Church Appointments (Repeal of Discriminatory Provision) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to follow the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen. I welcome this short Bill, but sometimes the shortest Bills close the longest chapters.

The Jews Relief Act 1858 was a landmark in the emancipation of British Jews. My own family came to Britain after its passage, settling in Tredegar, just up the road from the birthplace of the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, in the south Wales valleys, and, within a few generations, one of their descendants could sit in this House and serve as a Minister of the Crown. The Act therefore marked a decisive change in the relationship between the Jewish community and the state. It represented not merely toleration but the promise of equal participation in the public life of this country. That is a story about this country of which I am immensely proud, but Parliament had not quite finished the job.

Section IV of that Act still prohibits anyone “professing the Jewish Religion” from advising the sovereign “directly or indirectly” on certain Church appointments. The penalty for doing so, as my noble friend pointed out, is “a high Misdemeanor”. It carries permanent disqualification from any Crown office, both civil and military, and the prohibition is in very sweeping terms. It is not confined to a Prime Minister tendering advice to a sovereign; “directly or indirectly” would reach advisers and other Ministers involved in the process.

This is not merely a historical curiosity. When I served as a Minister at the Ministry of Justice, my responsibilities included the Crown dependencies. However, because I am Jewish, I could not advise the Crown on appointments of Anglican clergy in the Crown dependencies. I therefore have the unusual distinction of having been personally inconvenienced by an Act of Parliament passed in 1858. It is an odd experience to find that a provision enacted in the middle of the 19th century still has a practical bearing on the duties of a 21st-century Minister. That illustrates why the repeal of obsolete discrimination is more than a matter of tidying up the statute book.

The serious point is that discriminatory laws matter even when they are rarely invoked. The objection is not that this law is old; many old laws are actually good laws. It is that the law makes a person’s religion determine whether he may discharge the responsibilities of a secular office. The anomaly, as we have heard, is striking. A Muslim, Hindu, Sikh or atheist Prime Minister may advise, but a Jewish or Catholic Prime Minister cannot. Of course, Disraeli himself, our first Prime Minister of Jewish birth, escaped the strictures of this Act only because, as a child, he was converted to Anglicanism. As a matter of short interest—I do not have time to go into it—that was because his father had fallen out with the local synagogue. Some things do not change. It illustrates that the distinction was not only, so to speak, between Jews and Catholics and others; the distinction was even between somebody born Jewish but who later converted to Anglicanism and somebody who continued to profess the religion of his ancestors.

There is an important constitutional distinction as well. The Church is perfectly entitled to impose religious qualifications for religious office, but advising the sovereign is a constitutional responsibility of the Prime Minister, not a spiritual function, and the religion of the officeholder should not determine whether that responsibility may be discharged. There are respectable arguments to be had about the proper place of politicians in church appointments and about an established Church itself. Neither question is raised by this Bill and neither needs to be resolved this evening. The short point is this: so long as Parliament gives the function to the Prime Minister, it cannot sensibly make its exercise dependent on whether the Prime Minister is Jewish or Roman Catholic, or neither.

When the late Lord Sacks of blessed memory was Chief Rabbi, he was a notable defender of the established Church. He memorably compared the Church of England to the host at a cocktail party whose responsibility it is to make everyone else feel at home. The serious point is that he believed, as I do, that minority faiths are at home and flourish best not in a society which banishes religion from public life but in one which gives faith a recognised and respected place. For him and for me, the establishment of the Church of England is not a threat to religious minorities but is, in fact, a protection for them. He also argued that establishment could secure a place for religion in the public square for the benefit of faiths beyond the established Church, which is a very important point.

The provisions by which the 1858 Act achieved Jewish emancipation have all long since been superseded or repealed. The Promissory Oaths Act 1871 removed restrictions on Jews holding public office. The Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 repealed the earlier part of Section 4, concerning rights of presentation to ecclesiastical benefices. The point of the present Bill, therefore, is not to undo emancipation, but rather to remove the last discriminatory remnant of the legislation that helped to achieve it. I therefore have just one question for the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal, which might in fact be the easiest question I will ever ask her. The Bill repeals the Jews Relief Act 1858 in its entirety, as she said. I ask only, given the Act’s historical significance, will she therefore expressly confirm that its repeal removes no surviving right or protection enjoyed by Jewish citizens, but instead removes the last remaining disability imposed by that legislation?

The Jews who came to Tredegar, including my family, sought a country in which their religion would not determine the limits of their citizenship. The 1858 Act had been a great step towards fulfilling that promise, but Parliament had left the job unfinished. This Bill, nearly 170 years later, completes that job.

Retirement and Participation Committee Report

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Viscount, and it gives me an opportunity to thank him and the other members of the committee for the work which they put in under the obviously skilful chairmanship—if I can use that word—of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton.

I hope it was not particularly malign—if I can pick up that word—of the shadow Leader of the House to refer to me, because I was going to follow with a couple of legal points, and one legal point in particular, which is important for the House and perhaps those outside it to bear in mind, as to what these proposals will do and, importantly, what they will not do. I suggest that paragraphs 83 to 85 of the report repay careful reading. This House is self-regulating and therefore enjoys exclusive cognisance over its own proceedings. But, as the committee correctly recognises, that principle operates within the wider law of the land. Parliamentary privilege does not enable the House, whether by Standing Order or resolution, to alter, let alone abrogate, statutory rights. I suggest that that matters here.

Existing life Peers have, under the Life Peerages Act 1958, a statutory entitlement for life to receive a Writ of Summons and to attend, sit and vote in this House. As paragraph 84 of the report records, the advice received by the committee from senior officials of the House was clear: neither a Standing Order nor a resolution can override that statutory entitlement. Indeed, the report says that an attempt to do so

“would arguably constitute a challenge to the rule of law”,

because the law is the law, and a Standing Order is, with respect, just a Standing Order.

We should therefore be clear about the legal effect of what is proposed. For existing Members, the proposal is that they should retire at the specified age. That is an expression of opinion of the House. It carries an expectation. It may carry some moral or indeed some political force. Political groups may support it; they may somehow seek to give effect to it. But it does not—it cannot—change the law. It does not extinguish the statutory right of an existing Member who might choose, for whatever reason, not to comply. Indeed, the committee itself is candid about that. Paragraph 85 says that the resolution

“would not purport to be binding”,

and the implementation would therefore

“depend on the cooperation of individual members as well as party groups”.

By contrast, the position will be very different for new Members. The committee recommends that anyone nominated for a peerage should, before the peerage is conferred, give a “written undertaking” to retire by the 80th birthday. Of course, that then can be enforced under the House’s power of sanction under the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015. That distinction seems to be constitutionally important for future Members. The obligation is one which they accept when they enter the House; the consequences of breach are made clear to them in advance. But for existing Members, for everyone sitting here today, Parliament has already conferred the relevant statutory rights for life, and those rights—and they are legal rights—cannot be rewritten or abrogated retrospectively by resolution.

