates.

Events surrounding the imposition guideline, on which I do not propose to dwell but which obviously I need to reference, earlier this year highlighted an example of the issues that can arise where guidelines cover areas of policy that should properly be for Ministers and Parliament to determine. We are keen to avoid a similar scenario arising in future, and that is why Clauses 18 and 19 have been drafted to introduce approval measures that provide greater democratic and judicial oversight of the council’s work.

I recognise that noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are keen for more information about the intention of Clause 18. Put briefly, this clause will allow the Lord Chancellor to have a greater say over the guidelines that the council intends to develop across the year, ensuring that any plans are properly reflective of wider priorities across government and Parliament and with the wider public. As no noble Lord has so far mentioned this, I should stress that in preparing this clause we have had regard to similar provision that exists for comparable bodies across the justice system, such as the Law Commission.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Will the Minister explain why the Law Commission, which is a body that looks at law reform for the Government, is to be equated with the independent Sentencing Council, which constitutionally balances the three interests? It would be very helpful to have that explanation. A second explanation it would be helpful to have is: is it intended that the business plan sets out in detail what is going to be in the guidelines so that the Lord Chancellor can look through it to see whether there is likely to be the kind of short sentence or two that occurred in this guideline that is unacceptable? It would be very interesting to know the Government’s thinking on both these points.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I take the point that the noble and learned Lord makes that the Law Commission is different. That is why I said that we have had regard to that. On the second question that the noble and learned Lord raises, perhaps I can come to that in just a moment.

Clause 19 provides that the council can issue definitive guidelines only if the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice each individually approve them. The amendments from the noble and learned Lords propose instead that the council should be free to issue definitive guidance unless both the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice indicate that they do not consent. While I appreciate the sentiment and the spirit of compromise behind these amendments—which the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas, also referred to— I am afraid that we are not convinced that they would be the best way of securing the public confidence in sentencing guidelines that we seek. This is because they run the risk of definitive guidelines being published and implemented for use by the courts, even if the Lord Chancellor or, indeed, the Lady Chief Justice had indicated their discontent with them. We consider the current drafting of Clause 19 to be a practical and effective means of achieving our policy objective because it provides that the consent of the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice must first be obtained before a definitive guideline can be published and implemented.

I emphasise that, in developing our current drafting, we have sought to reflect the distinct roles and responsibilities that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to between Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary, as well as the careful balance that has been established for sentencing policy and practice. In particular, we are clear that these approval measures do not interfere—I hope that this is obvious, but I will emphasise it anyway—with the judiciary’s responsibility for setting sentences in individual cases.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I find myself back in the comfortable spot where I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Of course, that is something that we will come to later, no doubt, when we discuss the independence and the constitutional role of the Sentencing Council. If noble Lords are worried that I am being too glib, because “exceptional circumstances” seems too vague an alternative to a prescriptive list of offences which are exceptional, the answer is, on the one hand, to trust the judges—this is about their discretion, and they know jolly well about the awful case that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned, and about situations where people are repeatedly not paying their fines or breaching community orders, which should be exceptions to the 12-month presumption.

The second part of the argument is that the judicial limb of our constitution has in the form of its Sentencing Council—and I use that language deliberately because I am for the independence of the Sentencing Council—a council to help guide judges so that there can be an element of consistency in courts around the country as to the approach on what is exceptional, and therefore what type of case justifies the exception to the presumption and the philosophy of this measure that short sentences are a bad idea.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene on this matter, but I wonder what thought has been given by the Ministry of Justice to simplification. The Sentencing Code is now a very lengthy document. The way in which the title of the clause has been put is very sensible: it says that there is a presumption for a suspended sentence. However, one goes on to read the entirety of this text, with the words “the court must … unless”, and then there is a whole series of exceptions to that order. Why do we have to have complexity?

