Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

The shadow Minister is speaking very clearly, and I agree with him on the potential for political interference. Does he also see within the clause any scope for market distortion because of the powers that the regulator has?

[Mr French]

I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and I note that the Football Association sent a letter to Bill Committee members over the weekend, highlighting its concern about scope creep and how that may also interfere with what the regulator is meant to be tightly governed to do.

I would like to think that we would rather solutions were made within football. It is important that backstop powers are a clearly defined last resort and that the process encourages the principle of bodies working together to find a joint solution. Let me be very clear: by defining “relegation revenue” in statute and bringing parachute payments into scope, the Government risk triggering exactly the kind of interference that UEFA explicitly prevents in its statutes. Amendment 126 would remove subsection (3) in full. That would not abolish the regulator’s ability to consider fair distribution; it would simply make clear that internally agreed mechanisms, such as parachute payments, fall outside the regulator’s remit.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 112, in schedule 4, page 99, line 34, leave out “crest” and insert “badge.”

My amendment raises a point that may seem technical, but I believe it is important if the Bill is to respect the history and traditions of our great national game. There is reference in the proposed legislation to the “crest” of a football club, but as any student of heraldry or loyal football supporter will tell us, that term is often misunderstood. In fact, the correct term in almost every case should be the “badge”. A crest is a specific heraldic element part of a full coat of arms traditionally appearing above a shield and regulated under royal prerogative through the College of Arms.

That distinction may seem academic, but it is not. When clubs are challenged on their intellectual property, or when supporters are concerned about the commercialisation or alteration of the symbols that represent generations of loyalty, it matters enormously that we use the correct terminology. We are not just talking about branding. We are talking about something deeply symbolic: an identity that lives on scarves and gravestones, and in the hearts of whole communities. My noble Friend Lord Parkinson raised this point in the Lords with great care and I believe he was right to do so. He proposed that the Bill use the term “badge”, not “crest”, to ensure accuracy and to avoid the legal and cultural confusion that can arise when the wrong term is used.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Another reason to include the word “badge”, my hon. Friend would presumably agree, is not only that is it technically correct, but it is a word used in football. It is a word that fans use. It is always helpful if legal documents in a Bill can reflect both technical and everyday wording. If the two are the same, that seems like an obvious answer.

[Mr French]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. I must admit, as a long-term football fan, that I have never heard a player say that he kissed the crest of his club when celebrating a goal. The footballing term is as accurate as the legal one, as he highlights.

This may seem a modest amendment, but it speaks to something bigger: the importance of precision, respect for history and an understanding of football not just as a product but as a tradition. If we are going to regulate the game, let us do it properly with the right words and the right respect.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant.

Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated.

The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made?

Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks.

Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful.

Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend the shadow Minister sets out his question very well. It sounds as though the situation could get very complicated, especially over time, as the regulator might impose certain conditions on certain clubs and severely distort the market. Does he have any comment on that?

[Mr French]

That is exactly my concern. In trying to tailor the conditions that we are discussing, there is a risk of inadvertently impacting the ability of clubs to compete on a fair and level playing field. I am concerned that that should not happen inadvertently, as the regulator evolves. That is why I keep pushing for more parliamentary oversight, so that we understand the risks. At the end of the day, fans will not forgive us as Members of this House if this goes wrong. I do not believe in any shape or form that the Government are aiming deliberately to get it wrong—I say that openly—but I fear that there will be unintended consequences, and that is the broader point that we have been trying to make in a number of the Committee’s debates.

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[Mr French]

I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for explaining the objectives behind the amendment, which is aimed at preventing individuals with a record of human rights abuses from owning a club. My question for the hon. Member is about new clause 8(2)(b), which states that

“the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).”

In other words, it will have discretion to determine whether such conduct constitutes human rights abuses. Given we are talking about a football regulator, the obvious question to ask is about what qualifications the regulator would need to make such a decision. What information could they rely on? Would we be looking for Government involvement in that, given that that would probably provide the intellectual experience required? Does the hon. Member for Cheltenham think it might improve the new clause to include a route of appeal against such a decision, as a matter of natural justice, so we are seen to give individuals the right of appeal if they believe that they have been wrongly classified?

[Joe Robertson]

I have sympathy with the aims of the amendments, but I also have a few questions. I wonder whether the wording in the Bill about “requisite honesty and integrity” might cover the issue that the hon. Member for Cheltenham is trying to deal with in new clause 8. I note that amendment 75 would do more that protect against owners with a record of human rights abuses, because it would require them to promote human rights. I obviously have no problem with people promoting human rights, but the amendment would put a duty on an owner to do something positive to show that they are fit and proper. I wonder whether that is really the hon. Member’s intention.

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[Joe Robertson]

Once again, I have some sympathy with the aims of the new clause and I see where the hon. Member is trying to go with it. However, as it is currently drafted, it has a lot of breadth and contains vagaries that could throw up all sorts of issues. I will just deal with those issues briefly.

By the way, I like the idea of identifying “material change” to the extent that someone who may once have been considered fit and proper is no longer considered fit and proper, because of something that has happened or something that has been identified.

