Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill Debate
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Lord Wei
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Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill
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Lord Wei
“(c) a local authority is—(i) conducting enquiries under section 47 of the Children Act 1989 (duty to investigate) in respect of the child, or (ii) taking action under section 47(8) of that Act to safeguard or promote the child's welfare, in a case where the enquiries mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) have led the local authority to conclude that the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm (within the meaning of section 31(9) and (10) of that Act).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment limits consent requirements to safeguarding cases under section 47 of the Children Act 1989. It removes subsection (3) of 434A, recognising special school placement as supportive, not suspicious, and ensures local authorities must evidence actual harm risk, rather than requiring parents to justify withdrawal.
Lord Wei (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 203A and Amendment 215A, and to give moral support to Amendment 221. Before turning to these provisions, I wish to reflect briefly on the underlying scope and purpose of Clause 30.
Clause 30 as drafted is striking in its breadth. It hands local authorities the power to demand consent before a child may be withdrawn from a maintained school. I pick up here on a point made previously by the Minister about whether all parents could be subject to this. My assertion is that they could if a local authority decided, on the withdrawal of the child from school, to put the parent under a Section 47 order. Apparently, this is incredibly easy to do. The law requires only reasonable cause to suspect significant harm. It is a deliberately low bar, meant to protect children, and I have had correspondence—we can discuss this again in August—that indicates that it has at times been misused, just through a referral, for example, from the school itself. Let us say that a teacher does not really understand home education, is concerned that withdrawal might cause harm and alerts the local authority. Instantly, it can start an investigation. As an officer, you run that by your manager, who is busy—partly, perhaps, because there are many more families to investigate now that that the database exists. Perhaps there was a missed medical appointment, which I am sure we have all experienced, and they were late and could not see the doctor in time, perhaps because there was traffic. Suddenly, that might give rise to an S47. Although in theory, under the clause, only a certain subset of parents may be affected, potentially, in practice, depending on the ideological bias of the officers involved—and we have seen in some authorities that there clearly are some outliers—all parents may be swept into such measures.
Clause 30 as drafted hands local authorities the power to demand consent before a child may be withdrawn, yet nowhere does it properly limit the grounds on which that consent may be withheld. This gives the state a sweeping veto over parents’ decisions to withdraw their children, even when such withdrawal arises from urgent, pressing circumstances such as sustained bullying or grooming—I believe that you can be subject to an S47 if you are being groomed in a school—unmet special educational needs or serious mental health concerns. In doing so, it risks turning what should be a family’s protective step—for example, taking your child out of that circumstance of grooming by bullies in school—into a procedural trap.
This is a significant expansion of state power into private family life. It runs counter the well-established principle, under both domestic common law and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interests unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. By casting such a wide net without rigorous statutory safeguards, Clause 30 risks inviting inconsistency, arbitrary refusals and unnecessary confrontations that erode trust between families and local authorities. It is precisely this sort of overreach that sows the seed of future litigation and damages the co-operative spirit that effective safeguarding truly depends on.
Against that backdrop, Amendment 215 offers a much more balanced and constructive approach and, dare I say it, safeguard. It would require local authorities to offer parents a voluntary information session before they formally deregister a child to home educate. This session would do three modest but crucial things: provide an exploration of the parents’ legal rights and responsibilities, give details of what support services might be available, and lay out clearly what the process and consequences of withdrawal would entail.
This is not a barrier, a checkpoint or a covert mechanism for delay; it is simply an offer of information. It is a means to ensure that parents contemplating such a significant step—as we have heard, many more do so these days—do so with a full understanding of the legal and practical landscape, and it respects their right to choose while empowering them to make that choice wisely.
The decision to home-educate is rarely casual; many parents arrive at it after considerable distress. We have heard accounts from across England of children so overwhelmed by school that they stop speaking, suffer debilitating anxiety or face persistent exclusion. In such cases, parents often withdraw a child in a crisis, being understandably focused on immediate well-being rather than long-term procedural consequences. Those parents deserve our empathy, not our suspicion.
This amendment is rooted in sound constitutional principle. In R (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department the law is clear. Procedural fairness is a cornerstone of our system requiring timely, clear information when rights are at stake. This is precisely what Amendment 215A would achieve, ensuring that parents understand their freedoms and obligations.
It is not an abstract problem. In evidence we have repeatedly heard of parents who did not fully appreciate the impact of deregistration. Some assumed that they could simply return their child to school at any time. Others did not realise the additional hurdles for exam access or the financial implications once local authority funding fell away. One parent who wrote in from the West Midlands said starkly, “We thought we’d just get on with it, but suddenly we were isolated. No support, no guidance and a local authority more interested in interrogating us than helping”. Another told us, “No one warned us about exam costs. If we’d known, we would have budgeted and planned differently”.
This amendment also helps to address the troubling postcode lottery that currently characterises local authority engagement. Some councils build relationships with home-educating families, others issue notices to satisfy and school attendance orders at extraordinary rates. In Portsmouth, for instance, in one recent year nearly three-quarters of all known home-educating families were issued a notice. That is not a safeguarding approach grounded in individual assessment; it is a blunt instrument that breeds fear and resentment.