There are two strong reasons against it. First, there will not be parliamentary time to alter this if we get it wrong. Secondly, it is much better to leave this to the guidance of the Sentencing Council. If the Bill could say “the Sentencing Council will provide guidelines to bring about that there should be a presumption against short sentences”, would that not achieve what we want without language? I heavily criticise the parliamentary draftsmen for this unnecessary complexity. Can we go not go back to the Victorian age and do things simply? I know these words are likely to fall on deaf ears, but it would be so much better if we had simple sentencing legislation and left it to the Sentencing Council, which can adjust it as we see whether it works, because one thing experience shows is that we try one type of sentence and, a few years later, we want to tinker with it.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, as a judge who did not sit very often in crime but had to do it from time to time, I have been listening with increasing dismay to what has been discussed in these increasingly elaborate proposals. I hope that the Minister will listen to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, because that was the first bit of absolute good sense, whether we need to call it Victorian or just remind ourselves that the Victorians did a lot of things extremely well. At the end of this discussion and throughout this Bill, could we not do three things: simplify, trust the judges, and trust the Sentencing Council to do a lot of what is going to be, at the moment, in primary legislation?

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that I have addressed noble Lords’ concerns and clearly explained why the current position in the Bill is the right one.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Perhaps I might ask the Minister about the way he ran his business. One of the important roles of a legislature is to get things technically right. There is no disagreement, as I can see, on the view that that the policy is right, but can we not do things more simply? Throughout the Bill, I have asked the Minister: can we look at producing a piece of workable, simple legislation that can be adapted if what is set out is not right? I believe that this is something a legislature ought to address, where policy is not at issue.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

The principle that the noble and learned Lord raises is the right one. I do not believe that we can change things in this Bill now, but the message that I can relay will be very helpful. There is another point around complexity: how this is then communicated to the hard-working staff on the front line, who will need to interpret and put into action what we are proposing here.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I will respond to the Minister. First, it is always our duty to put legislation right, otherwise we might as well all go home. Secondly, the Sentencing Council is there to give practical guidance; it is not our job as a legislature to tinker with the detail. I urge the Minister to go back and see whether we can produce, instead of the complexities inherent in this clause, something that just expresses the presumption and leaves the Sentencing Council to do its job. It will do it far more competently, I am sure, than the Ministry of Justice.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

We will come back to that later in Committee, when we talk about the Sentencing Council. But I reassure the noble and learned Lord that I will take back to colleagues his point about clarity and simplicity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Yes, luckily they have, so I do not really need to be nervous at all.

Often, in putting my or the Green Party’s views—which obviously overlap quite a lot—I feel that I am speaking from the street. I talk to a lot of people who probably do not know much about this sort of thing, and they probably agree with me on some of it.

On simpler legislation, I know for a fact that the Met Police would like simpler legislation around protests. It is absolutely sick of the confusion and it is time for us to revisit it. However, that is not for today.

Amendment 29A would make a simple but important change: it would require courts to consider the use of a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. This would strengthen the Government’s own intention to reduce the overuse of short prison sentences—an aim that I and, I am sure, many across the Chamber, including the Minister, warmly welcome. However, unless we make it clear that community orders must be properly considered first, we risk creating what justice organisations call a net-widening effect. In other words, people who should have received a community order may instead receive a suspended sentence order simply because it appears to be a tougher alternative to custody.

A suspended sentence order is still a custodial sentence. It carries the weight and the lifelong consequences of a criminal record, and it places people at far greater risk of imprisonment if they breach its terms. By contrast, a community order is a genuinely non-custodial disposal. It is designed, when properly resourced, to address the underlying causes of offending, whether those are mental health needs, alcohol or drug dependency, or others. Community orders enable people to keep their jobs, maintain their homes, stay connected to their families and communities, and continue caring responsibilities—all factors that are well established as reducing the risk of reoffending.

If the Bill’s aim is to reduce the crisis in prison capacity, we must avoid funnelling people into suspended sentences where a community order would be more effective and safely promote rehabilitation. Otherwise, we simply increase the pipeline into custody through breach, defeating the very purpose of the Government’s reforms. We also risk the danger that this disproportionately affects women as it currently stands, which we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

This amendment is supported by Justice and aligned with the recommendations of the Independent Sentencing Review, which suggested

“introducing ‘crime reduction’ as an overarching principle”

to guide sentencing. Community sentences can play a crucial role in achieving that. They provide a real opportunity for rehabilitation and practical programmes that help people rebuild their lives without the barrier of a custodial sentence on their record. Crucially, community orders can command public confidence when victims are properly informed about what they involve and understand how these sentences can reduce future harm.