Let me be clear: none of that is an argument for or against retirement at 80. My remarks are not addressed to that issue at all. They are addressed to an argument for constitutional clarity, because if the Government want to impose a legally binding requirement for a retirement age on Members, the report identifies the route, and that is legislation. That legislation would permit Parliament to identify and to decide the issue expressly. But if we decide to proceed by resolution instead of legislation, we ought to be clear about what we are actually doing. We are expressing the view of the House, and we expect existing Members to comply with it, but we are not changing, because we cannot change by way of resolution, those Members’ current existing legal entitlement to remain Members of the House. That distinction, I suggest, is not a legal technicality. It is, as the committee itself recognises, a matter of the rule of law. Whatever view we take of the merits of these paragraphs of the report, the rule of law is not an inconvenience to be worked around. It is the framework within which all of us must operate.

Holocaust Memorial Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 21st January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, can the speakers in this debate concentrate on the issue? The issue is whether this amendment should remain in the Bill. We have had two long speeches that have not addressed that.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly, and I will try to address that. I will speak briefly not because the subject is not important—it is such an important subject that there could be no end of words said about it—but because we are focusing on the Commons reason and our response to it. For reasons that I gave at the time, I supported the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. As the Minister pointed out, the purpose of that amendment was to ensure no mission creep—if I can pick up his phrase.

I am one of the Members of this House who have had sustained, constructive and helpful engagement from the Minister, his staff and his team of civil servants. I was pleased to hear the clear and constructive statements that he made, and those made from the Dispatch Box in another place. When we are talking about governance provisions in a trust document, those are legally binding and effective. The nice legal and constitutional question of whether a Government can bind their successor is one thing, but a board of trustees is bound by its constitutional documents.

The important thing to me tonight is that we simply have to get on with this project. I am concerned that there is a risk that further delay will lead not just to further cost but to question marks over the project. We have had a good debate about it, and I think we all share the concern behind the amendment. Indeed, as I say, I supported it. But now we have to get on and not so much complete the job but complete the legislative job and begin the real action on the ground.

The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, knows the high regard I have for her. She explained her opposition to parts of this project very clearly. We agree on some points and we do not agree on others. Disagreement is part of what this place is all about. I respectfully say, on the proposed amendment to say that the “main purpose” must be the provision of education—as opposed to the original amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which had the “sole purpose”—that saying “main purpose” is worse than saying nothing. If you say that the main purpose is X, you are almost admitting, accepting and implying that you can also do Y and Z. It is not just nearly like “sole”. In law, there is a clear distinction between “main purpose” and “sole purpose”. In any event, that is not the real focus of my remarks, which is that we need to get on with it, for the reasons I have given.

I put on record my personal thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Khan of Burnley, who started the work on the Bill in this House. Both in the Chamber and out of it, he and I had many conversations about it, all of which were constructive and conducted in the best traditions of this House. We all owe the noble Lord a huge debt of gratitude. Perhaps he might think about this: his name will always be linked to this Bill because he made the rather prosaic statement, noble Lords might think, set out in Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act, to the effect that the provisions of the Bill are compatible with convention rights. We can have arguments about Strasbourg jurisprudence—that is not for now—but it struck me, reading those words in the Bill, that it is not just that the provisions of the Holocaust Memorial Bill are compatible with convention rights but that the Holocaust is a reminder of what may happen if fundamental rights are not protected.

[Baroness Debbonaire (Lab)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate but, for the avoidance of doubt, I was in the Chamber when it started—I rushed in—because I wish to hear every word. That is partly because I was first alerted to the provisions of the memorial by Anita Lasker-Wallfisch, my cello teacher Raphael’s mother, and subsequently by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, many years ago. This was before 7 October.

The reason I mention this is that, when I was a Member in the other place, I represented a constituency that had extreme views and, as a non-Jew, I felt it was bad enough that I had to hear some of them. It was unbearable. I represented two synagogues, one Orthodox and one progressive, with a very diverse Jewish constituency with a range of political views. Before 7 October the feeling was—I consulted my constituents, and I wanted to put this on record, particularly for the noble Baroness, Lady Deech—that they wanted a memorial, as they all said. There were some variations but, overall, people said they wanted the memorial as proposed.

I put to them the arguments that the noble Baroness and I share. Yes, that is partly because I am so aware of Anita’s experience, longevity and wonderful personality, and the fact that, whenever she sees me, she checks my fingers before she says hello to make sure I am still practising the cello—despite everything. I really wanted to hear from my constituents that they also held some of those ambiguities, and they did not. But they were utterly clear about the issue of the purpose of the memorial and the learning centre.

This has been my concern since 7 October, since when, frankly, I have heard many things that reinforce the need for the purpose of the learning centre to be utterly clear, without doubt and without any diminution or dilution. People have been capable of saying the most dreadful things, which implied to me that they had little or no knowledge of the Shoah and why it matters, and why a focus on the Shoah and on antisemitism matters. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, is quite right to say that it is about not just the dead but the living. The risk of further such atrocities right now, specifically to Jews, is so great. I feel that, as a non-Jew, it is even more my duty to say that and to put on record that which many people have been frightened to say—they have been frightened to say the truth. That is why it mattered to me to see this amendment. However, I am afraid I share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, that seeking to put something in has made it weaker than the original thing that the other place has now rejected. I regret that, but this is the place we are at now.

I share other noble Lords’ determination that we should get this right, and I share the admiration for my noble friends Lord Collins and Lord Khan, who have worked so hard to get us to where we are. It feels like a tremendously long time since we began. However, the need for clarity of purpose has not diminished. It has only grown in the intervening years. I wish to put on record, in my name—as a non-Jew, but with former Jewish constituents who I did my best to represent—the doubling, tripling, quadrupling need that there seems to be, not just over the last four years since the atrocities of 7 October but even in the last four weeks, in Australia and in Manchester, given the sort of antisemitism that we hear about every day. We all know, having read the history of the Shoah, that this is how it starts. I share noble Lords’ determination that we should not hold back.

I share the disagreement of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about where the memorial should be, but we are now past that. I encourage other noble Lords, if they have not already, to go to the Imperial War Museum and hear the beautiful cello playing of my cello teacher, Raphael, and see some of the things that Anita wore and was able to keep with her, which in themselves tell their story. I hope that this memorial and learning centre will tell the story as we need them to, now possibly more than ever.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend’s amendment. I want to make a slightly different point in addition to the legal arguments that have already been made. It is a shame to be speaking before hearing the Leader of the House set out her case, but, as my noble friend said, she was very clear in Committee that she takes this matter very seriously, as I know she does. As we discussed in Committee, all of us who have led our groups or been Chief Whips have had to deal with this issue, and I think we are united in knowing that it needs addressing.

