Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, this amendment has been tabled—in haste, it appears, as I will explain in a moment—at a very late stage in proceedings. It is not clear in its intention and appears to relate to an important category of people who I do not think any of the speakers in support of the amendment referred to. I will come back to that point.

I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who said that he came cold to this matter. Far from being cold, I have had a number of warm meetings with Members from all sides of this House on all matters relating to Ministry of Justice provisions in the Bill. I regret to say that until this amendment dropped without warning, half way through my dinner last night, none of its proposers had found the time to engage with me or approach me in any way on this matter since it was debated in your Lordships’ House. That is a matter of regret, because in my relatively short time here I have found that discussions before matters are raised in the Chamber can be very useful. Had the matter been raised with me, I would have had the opportunity—and I would have availed myself of it—of pointing out some of the confusion behind the amendment and asking the noble and learned Lord whether the amendment he has tabled is in fact the amendment he wanted to table. I will come back to that point.

Having heard the words of my noble and learned friends Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Clarke and my noble friend Lord Cormack, I will not get into the propriety or otherwise but will deal with the substance of the point. Harper’s law, which is the focus of the amendment, requires the imposition of a life sentence in cases where an emergency worker is the victim of unlawful act manslaughter. The intention of the amendment appears to be to restrict this to cases that involve an underlying unlawful act that is of a certain level of seriousness. My understanding is that it seeks to do so by excluding from the scope of Harper’s law those cases in which the unlawful act that underpins the unlawful act manslaughter of the emergency worker is one that, had the offender been convicted of that as a stand-alone offence, would have carried

“a maximum sentence of less than five years imprisonment.”

There is, I am afraid, real confusion as to what the amendment seeks to do. Noble Lords who enjoy it really ought to turn to page 4, line 39 of the Bill and remind themselves that this seeks to include an exception into Harper’s law. That is very important when one sees that in proposed new paragraph (c)(i) of the amendment there is a “not”, so it ends up with a double negative.

It seems to me that there are two interpretations of this paragraph and, from what the noble and learned Lord said, I am really not sure which interpretation he seeks to put forward. The first is—bear with me here—that it appears to except from that five-year maximum category, and therefore include within Harper’s law, cases in which the death was

“caused by dangerous driving or driving when under the influence of drink or drugs,”

even if the maximum penalty for the unlawful act offence was less than five years. If that is the case, it is not clear why that should be if the main thrust of the noble and learned Lord’s argument is that Harper’s law should not apply if the underlying offence carried a sentence of less than five years.

I also point out, as I am sure the noble and learned Lord knows all too well, that dangerous driving and the other driving offences here do not and cannot themselves form a basis for unlawful act manslaughter in any case, because that is the result of the decision in Andrews v DPP.

The alternative explanation of this form of words put forward by the noble and learned Lord is that the amendment appears to intend that where the unlawful act underlying the unlawful act manslaughter is one that in and of itself would attract a maximum penalty of less than five years’ imprisonment, that will be outside Harper’s law unless that act is accompanied by

“dangerous driving or driving when under the influence”,

which in the context of unlawful act manslaughter would be the circumstances that render the unlawful act dangerous.

I apologise to the House for subjecting it to a disquisition on unlawful act manslaughter but this is precisely the sort of point I would have discussed with the noble and learned Lord, had it been brought to my attention before I was halfway through my main course last night. More to the point, this would be an insertion at page 4, line 39 of the Bill; it would therefore go into proposed new Section 258A, which applies where

“(a) a person aged under 18 is convicted of a relevant offence, (b) the offence was committed … when the person was aged 16 or over”.

So, this amendment to Harper’s law, which is put forward on the basis of general principle, applies only to 16 and 17 year-olds. I did not understand from any of the speeches in favour of the amendment that the principle underlying those speeches was limited to 16 and 17 year-olds. The point was put on the basis that it ought to be of general application.