Amendment 29A would simply ensure that the most proportionate, most effective and least harmful sentence is considered first. It would strengthen the Bill’s stated ambition of reducing pressure on prisons while supporting better outcomes for individuals and communities. I hope that the Minister sees this as a constructive amendment that aligns with the Government’s own agenda. I urge the Committee to give it serious consideration.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I support what is behind the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones, for two reasons. First, we still send far too many women to prison; we need to reduce that number. Secondly, a community sentence probably should be in priority to a suspended sentence.

However, it is not that simple. I will not come back to this point again, but the amendments show precisely why this should be left to the Sentencing Council, which can weigh up the detail of the terms and conditions that it is appropriate to attach to a suspended sentence, as you can make them almost as tough as a community order. The judgment of how the public perceive suspended sentences and community orders can also be left to the council. Unless we satisfy the public’s perception that we are punishing people, the result will be that the judges will think, “Okay, we’ve got to go above 12 months”. That would be a disaster, particularly in the case of women.

I support the excellent ideas behind the amendments. However—and I promise not to say any more about the Sentencing Council today—they are a very strong argument for changing this Bill and making it sensible.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to these amendments, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to insert an explicit reference to Section 77 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make it plain that courts may mitigate a sentence to a community order where appropriate. This amendment is not necessary. The Bill does not alter the courts’ ability to consider the full range of mitigating factors, nor does it disturb their discretion to impose a community sentence where that is the just and proportionate outcome. What it does is imposes an obligation to suspend a prison sentence where otherwise a prison sentence might be imposed. Those powers remain firmly in place. To single out Section 77 of the Sentencing Act for restatement in the Bill might imply that the legislation would otherwise curtail judicial discretion to impose a community sentence. That is not the case. For this reason, we do not consider the amendment to be needed or helpful.

Amendment 29A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would place a statutory duty on courts to consider a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. Although we understand and appreciate the intention behind the proposal, we do not support it. The courts are already required to work upwards through a full hierarchy of sentencing options, including setting community sentences, before custody is reached. That is the well-established principle in law and practice. Sentencing judges are highly experienced in applying those principles.

To introduce a further procedural step will not add substance but create additional bureaucracy in an already very complex framework. It risks increasing administrative burdens on the probation services and court staff, and generating uncertainty about what additional assessments or reports might be required to satisfy the new duty. We should not legislate for processes that the system is not resourced or structured to deliver. Above all, a suspended sentence of imprisonment is, by definition, imposed only when the custody threshold has already been crossed. To require courts to revisit considerations that are already inherent in the sentencing exercise risks weakening clarity and undermining judicial confidence in the tools at their disposal.

For all these reasons, although we respect the intentions behind both amendments, we do not believe that they would strengthen the sentencing framework. We cannot support them.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 12th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may first pay tribute to Baroness Newlove. She brought to the office of Victims’ Commissioner an enormous energy, and she will be greatly missed.

Secondly, I follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, in declaring my interest as a president of the Sentencing Council. I also declare my interest in having been appointed by the Government of Wales to chair a Commission on Justice in Wales for the people of Wales. I have also contributed to one or two bits of work, as has already been said this evening, in relation to the issues in the Bill.

I welcome the Bill, but we must see it in its context. We really need a reappraisal of our whole sentencing system, as so many people have said, but we cannot get there in one step. So, the Bill should be seen as a step. We need to look at why we are now imposing sentences that are vastly greater than those handed down by the tough old judges I remember 30 years ago. They were thought to be very tough, but these days they would be plastered over the popular newspapers as softies. Why have we done this? That is a question we should ask ourselves. But, more importantly, we should ask ourselves about the consequences, which are that there are not the resources in the prisons to do what they should be doing, and nor are there in the Probation Service, which will now have a great deal more to do. We must see this in context. I welcome it. I pay tribute to the Minister for bringing it forward, and to David Gauke for the tremendous amount of work he has done.