The thing I find hard to understand is why we would not use the opportunity we have right now to put this matter beyond doubt. There are very few opportunities to do that, and one is presented to us right now, so I hope that the Leader of the House will take it. If she does not and my noble friend presses for a Division and is successful, I hope that, in the period between now and the Commons considering any amendments we pass, she will use the opportunity to make the case for this amendment to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues. As the Leader of the House sometimes reminded me when I was sat where she is, the Leader has a responsibility not just to bring the Government’s arguments to this House but to represent the arguments of this House back to government. This is one of those occasions when the House would look to her to take that lead.

I would simply add that, on this occasion, this is not political or partisan; it is about serving the public interest, not just the interests of us as individual Members. I hope that the Leader of the House will act in accordance with that if my noble friend divides the House and is successful in passing his amendment.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the point raised by this amendment is very short, and I will therefore make only three short points on it. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is unfortunate that we do not have sight of the relevant legal advice. Here, the Government are not relying on legal advice that is covered by the normal principles of confidentiality; this goes directly to how the House is going to vote on this matter, and it is unsatisfactory and unfortunate that we do not have sight of that legal advice.

Secondly, whatever view one takes on the underlying position, we now know that there are two contrary and conflicting legal opinions out there. That necessarily gives rise to ambiguity, which is something we should avoid if we possibly can. That brings me to the third point: we can avoid ambiguity here, because this amendment makes very clear what the position is going to be going forward, and we have the ability to put the matter beyond any doubt. Given that the Bill is already going back to the other place in respect of a number of points, I suggest that this amendment ought to be accepted. If the Leader of the House is unable to accept it, these Benches will support my noble friend in the Lobbies.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that, and perhaps I can offer a helpful way forward. This amendment is identical to one tabled in Committee, except that it seeks to permit Peers to retire by allowing a person holding a lasting power of attorney to sign the notice of retirement, which is then given to the Clerk of the Parliaments.

The debate we had in Committee was very useful. As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, said, it was an example of the House at its best, coming together to resolve an issue concerning the dignity of our Members that we all need to be resolved. There was cross-party support for addressing this issue, which has lingered unresolved for far too long, and which the House should have addressed a long time ago.

At the Dispatch Box last time, I made a commitment to report back to the House, and I am able to do so positively today. I will give some of the background of why this matters to me: I was concerned about it before I was Leader of the House, when I was Leader of the Opposition. I know that previous Leaders and Chief Whips were given the same advice as I was—that it was not possible for somebody to be retired by lasting power of attorney or by power of attorney.

I had a case with a colleague whose health was declining, the family wished that Member to retire, and when they approached the Clerk of the Parliaments they were told that the Member could not be retired but he could take a leave of absence. I found that completely and totally unacceptable, because we did not give that Member the opportunity to leave this House with dignity. I investigated further, and I was shocked to discover that they would not even accept a power of attorney. Given that the circumstances in which a power of attorney is accepted are significant, for this House not to accept it seemed rather strange, and I thought it was unacceptable. You can sell your family home, you can resign somebody as a director of a company, but you could not retire from the House.

I raised this matter with the Clerk of the Parliaments, but I also sought my own government legal advice. I have discussed the matter with noble and learned colleagues around the House and the Clerk of the Parliaments, and we reached an immediate practical solution. Members may or may not have seen the Procedure and Privileges Committee’s report. The Clerk of the Parliaments contacted me to say that, having reviewed the legal advice available to him and his predecessors, subject to safeguards—which I will come on to—he would be willing to accept the notice of resignation submitted to him on behalf of a Peer who has lost capacity, holding either a lasting power of attorney covering property and affairs, executed under Section 9(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, or an enduring power of attorney made prior to the 2005 Act coming into force. The safeguards were that the clerk would see the power of attorney, which is a standard procedure in all cases, and that if there was any doubt or any concern, he would raise that with the Whips.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

24: Clause 2, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“(3) Any peerage claim is to be made to His Majesty in Council.(4) A claim under this section must be made in accordance with such rules as His Majesty may by Order in Council prescribe.(5) Section 3 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 (reference to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of appeals to His Majesty in Council) applies to a claim under this section as it applies to an appeal to His Majesty in Council from a court.(6) The Judicial Committee may require an applicant to give such security for the costs of the proceedings as the Judicial Committee may direct.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the future of claims to a hereditary peerage as it was originally drafted by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel for the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 24 seeks to place in the Bill the Government’s intentions in respect of the determination of peerage claims. Can I say what a pleasure it is to see such a large turnout from the Government Benches when we are discussing the role of the Privy Council? It is heartwarming to see what a focus the Government Benches have on this important matter.

As I explained in Committee, the Bill removes the role of your Lordships’ House in determining peerage claims, but it leaves behind a statutory lacuna. My amendment—I emphasise this point—does not depart at all from the Government’s intentions as set out in the Explanatory Notes. It would put those intentions in the Bill. If we do not add this amendment to the Bill, the peerage claims determination process will still be undertaken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council where the case is complicated, but it is possible that other arrangements may be made by future Governments. We need an effective system for peerage claims. Since this House has had a role in this process up to this point, it is only right that we in this House should be concerned about this debate, and we should seek to secure a proper future for that process.

Given the hour, I will not say any more about the Irish peerage issue—I made this point in Committee, and I know that the Government Benches are very focused on this—save to say that I am very pleased that we could get a confirmation from the Government that, as the Attorney-General said in Committee,

“the position will be precisely the same in respect of disputed Irish peerages”.—[Official Report, 1/4/25; col. 177.]

I am grateful to him for that confirmation.

In responding to my amendments in Committee, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General also told your Lordships that the

“power to refer claims to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council … already exists in Section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833”.

I accept that he is right about that, of course, but, with respect, I do not think that that counters the case for my amendment.

More convincingly, the Government made the case that requiring

“all peerage claims to be made to His Majesty in Council … would therefore result in a significant increase in claims already considered beyond the stage of consideration by the Lord Chancellor to be entered on the Roll of the Peerage”.—[Official Report, 1/4/25; col. 177.]

Given that question of proportionality and the impact on the work of the Privy Council, I am not going to seek to divide the House on my amendment today. However, I will take this opportunity to ask—I do not know who will be responding for the Government; it looks as though it will be the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson—whether the Minister can foresee circumstances where a body other than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could take over the role of determining complex peerage claims. Can she confirm whether Parliament would be consulted on that matter before any changes are made? I hope that that confirmation can be given; it would be extremely helpful.

While I am on my feet, to save time, if I may—I know that the noble Earl, Lord Devon, will soon speak to his amendments—I will say something more. Obviously, I recognise the complexity and strength of feeling that arise in any debate on primogeniture. I am aware of families that are at risk of losing their family home as a result of the rules of succession, as well as entails attached to certain properties. I am not going to explain at this hour what an entail is—Wikipedia is available—but this is a serious issue that needs to be looked at. I should say that I am grateful for the conversations that the noble Earl, Lord Devon, has had with me and with others, and grateful that he has taken a circumspect approach to these amendments in seeking to initiate a report on gender equality in the inheritance of peerages. I hope that the Minister will be able to give the House greater clarity on the Government’s position on this issue but, so far as the amendment in my name is concerned, I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

Noble Lords will be disappointed that I do not have a line from the Box on one thing, so they may have to bear with me.