Why, I ask rhetorically, since the point has not been made, is this limited to 16 and 17 year-olds? Of course, the answer is obvious: it is not intended to be limited to 16 and 17 year-olds. Again, had this amendment been shown to me before halfway through my main course last night, I would have pointed this out, with respect, to the noble and learned Lord. What we have, therefore, is a late amendment, brought without any discussion with me or my colleagues, which fundamentally seeks to uproot the position taken by this House in Committee and on Report. It also suffers from fundamental uncertainty as to what it actually does, and the fundamental problem that it seems to apply only to 16 and 17 year-olds.

Quite apart from all of that, I simply do not see any merit in restricting Harper’s law in this way. We have already taken care to ensure that the provisions inserted by Clause 3 will apply only in cases of unlawful act manslaughter of an emergency worker who is acting in exercise of their functions as such a worker. Unlawful act manslaughter, as noble Lords certainly know by now, captures those cases where an unlawful act has been intentionally performed in circumstances rendering it dangerous, and that has caused death. It is the Government’s position that the unlawful act manslaughter of an emergency worker merits a mandatory life sentence. The seriousness of such conduct and the harm it causes both to the emergency worker—obviously—and to our wider society are evident. I respectfully see no reason to limit the sentence in the way this amendment appears to intend.

I come to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—I respectfully congratulate her on 50 years in the criminal justice system—about discretion. There is, of course, a judicial discretion built in here; we have had this debate on several occasions during consideration of the Bill. Where the court considers that there are exceptional circumstances relating either to the offence or the offender that justify the imposition of a sentence other than life imprisonment, this could be done. I accept that some people want the exception to be broader, while some people may not want an exception at all, but that has been the Government’s consistent position throughout the Bill. I find it a little surprising that, at Third Reading, such a fundamental point is apparently up for discussion again.

Before I sit down—and I apologise to the House for delaying it—I come to the “one knock” case that the noble and learned Lord has put. If a person at a protest or demonstration were to hit a police officer who was then, for example, to fall over, hit their head and, God forbid, die, that could be captured under Harper’s law if it amounted to unlawful act manslaughter. Why is that? The reason is that what has happened here is not a simple case of battery. Under the offences made out here, the offence for which the offender would be sentenced is unlawful act manslaughter, and the Government believe that that crime, when done against an emergency worker acting as such, merits a mandatory life sentence other than where there are exceptional circumstances.

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Moved by
3: After Clause 136, insert the following new Clause—
“Imprisonment for public protection etc: duty to refer person released on licence to Parole Board
(1) Section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (imprisonment or detention for public protection: termination of licences) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (6).(2) In subsection (2)(a), after “Chapter” insert “(whether or not the prisoner has subsequently been recalled to prison under section 32)”.(3) For subsection (3) substitute—“(3) Where—(a) the prisoner has been released on licence under this Chapter (whether or not the prisoner has subsequently been recalled to prison under section 32);(b) the qualifying period has expired; and(c) if the Secretary of State has made a previous reference of the prisoner’s case under this subsection, the period of twelve months beginning with the day of the disposal of that reference has expired,the Secretary of State must refer the prisoner’s case to the Parole Board under this subsection.”(4) In subsection (4)—(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “an application” substitute “a reference”, and(b) in paragraph (b), for “application” substitute “reference”.(5) After subsection (4) insert—“(4A) A reference under subsection (3) must be made, and a reference under that subsection must be determined by the Parole Board under subsection (4), even if at the time of the reference or determination the prisoner is in prison having been recalled under section 32.(4B) If at the time of the determination the prisoner is in prison having been recalled under section 32—(a) subsection (2) does not apply, and(b) subsection (4)(a) has effect as if it required the Parole Board—(i) to determine whether it is satisfied that it is not necessary for the protection of the public for the prisoner, when released, to be released on licence in respect of the preventative sentence or sentences, and (ii) if it is so satisfied, to direct the Secretary of State accordingly.(4C) Where the Parole Board gives a direction under subsection (4B)(b)(ii)—(a) if at any time the Board directs the prisoner’s release under section 28, that section has effect in relation to the prisoner as if, in subsection (5), for “to release him on licence” there were substituted “to release the prisoner unconditionally”, and(b) if at any time the Board directs the prisoner’s release under section 32, that section has effect in relation to the prisoner as if, in subsection (5), for “immediate release on licence” there were substituted “immediate unconditional release”.”(6) In subsection (5), in the definition of “the qualifying period”, after “on licence” insert “(whether or not the prisoner has subsequently been recalled to prison under section 32)”.(7) Subsection (8) applies to an application made by a person under section 31A(3) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 before this section comes into force.(8) If the application has not been determined when this section comes into force, subsections (4) to (4C) of section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 apply in relation to it as if it were a reference of the person’s case by the Secretary of State to the Parole Board under subsection (3) of that section.(9) Subsection (10) applies if a person remains on licence under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, or remains subject to release on licence under that Chapter, following—(a) the disposal before this section comes into force of the person’s application to the Parole Board under section 31A(3) of that Act, or(b) the disposal under subsection (4) of section 31A of that Act, as it has effect by virtue of subsection (8) of this section, of the person’s application to the Parole Board under subsection (3) of that section.(10) Subsection (3) of section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 applies in relation to the person as if the application had been a reference of the person’s case by the Secretary of State to the Parole Board under that subsection.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendments in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar at page 133, line 13, page 135, line 13 and page 233, line 33 give effect to an undertaking given by Lord Wolfson on 15th December 2021 (Hansard col. 359). This amendment imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to refer the case of a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection (or the equivalent youth sentence), and has been released on licence, to the Parole Board after ten years and annually after that.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, following my commitment and undertaking to the House on Report, I am pleased to be able to bring this package of amendments relating to imprisonment for public protection—IPP—before the House this afternoon. I thank sincerely the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett—and I understand why he is unable to be in his place today—the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Moylan for their commitment to this cause and continued engagement with me on this matter. We have had a series of meetings and calls, which have been invaluable. They offered me their considerable wisdom and experience both of this subject and of this House in order to get this amendment—if I may put it this way—across the table and over the line.