Offering a voluntary information session helps to shift this climate. It replaces adversarial compliance checks with constructive engagement. It gives parents confidence that they understand their rights, that they are under no obligation to accept invasive home visits, and that they can approach home education in a spirit of informed partnership rather than fearful retreat. It is essential that this remains voluntary. To compel attendance would simply re-create the coercive environment that we seek to avoid. Some parents may never need further help; others may seek guidance. This gentle first step ensures that they start that journey from a place of respect and understanding.
Finally, I want us to remember the positive role that schools themselves can play. Head teachers are often the first to hear of a family’s intention to deregister. With this amendment in place, they would have somewhere helpful to direct parents to—not as a hurdle but as a supportive opportunity to become better informed.
In sum, this is precisely the kind of proportionate, relationship-based approach we should be championing, respecting parental authority, ensuring clarity of obligation, building trust and ultimately safeguarding children far more effectively than heavy-handed procedural entanglements could ever do. If in August we can perhaps implement more changes such as this, we may need fewer tribunals, although I agree they are a very important measure, and we may need fewer databases because parents and local authorities are working together in co-operation. I beg to move.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, as I said at Second Reading and repeated earlier this afternoon, it is my contention on behalf of home-schooling parents that the provisions in this Bill are
“too long and too complicated”.—[Official Report, 1/5/25; col. 1414.]
To that end, I have given notice that I will oppose the Question that Clause 30 stand part of the Bill. I also put down Amendment 233A relating to Clause 31.
Perhaps we could look at the whole. I have argued against the long and complicated provisions in this Bill relating to home-schooling parents because they are frightfully oppressive on home-schooling parents and are in many ways unworkable because of the complicated language used in this Bill.
To look at it as a whole, the home-schooling provisions in the Bill are covered in Clauses 30 to 33. They cover 29 pages, from page 50 to page 79 of the Bill, and the clauses therein contain 17 very large new sections to be inserted after Sections 434 and 436 of the Education Act 1996. So the further complication is that not only do you need to have in your hands this Bill, or Act when it is passed, but you have to go back to the 1996 Act.
Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)
The children who are subject to child protection inquiries and plans are among our most vulnerable and the children who attend special schools are likely to have the highest levels of need. It is necessary that local authority consent is sought in those scenarios to ensure that these children are safe and suitably educated.
Even then, Clause 30 does not mean that these eligible families will not be able to home-educate their children. We are simply requiring the local authority to take a closer look in those circumstances. It may, in any of those three categories, be wholly appropriate for those children to be educated at home, but it is also right, given the specific circumstances, that the local authority that has responsibility—or where those children live—looks at that case and gives consent for home education in those narrow categories of cases.
We want local authorities to know which children in their areas may be home-educated and to make an informed decision to determine what will be in the best interests of the child in those circumstances. Clause 30 is underpinned by a review process; I will return to that in a moment. Statutory guidance will also be published to help schools and local authorities to carry out their new duties consistently from authority to authority and in a proportionate way.
I turn to the specific amendments. Amendments 203A and 204, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Wei and Lord Lucas, seek to remove the requirement for parents to obtain local authority consent to home-educate should their child attend a special school under arrangements of the local authority. The Government believe it is important to retain this requirement. We totally recognise that parents of children at special schools have their children’s best interests at heart, just like other parents. However, children in special schools often have very complex needs that would be difficult for their parents to provide for at home. The loss of the support the child receives in a special school may be a major upheaval in the child’s life. Clause 30 retains an additional check that there are no educational suitability issues resulting from the loss of this support and that home education would be in the child’s best interests. It is clear that this is a different nature of concern from that represented by Section 47 inquiries or a child protection plan.
Amendment 210, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wants to specify a timeframe for the home education consent decision to be made. I wholly share the noble Lord’s desire for decisions to be undertaken as quickly as possible. We think that the current wording in the clause, “without undue delay”, ensures as prompt a turnaround as possible. If we had an arbitrary timeline for this process—28 days, for example—that would imply that every decision was as straightforward as any other. Timings are likely to be different, depending on the circumstances of the child. By necessity, because these are children who already have other needs and requirements, the process could be complex and will involve multi-agency collaboration and information-sharing to reach a decision.
Amendment 215A seeks to ensure that local authorities offer parents an information session on home education as part of the consent process. I agree it is important that the decision to home-educate is an informed one. But the duty to secure a suitable education rests with the parent, not the local authority. With this in mind, requiring local authorities to offer mandatory information sessions would not be appropriate. It is parents who should be taking responsibility for researching their educational choices. Parents should carefully consider their responsibilities and the financial implications of home-educating before requesting permission to withdraw their child from school. We will ensure that the department’s relevant guidance provides key information that a parent needs to consider when contemplating whether to home-educate. Local authorities and schools can signpost to this should they become aware of parental intentions to home-educate.
Amendment 219, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, seeks to require local authorities to provide a statement of reasons to parents when refusing a request for consent. As the noble Baroness suspected, it is the case that local authorities are already obliged to provide their rationale for such a decision. We intend to make this clear in the relevant statutory guidance, which will need to be updated so that relevant professionals know what is required of them.
Finally, Amendment 221, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, looks to provide a tribunal appeals process as a review in the case of a local authority’s decision to refuse to grant permission to home-educate a child. We do not believe that this amendment is necessary because Clause 30 already provides for a review process. Parents who disagree with the local authority’s decision to grant or refuse permission to home-educate their child can refer the decision to the Secretary of State for review. They will carefully consider the full facts of the case. Having done so, the Secretary of State has the power to either uphold the local authority’s decision, to direct the local authority to grant consent or to refer the question back to the local authority for review.