I thank noble Lords for this surprisingly short debate on some very important issues. To clarify, as we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and as he so entertained us in Committee about his family’s stories, the last complex case to be discussed by the JCPC was in 1997. There have been fewer than 10 complex cases in the last 50 years and routine claims are around 12 cases a year, which I hope gives noble Lords some context to what we are discussing.

On Amendment 24, from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General set out the Government’s position on peerage claims in great detail in Committee. To put it briefly, Clause 2 abolishes the jurisdiction of this House in relation to hereditary peerage claims. In future, it is intended that any complex or disputed claims that would have been referred to this House by the Crown will instead be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

To reiterate the statement made by my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General, under the power in Section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833, as was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, His Majesty may already refer matters to the judicial committee for consideration and advice. I am sure that noble Lords would agree that where it is necessary to duplicate legislative provisions, we should avoid doing so. Notwithstanding the way in which the noble Lord regaled us in Committee with his bitter experience of the Pet Abduction Act 2024, I expect the other place will be some somewhat less exercised by this matter.

The noble Lord’s amendment would result in all cases, including straightforward cases, which are usually dealt with only by way of application to the Lord Chancellor, being referred to the JCPC. This would not be the best use of its time, as there is no dispute or legal complexity in these claims. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.

The noble Lord asked me a very important question, which was whether I could foresee circumstances other than the use of the JCPC and, if we did, whether Parliament would be consulted. Having consulted my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General, who thankfully was sitting to my left, I can say that we do not foresee this moving away from the JCPC, but my noble and learned friend assures me that although this issue has not been raised before—so we would have to consider it in more detail—we would seek to consult on principle if there was going to be a move away from the JCPC. If, on reflection that is not the case, we would inform your Lordships’ House at the earliest opportunity. That is as far as I can assist the noble Lord.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

To be clear, when the Minister says that the Government would seek to consult, is that consult generally at large, so to speak, or consult with Parliament? Obviously there is a difference.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

With Parliament. I am glad to be able to assist, even at this hour.

I turn to the points made by the noble Earl, Lord Devon. The noble Earl has raised an important point that was touched on in Committee by my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General. Noble Lords will not be surprised that the Government’s approach has not changed on this issue since Committee, and I will briefly reiterate the rationale for that. While I am sympathetic to the noble Earl’s concerns, as is the Lord Privy Seal, the Bill deals only with the membership of this House. The Leader of the House has written to him to explain some of the complexities of addressing that.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I am not sure that I completely agree with the noble Earl but, in order to continue at this point and to give him the answers that he seeks from the Government, I am going to move forward. As I was about to say, my personal view is that those complexities should not stop us addressing the issue, but it is not an issue for this Bill, which is about membership of your Lordships’ House.

I note that Amendment 25 has been refined by the noble Earl since Committee, but it still seeks to assert how the Judicial Committee should exercise its jurisdiction.

On Amendment 27, while the Government may consult on how the principles of gender equality should apply to determining hereditary peerage claims, without legislative changes the law as it stands distinguishes between sexes, as the noble Earl is clearly aware, in the case of succession to hereditary titles, and it is the duty of the courts to give effect to it. As I have said, that is something that many Members in both Houses, including me, are not comfortable with, but I do not believe that to be a matter for this Bill. The role of the courts is to apply the law, and in doing so they treat all litigants equally. However, the law itself distinguishes between sexes, as the noble Earl is clearly aware, and in the case of succession to regulatory titles it is the duty of the courts to give effect to it.

In summary, the amendment on peerage claims is unnecessary and the amendments on primogeniture are not for this Bill. I therefore respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, especially for her reassurances. I think Moses spoke to the Almighty face to face, but I interact with the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General through the Minister, so I thank the noble and learned Lord via her. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 24 withdrawn.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Lords Chamber

The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, said that he was, in his humility, willing to yield to the mandate gained at the ballot box, but the mandate gained at the ballot box is what is in the Bill and not what is in his amendment.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will make two very short points. First, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, knows the respect in which I hold him, but it is a subtle piece of advocacy to say that the hereditaries sit here purely because of the family they were born into, to use the noble Lord’s phrase. Since 2005, that has not been the case; it is the family plus an election. Indeed, some of them sit here on a firmer basis than many other Members of your Lordships’ House.

Secondly, on the “too late” argument, which seems to be the primary point put by the Government Front Bench, I have never quite understood why opposing a Private Member’s Bill, with all the legislative hurdles and difficulties that such Bills have, precludes you from later supporting an amendment to a government Bill which is bound to become law.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I am finding it difficult to compute exactly what is going on today, because Friday after Friday, Bill after Bill, to a three-quarters empty House, which is characteristic on a Friday, I have been faced with substantial opposition, not just from individual Members—not exclusively from the Tory party but overwhelmingly—but from the Government. The Bills got no further.

Here we are now, with a pretty full House, all agreed that these by-elections are farcical. The amendment gets rid of them; the Bill before the House—which I strongly support—gets rid of them. That was my motive for bringing the whole process in to begin with. Believe it or not, the primary motive was to stop this absurdity which the noble Lord, Lord Newby, described as the most offensive of the lot.

I did not think it would be a problem. I have been around quite a long time, but I thought, “Surely, there is no one in this House who thinks that a by-election to get into this House should be exclusively for men, both the electorate and the candidates, and it is feasible to have an electorate of three when you’ve got seven candidates”. By the way, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, did not mention the last line of that, which is that all three votes went to one of the seven candidates—so there was 100% turnout, with 100% of the vote going to the winning candidate. I mean, North Korea would not dare to do that.

I am flattered, I suppose, to find that everyone suddenly seems to be agreed on this. We could have saved ourselves so much time when I brought it in first in 2016—since when, 27 new hereditaries have come here. To those who say that we might as well do it now, I say a whole new generation has been elected since I first introduced the Bill. But I must be immodest about this—

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful that so many of your Lordships have remained in the Chamber for this particular amendment. I rise to move this amendment with due deference to successive Lord Chancellors, albeit I take no position as to their past suitability. This may appear to be a slight amendment, but it serves a serious purpose. There was a time when Lord Chancellors provided an authoritative senior legally qualified voice in Cabinet, as well as undertaking duties in your Lordships’ House. Today the post has been changed significantly, and of course we have had a number of Lords Chancellor who have not been lawyers.

I tabled this amendment to explore further the possible benefits of returning to the position where the Lord Chancellor sat in your Lordships’ House. My amendment is not, as I say, seeking to look backward. We of course should look forward to the contributions that future Lord Chancellors could make, not only in Cabinet but to your Lordships’ House.