It was made very clear at all stages in this House that there was enormous strength of feeling that some beneficial change for IPP offenders was both right and necessary. I am pleased that we have cross-party support for this sensible, proportionate and effective change that will provide such benefit but at no risk to public protection.

I committed on Report to bringing forward an amendment which puts the Secretary of State’s policy of automatic referral of applications to terminate the IPP licence on to a statutory footing. This would enable all eligible IPP offenders to be referred to the Parole Board for consideration for licence termination at the appropriate time. The new clause that I have tabled delivers on this commitment.

The position is that Section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 sets out how IPP offenders are currently able to apply for licence termination. Once the qualifying period of 10 years has elapsed—that is, 10 years from the offender’s first release by the Parole Board—this section provides that offenders can apply to the Parole Board to be considered for licence termination. In practice, the Secretary of State has made it policy to do this on the offender’s behalf, but first had to obtain consent from the offender.

The principal change in the first of the amendments in my name is in new subsection (2), which amends the wording of Section 31A so that the Secretary of State will be legally required to automatically refer the offender where the 10-year qualifying period has expired. Where the offender has previously been referred to the Parole Board for licence termination, they will automatically be referred if 12 months have elapsed since the previous reference. That removes the need for the offender to give permission for the Secretary of State to make applications on their behalf, and will enable the IPP licence to be brought to a definitive end for more offenders.

The clause also adds a new subsection to Section 31A which deals with offenders who are in custody following recall under the IPP licence. When an offender is recalled to prison, their licence is automatically revoked, so they cannot have their licence terminated while they are in prison following recall because they are no longer on licence. But, in these cases, the Secretary of State will still be required to refer the offenders to the Parole Board on the point of eligibility and every 12 months thereafter. The Parole Board will then determine whether the licence should remain in force following any subsequent release decision. It will be up to the Parole Board whether to terminate the licence of an IPP offender in custody—but these provisions are specifically intended to ensure that all eligible IPP offenders, who are either on licence or have been recalled and had their licence revoked, have the opportunity to have their licence terminated.

The remaining subsections are technical, transitional and clarificatory to ensure that the clause works correctly. But I make it absolutely clear from the Dispatch Box that time spent in custody on recall does not affect the running of the 10-year qualifying period. There are two further amendments in my name, both of which are consequential. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for joining me in them. The second amendment ensures that this clause operates correctly with other subsections that might prevent a referral, and the third sets the commencement date at two months following Royal Assent.