There is much to be welcomed. The provisions in respect of deferred and suspended sentences will enable the Sentencing Council, which I hope will be given its independence to continue, and the judiciary, to develop deferred sentencing and get suspended sentences right. I also welcome the reality of trying to make the public understand that community orders are a punishment. If we do not get that right, there is a real risk that judges and magistrates will suspend sentences of under 12 months. Of course, a suspended sentence increases the risk of incarceration if subsequent offences are committed. This is a very important consideration, which experience has shown we must not overlook.

Having said that, there are one or two observations I will make in more general terms, judged by two principles. The first is that sentencing is part of a system of justice, and we must show that the Bill is a just Bill. Secondly, I want to address the question of practicality and resources.

The first question that relates to the justice of the Bill obviously relates to IPPs. I pay tribute to the Minister for what he has done to try to invigorate the action plan. But the action plan will not achieve justice and remedy an injustice in a period that is just.

There are four short points, in the light of everything that has been said, that I would like to make. First, this sentence has been accepted to be wrong in principle. How can we, as a nation, continue to punish people under a sentence that is wrong in principle? There is no justification for that.

Secondly, there is a misunderstanding about this sentence. People who write about it now simply do not understand what it did and how it worked. It was not a sentence that punished serious violent or serious sexual offending. If we look back at the tariffs that were given, we find that they are of the order, in some cases, of 16 or 18 months. It is absurd to say that these are serious offences—look at the tariff. It is also a misunderstanding of the circumstances in which it came to be imposed.

Thirdly, it is now required that those who are subject to a punishment that we accept is wrong are effectively required to prove that they are not dangerous, but people who committed exactly the same offences before 2005 or who were sentenced after 2012 do not have to prove that. How can that be just? It fails on that score.

Finally, there is the responsibility of the department in continuing this sentence in a means that has made those who languish in prison without knowing when they are to be released more dangerous. That is the responsibility of the Government, and they should acknowledge that. I look forward to and hope we will see cross-party dialogue on this matter, because we must find a solution.

There are three other short points I wish briefly to make on the question of justice. First, the system of earned progression and the way in which punishments are to be added to must be subject to detailed study and detailed dissemination before we pass the Bill. It must be just and be seen to be just. Secondly, it is important that we think again about deporting offenders without them being punished. We do not want this to become a nation where people can shoplift for nothing or, worse still, commit serious crimes and return—courtesy of taxpayer-funded travel, of course—without any consequence.

Thirdly, so much has been said about the Sentencing Council. I do not wish to add anything to that. I was present when it was all negotiated. It was a carefully constructed balance of the power of Parliament, the power of Ministers, and the duties and responsibilities of judges. Getting the constitutional balance right was achieved. We should not upset it because of an unfortunate incident about which least said, soonest mended. Let us just give this up. Those are the points I wanted to make about judging this Bill by reference to justice.

I shall make three other quick points relating to the other principle: does it produce and reflect the realities? First, it seems that we must look at IPPs through the reality of resources. They are taking up room in prison, and probation officer time. We need to adjust and look at the costs of that quite separately from the priceless attributes of justice. Secondly, we must be sure that there is adequate funding for what is to be done. That point has been very strongly made, and there is no point in me repeating it.

Thirdly, I shall say something about Wales. I fear, at times, that we are back in the 19th century and the famous entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica about Wales: “See England”. However, Wales is different, in the form of the way all other home affairs, other than, for example, probation and other aspects of justice, are dealt with. There is a different system. It was the position of the previous Government, and it now appears to be the position of this Government, that they cannot give consideration to what the commission I chaired recommended, which the Welsh Government were happy with, in respect of probation—there were a whole lot of others, but I want to concentrate on probation. Why can they not devolve probation? I want to raise this issue. It seems an important one, and I would like to know why the Government will not give Wales the benefit of what England has. I welcome the Bill, but there are things we must do to put it right.

Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice (Alteration of Overall Compensation Limits) Order 2025

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Wednesday 17th September 2025 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, miscarriages of justice have a devastating impact on those who suffer them. It is no exaggeration to say that such people are in fact victims of the state, so it is right that the state should support those people in rebuilding their lives.

