Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Vallance of Balham
Main Page: Lord Vallance of Balham (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Vallance of Balham's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 day, 19 hours ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1.
My Lords, I will speak to some of the amendments made in the other place, starting with Amendments 1 to 31. These will ensure that smart data schemes can function optimally and that Part 1 is as clear as possible. Similarly, Amendments 35 to 42 from the other place reflect discussions on the national underground asset register with the devolved Governments. Finally, Amendments 70 to 79 make necessary consequential updates to the final provisions of the Bill and some updates to Schedules 11 and 15.
I will now speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords, starting with those relating to sex data. Motion 32A disagrees with the amendment to remove Clause 28(3) and (4), and instead proposes changes to the initial drafting of those subsections. These would require the Secretary of State, when preparing the trust framework, to assess whether the 15 specified public authorities can reliably ascertain the data they collect, record and share. Amendment 32B limits this assessment to sex data, as defined through Amendment 32C; that definition limits sex to biological sex only and provides a definition of acquired gender.
It is also relevant to speak now to Motion 52A, which disagrees with the amendment to remove Clause 140 and, instead, suggests changes to the drafting. Clause 140, as amended by Amendment 52B, seeks to, through a regulation-making power, give the Secretary of State the ability to define sex as being only biological sex in certain areas or across public sector data processing more widely. Let me be clear that this Government accept the recent Supreme Court judgment on the definition of sex for the purposes of equality legislation. We need to work through the effects of this ruling holistically and with care, sensitivity and—dare I say it—kindness. In line with the law, we need to take care not to inappropriately extend its reach. This is not best done by giving the Secretary of State the power to define sex as biological in all cases through secondary legislation without appropriate scrutiny, given the potential impact on people’s human rights, privacy and dignity, and the potential to create legal uncertainty. Likewise, giving the Secretary of State a role in reviewing how other public authorities process sex data in all circumstances based on that definition would be inappropriate and disproportionate, and I note that the Supreme Court’s ruling relates specifically to the meaning of sex in equalities legislation.
The driver behind these amendments has been the importance of sex data being accurate when processed by public authorities. I strongly agree with that aim: accurate data is essential. This Government take data accuracy—including the existing legislation that requires personal data to be accurate—and data standards seriously. That is why we are addressing the question of sex information in public sector data. First, the EHRC is updating its statutory code of practice to support service providers in light of the Supreme Court judgment. Secondly, the Data Standards Authority is developing data standards on the monitoring of diversity information, including sex and gender data, and the effect of the Supreme Court judgment will be considered as part of that work.
Thirdly, the Office for Statistics Regulation published updated guidance on collecting and reporting data and statistics about sex and gender identity data last year. Fourthly, the Office for National Statistics published a work plan in December 2024 for developing harmonised standards on data more generally. Finally, the department is currently considering the implementation of the Sullivan review, published this year, which I welcome.
On digital verification services, I reassure noble Lords that these measures do not change the evidence that individuals rely on to prove things about themselves. The measures simply enable that to be done digitally. This Government are clear that data must be accurate for the purpose for which it is being used and must not be misleading. It should be clear to digital verification services what the information public authorities are sharing with them means. I will give an important example. If an organisation needs to know a person’s biological sex, this Government are clear that a check cannot be made against passport data, as it does not capture biological sex. DVS could only verify biological sex using data that records that attribute specifically, not data that records sex or gender more widely.
I know this is a concern of the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and I hope this provides some reassurance. The data accuracy principle of GDPR is part of existing law. That includes where data is misleading—this is a point I will return to. I hope that noble Lords find this commitment reassuring and, as such, will agree with Commons Amendment 32.
Motion 34A on Amendments 34B and 34C address the security of the national underground asset register. Security has always been at the heart of the national underground asset register. We have therefore listened to the well-thought-through concerns that prompted the amendment previously tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, regarding cybersecurity. Following consideration, the Government are instead proposing an amendment we have drafted with support of colleagues in the security services. We believe this addresses the intention of ensuring the security of the national underground asset register data, with three key improvements.
First, it broadens the scope from cybersecurity only to the general security of information kept in or obtained from the national underground asset register. This will ensure that front-end users have guidance on a range of measures for security good practice—for example, personnel vetting, which should be considered for implementation—while avoiding the need to publish NUAR-specific cybersecurity features that should not be in the public domain. Secondly, it specifies the audience for this guidance; namely, users accessing NUAR. Finally, it broadens the scope of the amendment to include Northern Ireland alongside England and Wales, consistent with the NUAR measures overall. Clearly, it remains the case that access to NUAR data can be approved for purposes only by eligible users, with all access controlled and auditable. As such, I hope that noble Lords will be content to support government Motion 34A and Amendments 34B and 34C.
