Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for repeating the Statement this afternoon, and I too begin by paying tribute to all the service personnel and civilian staff who served bravely and with distinction in Iraq and to their families. I do so particularly in remembrance of all those who lost their lives, and I also remember the countless thousands of Iraqi citizens who died in the conflict. Indeed, today we have heard that the number of people killed in a suicide attack in Baghdad at the weekend has risen to 250. That is the latest in a much-too-long list of terrorist outrages in Istanbul, Paris, Brussels and—11 years ago tomorrow—London.

Today we have seen the judgment of Charles Kennedy to lead my party in opposition to the war in Iraq, back in 2003, as truly vindicated. His words at the time, in a debate in the House of Commons, were profoundly and devastatingly prophetic. He said:

“Although I have never been persuaded of a causal link between the Iraqi regime, al-Qaeda and 11 September, I believe that the impact of war in these circumstances is bound to weaken the international coalition against terrorism itself, and not least in the Muslim world. The big fear that many of us have is that the action will simply breed further generations of suicide bombers”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/03; col. 786.]

The Chilcot report sets out clearly that the United Kingdom chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort. The inquiry concludes that the judgments made about Iraq’s capabilities were not justified and that the Joint Intelligence Committee should have made it clear that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued.

However, there can be no satisfaction in saying that we got it right at the time. Instead of improving our security, the war that ensued in Iraq has, sadly, made our country and our world less safe. The choices made by those at the time to go to war have contributed to a failed state that continues to be a source of extremism and instability across the Middle East. The decision to lead UK forces into the invasion and the occupation of Iraq in 2003 not only meant that we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan at a crucial time in our military engagement there but directly contributed to the continued instability in the Middle East and the threats that the world now faces from Daesh.

Of course the terrorists themselves are responsible for these horrific attacks, but the actions of a Government were responsible for helping to create the vacuum in which terrorism was allowed to develop—actions taken despite being advised by the Joint Intelligence Committee that such a development was a risk. Its assessment on 10 February 2003 concluded that,

“al-Qaida and associated groups will continue to represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat will be heightened by military action against Iraq”.

Perhaps one of the more devastating and shaming findings of the report is that the United Kingdom failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required in Iraq. That, together with the exaggeration of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime to the public to justify this war, has damaged public trust. It has damaged our country’s standing in the world and has almost certainly undermined the ability of the United Kingdom to intervene abroad to prevent crimes against humanity. A further consequence has been hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing their country as refugees, in turn resulting in millions of Iraqi children missing out on education, which has resulted in yet another generation of young people growing up without hope for the future.

It is easy for us all to agree that lessons must be learned, so what do the present Government consider to be the most important lessons that can be learned from this report? How have the Government addressed the issue of legal advice in such situations so that never again can it be said that the circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for the action taken were “far from satisfactory”? Will the noble Earl reflect on the governance issues—on the one hand, so-called sofa government and the inadequacies of that, but also the difficulties and dangers that we have if we have an ineffective Opposition unwilling to challenge and scrutinise?

Does he agree that we must reaffirm this country’s commitment to the international rule of law, and to collective decision-making through the institutions of the United Nations? Does he agree that before we would ever commit to further armed interventions in the future, it is vital that we have a post-conflict reconstruction plan, as well as an exit plan? Finally, does he share my concern over findings such as that at key times,

“UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas”?

Has any assessment been made of the extent to which such gaps could have contributed to casualties? Can he reassure the House that in future there will be transparency on the preparedness of our troops to be deployed for war, and the adequacy of the equipment and logistical support that they are fully entitled to expect?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Lord for their comments and questions. May I first associate myself with the tribute that they each paid to our Armed Forces, and with their references to the implicit duty to have systems in place to ensure that we treat the members of our Armed Forces and their families fairly, particularly soldiers, sailors and airmen who suffer grievous, sometimes life-changing, injury? That is why, with support from all political parties, the previous Government were proud to have put into law the principles of the Armed Forces covenant—which, of course, can never produce a perfect situation. But we are constantly working at it, and I think it has produced a very much better and fairer system for our brave service men and women. It is notable that 1,000 businesses and organisations have now pledged their support for the covenant in various ways.

Both the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Lord referred to the importance of reliable intelligence. Successive Governments have implemented the recommendations of the 2004 Butler review about the way in which intelligence is used in government. When the coalition Government came into office in 2010 we introduced the consolidated guidance to provide clear direction to intelligence officers about obtaining and using intelligence from sources overseas. Formal routes for challenge and dissent within the intelligence community have also been established and strengthened, which is an important innovation. We ensured that at the very beginning of every National Security Council meeting, the Joint Intelligence Committee chair provides relevant intelligence assessments, so that we know what basis of intelligence and other information we have at our disposal. Through the Justice and Security Act 2013 we improved the oversight of the security and intelligence agencies.

The noble and learned Lord asked a profound question about whether the invasion of Iraq created a vacuum for terrorists, and whether we are therefore less safe as a result. It is never possible to prove a counterfactual—what would have happened if Iraq had not been invaded—but I would point noble Lords’ attention to a passage in Sir John’s report in which he says explicitly that the JIC’s assessment in February 2003 was that the threat from al-Qaeda,

“will be heightened by military action against Iraq. The broader threat from Islamist terrorists will also increase”.

As we reflect on the report in the days and weeks ahead, we should perhaps reach our own conclusions about whether the judgment of the Government at the time to downplay that advice was the right one.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, referred to the virtues of ad hoc Cabinet committees, and the noble and learned Lord criticised the practice of what he called sofa government. These are exactly the reasons why, when the coalition Government came into office six years ago, the National Security Council was established as a Cabinet sub-committee. It is not an ad hoc committee; it is a standing committee. Indeed, the noble Baroness asked why it met only during parliamentary term times. It meets every week during parliamentary terms but it also meets, with officials only, in the recess as well, and it can advise the NSC, as a full committee, to meet if required. For example, that happened during the Libya campaign.

The noble Baroness also questioned whether it might have been wise for the Chilcot panel to have had legal assistance or legal representation within it. There are a number of different ways of constituting inquiries, as she will know. The then Prime Minister, Mr Brown, decided that a committee of privy counsellors should conduct the questioning of witnesses themselves rather than through counsel. I think that most people will feel, when reading the report, that they succeeded very well in managing the hearings that took place.

I am the first to say to the noble Baroness that the report makes no inference or statement that anyone in government acted in bad faith. The decisions that were taken rested clearly on the judgment of Ministers—in particular, Mr Blair. I think that we all need time to digest the report and reach measured conclusions of our own as to whether we believe that the judgments made were well founded. That is for another day perhaps, but it is clear that the need for Ministers to have a proper framework for decision-making is very powerful. Again I come back to the National Security Council, which I think is doing a good job in that respect, although I would be the last to claim that no improvement could ever be made to the decision-making process.

I end by saying that the task for us all now is to look at the report in detail. We should examine how further to improve our structures, policies, the procurement systems that we have and training. We should recognise in all humility that there is always more we can do to improve what we have, and that not every improvement sticks. Certainly, the aim of the Ministry of Defence is to become an organisation that is able constantly to adapt, to manage its resources properly, and to deploy our Armed Forces in defence of the nation efficiently and effectively. I think that a great deal of progress has been made in those regards since 2003, but there is always more to do.