Although we may not be able to return to the position before the role of Lord Chancellor was changed under the last Labour Government, we can place the role of Lord Chancellor on the same level of status as it previously held. If, as was discussed in Committee, the office of Lord Chancellor was to be seen once again as what might be termed a “destination” appointment, rather than one held by a politician on their progress through the Cabinet, we might gain a great deal.

I suggested in Committee that the Lord Chancellor, newly restored to your Lordships’ House, could also serve as a Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and thus as a guardian of our constitution. We lack that guardianship today, with responsibility for the constitution being divided between various government departments, without any clear insight as to who is responsible finally for important constitutional decisions.

The Bill is liable to set a dangerous constitutional precedent, and I wonder whether a distinguished Lord Chancellor in your Lordships’ House who was entrusted with the guardianship of our constitution and was sitting at the Cabinet table, might have offered a sage warning to the Government about the potential challenge that Bills such as this can present to our constitutional order. It is in these circumstances that I beg to move.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will be brief, because this is the fifth time I have spoken on this topic. The first time I spoke, when I advanced the proposition that the Lord Chancellor should come back to this House, Lord Judge—whom I think we all miss very much—inquired in that very gentle way of his whether I was making a job application on the Floor of the House of Lords. I confirmed that I was not and I declare the same non-interest in this speech today.

As my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie has made clear, the position of Lord Chancellor occupies a distinct role in our constitution. The Lord Chancellor is still the only Cabinet Minister who takes a distinct oath to uphold the rule of law, and while the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General and I have had some interesting debates about what is and what is not constituted within the term “the rule of law”, it is an important—indeed, a fundamental—part of our constitution, and I think it is undeniable that in moving the Lord Chancellor away from this House and allowing the position of Lord Chancellor to be held by a Member of the House of Commons, for whom, as my noble and learned friend indicated, it might be an intermediate station stop on a ministerial career, rather than a grand terminus, I think we have lost something.

We have also changed the position of Lord Chief Justice, because while formerly the Lord Chancellor was the person who would speak up for judges, that role now falls to the Lord—or now the Lady—Chief Justice. While there have been some excellent holders of that post—the current holder is particularly excellent —it is unfortunate that we have, in part, turned that post into something of a shop steward for the judges, whereas in the past they had a member of the Cabinet around the Cabinet table, speaking up for judges, for justice and for the rule of law.

I also think, finally, that there is considerable merit in what my noble and learned friend said about the Lord Chancellor heading a small but focused department. One could even call it the Department for Constitutional Affairs: I seem to remember that name being used in the past. That department could have responsibility for the rule of law, for devolution, for civil liberties, for treaties and for human rights—the very things that keep our society the sort of society that we want it to be. These things should not change; they should not come and go with Governments. Frankly, under the last Government as well, we had too many Secretaries of State for Justice, because it was treated as a Cabinet position like any other, but the reason it is treated as a Cabinet position like any other is because that is essentially what the 2005 Act did.

I do not want to go back. We cannot go back to the status quo ante, or to a situation where the Lord Chancellor was a Cabinet Minister and a judge and occupied the Woolsack here; but we can identify that there is something about the role of the Lord Chancellor that is different from all other Cabinet Ministers. For those reasons, I have put my name to this amendment, and I support it.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it may be helpful if I inform your Lordships’ House that my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General also took an oath to uphold the rule of law when he took office.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The point I was trying to make is that I think—the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General may correct me—that he took an oath because he wanted to. I think the only one that is based in statute is the Lord Chancellor’s. That is the point I was making.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

That is correct, but I think it is important to note that my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General chose to because he views that as part of his role.

Amendment 10, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, seeks to ensure that the Lord Chancellor is always a Member of the House of Lords rather than of the other place. It is the same amendment tabled previously by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, who, as ever, made an effective and articulate argument for the change, but, with the greatest respect, as my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General said in the previous debate on this matter, the amendment is more focused on unpicking the constitutional settlement agreed in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and recasting the role of Lord Chancellor as it currently stands than it is on the principle of the Bill before us. The noble and learned Lord made his case with his customary eloquence, but the Government are not persuaded of the constitutional or policy rationale for a return to the 2005 decision.

The 2005 Act rightly ended the mixing of the Executive and the judiciary, and this is not something that this Government wish to reverse. The amendment would, in effect, bind the hands of the Prime Minister over whom he can appoint to be Lord Chancellor, excluding Members of the other place from holding this role. This is unnecessarily restrictive. It would also have the practical effect of forcing the Prime Minister to appoint a new Lord Chancellor, either by appointing a new Peer to this place, choosing an existing Peer or triggering a by-election so as to appoint the present Lord Chancellor to your Lordships’ House.

As my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General said in Committee, the Constitution Committee noted that

“character, intellect and a commitment to the rule of law”

are the most important qualities of a Lord Chancellor. My right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor demonstrates these qualities in abundance, and the House she sits in does not hinder her from discharging her duties as Lord Chancellor. This amendment does nothing to safeguard such qualities in the role of the Lord Chancellor.

I am surprised that the Official Opposition have raised the creation of a department for constitutional affairs; they had 14 years in which to create such a department if they had chosen to do so, yet they did not. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said that the Lord Chancellor should be in charge of a department for constitutional affairs. Such machinery of government changes are of course a matter for the Prime Minister, not for this Bill. Since the creation of the Ministry of Justice in 2007, different Government departments have seen value in a single officeholder having a more holistic oversight of the justice system, by virtue of their responsibility for prisons and probation, as well as for courts and tribunals.

I therefore respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, this is a short but focused amendment, which rightly addresses the issue of standards and trust in our House. Ultimately, this House rests on its integrity and reputation.

As my noble friend mentioned, the Labour Party’s manifesto committed to

“ensure all peers meet the high standards the public expect of them”,

and went on to say that they would do that by,

“strengthening the circumstances in which disgraced Members can be removed”.

During the debate we had on 12 November last year, my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie asked the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal why the Government were delaying their manifesto commitment to strengthen the circumstances in which disgraced Members could be removed. I have to say that a good reason was not provided. The only reason provided was the oft-repeated statement that the only way reform will be achieved is to do it in pieces. Obviously, we have heard that a number of times.

Although I accept that the precise way this House works is not the common currency in the Dog and Duck, and that people do not talk about it around the country, I suspect that the one thing people everywhere around the country would expect is that lawbreakers should not be lawmakers, and that if you break the law and you are convicted, you should not continue to sit in Parliament. That is the short point at the heart of this amendment. It is already the case, of course, that if you are convicted and you have your liberty taken away from you then you lose your right to be here. To that extent, this amendment is only therefore an extension of that principle.