Taken as a package, these amendments appropriately balance the need to protect the public with ensuring that IPP offenders who are assessed by the Parole Board as no longer posing a risk to the public are given every opportunity to have their IPP licence, and the IPP sentence as a whole, terminated. So, with renewed thanks to those noble and learned Lords who joined me, particularly in supporting the first amendment, for their sustained engagement, I beg to move Amendment 3.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge has asked that I go next. I have indeed added my name to the first substantive government amendment, but I indicated that I would—and I do—make it plain that I do so without any great enthusiasm. Rather, it is on the basis that one must be grateful for small mercies—here, alas, I put the emphasis on the “small”.

I am grateful to the Minister for doing what he could for us, and, so far as it goes, I welcome the small change brought about by the amendment. But, in my respectful view, it does not go remotely far enough. It is difficult to overemphasise how small a concession this is in relation to the overall problem of the remaining IPP prisoners. Even in respect of the recall prisoners, we had hoped that the maximum term for which a licence should remain in force would be reduced from 10 years to five.

Beyond that, I fervently hoped to do something for the 1,700-odd cohort of IPP prisoners who have never been released and who remain incarcerated 10 years after this whole sentencing regime was abolished by LASPO in 2012. Many of the 1,700 are substantially more than 10 years beyond their tariff term—but there it is. We now have to—and we do—put our faith in the House of Commons Justice Committee, which has taken evidence and listened to many, including me, and is shortly to report on the whole question of this remaining regime. One hopes that it will do something to meet this grave, continuing and, indeed, growing injustice. In the meantime, I make it plain that I support this most modest of amendments.

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Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Portrait Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
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My Lords, I too would like to echo the thanks for the Minister. He has, in a sense, been a lobbyist within the Ministry of Justice to get this modest amendment over the line. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, summed up the position very well when he described it as the first crack in the wall. I was alarmed by the figures he quoted from his Written Question, where he seemed to indicate that there would be more prisoners in jail because of recalls, so the problem is likely to get worse and not better.

The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, referred to the Minister’s reference to Newton’s second law—that it is easier to move an object that is already in motion. My first degree was in physics, and I would phrase that slightly differently, in a way that is relevant to the politics: the rate of change of movement is proportional to the impressed force. We on this side are certainly interested in increasing the impressed force on this object which is currently under way.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful for the kind words a number of noble Lords have said. This may be a modest start, but it is a start, and I am sure that the conversation will continue. In particular, as I said when we discussed this matter substantively, I am well aware that the Justice Select Committee is looking at this matter. It will be reporting soon and, while I cannot go quite as far as my noble friend Lord Moylan would want me to by saying that, if the committee recommends, for example, changing the qualifying period from 10 years to five years, the Government will adopt it, I can say—which I hope would be obvious anyway—that we will take anything that comes out of the Justice Select Committee extremely seriously and look at it with very great care.

The action plan has been provided to the Justice Select Committee. We will review it again following the publication of its report to take account of our consideration following its recommendations. I hope the House will forgive me if I do not respond to everybody who contributed. I am conscious that we are at Third Reading and there is other business before the House. But I thank everybody who has contributed to this short debate. In particular, I respectfully thank the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, for our conversations and the correspondence we have had, which she knows I have been dealing with.

I am conscious that Newton has now been invoked on a number of occasions. I am not altogether sure whether Newtonian physics applies to government action, but I will proceed on the basis that it does. I will try to push things as far as I can, but for present purposes, the only things I will immediately seek to move are these amendments.

Amendment 3 agreed.
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Moved by
4: Clause 142, page 133, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) Subsection (3) does not apply to a reference by the Secretary of State under section 31A(3).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the new Clause in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar to be inserted after Clause 136. It disapplies section 33A(3) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (inserted by Clause 142) in relation to a reference by the Secretary of State under section 31A(3) of that Act.
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Moved by
6: Clause 209, page 233, line 33, at end insert—
“(ma) section (Imprisonment for public protection etc: duty to refer person released on licence to Parole Board);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the new Clause in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar to be inserted after Clause 136. It provides for that Clause to come into force two months after Royal Assent.