Lord Wei (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister. I believe that this appeal process to the Secretary of State already exists. Clearly, it is a very difficult situation for the Secretary of State to be the tribunal for the parents, if the parents feel that the local authority or the Government have not been supportive of their desire to home-educate. I would be grateful if the Minister could let us know how many times, when a home-educated family has requested support from the Secretary of State to overturn a local authority decision, that has actually happened. According to the statistics I have, there has never been such an instance. I wonder whether, if this were to be tested in a court or by some other mechanism, this form of procedural appeal would not really muster the kind of belief that the Minister has. Might she reconsider looking into the various forms of appeal that we will propose in later groups of amendments, or indeed look again at the idea of a tribunal?
Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)
This legislation introduces the consent process. People have not gone through this process, with the specific, narrow categories of children and families for whom it applies. Does the noble Lord want another go?
Lord Wei (Con)
I am referring to other instances, which home-educated families have referenced, where they have written to the Secretary of State for Education —under the current regime, not the future one—and where no action has ever been taken in their favour. Perhaps we can discuss this in August.
Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)
Let us not talk about what will happen and when in terms of engagement with my officials. Just to be clear: as I said at the beginning of my remarks, that engagement will enable noble Lords to get an understanding of the way the Government intend to implement these provisions and to get some assurance around the processes that will be used. It will not be another opportunity for noble Lords who fundamentally oppose what the Government are doing—I am thinking of the noble Lord, who started his contribution by saying that he fundamentally opposes what we are trying to do here. I am not sure that the engagement will be particularly helpful for persuading, through officials, the Government to wholly change their approach to this. As I said, it is intended to look at the detail and to provide some assurance about how the processes will work.
I will reiterate the point I made previously. Clause 30 is introducing a consent mechanism and, specifically, a review process of that consent mechanism. Home-educating parents may well have written on other issues to the Secretary of State and been dissatisfied with the response that they received. However, that is different from the review process that is spelled out in legislation in Clause 30.
I turn to the points made by my noble friend Lady Morris. She is right. She asks questions that are the subject of amendments to be debated in later groups, but they are very reasonable. She asked about how much time a child would need to study with a provider for it to be reported, and how often and how quickly parents would need to update the details about that. Those are precisely the types of issues that would be subject to the further consultation around the regulations and guidance, including with home-educating parents and others, to ensure that we do that in a way that balances the burdens and requirements on parents, alongside ensuring that the local authority has the basic information that it needs to make the scheme work properly. In this area, there is considerable scope for consultation and engagement about how precisely that will work. I hope that answers my noble friend’s question and that the noble Lord, Lord Wei, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lucas (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for what she said. I entirely understand the limitations of discussions with officials, which is why I want to talk to her again about tribunals. Tribunals are an established part of mediating between the citizen and the state. In situations like this, or in many circumstances similar to those we are talking about—and this is by no means the only time we will discuss this; the next time will be when we are talking about best interests—when you have a hard-pressed local authority that may have a particular prejudice against home education and may be making life extremely difficult, as some of them do, you want an effective right of appeal. The system of appeal to the Secretary of State has existed in various forms in various bits of legislation for a long time. I am aware of one occasion when the Secretary of State agreed with the complainant. It does not work as an effective forum. It is not set up to be an effective forum. It does not allow for balanced and deep argument. The department is just not set up as a tribunal: it is not staffed as a tribunal, nor skilled as a tribunal. It is not the right place. I just say to my noble friend Lady Barran that I would very much appreciate her support for a tribunal amendment at Report, because that is what this appears likely to come to.
Lord Wei (Con)
We have heard in discussing this group of amendments a number of excellent suggestions for trying to take the edge off these complex—as the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, said—and, in my view, quite heavy-handed requirements on families. On the previous group, the Minister was very kind in offering discussions so that we can move forwards. Even though I have said that I oppose the register totally, that does not mean that I am shirking my responsibility as a legislator to help improve this legislation and to make it practical, based on the experience of someone from a home-educating family and having heard what was said by many Peers who have contributed to the debate. We are trying to make this practical and to make it work, so that people can get on with educating their children and local authorities can catch the perpetrators they want to catch.
There have been discussions about the tribunal, appeals and the fact that the department’s appeals process generally does not seem to behave in the way you would expect of a proper appeals process when parents complain directly. We have heard some quite sensible amendments in this group and the Minister has not indicated that she is willing to adopt any of the ideas in them. We will see later on. We appreciate the clarification that, when we meet officials, we will be told what the Bill is about and why it has been written in this way, but I hope we can also improve the Bill, which is the intent of us all. There have been suggestions on ways to improve its wording, in order to treat children in special schools and their parents with a bit more care and to have a statement of costs and benefits. These do not seem unreasonable.
I am afraid I am hearing a bit of a “state knows best” argument—that it should have 28 days to give a reason for its decision whereas parents should have only 15. That does not sound very fair to me and I am not sure it will sound fair to the British public, let alone to home-educating families. However, in the interests of time and given that we will discuss in further groups and potentially over the summer more of what we have talked about today, I will reflect on what has been said. I may return to this on Report but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 224, which I think is less contentious than the last issue that I raised in your Lordships’ House. The amendment is about deregistration from school when it is triggered by crises, or whatever. Taking your child to school is a voluntary arrangement at the point of enrolment, but parents get fined for unauthorised absence, even if they go into the sort of crisis that will eventually lead to them deregistering.