I have a problem with imposing a duty, particularly on some of the groups set out in paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (2). For example, there would be a positive duty on “club employees”, which would include some very junior members of staff. In English law, imposing a duty on someone to do something is fairly exceptional. Although I could probably tolerate imposing a duty on “officers and board members”—if people have attained that level within an organisation, they should expect duties to come with it—I could not tolerate imposing a duty on all “club employees”. That is a difficulty I have. Also, that list is not exhaustive. Subsection (1) refers to:

“ Individuals or organisations associated with a regulated club”.

That could capture a lot more people than those listed in subsection (2).

I am also slightly concerned that the duty for notification applies:

“when they”—

that is, the person—

“have evidence or information that a material change in circumstances has occurred”.

I suspect that that could open the floodgates and be misused as a means to try and potentially smear someone, or raise questions about whether they are fit and proper, based on some pretty spurious “evidence”. Such evidence could be pretty much anything—even a trivial matter. I would have hoped that there would be some sort of threshold, such as evidence that points to a strong or compelling case. “Evidence” on its own is a very, very low bar and could encourage all sorts of minor allegations that could make the job of the football regulator far bigger than it is intended to be.

Otherwise, I broadly support what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve.

[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club.

Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play. We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do.

Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light. An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs.

My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence. I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Thursday 5th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

I am genuinely surprised that the hon. Member did not talk about Crystal Palace’s success in the FA cup final. I am sure his point is noted by the Committee.

More broadly, the football industry supports around 100,000 jobs in the United Kingdom, contributes more than £7.6 billion to GDP and delivers £3.6 billion in tax revenues annually. A major disruption to international participation because of this Government’s regulator would clearly put a serious dent in all that. In short, any move that risks our relationship with UEFA and FIFA is not just a sporting gamble but an economic one, and a profoundly reckless move for any Government to take.

We must also consider the practical impact on clubs and fans. Imagine a scenario in which the Government’s regulator intervenes in the ownership model of a particular club in UEFA competitions and in doing so breaches UEFA’s licensing criteria. That club could find itself barred from the Champions League, the Europa League or other leagues through no fault of its own. Fans, players and club employees would suffer, and the club’s value and viability undermined, all as a result of a conflict that could and should have been avoided through foresight and careful drafting of this legislation.

There is precedent for this kind of statutory provision. In sectors such as financial services, we have long recognised the need for domestic regulators to align their actions with international frameworks that they are part of. The Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority operate in a global regulatory environment and Parliament has provided them with duties and powers that reflect that reality. This is not a novel concept; it is standard practice where cross-border frameworks exist. As the Government have chosen to model their regulator on those in financial services, perhaps the Minister can tell us why they have not done so in this regard.

Football is different. It is more internationally integrated than most sectors. Rules are more intertwined and clubs more interdependent on foreign clubs for competition, particularly at elite level. English clubs compete weekly in cross-border tournaments—for example, when Arsenal sadly lost to Paris Saint-Germain, who went on to win the Champions League. What a final that was. Players move freely between jurisdictions. Broadcasting rights are sold and consumed around the globe, as we have heard. Football’s regulatory framework must reflect that international dimension, not wilfully ignore it.

Some will say that the amendment is unnecessary because the regulator can use its discretion to avoid conflict, but without a statutory duty, it could operate without full regard to the consequences abroad. The amendment would place a clear and proportionate duty on the Government’s regulator—something that its leadership would be required to consider in every decision they take.

Importantly, the amendment would not hand international bodies a blank cheque. It would not bind the regulator to follow their rules blindly or to give up domestic responsibilities. What it would do is make sure that the Government’s regulator takes those rules into account and, wherever possible, avoids direct conflict. That is entirely reasonable and, in my view, essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the Government’s regulator.

We do not want to create a regulator that acts in splendid isolation. We want a regulator that defends English football’s integrity but also safeguards its place in the global game. It would be the height of irony if, in the process of attempting to strengthen our domestic football pyramid, we inadvertently isolated it from the wider footballing world, solving one problem only to create a much worse one. The amendment would act as a safeguard and send a signal to fans, clubs and international partners alike that we in Parliament understand the integrated nature of modern football and legislate accordingly.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Turner. Amendment 97 is objectively reasonable; the Government, in setting up the independent football regulator, should want to do so in compliance with any FIFA or UEFA rules, in order to secure our national teams’ places in international tournaments.

There is a genuine risk that the football regulator may conflict with FIFA and UEFA rules, not least in the political appointment of its chair. I know that the Government do not think that it is political to appoint a chair who, in the current circumstances, donated to the Prime Minister’s leadership campaign, but FIFA may take a different view. If FIFA takes a different view and seeks to ban our national sides, the Government will not be able to do anything about it. This is the moment to enshrine in law that the regulator must comply with FIFA and UEFA rules.