Commons Amendment 43, made in the other place, on scientific research removes the public interest test inserted in the definition of scientific research by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. While recognising the concern the noble Lord raises, I want to be clear that anything that does not count as scientific research now would not do so under the Bill. Indeed, we have tightened the requirement and added a reasonableness test. The Bill contains strong safeguards. Adding precise definitions in the Bill would not strengthen these protections but impose a significant, new legal obligation on our research community at a time when, in line with the good work of the previous Government, we are trying to reduce bureaucracy for researchers, not increase it with new processes. The test proposed will lead to burgeoning bureaucracy and damage our world-leading research. This disproportionate step would chill basic and curiosity-driven research, and is not one we can support.
I beg to move that the House agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1. I have spoken to the other amendments.
My Lords, I first thank the Minister for his—as ever—clear and compelling remarks. I thank all noble Lords who have been working in a collegiate, collaborative fashion to find a way forward on the few but important remaining points of disagreement with the Government.
Before I come to the issue of accurate recording of personal data, I also thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling the government amendments on the national underground asset register and her constructive engagement throughout the progress of the Bill.
As noble Lords will recall, I set out our case for stronger statutory measures to require the Secretary of State to provide guidance to relevant stakeholders on the cybersecurity measures that should be in place before they receive information from the national underground asset register. I am of course delighted that the Government have responded to the arguments that we and others made and have now tabled their own version of my amendment which would require the Secretary of State to provide guidance on the security of this data. We are happy to support them in that.
I turn to Motions 32A and 52A standing in my name, which seek to ensure that data is recorded accurately. They amend the original amendment, which my noble friends Lord Lucas and Lord Arbuthnot took through your Lordships’ House. My noble friend Lord Lucas is sadly unable to attend the House today, but I am delighted to bring these Motions forward from the Opposition Front Bench. In the other place, the Conservative Front Bench tabled new Clause 21, which would, we feel, have delivered a conclusive resolution to the problem. Sadly, the Government resisted that amendment, and we are now limited by the scope of the amendments of my noble friend Lord Lucas, so we were unable to retable the, in my view, excellent amendment in your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, I have had a misspent not-so-youth over the past 50 years. As a lawyer, when I read the wording in the amendment, I cannot see the outcome that he is suggesting. This wording does not cut across anything that he has had to say. I genuinely believe that. I understand how genuine he is in his belief that this is a threat, but I do not believe this wording is such a threat.
I also understand entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, had to say, but an awful lot of that was about the frustration and some of the controls over health data. That does not apply in many other areas of scientific research. The Frascati formula is universal and well accepted. The noble Viscount made an extremely good case; we should be supporting him.
I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for his Motion 32A and Amendments 32B and 32C, and Motion 52A and Amendments 52B and 52C. I reiterate that this Government have been clear that we accept the Supreme Court judgment on the meaning of sex for equalities legislation. However, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, it is critically important that the Government work through the effect of this ruling with care, sensitivity and in line with the law.
When it comes to public sector data, we must work through the impacts of this judgment properly. This would involve considering the scope of the judgment and the upcoming EHRC guidance. Critically, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has indicated that it will be updating its statutory code of practice for services, public functions and associations in light of this ruling, which will include some of the examples raised this afternoon, including by my noble friend Lady Hayter.
Ministers will consider the proposals once the EHRC has submitted its updated draft. It is right that the Government and, indeed, Parliament fully consider this guidance alongside the judgment itself before amending the way that public authorities collect, hold and otherwise process data—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the EHRC ruling.
I set out in my opening speech that this Government take the issue of data accuracy seriously. That is why, as I outlined, there are numerous existing work streams addressing the way in which sex and gender data are collected and otherwise processed across the public sector.
The digital verification services amendments that we have discussed today are misplaced, because the Bill does not alter the evidence and does not seek to alter the content of data used by digital verification services. Instead, the Bill enables people to do digitally what they can do physically. It is for organisations to consider what specific information they need to verify their circumstances, and how they go about doing that. Any inconsistency between what they can do digitally and what they can do physically would cause further confusion.
While this Government understand the intention behind the amendments, the concerns regarding the way in which public authorities process sex and gender data should be considered holistically, taking into account the effects of the Supreme Court ruling, the upcoming guidance from the equalities regulator and the specific requirements of public authorities. It is very unlikely that the digital verification services would be used for many of the cases specifically raised by or with many noble Lords. We expect DVS to be used primarily to prove things like one’s right to work or one’s age, address or professional educational qualifications.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, rightly highlights that the proposals have the potential to interfere with the right to respect for private and family life under the Human Rights Act by, in effect, indiscriminately and indirectly pushing public authorities to record sex as biological sex in cases where it is not necessary or proportionate in that particular circumstance. I raise the example that has been brought up several times, and again by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox: it is not relevant for the French passport officer to know your biological sex. That is not the purpose of the passport.