I do not know anything about education, despite being in education until I was 18, and then at university, but I have vested interest because three of my grandchildren were home-schooled. Two of them are now at Cambridge—one is doing history and the other politics—and the other one has made a comedy film about autism, which is a condition she has, and that is doing incredibly well. Those three children have been home-schooled and have reached a level that many children do not get to regardless, so I would argue that home-schooling can work extremely well. It is important to remember that, for some children, it is the answer. We want to avoid government overreach in these situations.
It seems obvious to me that, where a parent clearly no longer consents to the education arrangement with the school, it makes sense that they do not get fined. The fines do not get the children back to school, but they do add financial worries to the sense of stress. I understand why the Government reach for deterrence in order to give children the best education that they can, but sometimes school is not the right answer and I ask the Minister to consider whether financial penalties are useful in all these situations.
Lord Wei (Con)
My Lords I rise to speak to my Amendments 218, 223, 381, 403 and 418. Together, they seek to introduce fairness, balance and accountability into the Bill and to support families who are simply choosing a lawful, legitimate path of home education.
I will first focus on Amendment 218, which will require any local authority officer making decisions about elective home education to have at least two years’ personal experience of home educating their own children. This is not an ideological proposal but a practical one. I recall being asked once by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, to help create a Teach First programme for social workers. I declined, not because I doubted the value of new graduates but because lived experience matters. Pattern recognition, nuance and trust are not easily taught, especially if you have only recently graduated. You cannot understand the reality of raising and educating a child outside school unless you have walked that path yourself.
To ask someone with no such experience to judge a family’s educational approach is like asking a man to speak with authority on childbirth or someone without children to dictate how others should raise theirs. According to Education Otherwise, home-educated children are twice as likely to be referred to children’s social services as their schooled peers, and yet no more likely to be placed on a child protection plan. This points to systematic overreferral, driven in part by ignorance and in part by a narrative that wrongly associates home education with safeguarding risk. This amendment offers one step towards correcting that imbalance.
Case law supports this. In R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 2014, the Supreme Court held that administrative decisions that infringe individual rights must be informed by proper context and not rely on rigid or generic assumptions. Without understanding the diversity and nuance of home education, decisions risk being fundamentally flawed. If flawed decisions are made persistently, structurally and without oversight, judicial review becomes not just possible but likely. My concern is that the Bill, without this amendment and others like it, will open floodgates to such challenges, and perhaps rightly so.
This brings me to Amendment 223, which would establish an independent home education ombudsman—somewhat similar to the tribunal idea but very focused—to receive and investigate complaints against local authorities that overstep in the course of carrying out their duties under the Education Act. This is frankly overdue. At present, if a parent believes that they have been mistreated, there is no meaningful avenue of redress: no independent appeal, no clear complaints process and no statutory body to oversee how these immense powers are exercised. All they can do, as we have discussed, is write to the Minister, who to our knowledge has never, or rarely, upheld a complaint by a parent in this or a similar context.
I will give noble Lords some testimonies to bring this to life here. We have talked about the legal process here, but I want to bring home how human lives are affected by what we are proposing and what already takes place. One mother, a non-UK national, withdrew her child from the UK system before school age, having mistakenly registered with the local authority on school advice. Despite their lawful departure, the LA demanded boarding passes, proof of address and school details abroad. The child was never of school age in the UK. This was not protection; it was pursuit.
A military family has described how their local authority contacted the husband’s workplace repeatedly to discuss the children, even after it had ruled that the home education was of a satisfactory, suitable level. It then had to make an apology and had clear instruction to contact only the mother. The mother said this was a huge breach of privacy because of the nature of the agreement they had established. A home-educating doctor wrote:
“After de-registering my daughter with SEND, I was referred to social services again. My son and I were followed in public. I feared for our safety. My daughter began to regress. I had done nothing wrong—just removed her from a school that failed her”.
Lord Wei (Con)
To clarify, I was in no way saying that men could not work with women in childbirth. I was trying to make a point about speaking as authoritatively on the process of giving birth as a man as if you were a woman. In no way would I want the Minister to interpret me as saying that one could not be a male midwife or anything like that, but, as some of us know, when in certain circles I have talked about something feeling like childbirth, I have quite rightly been told off, because I have never given birth. There is something about that lived experience that I am pointing to. I am not making the point that people cannot work in certain professional settings in that sense.
We are crossing over from professional expertise into lived experience, saying that a parent can or cannot raise their child and parent-educate. Even if you were to use the professional argument, I am not sure that having that determined by someone who may not have that experience—when, right now, even the professional in this context is not trained in the philosophies and the different nuances of home education—is quite right in this context.
Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)
I certainly think it is right that we should attempt to ensure that people with lived experience are a key part of all areas of policy. That is why, for example, I talked earlier about the home educators’ forum that the department has brought together to help to inform our work here and the guidance. The point that the noble Lord was making went well beyond that. The suggestion that you could not make a professional social work or education decision in this area unless you had lived experience would make this area wholly different from any other area that professionals were making decisions about, and that is the stumbling block for this amendment.