Although miscarriages of justices are, thankfully, rare, they do occur. When they do, it is vital that the criminal justice system learns lessons in order to minimise the risk of them happening again and that we support those people whose lives have been affected. Justice for the wrongly convicted is vital to the Government’s ambition to restore confidence in the criminal justice system as part of their Plan for Change: Milestones for Mission-led Government.

With the introduction of this instrument, we are taking action to ensure that victims of miscarriages of justice will continue to be appropriately compensated, while keeping in mind the wider financial context. There are two compensation schemes: one relates to convictions in the civilian justice system, while the other relates to convictions by a court martial. Both have caps on the maximum compensation that can be paid for a miscarriage of justice. They have not been changed since their introduction in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

The purpose of this instrument is to increase the maximum amount under both schemes by 30%. This means that where an individual has spent at least 10 years in prison, the maximum amount that they can receive will increase from £1 million to £1.3 million. In all other cases, the maximum amount will increase from £500,000 to £650,000. The Government consider this a substantial increase. Of course, these compensation schemes are just one route by which an individual can receive compensation for a wrongful conviction; for example, applicants can also seek further compensation by bringing civil claims against public bodies if they have been at fault in such a way that it has caused the miscarriage of justice.

I am now going to deal with each scheme in a little more detail. For those who have suffered a qualifying miscarriage of justice in the civilian criminal justice system, the payment of compensation is governed by Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Applications for compensation under this scheme are determined and the compensation will be paid by the responsible devolved Government.

In practice, this means that the Secretary of State for Justice is responsible for cases in England and Wales, Scottish Ministers are responsible for cases in Scotland and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland is responsible for cases in Northern Ireland. This reflects the position that miscarriages of justice compensation are a transferred matter. There is a small number of cases in Northern Ireland involving sensitive national security information for which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has responsibility.

For those who have suffered a qualifying miscarriage of justice following conviction by a court martial, Section 276 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides that applications are determined by, and that the compensation will be paid by, the Secretary of State for Defence. To be clear, compensation payable under this scheme is also subject to the caps.

The proposed instrument will increase the caps that apply to compensation payable by the Secretary of State—that is, eligible England and Wales cases, eligible Northern Ireland national security cases and eligible cases under the Armed Forces Act scheme. It will have no effect on the caps that apply to compensation payable by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice as it has a separate power to amend its caps.

The Government are aware that there are some aspects of the entire compensation scheme that remain controversial. However, the Law Commission is consulting on a wide range of changes to the laws relating to criminal appeals, including compensation for miscarriages of justice. We look forward to receiving its final report and remain committed to ensuring that any changes we make will promote fairness and justice for all involved in criminal justice proceedings.

I thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for its consideration of this instrument and its report. We are laying the instrument now as part of our mission to improve the Government’s response to miscarriages of justice. We believe that it is crucial to ensure that victims of miscarriages of justice continue to be appropriately compensated, while being mindful of the Government’s wider financial context. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, it is an enormous privilege to welcome the Minister to the Dispatch Box on her first appearance. I welcome the fact that such an experienced lawyer now holds this position.

I turn now to the substance of the debate; the Minister has explained everything in such lucid detail that I can go straight to the two points that I want to raise, without going into the background. The limit was fixed in 2008 and, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, on which I sit, observed, the limit is being raised by only 30% whereas, unfortunately, inflation has been very much higher. We have the privilege of having the Financial Secretary to the Treasury here in the Room, and he will no doubt be very pleased to see that the Ministry of Justice is taking such good care of the scarce resources of the country.

When the previous Labour Administration were in power in 2008, they thought that the limits set out then were fair and reasonable and reflected the public position at the time. Is there a reason why we cannot have the same position today and therefore raise the amounts? As the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee was told, there has never been a payment of the maximum amount, and only very few payments of the lesser amount. Is there therefore a real difficulty in being parsimonious—which is no doubt appreciated by His Majesty’s Treasury—in relation to these amounts? Could this be looked at again?