I accept that there were discussions across the Dispatch Box and there was a general understanding that some complexities were involved; the noble Baroness also told us that there would be “further dialogue”. As it is now just after midnight and we come to the end of the first day on Report, can the Lord Privy Seal update us on the extent of that further dialogue and what the Government’s plans are in this regard? If the Government do not have anything really focused in this area, having thought about it, it might well be that my noble friend’s amendment is the way to go.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

To reassure noble Lords, the Government remain committed to strengthening the circumstances in which disgraced Members can be removed. Our position on this amendment has not changed, not least given that it is not a matter for the Bill.

It may be helpful to the House if I briefly set out the current arrangements regarding expulsion. There are two routes of suspension. At the moment, under the House of Lords Reform Act 2014, a Member of the House ceases to be a Member if the Lord Speaker certifies that they are convicted of a serious offence—that is, they are convicted of a criminal offence and given a non-suspended prison sentence of more than a year.

Where a Member receives a prison sentence but not one long enough to engage the 2014 Act, the provisions of the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015 and Standing Orders will be engaged. Under these, a Member who has received a prison sentence of any length is deemed to have breached the Code of Conduct and may be referred to the Conduct Committee, which in turn may recommend a sanction up to and including expulsion from the House. The current statutory framework is a tightly bound one, where only Peers who have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment can be subject to the sanction of suspension, either on an automatic basis or by engaging the 2015 Act and the provisions in Standing Orders.

The noble Lord’s amendment, in setting the threshold at indictment, would have the effect of bringing into scope a much wider array of offences with significantly varying degrees of seriousness and sentencing. I would question whether that is necessarily the appropriate threshold for expulsion and whether this sanction should not be reserved for the most serious of offences.

The Government are committed to ensuring that those who work in public life maintain high standards of ethics and propriety, not just in this House, but across all public servants and officeholders.

As the House will be aware, the Conduct Committee has only recently concluded its review of the Code of Conduct, which made several recommendations relating to the process following a Peer being convicted of a criminal offence. Therefore, it would be right for the House to allow these changes to bed in before considering what further changes may be needed. But we are open to the idea of pursuing this further in the Conduct Committee.

Given that the hour is late, I plan on finishing my comments there, but I am happy to continue discussions outside your Lordships’ House on this area. I therefore respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraw his amendment.

UK-Mauritius Agreement on the Chagos Archipelago

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Monday 30th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, although he will appreciate that I take a very different position in responding to this interesting and important debate.

Before I turn to the more controversial points, let me start with a point on which there is unanimity. I welcome my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis of Banbury, who gave a truly magnificent maiden speech. As an Attorney-General, she was respected across the whole of the other place, and I am sure that her contributions here will be similarly listened to with great care across the whole of your Lordships’ House.

In my tradition, when we finish the annual reading of the Pentateuch with the end of Deuteronomy, we immediately start again with the first chapter of Genesis. In that spirit of linking a beginning and an ending, I also take this opportunity to mark the valedictory speech of her father, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. I am sure that, as the noble Lord leaves this House, it must be an especial pleasure to see his noble kinswoman—as I believe she is known—make the first of what I hope will be many contributions to our work.

This debate is required by statute before a treaty is ratified. Normally, with a treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, we just have a debate. This is a different case. A treaty that cedes British sovereign territory to a foreign power cannot be ratified without an Act of Parliament. Professor Richard Ekins, in a Policy Exchange paper, has set out how every concession of British territory since 1890 has been enabled by primary legislation, the most recent example being the surrender of Hong Kong to China. In addition, since 1945, whenever a colony has achieved independence, either within or without the Commonwealth, primary legislation has been passed to renounce UK sovereignty under those territories. Indeed, FA Mann, a leading authority on foreign relations and the legally applicable principles, regarded this not just as a constitutional convention but as a legal principle.

In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government appear to confirm that this is the position. Can the Minister inform us when this primary legislation will be brought before Parliament? Can we have a clear assurance that the treaty will not be ratified unless and until that legislation has received Royal Assent?

That is a problem with the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, and why, in preference, I will support my noble friend Lord Callanan’s Motion. The former Motion states that the Government should not ratify the treaty until various matters have taken place, but the noble Lord has not included passing an Act to permit the cessation of British territory. I do not know whether it is now Liberal Democrat policy that a Government can give away sovereign territory without an Act of Parliament. It is a little odd. Those Benches are always so keen for Parliament to have a say before we even act in our own self-defence or support militarily our allies, but, apparently, they are keen now for Parliament to have no say before we cede sovereign territory.

In that respect, I regret the terms of Article 1 of the treaty, which states:

“Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago in its entirety, including Diego Garcia”.


That purports to accept that Mauritius is already the sovereign power. That is not the case in international law, as the UK has said repeatedly and consistently until this Government took office. It is also not the case in domestic law. Schedule 6 to the British Nationality Act 1981 includes the British Indian Ocean Territory as one of the British Overseas Territories—and that is also reflected elsewhere in the Act. All of that can be amended only by domestic legislation and an Act of Parliament. If the Act is not passed and the treaty is therefore not ratified, the effect in international law of the Government even agreeing a treaty in these terms will be to weaken our legal position over the Chagos Islands, even before the Bill has been laid before Parliament, which is to be regretted.

Why are we here at all? We are here because Mauritius has claimed sovereignty since 1981, despite decades of Mauritian Governments saying that they did not make any such claim. As we have heard, an ICJ advisory opinion in 2019 opined against the UK’s administration of the islands. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, referred to that as a “ruling” in a rare, but perhaps Freudian, slip. I suggest that it is not a ruling at all; it did not, in terms, talk about the sovereignty of the islands at all. An advisory opinion is not a ruling, a judgment or a binding decision of any sort. The clue is in the name: it is an advisory opinion.

The United Kingdom would have to agree for the International Court of Justice to deliver a binding opinion or judgment. We would have to agree to submit the question of jurisdiction to the ICJ. We have not. I would hope that, even under this Government, we would not. Without that, there would be no binding ruling from the ICJ. While I recognise the political force of advisory opinions, we need to be clear-eyed about them: they are not binding.

We as a country have never accepted that we would always act in accordance with advisory opinions. Indeed, in 1996, an advisory opinion came within one vote of holding that the use of nuclear weapons would nearly always be illegal. Would we, if that vote had gone the other way, have unilaterally disarmed ourselves of all or most of our nuclear arsenal? Perhaps we would have done if this Government, with this Attorney-General advising them, were in charge; I just do not know.

The Government appear to accept that the advisory opinion is not binding, but they say, “Oh, ITLOS—the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea—may assume that the advisory opinion is binding and that Mauritius is sovereign and exercise its own jurisdiction on that false premise”. But there are two problems with that: ITLOS has no jurisdiction to adjudicate a territorial dispute, nor can it properly take it that the question of sovereignty has been decided by an advisory opinion.

To respond to a point from the noble Lord, Lord McDonald of Salford, the advisory opinion is not binding—to use the noble Lord’s words—on ITLOS. An advisory opinion, as is made clear on the website of the ICJ itself, is not even binding on the particular agency which has asked for the advisory opinion, so it is certainly not binding on ITLOS. Secondly and relatedly, the United Kingdom should not accept that its sovereign rights can be taken away from it by one tribunal, ITLOS, misreading and misunderstanding the advisory opinion from the ICJ.

To pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, ITLOS has no jurisdiction in relation to this dispute and we should not accept any ruling that takes for granted that the ICJ has established authoritatively that Mauritius is sovereign, first, because it has not and, secondly, because we would not give our consent to any such judicial determination. We should not, I suggest, give up our sovereign territory because of a fear that ITLOS might wrongly issue some order for some vague protective or provisional measures against us at some future, indeterminate date.

Of course I recognise that an advisory opinion gives the risk that future legal proceedings could be brought against us, but it is a terrible precedent, I suggest, for us to give up territory because we are worried that an international tribunal might in the future reach a conclusion which we regard as legally flawed. I have to say that, if British foreign policy is henceforth to be at the mercy of the vote of the United Nations General Assembly, then it really is game over.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, referred to the—excellent, if I may say so—report from his committee, which I enjoyed reading. In that report, there is a reference to the fact that if we were to stand in the face of an advisory opinion by the ICJ, we would somehow be in the same position as Russia is in relation to the invasion of Ukraine. I hasten to add that that is not the view of the committee, but it was the view ascribed in its report to evidence it took from Professor Sands. The notion that standing on our legal rights in the face of a non-binding advisory opinion makes us like Russia invading Ukraine is less a piece of considered legal analysis and more a piece of advocacy. My late father used to say about one partisan newspaper that it was difficult to see where the news ended and the comment began. When reading Professor Sands’ evidence to the committee, it was very difficult to see where the analysis ended and the advocacy began.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am listening attentively to what the noble Lord is saying. If he has time, could he outline a little more of the background to the decision James Cleverly made in November 2022 to open negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am going to deal with the legal issues affecting this because the Government are saying to us, “We have no choice: we have to sign this because we have legal risk”. There is no point the noble Lord muttering from a sedentary position.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I will finish the point and give way. This Government are trying to dress up a political decision as a legal decision. Now, of course, I am happy to give way.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I just wanted to ask the noble Lord to address the testimony given to the committee by Sir Christopher Greenwood, rather than having a lot of fun at the expense of Mr Philippe Sands.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I have. Sir Christopher Greenwood made the point that we have legal risk. He is absolutely right: there is legal risk. But I am suggesting that we need to analyse that legal risk carefully.

There has been very little reference in the debate so far to the other evidence taken by the committee from Professor Ekins. Indeed, it is a shame that we have not been able to hear from the noble Lord, Professor Lord Verdirame, this afternoon because I would be very interested to hear his view on this issue. Ultimately, the committee heard from three lawyers. There is a difference of legal opinion on this issue, and that is because, ultimately, this is a political and not a legal decision.

Let me turn now to Article 4 of the treaty, which has not yet been raised. The premise of the agreement rests on the proposition that our interests will align with those of Mauritius for the next 99 years to the extent that there is no appreciable risk that Mauritius—and it has, of course, retained lawyers of the highest calibre—will seek to leverage the terms of the treaty for its own benefit. Merely to state that assumption is to show how unsafe it is.

I say 99 years; I was very surprised that the noble Lord, Lord McDonald, referred to 140 years. The ability in the treaty to extend it for 40 years is really not worth the paper it is not written on. There is simply no legal right to extend. There is an ability to negotiate, and the idea that there will be an extension, absent perhaps another huge payment of money, really is for the birds.

Article 4 provides:

“Each Party agrees to ensure that in the implementation and application of this Agreement, including activities in relation to the Base, there shall be compliance with international law”.


No court or body is appointed to deal with that issue. If Mauritius, advised by its eminent lawyers, took the view that UK or US operations out of Diego Garcia are not in accordance with international law, then it could allege the UK was in breach. That would not entitle Mauritius to terminate the treaty—the rights of termination are limited in Article 15—but it would entitle it to take countermeasures which would otherwise be prohibited under the treaty, such as allowing the presence of armed forces of other countries or constructing installations elsewhere on the islands that might adversely affect the security of Diego Gracia. Let us be clear: if Mauritius took that action, there would be nothing that we could do and we would not be entitled to stop paying the sums that we have promised to pay under the treaty.

There is a similar legal risk under Annexe 1. It was mentioned earlier that we have to inform Mauritius about the use of force originating from the base at Diego Garcia “expeditiously”. I have three questions for the Minister in this regard. First, my understanding is that the UK’s position is that this provision requires notice only after an operation is launched. Is that correct? Secondly, assuming that it is only after an operation is launched, what do we consider “expeditiously” means? Does it mean that we have to inform Mauritius as soon as the planes take off, or can we deliberately decide to delay informing it, even though we could inform it, until the operation has been completed? Thirdly, whatever our interpretation of that word might be, have we agreed that interpretation with Mauritius? If we have not, I can give the Minister some free legal advice: all of this is very ripe for a further dispute, which would likely result in Mauritius not abiding by its obligations under the treaty.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

Has the noble Lord considered the evidence given by Sir Christopher Greenwood, former judge at the International Court of Justice—in a sense, our former judge—who dealt with specifically that point, as well as other points that have been discussed?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I have; I read absolutely what Sir Christopher said about Article 4, but it did not find his way into the final report.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

It did.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Well, it touched on it.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

It is in the final report.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The point I have made about Article 4 is absolutely right. Mauritius can take measures in response.

I will wrap up because of the time. My noble friend Lord Callanan reminded us of the price we will have to pay for this legal farrago. Thanks to the approach taken by the Attorney-General, whose advice, properly, cannot be disclosed, the ultimate position is that we are not just giving up the Chagos Islands to a country which never owned them and is thousands of miles away but are paying it handsomely for the privilege.

I do not know whether my friend, the Attorney-General, is thinking about doing his bit to get our sluggish economy going by deciding to move home and increase transactions by putting his property on the market, but if he does, I hope that he might allow me to enter negotiations with him about the ownership of his house. I suspect that the result might be that I end up as the owner of his house having used his own money to pay for it.

The truth is that this is a legally unnecessary and badly drafted treaty. It is a treaty with holes in, and which contains within it the seeds of further disputes. It is a treaty under which we are paying Mauritius to take our sovereign territory off our hands, and we are paying it very handsomely for that purpose. For those reasons, I urge the House to support the Motion in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

93: Clause 2, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“(3) Any peerage claim is to be made to His Majesty in Council.(4) A claim under this section must be made in accordance with such rules as His Majesty may by Order in Council prescribe. (5) Section 3 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 (reference to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of appeals to His Majesty in Council) applies to a claim under this section as it applies to an appeal to His Majesty in Council from a court.(6) The Judicial Committee may require an applicant to give such security for the costs of the proceedings as the Judicial Committee may direct.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to clarify the future of claims to a hereditary peerage as originally drafted by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel for the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 93 would put the process for dealing with peerage claims into the hands of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. When the Bill was published, many people noted that Clause 2 abolishes the role of the House of Lords in peerage claims, expressly including claims to peerages that are in abeyance. However, it does not replace that system; in other words, the clause abolishes but does not also replace.