We have a workforce of trained, dedicated practitioners who understand and champion the needs of the children they work with across schools and children’s social care. These amendments, in effect, would exclude around 99% of the population and, of course, would assume that one professional’s experience of home education is reflective of all parents. Working Together guidance is clear which practitioners should be involved in safeguarding decision-making and the importance of including children and families in that as well. We are confident that the Bill measures, and wider children’s social care reform that strengthens the protection of children, will mean that local authorities can draw on a range of expertise when making decisions—and so they should.
Amendment 220 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and Amendment 224 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would allow a child not to attend school prior to receiving consent from the local authority. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, who was not here for the earlier parts of the debate—for which I do not condemn her—that the points she made about the very successful home education experience of the children she was talking about who are close to her has very much been reflected in the comments that other noble Lords made earlier. We are clear that there are many children for whom home education has been a very fulfilling and successful process, and there is nothing in this legislation that removes, for example, the right of parents to make that decision to educate their children at home.
With these consent provisions, however—and in wanting to ensure that if a child is being educated at home, they are at least seen and understood to be being educated elsewhere than in school—we want to make sure that every child is seen. That is the expression that we were using earlier, and that is what we are aiming to do here. Also with respect to the consent provisions, we are concerned about those children for whom there might be particular reasons for a local authority to look carefully at the decision to grant consent by virtue of them being subject to a Section 47 inquiry, under a child protection plan or requiring the specific facilities of a special school.
For many children, a school is a protective environment and a means of offering essential support. I know that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness share our desire to reduce the risk of children falling through gaps and potentially going missing. It is therefore important that a child continues to attend school until a local authority has determined the consent request. Removing a child before this could subject them to unsuitable education or increase the risk of harm. I am sure that the noble Baroness could envisage a situation where, for legitimate reasons, a Section 47 inquiry is instituted where there are concerns about a child being at risk of very significant harm and—I am afraid that we have seen examples of this—a parent, thinking that this would be a way of avoiding it, decides at that point that they want to remove their child from school. In those circumstances, I do not think that any of us would want that child to be removed from what may well be the protective environment of a school before the decision had been made about consent.
For all children who are not subject to the consent process, which will be the vast majority of children whose parents want to home-educate them, all we are expecting is that the parent notifies the school that they want to remove their child from the roll and that the school has the opportunity to check, therefore, whether they fall within the criteria of a child for whom consent would be necessary or whether they are subject to a school attendance order. It would not be unreasonable to expect a child to carry on attending school while that relatively straightforward administrative check was made.
Amendment 222, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, would require consent decisions to be revisited sooner than six months after the previous request when new evidence becomes available or the child has been disadvantaged by the decision. This six-month timeframe is proportionate and is provided to reduce multiple requests regarding the same child. There will be situations where it may be appropriate for the local authority to consider applications sooner—for example, if there has been a substantial change in the child’s circumstances. A local authority can do this under the clause as drafted, if it so wishes. I am sure that the noble Lord could also envisage a situation where a parent who was unhappy about the consent decision made by a local authority expected the decision to be revisited perhaps every week. That is the reason for setting this timeframe.
Amendment 223 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wei, is about establishing an independent ombudsman. I understand the theme that is developing here about independent review capacity. Notwithstanding that, the Government do not believe that it is necessary. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, uses almost every opportunity to push his tribunal suggestion. I am interested in whether the proposition now is that we should have both a tribunal and an ombudsman in these cases. Of course it is right that there should be a process for referring local authority decisions that parents are not satisfied with; however, it should be uncomplicated. It is right that the final decision should rest with the Secretary of State, or Welsh Ministers, who will fully and objectively consider the merits of the case.
Amendment 225, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, would remove the definition of the “relevant local authority” that is responsible for making a home education consent decision. For children subject to a child protection inquiry or plan, the local authority where a child lives is responsible for making the consent decision. They will have the information needed to make informed decisions and should therefore determine consent. For children in special schools, who are not also subject to child protection processes, consent is needed from the local authority that maintains the plan, just as is the case under existing legislation. This new subsection provides legal clarity for parents, schools and local authorities.
Amendment 403, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wei, requests emergency court hearings for parents where a local authority seeks to remove, or removes, a child from their parents due to concerns arising from home education. To reiterate, the Children Act 1989 is clear that the threshold for care proceedings is significant harm. Home education as a singular factor would not reach the threshold for care proceedings. Child protection concerns about a home-educated child must be addressed through the same process as any other child facing harm. This includes parents’ rights to challenge decisions about the removal of a child into care.
Finally, Amendment 418, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wei, would require local authorities to refer individuals who file false or malicious allegations against home-educating parents, who then may be subject to civil penalties. There is a concern that this could deter valid concerns about home-educated children being reported, potentially leaving children at risk. Local authorities have robust processes in place to identify whether a child is suffering, or likely to suffer, harm and appropriately respond to malicious allegations, regardless of a child’s educational status.
I said earlier that it would not only be in the case of home-educated children that a local authority might have to make a decision about whether a complaint about a child’s parents was well founded or malicious. Home-educating parents have the same rights as other parents. Families can seek support from the local authority or police advice if intentional false reports are being made against them.
For the reasons I have outlined, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.