That takes me to my second question. The Ministry of Justice is in the unfortunate position of having a number of instruments and other pieces of legislation where limits are set, and it is very important that these are kept under regular review. There have been occasions when the ministry has failed to do so. Does the ministry now have a proper schedule for reviewing this and making certain that we do not have a very long period of time, such as that which has elapsed since 2008, before this kind of limit is reviewed? It may be that the Minister will want to take some time to investigate this, but I hope that there is a system in place for such limits to be looked at.

Those are my two observations. I again express what a great pleasure it is to see the Minister in her place and dealing with such an important subject.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I join with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in welcoming the Minister to the Dispatch Box.

Our legal system is based on the principle of fairness. This country prides itself on its judiciary. Trial for serious offences by judge and jury is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system. The law exists to right wrongs and to create and maintain a system in which honest subjects can live their lives under the even-handed protection of the law. However, those who suffer miscarriages of justice under the same system must be compensated fairly. A legal system without the means of self-correction is devoid of trust and justice.

We on this side of the Committee support the measures brought forward today. Compensation for those wronged by the system must be fair and proportionate. It is not just that those wrongly convicted and imprisoned have not had the maximum compensation increased for nearly 17 years; the onus is on the justice system to correct its mistakes and increase compensation payments as time passes. It was in the same spirit that, as my honourable friend in the other place the Shadow Minister for Justice noted, the former Lord Chancellor removed the compensation guidance that allowed deductions for living expenses saved while in prison. The justice system must be seen to correct its own mistakes, which is what this instrument aims to do. This is why we support it.

Imprisonment for Public Protection (Re-sentencing) Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 4th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, for all that he has done, is doing and, I am sure, will continue to do to try to remedy the kind of injustice that he has outlined.

Before I turn to the options put before us, I would like to say something about that injustice. It is largely common ground, I think, that the imposition of this sentence in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was a mistake. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for acknowledging that mistake. However, what we have failed to do—herein lies the real perpetuation of the injustice—is deal with those who are still subject to that sentence. I am sure it is that which caused Members of your Lordships’ House, in particular the late Lord Judge, the late Lord Lloyd of Berwick and the late Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, to describe this as a stain on the character of British justice—which it is. It is a very serious matter that we are not taking practical steps to deal with injustice. As the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, said, we did it in respect of the Post Office, but, in my view, there are a lot of hang-ups and misconceptions that are preventing the doing of justice in this case.

Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Gloucester]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I have already registered my feelings about the Bill at Second Reading and in Committee. Now that we have had the publication of the Independent Sentencing Review and the Government’s response, I reiterate the point that, like others, I simply do not believe that we need this legislation. It seems that the left hand is not aware of the right hand on the evidence around sentencing.

I agree with what has been said already. Amendment 8, in my name, seeks something very specific: to ensure that existing sentencing guidelines relating to the mitigating factor of pregnancy, childbirth and postnatal care can continue to provide directions for courts to obtain pre-sentence reports for offenders who are pregnant or primary carers of young children. Without this amendment, the Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill directly contradicts the Government’s stated policy intent to reduce the imprisonment of pregnant women and mothers of young children.

On 22 May, in her response to the Independent Sentencing Review, the Lord Chancellor explicitly stated the Government’s intent to reduce the imprisonment of pregnant women and mothers of young children. She said:

“I am particularly keen to ensure that pregnant women and mothers of young children are not anywhere near our female prison estate in future”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1204.]


Indeed, the Independent Sentencing Review

“recognises the harm caused by imprisoning pregnant women and believes pregnant women and new mothers should be diverted and supported in the community, unless in exceptional circumstances. Custody must only be a last resort”.

How, then, are we to achieve this, when the Bill makes unlawful the existing Sentencing Council’s mitigating factor—pregnancy, childbirth and postnatal care—which came into force on 1 April 2024 and directs courts to obtain PSRs for pregnant and postnatal offenders? I am very grateful to the Minister for writing after Committee, but he confirmed—extraordinarily—that the Bill will render such direction about obtaining PSRs across existing sentencing guidelines unlawful. I query his assumption that, without direction, sentencers might request a PSR. This is a backward step. Simply put, without a pre-sentence report, alternatives to custody cannot be considered by a sentencing court. Without a mandatory direction to obtain a PSR, there is no way to ensure that women are diverted from custody. Without this amendment, the Bill directly contradicts the Government’s stated policy intent. I recognise the very difficult position that the Minister has been put in, but I am simply looking for the Government to have the grace to admit this contradiction and to accept this amendment. It does not have to be seen as a humiliating backing-down, but, rather, a humble response to listening.