I appreciate that, three weeks ago in this Committee, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General, whom I am delighted to see here, appeared somewhat surprised to find that there are many Peers who do not sit in your Lordships’ House but are Peers none the less. That is a fact. We must have an effective system in place to determine peerage claims.

The Explanatory Notes to the Bill set out how this process is to work in future. I will quote them, because this is short and clear:

“As well as removing the final link between hereditary peerage and membership of the House of Lords, the Bill also abolishes the jurisdiction of the House of Lords in hereditary peerage claims. The intention is that: a. any complex or disputed peerage claims that would have otherwise been considered by the House of Lords will instead be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council by way of section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833; and b. claimants to a peerage of Ireland will no longer petition the House of Lords to confirm their succession”.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 93A (to Amendment 93) withdrawn.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will of course withdraw the amendment. Before I do, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General for answering the question about the Irish peerages. I will look very carefully at what he said in response to the rest.

I had a wry smile when the noble and learned Lord said that it is unnecessary to duplicate legislation. I started off with that aim as well and I ended up with the Pet Abduction Act 2024. It is all very well when you are faced with a lawyer across the Dispatch Box here, but when you are faced with a group from the House of Commons with the wind in their sails, it may be more difficult to hold to that. I used to tell people that the statute book was not a form of semaphore to send signals, but that often fell on deaf ears.

I am grateful for the support I had en passant from my noble friend Lord Northbrook. Respectfully, I fundamentally disagree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham. There is an interesting—by which commercial lawyers normally mean expensive—legal question raised by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, as to whether a peerage is a matter of property or not. Quite beyond that, we do not want these cases starting in the county court and going all the way up. We need somewhere to resolve them, and the Privy Council is the obvious place. It resolves other sorts of disputes to do with universities and things like that. It would be a bit of fun for it, in between all the other difficult jurisdictional work that it does. My noble friend Lord Moynihan gave a good example of a disputed peerage.

My answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher—who was obviously satisfied with the Attorney-General’s answer, because she has now gone—was going to be slightly different. I was going to encourage the noble Baroness to stay for groups 5 and 7, when the questions of commencement and when we will have the last hereditary Peer will be before the Committee. I was not going to give an answer now, so that she would stay and listen to the debates on those groups. I hope that she comes back.

On a more serious note, if there are discussions, as we have heard, through the usual channels on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, the answer given might be that it will be when one of the current hereditary Peers in the House reaches the ripe old age of 120. Subject to that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 93 withdrawn.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Leader says two and a half days, and I always bow to her suggestions. And let us put some perspective into this. The image we present through the discussions that we have been, and are still, having—that this is the single most important issue facing this House this Session, and that we need to debate it at huge length, which we do not give to every other subject that comes along—is not the best of public relations as far as this House is concerned. I shall not be tempted to get up again, but I did want to inject a bit of realism into our debate.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the nature of this amendment has been clearly set out by my noble friends Lord Forsyth and Lady Seccombe. My noble friend Lord Forsyth explained what the amendment actually does, and he made us confront the reality of what the amendment purports to do. I heard my noble friend Lady Seccombe say that she was ashamed to have to speak to the amendment, because it is so brutal—and brutal it is.

Therefore, one wonders why this amendment has been brought forward by the noble Baroness. The reason she gave was an odd one. The reason she gave was that, when the House adjourned at 10 pm, as it customarily does, light descended on her and she just had to put down this amendment.

I have not been here as long as the noble Baroness, but my understanding is that the House generally adjourns at 10 pm unless there is an arrangement between the usual channels for a later sitting. I understand that there was no such arrangement and that was why the House came to an end and adjourned at 10 pm. In any event, the idea that that is a reason to go further than the Government’s own Bill in respect of the date by which the hereditaries leave this place is, as a reason, not a reason at all. It is a fig leaf. There must be else something behind it. One wonders, what is that something else? I look forward, as I always do, to the words of the Leader, but especially on this, because this amendment contravenes, in terms, the Bill. It goes well beyond the Bill.

We have been hearing this evening that, when the Front Bench responds to amendments, the Minister should respond to the amendment and not to the debate. Therefore, I look forward to the Leader saying in unequivocal terms that she is opposed to this amendment. Otherwise, there will be a concern that—in a series of groups where very few people have spoken, and very few amendments have been put forward, from the government Benches—this amendment and this speech have been singled out above all else to be made and to be said.

We of course oppose this amendment, for the reasons already set out. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who spoke in this House on one of the various Private Members’ Bills put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I see that he got in early with the Government’s excuse as to why they cannot do second-stage reform: because it will be so amended and will take up so much time. That was very useful. I do that when I am in court. If I think that point is going to come up in six months’ time, I just put down a “sleeper”, as I call it. That was a good, old-fashioned sleeper as an excuse for no second-stage reform. But I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who said in your Lordships’ House on 3 December 2021:

“We are not seeking to say farewell to any hereditary already here; indeed, we look forward to their contributions for many more years”.—[Official Report, 3/12/21; col. 1569.]


What has changed to make the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, not content with her own Government’s Bill but seek to accelerate the expulsion of the hereditaries? There seems to be no reason for it at all. I do hope that the Leader of the House will join me in our forthright opposition to this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, given the hour, I can also be brief, because the essential points have been made by the Convenor and by my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. In essence, what lies behind all these proposed amendments is the question of effectiveness and the importance of putting in place some transitional arrangements to make sure that we do not face the cliff edge, to pick up that phrase from the Convenor, which would be to the detriment of all of us in this House and, indeed, to Parliament generally. We have, as my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay reminded us, a bicameral Parliament and we have to make sure that both Houses work well together. So, the critical point here is that of effectiveness.

This group shows again why analogies are dangerous in this area. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, spoke in the last group and we had, yet again, the analogy with MPs. It is not a good analogy. The problem with analogies, as a Court of Appeal judge once put it to me, is that they are different, and we are dealing with a vastly different circumstance here: hereditary Peers leaving this House as against MPs leaving the House of Commons in a general election.

The central issue here is one of effectiveness and proper transitional arrangements. Therefore, I look forward to the response of the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal to these various options as to how we might best proceed here.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

I am afraid I start by disappointing the noble Lord.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Forgive me—I apologise.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

As long as it is not a disappointment, my Lord. It would have been a disappointing end to Committee—although we have one more group to go—if we had got to the final groupings without reference to the now famous spreadsheets of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. So, I thank him for that.

With regard to some of the comments, before I move on to the substance, I just want to correct for the record a couple of things. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, underestimates the interest of our colleagues at the other end of the building: not least, I believe that my fiancé is watching on television, so I am pretty sure that some Members of the other the other place are interested.