Lord Frost (Con)
My Lords, I have similar doubts and concerns about Amendment 211—or rather the problem it is designed to deal with—to my noble friend Lord Lucas. To elaborate, the principle that parents have the primary responsibility to provide education for children has been in statutes of various forms for the best part of 150 years and is currently in Section 7 of the 1996 Act. There is a qualification to that, for reasons of cost and efficiency, but no qualification for anything else. My noble friend Lord Lucas is right to say that this is the first time we have seen this very important principle qualified. The fact that it is done almost in passing and, as the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, said, in a bit of a muddle, makes one wonder how much thought has been given to this, and whether indeed the intention is to go back on this very long-standing principle or not. It does not seem to have been very clearly thought through.
At the moment, we have a provision that says that local authorities “must refuse consent” to the subset of children who are caught by these new provisions if they think that home education is not in the best interests of those children. That is most egregious for children in special educational schools but also for the Section 47 part of the definition, which, as we have been discussing, potentially has quite a low threshold.
My questions to the Minister are these. Is it intended with this provision to overturn that very long-standing principle? If it is not, can she explain why it is not and why this draft does not do that? Is it worth thinking a bit harder about the drafting of this section and, as the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, said, substituting some sort of objective positive test rather than this very broad and novel “best interests” test?
Lord Wei (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 212 and the related amendment to Clause 30. Taken together, these amendments aim to restore vital balance and proportion to the question of whether a parent may withdraw their child from school. They would place evidence, not mere suspicion, at the heart of decisions to profoundly shape children’s lives, reaffirming that it is parents who are the primary guardians of their child’s welfare, unless proven otherwise.
As others have mentioned, Amendment 212 addresses the critical flaw in the Bill: trapping children in harmful environments by allowing local authorities to withhold consent for withdrawal without first producing clear, documented evidence of a standard sufficient to satisfy courts that such a withdrawal would cause greater harm. This is not some radical departure; it simply restates the core principle of the Children Act 1989 that the welfare of the child and the authority of the parents to act in their child’s best interest must be paramount.
From the groups that we have discussed so far, one of the concerns I have is that although we must recognise the sterling efforts of local authority officials, the department and the Minister, we must not always presume that in every case the state knows best. Mistakes are made, and from what I have heard so far I am worried that there is no real consciousness that there could be mistakes that would warrant either a tribunal or an ombudsman, and, in this case, no recognition that schools can potentially be a cause of harm as well—for example, if children are being groomed or exploited at school. Why is there this presumption that the parent must prove to the official that the alternative to school that they are about to provide will be safer, when in some cases they may be trying to get their child out of a harmful environment—for example, that particular school?
This is a real issue. Scandals we have had in the past. Horizon, and even Rotherham—if I dare to mention that in this place—were based on the assumption that the state clearly understands what is going on and is not making any mistakes, that nobody is overlooking anything, and that the state is wise and therefore everything it does is right and cannot be challenged, except when we find out years later that there have been mistakes and problems. The amendments that many of us are proposing are trying—certainly I am with this one and others—to address that assumption and create some safeguards.
The related, equally essential amendment to Clause 30 rightly distinguishes between the mere existence of a Section 47 investigation and its actual outcome. It seeks to ensure that local authorities may refuse consent only if their inquiries under Section 47 have led them to conclude that the child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm.
I want to echo similar points made by others in this group that there is a real troubling shift towards the state deciding what is in the best interest of the child, based not on neglect or the criteria that we have relied on in the past for state intervention but on deciding what is in the best interest of the child educationally and holistically. How can this possibly be justified?
Even with Section 47, we are talking about suspicion as the threshold, so we may have this running debate which we may need to resolve when we sit down with officials. I have documented proof—real testimony—of officials who are suspicious, not recognising that there is harm being done in school to a child, of parents who want to home-educate. They say that the parents are going to harm the child, using cases such as the Sharif case and others to justify this intervention. This has caused officials to behave in ways that put them in a position of extreme power, without any protections or appeals.
The state should override parental rights only when there is evidence of significant harm, not because the state believes that it has a better view of what is in the best interest of the child over the parent. In re B (A Child) 2009, the Supreme Court was unequivocal. As Lord Kerr memorably put it, the state does not become the parent. It is justified in interfering only where a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm. That is the litmus test.
For many families this is not theoretical; it is painfully real. I have been sent countless accounts, too often dismissed as anecdotal, of children enduring conditions in school that no safeguarding regime should tolerate. The 2021 Ofsted review on sexual harassment found that many girls routinely experience peer sexual abuse in school. The Women and Equalities Committee has documented similar risks. Children with autism, sensory processing difficulties and anxiety disorders frequently find the mainstream classroom overwhelming, not through any failing by parents but through systemic failure.
One mother recounted that her autistic child’s school-triggered anxiety caused seizures three to four times a week, which dropped to once every six months after she was withdrawn. Another spoke of her son vomiting every morning, paralysed by dread. Yet another mother described home education as not a lifestyle choice but “a safety net that saved my child’s life”. A 2023 study in the British Medical Journal found that adolescent mental health measurably improves during school holidays and worsens during school term time. This is not mere coincidence but evidence that for some children, school environments simply do not work.
Lord Wei (Con)
To build on that, if you had a local authority officer with not much experience of home education—given that that is apparently not available—who is shown suitable education arrangements by the parent planning to take their child into home education, then that first new sub-paragraph could allow them still to override those arrangements, which they have agreed are suitable, by saying that they think it would be best if the child attended a school. How do we deal with that precise situation which she has said could happen? Do we not need to work this out so that our wonderful local authority officials are not confused when reading this guidance and say, “Well, I can still override the parents because I think it is right that they stay in school, because that is in their best interests”?
Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)
That is what I was saying. You could envisage circumstances in which there is a child on a child protection plan, notwithstanding that there might be suitable education, where the protective role of being in school would be in that child’s best interests and being away from the school might be against them, regardless of what the other education provision might be. Let us not forget that this would be a consideration only for children for whom there are child protection concerns or for children in special schools, where, to be fair, it would more likely be about the appropriateness of the education, but could be about the other support available for a child that would not be available in other circumstances, notwithstanding the question of education, because of their needs that required them to be put into the special school in the first place.
Lord Wei (Con)
I can fully appreciate that, given the scope here, if there was a safeguarding concern then one might want to pursue the route the Minister is talking about as the officer in question is trying to make that decision. However, the way that this is worded, even if the parents or family subject to Section 47 have found a way to provide suitable education, gives the officer the room to say, “I am concerned about the safety of the child”, when it is more that they do not like the education being provided.
Baroness Barran (Con)
I think I might speak for others in the Committee in saying that this level of detail could be better dealt with face to face with officials, which would allow us to do another group before the House rises.
Lord Wei
“(6A) A child is not required to be registered under this section if the parent provides evidence that any one of the following conditions is met—(a) a competent home educator with at least five years of personal or professional experience has provided a sworn affidavit affirming that, in their judgment, the parent will be capable of providing a suitable education consistent with their educational philosophy,(b) the parent has arranged and paid for the child to sit at least three externally assessed national qualifications, including but not limited to GCSEs, A-Levels, or accredited vocational awards, or(c) the child is enrolled with a national online school or flexible provision provider known to support home-educated or otherwise educated children to a suitable standard.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and another in the name of Lord Wei exempt families from registration and data submission requirements where they can show credible evidence of suitable education through endorsement by an experienced educator, formal qualification entry, or enrolment in a recognised online provider.
Lord Wei (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 230, 254, 323 to 326 and 423, all of which stand in my name. The creation of a register, though flawed, is fundamentally intended to identify children and families who have yet to demonstrate they are providing a suitable education through home education or otherwise. It stands to reason, therefore, that those who have already demonstrated this suitability or who have mitigating circumstances preventing them doing so at this time, such as being in crisis, seeking asylum, holding diplomatic status or navigating a legitimate and complex personal or family situation, should not be treated identically to those where safeguarding concerns may genuinely arise.
There ought to be legitimate exemptions. These amendments start to aim to highlight such families, to give space to children who can show for themselves or through others that they are receiving a suitable education and that their parents are competent, committed and responsible, free from unnecessary state interference. These amendments deal with a wide range of contexts, but they all converge on a single point: not every child outside school is invisible, unsafe or neglected. Many are thriving, and the law must recognise that.
Amendment 230 is central to this group. It proposes that where credible evidence of suitable education already exists, families should not be compelled to register with the local authority. This could be demonstrated, according to the amendment, in three ways: first, through an affidavit from an experienced home educator, perhaps one who has seen their own children succeed in life and academically; secondly, through enrolment and payment for formal qualifications, such as GCSEs, for which I think the going rate is currently several hundred pounds; or, thirdly, through enrolment with an established online provider. It should be noted that the fastest-growing sector within education in the country is online virtual schooling. Indeed, the Government have their own Oak National Academy. These are not mere technicalities. They are serious, objective indicators that a child’s education is suitable. For those not taking home education seriously, they could be a suitable deterrent as well.
The state routinely accepts this kind of evidentiary substitution. The DVLA accepts a GP’s opinion for driving fitness. The Home Office accepts identity attestation from religious leaders. I think it is all digital now, but many of us have had our passport photos signed, and I think you still can get them signed, by a vicar or someone else of standing in the community. The courts accept third-party expert testimony in mental health cases. In GDPR, controllers are not required to collect identifying data if it is not needed. Why should education be the one domain where all such trust is withdrawn?
Case law supports this principle. In R v Secretary of State for Education ex parte Talmud Torah, the court affirmed that where parents choose an alternative but suitable method of education, the state must respect it. In Campbell and Cosans v UK, the European court held that education must respect parents’ philosophical convictions. A blanket requirement for registration, regardless of evidence or circumstance, may fall foul of that very principle. Not every religious school or environment is raising terrorists. Many of them are producing Nobel Prize winners, children who are totally blitzing every GCSE, children who are rounded and full of confidence.
A mother in rural England wrote: “I have taught three children from home, all of whom are now gainfully employed, emotionally stable and engaged in their communities. We have done this without needing state validation or supervision. If I now had to register and justify my choices retrospectively, it would feel like rewriting our family history through the lens of suspicion”.
This amendment makes clear that oversight should not be triggered where provision is already evidenced and functional. It reflects principles long recognised in other fields that where the state’s goals, be they safety, quality or accountability, are already being met, it need not intervene further.
I just want to share one testimony that I have been sent. One parent with qualified teacher status, who taught in state schools for over 12 years before home-educating, argued that the register was so vague that it risked turning families such as hers into scapegoats for failures that have nothing to do with home education. Another mother, a primary teacher of 15 years now teaching her own children, warned that repeated oversight by less experienced officials would be disproportionate and likely to be carried out by people who have no understanding of what is going on. I have one more: parents have been reported being referred to social services simply because their children were home-educated, despite data showing that home-educated children are less likely to end up on a child protection plan. One said that choosing to educate outside the system was in itself seen as neglect.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, very briefly, I find myself roughly in agreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, on this one: a register should be there.