I will not delay the House further. I will listen to the Minister’s response in due course, but I am minded, at this point, to divide the House. However, I might need some careful direction, should other amendments be passed, as to where that leaves my Amendment 8.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to add a few sentences to what the right reverend Prelate said. I preface that by noting that, when we built the Sentencing Council, the legislation was discussed and agreed. It was clear when this Bill was introduced that discussion and agreement were needed. I find it very disappointing that we have not been able to get together to find a satisfactory way to deal with this legislation other than by dropping it—I regard that now as gone.

I think it important that Ministers appreciate what the right reverend Prelate said. It is plain that pregnancy and maternity are characteristics, and one ought to ensure that all judges receive the same guidance as to obtaining pre-sentence reports. I know that the Minister and the Lord Chancellor are very keen that pregnant women do not go to prison, but they are not the law; the law is laid down by this unfortunate legislation. If there is one thing we can do to ensure that it does not wreak injustice, it is to allow the amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate. There is a huge amount more that we should do, but, without a consensus and discussion between us, I do not believe that we can make any improvement. That is why I content myself with this very narrow point. We cannot be in a position where we cannot give guidance to courts that they should get a pre-sentence report to avoid sending pregnant women to prison.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to the Bill’s progress in Committee. In particular, I acknowledge the thoughtful and constructive contributions from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon. We have heard further thoughtful contributions today, not least from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester.

None the less, from this side of the House, I wish to place on record our broad support for the principles that underpin the Bill. The use of pre-sentence reports, when applied rigorously, consistently and with due regard to the individual circumstances of the offender, is an essential part of a fair and effective justice system. They play a crucial role in informing judicial discretion, ensuring proportionality in sentencing and helping to reduce the risk of reoffending through appropriate rehabilitative measures. We welcome the intention of the Bill to strengthen and clarify the expectations around the preparation and consideration of pre-sentence reports. These seek to embed good practice across the system and to promote greater consistency in the court’s approach to sentencing.

However, while we on this side support the direction of travel, we remain mindful that sentencing is a complex and sensitive area of the law. It touches not only on legal principle but on human lives, social outcomes and the effective operation of our prison and probation systems. In that context, I will take a moment to acknowledge a specific concern raised by noble Lords in Committee: the lack of clarity around the term “personal characteristics” as it appears in the Bill. This is not a small point. If the legislation is to provide clear and workable guidance to practitioners, including report writers and the judiciary, we must be precise about what we mean. Any doubt or uncertainty in this area risks inconsistent application. It undermines the very consistency and fairness that the Bill seeks to promote. I hope that the Government will reflect carefully on these concerns and consider whether further definition could be usefully provided.

More broadly, I echo the view expressed at earlier stages that, with just a little more time and careful consideration, we could strengthen and improve this legislation further. There remain questions that would benefit from additional scrutiny, and we should proceed with care. We must get this right, not only in the interest of justice but for the confidence of the public, the judiciary and those working on the front line of our criminal justice system. We on these Benches remain committed to working constructively with the Government, with noble Lords across the House and with all those who bring experience and insight to bear on this important issue.

I will turn briefly to the amendments in the first group. As for Amendments 1 and 7, spoken to by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, we recognise that Amendment 1 seeks to provide clarity about the range of matters that the sentencer may take into account. We invite the Government to consider these during the Bill’s journey through the other place.

Independent Sentencing Review

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I cannot comment on individual cases, but it is up to the judiciary to decide what sentence they hand down to offenders.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I too add to the welcome that has been given to David Gauke’s review and the Government’s response to it. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Baker, when he said, “Let us try to approach this in a non-political manner”, but I fear that is probably pie in the sky. I shall put it in a slightly different way: can we try to approach this by seeing what works? Do these long prison sentences work? My own view is that they do not. As important to these reforms will be making sure that the substitute, of people spending more time in the community, works. Here, money is critical. I very much hope that the Government will be prepared to submit their detailed costings for critical examination, because we cannot afford to get this wrong.