We acknowledge, however, that there are safeguards that address the concerns raised by noble Lords, including those of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, regarding information being shared under Clause 45 but without presenting issues that could cut across existing or prospective legislation and guidance. I remind the House that the data accuracy principle is already included in law. The principle requires that only data accurate for the purpose for which it is held can be used. Again, there are workstreams looking at data use to answer the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and indeed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked why it was not accurate for 15 years and what that means about our reliance on this accuracy. I am afraid the fact is that it was accurate for 15 years because there was a muddle about what was being collected. There was no requirement to push for biological sex, but that is the case now. In response to the question of whether you could end up with two different sources of digital verification showing two different biological sexes, the answer is no.
I beg the House’s indulgence and indeed the Minister’s for my interrupting him. The fact is that the Supreme Court has confirmed what was always the law: that the Equality Act meant biological sex. It is therefore not true that the data accuracy principle has ensured that the law has been followed for the past 15 years. I am sorry, I find that answer a little dismissive. I do not think we can rely on that sort of assurance, and I apologise for saying that.
I apologise to the noble Baroness if she found that dismissive. My point was to try to say that there is a clear imperative under the new situation to have biological sex verified as biological sex. As a result—though not in all cases; I have given an example where it would be inappropriate to have that information—where you need that, it would not be possible, to answer her second question, to have two different sources of verification that gave two different biological sexes.
When information is shared through the gateway, it will be clear what that information represents, including in relation to sex and gender. In the light of the Supreme Court judgment, I further reassure Members by clarifying that, before the information gateway provision is commenced, the Government will carefully consider how and when biological sex may be relevant in the context of digital verification checks, and will take that into account when preparing the DVS code of practice.
I hope that these commitments and the assurance about the EHRC will provide noble Lords with reassurances that their concerns will indeed be taken into account. The amendments proposed do not fully take into account the fact that the Gender Recognition Act gives those with gender recognition certificates a level of privacy and control over who has access to information about their gender history. It is essential that Government have the chance to fully assess the Supreme Court judgment and update guidance accordingly. Given the need to consider this area holistically to ensure alignment with existing legislation and upcoming EHRC guidance, the breadth of work already being carried out on public data standards and data harmonisation and statistics, and the specific reassurance on compliance with the accuracy principle under the UK GDPR, I hope the noble Viscount feels comfortable not pressing his amendments.
I turn to Motion 43A from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. Scientific research is one of the UK’s great strengths. We are home to four of the top 10 universities in the world and are in the top three in scientific outputs. Today’s researchers depend on data, and the UK data protection framework contains certain accommodations for processing personal data for purposes that meet the definition of scientific research in Clause 67. I understand the noble Viscount’s intention to avoid misuse of these research provisions, but the Royal Society has said the reasonableness test in the Bill provides adequate protection against that. The Bill actually tightens the current position, with the ICO being able to use the reasonableness test. “Reasonable” does not mean the subjective opinion of an uninformed person; it refers to an objective, fair observer with good judgment and knowledge of the relevant facts. Such tests are well known to UK courts.
The Bill does not extend and expand that definition. If something is not considered scientific research now, it will not be under the Bill. Similarly, the Bill does not provide any new permission for reusing data for other research purposes. Moreover, further safeguards are provided in Clause 86 and the wider UK GDPR, including the requirement that processing be fair. The Bill clarifies that all reuse of data must have a lawful basis, putting an end to previous confusion on the matter. Adding further specific conditions to the definition in law will be unnecessary and impose a disproportionate burden on researchers, who already say they spend too much time on red tape. The previous Government rightly started to tackle the pernicious creep of increased bureaucracy in research. We should not add more. At worst, this could have an unintended harmful consequence and exclude genuine researchers.
The Frascati manual provides useful guidance; it is not, however, a legal definition. Requiring researchers to start complying with a new legal standard, and one that might change, would undoubtedly create more committees and more bureaucracy—the very thing that Max Perutz argued against in his guidelines on great research.
My noble friend Lord Winston and the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, have given powerful examples. Let me give two examples of where the proposals might cause problems. Does requiring research to be creative hinder the essential task in science of testing or reproducing existing findings? Does the Frascati manual definition of “systematic”, which means “budgeted”, exclude unfunded, early research trying to get a foothold? Let us not dampen the UK’s world-leading research sector for a protection that is already included in the Bill.
I sympathise with the intentions of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I assure him that the Bill also contains a power to add to the existing safeguards and narrow access to the research provisions if necessary. The Government would not hesitate to use that power if it ever became necessary to tackle misuse.