Lord Wei (Con)
My Lords, I want to clarify that, while I personally oppose the register totally, if there must be a register, I am proposing practical amendments. I believe the numbers shared earlier today were that the Government are going to have to get local authority officials to deal with more than 100,000 home-educating families. If they all have to be registered and a portion of them lead to various determinations and investigations, this will create a massive workload for already stretched local authority officers, who we know are struggling to catch the children we want to protect. My point in tabling these amendments is to create exemptions.
Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Blake of Leeds) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hacking for the clarification that he has just made, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for a very clear explanation of why she is not supporting these amendments. As a former lead member for children’s services for the second-largest metropolitan authority in the country, I find it very difficult to recognise some of the comments that have been made tonight, and I emphasise the dedication and hard work of so many people whose primary, indeed sole objective is to make sure that all children in this country are safe from harm. It is so important to reference that as we go through.
I am not sure how many more times Ministers need to stress that there is total recognition of how many parents are out there working extremely hard to provide a suitable education when educating their children otherwise than at school. We have heard examples of the successes of so many of them, and we recognise that many of those children are thriving.
I emphasise that parents have no reason to fear the prospect of having to include key information on local authority children not in school registers. This information is vital to help local authorities discharge existing responsibilities and ensure that the education children receive is suitable and safe. As we have heard, without the registers, too many children and young people are at risk of falling through the gaps.
I will respond briefly to the amendments in this group, which are all tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wei. They suggests exemptions for why a child’s information should not be included on a local authority’s children not in school register.
Amendment 254 seeks to ensure that, if a child does not fit the eligibility criteria, their parents would not be required to provide any information. This is unnecessary. If a child is not eligible to be registered, their parents would not be under the duty to provide information.
Amendments 230, 323, 324 and 326 seek to limit which children must be registered on a local authority children not in school register. A key objective of the registers is to aid local authorities in their existing duty to identify, as far as it is possible to do so, all children in their areas who are not registered pupils in school and are not receiving a suitable education. These amendments would prevent this.
Amendment 230 would exempt children if the parent is able to provide a sworn affidavit from an experienced home educator that the home education being provided is suitable, if the parent has arranged for the child to sit at least three national qualifications, or if the child is enrolled in certain educational provision. None of these proposed reasons for exemption would give a local authority enough assurance that the education being provided is suitable for an individual child.
Amendment 323 would exempt children who are temporarily residing in the UK with a permanent residence elsewhere. Where a child is living in the local authority’s area, even if only for a short time, the local authority has education and safeguarding duties towards the child.
I am particularly disappointed to see Amendments 324 and 326, where the noble Lord suggests exempting asylum-seeking families and families affected by war, natural disaster or economic collapse from registers. These are some of the very children who registers will most benefit. Where local authorities are aware of these children, they can offer support to ensure that their education continues undisrupted. The registers would simply not work if the exemptions that the noble Lord proposes were to apply.
Amendment 325 would enable children aged 14 or over to be exempt from being included on the register if they register as self-directed learners. Section 7 of the Education Act 1996 is clear: it is the responsibility of the parents to secure a suitable education for their child. Parents, not children, must remain accountable for this. As we have heard, most parents are fulfilling this duty, but registers will be a crucial tool in identifying where this is not the case so that these children can be supported into suitable education.
Finally in this group, Amendment 423 seeks to allow parents to discharge their duty to provide suitable education when their child is providing services, mentoring or trade-related activities. The Government’s guidance on home education for local authorities and parents sets out that a parent must provide their child with a full-time, efficient, suitable education. Parents therefore have the flexibility to educate their child in whatever manner they deem best for their child, provided it is suitable. This may be able to be achieved through school-type work or through practical education, such as the noble Lord mentioned, depending on the needs of the child. For the reasons I have outlined, namely that exemption of any eligible child for inclusion in the registers would mean that children who may be in receipt of unsuitable education fall through the gaps, I kindly ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Wei (Con)
I thank the Minister and my noble friend Lady Barran for their comments. Frankly, I am disappointed. I feel that many of the measures that I have proposed are designed to help our wonderful officials, who work in local authorities and are struggling under a huge workload, to focus their efforts with the register, which will create a lot of, let us say, false positives as well as genuine areas where intervention might be needed, and a huge amount of work. That is the focus of these amendments.
The point I wanted to raise about asylum seekers was that asylum seekers are obviously very vulnerable, but under the Bill, the moment when the details of the asylum seeker’s children are in the register, the clock starts ticking. They have two weeks to do it, they have to report X number of people’s email addresses and names, they might not even speak or write English, and yet the clock will start ticking. Of course, local authorities and we as a society need to support asylum seekers, but are we willing to put them through such an onerous process if they choose, for whatever reason, to home-educate? I am not sure that this has been really thought through.
It is not any part of my design to exclude asylum seekers from the support that local authorities can provide; it is just trying to be practical. While I recognise and really applaud the officials working on the front line—already under huge pressure and struggling to work out, within all the noise of all the many databases they have access to, where they should intervene—my concern is that without exemptions such as these, this is going to make their life much more difficult and may indeed lead to safeguarding scandals and problems because they have not been able to get around to the families and children who really do need help.
I am grateful for what has been said. I will reflect on it and may return to it at a later stage but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.