There are three areas that concern me. First, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that in this electronic age, tagging should be efficient. I do not want to say much about the companies that have been used, but they have a fairly dubious history in some respects. Secondly, we ought to be very careful in how we deal with people who offend. When we tried this 20 years ago, that was the problem: if someone broke the conditions, we were too slow at doing anything about it; therefore, that needs funds. Thirdly, can we ensure that there is proper money for the Probation Service, and that that is examined critically? All of those are critical to the point that has been made—how do we have confidence in the community?

I remember going up north as a youngish judge and being told, when I advocated community sentence, “Young man,”—I was, I think, relatively young then— “we don’t believe in it up here”. We have to make them believe in it.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My approach to this job is exactly my approach to all my working life: follow the evidence and make sure you get some great people working with you who have a very clear idea of what needs to be achieved. That is my plan here. That is why, for example, Texas provides an interesting example; the evidence is clear, and I am delighted that we have taken it on board. The point within that is the incentives: what incentives does a prisoner have to do what we ask them to do? If they behave badly, they get time added on to their sentence, so it is a good example of following the evidence.

Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 7th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

May I add very briefly to the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the late Lord Etherton? He was a lawyer of the highest ability. He had great skill and was a man of real quality. I worked with him for many years at the Bar, and as a colleague on the Bench. All those qualities were shown in abundance in what he achieved in that period. But he also achieved a great deal in this House and took on number of causes that some might not have found popular. He was a great man and will be greatly missed.

I turn very briefly to make three points about the Bill. First, although we have been accorded a long time to speak, I do not intend to take advantage of that to repeat what I already said at length prior to the Easter Recess. I explained then why I thought the Bill was not necessary, and I regret that the Government feel it is. I very much hoped then—and still hope today—that this issue can be resolved without legislation, but I will not repeat what I have already said to that end.

Secondly, I agree with the Minister that this is a very narrow Bill. That is no excuse for not getting it right, but it is a narrow Bill. It is important to note that it is not the occasion for the kind of wide-ranging issues such as those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, to be raised. Therefore, I do not intend to answer them. If they are raised on a subsequent occasion, that will be the appropriate time, but this is a narrow Bill.

I say that because I think it is important that the Sentencing Council and its predecessor bodies, the Sentencing Guidelines Council and the Sentencing Advisory Panel, have worked well, although I ought to declare that I was a member of the Sentencing Guidelines Council, had a hand in setting up the Sentencing Council and was its president for four years until 2017. If we look at what it has done and analyse the constitutional position, I do not believe there is any basis for making any real change. It has been a great success as it brings together two arms of the state, the judiciary and the Executive, under the supervision of the third arm, Parliament, in producing a very sensible way of dealing with balancing the role of Parliament in setting policy and the role of the judiciary in sentencing individuals. That is a complex issue, and I would like to leave it for an occasion where it properly arises. It does not arise today.

Thirdly—this point does arise today—there is the definition of personal characteristics. This has already been touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I think it could, with advantage, be clarified. It would be helpful to understand why the definition is different to the definition of protected characteristics in Section 4 of the Equality Act. I note that the Minister has already referred to the remarks made by Sir Nicholas Dakin in the other place on 30 April, where he said

“we are clear that it is intended to cover a wider range of characteristics including sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/4/25; col. 388.]

There are a lot of other characteristics. Before trying to amend it, it would be helpful to have a clear explanation—I have given the Minister notice of this—of why the course chosen has been chosen.

That is more important in the light of paragraph 14 of the Explanatory Notes, as it uses the term “particular circumstances” of individuals in apparent contradiction to “personal characteristics”. I am not sure that I understand the difference. It would be helpful if the Minister could try to explain it. In any event, with that explanation, we can look forward to amending—I hope with considerable advantage—this part of the Bill without anyone being accused of wrecking it.