We can delve briefly into what we think FIFA might deem political. In 2016, FIFA fined domestic teams, including England, for wearing an armband with an Armistice Day poppy because, in FIFA’s view, the poppy is a political symbol. I think that is madness, and pretty much everyone in this country thinks it is madness, but that was FIFA’s view, and it levied a fine. I think that, after negotiation, FIFA has since changed its mind—but if that was its view of the poppy and all sorts of symbols that most ordinary people would not think of as political, I am concerned about what it will think about a football regulator that has a chair appointed by Government, who in this instance also donated to the leadership campaign of the Prime Minister of the day, and who may then exercise a decision over ownership of a particular club in this country. I suspect FIFA may think that is political and conflicts with the ability of England and other home nations to compete in international events. The Government can deal with that very simply.

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[Joe Robertson]

I, and I suspect a lot of fans, would not be comfortable if there was a negotiation between FIFA and the Government—by the way, the current Secretary of State received money from the current preferred candidate—about the viability of the England national team playing in an international tournament, when what they were negotiating about was the suitability or decision making of a political donor to that Government. That is not healthy. It does not satisfy me.

I would much prefer that there was a provision in the Bill that clearly stated that the football regulator—that is more than just the chair; it is the entire body—must not do anything that

“conflicts with any regulations or rules of international football governing bodies”.

By the way, this is about far more than just politics; I use the political issue as an example, but there are many other ways in which the regulator could conflict with FIFA and UEFA. I am sure that nobody here intends that it does, so let us build that into the Bill.

[Mr French]

A point that is being slightly missed in this exchange is something that I mentioned in my speech: the impact and risk for clubs and whether the line is crossed. In particular, the qualification for the Champions League each year in the Premier League is a huge source of revenue, as I explained. Having that risk at play could deter the inward investment into clubs that we know is key to the future success of English football, as we have already seen. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with the shadow Minister. I suppose there is a not-too-fanciful theoretical situation in which the football regulator makes a decision on the ownership of a club that has otherwise qualified for the Champions League, and that decision was made by a body headed up by someone who had donated to the Prime Minister of the country. I think that that would be a problem. However, if clause 7 were amended, he would have to recuse himself, or the body would have to deal with it in a different way. My hon. Friend demonstrates perhaps the most likely scenario and the most powerful justification for backing the amendment. I urge all Members to do so.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

The clause formally establishes the Independent Football Regulator as a statutory body, providing the legal foundation for the IFR’s existence and marking a significant moment in English football governance and our constitution. The clause gives the Independent Football Regulator its own legal personality, allowing it to operate independently of Government and the football authorities.

We will come to the issue of independence, so I will not hold up the Committee too much on the point. I will not make this personal to the Government’s proposed choice of chair. It is rather about the structural integrity of independence, which is crucial to what we do as a House and how sport operates across this country, as it has done successfully for a number of years. The last thing that sport fans want is politicians involved in the regulation of football. We all welcome being supporters—a number of Members are supporters of clubs—but we must be clear that there should not be political interference in the running of the game.

The clause ensures that the regulator can exercise powers conferred elsewhere in the Bill, including around licensing, enforcement and oversight functions. We have a number of concerns about how the details in schedule 2 will work in practice, and the rules around making the independence of anyone involved in football regulation clear as we move forward.

More broadly, I seek clarity from the Minister on a few matters. Does she believe that clause 5 provides sufficient clarity and authority for the IFR to act decisively and independently when enforcing breaches of licensing conditions or financial rules? What safeguards are in place to ensure the Independent Football Regulator’s independence from political or industry pressure when taking enforcement action against powerful clubs or owners?

Will the IFR have the necessary investigatory powers from the outset to underpin robust enforcement, or are those powers dependent on secondary legislation or guidance? How will the IFR balance its role as a regulator with the need to maintain constructive relationships with clubs, especially when initiating enforcement proceedings?

On that point, I again highlight the importance of independence—not just independence from this place, but independence from other leagues and experiences that might bring into question any judgment that the IFR makes. That is a concern I have around the choice of chair, which I know we will come on to. I have concerns about leagues and any bias—known or unknown—in decision making, and the questioning of that. Going forward, that would generally be very unhelpful for the game.

Lastly, to what extent will the IFR be held accountable for the consistency, transparency and proportionality of its enforcement decisions under the powers established in the clause?

[Joe Robertson]

The requirement for the regulator to be independent is clearly essential. I am sure that it is common ground on both sides of this Committee Room, and in the rest of the House, that the Independent Football Regulator board and chair need to be independent.

This is a significant time for English football. To be regulated by statute and lawmaking and the decisions of the Members of the House of Commons and the other place is a departure from the way our beautiful game has grown in this country, without regulation. In certain aspects, we need to be really careful about what we are doing. The independence of the chair and the board of the regulator is key. Independence can mean so many different things, as the shadow Minister has noted. It can mean independence from the influence of certain interests within the game—clearly, if the regulator is to regulate multi leagues, we need an independent regulator that is not encumbered by particular interests, particular clubs or particular leagues.

There is also the very important issue of political independence. Given that the chair will be appointed by an elected politician—by the Secretary of State—the decision needs to be carefully scrutinised to ensure that independence, with a capital I, remains key. We might get on to this point at another time, possibly today, but the Secretary of State has recused herself from making any decision over the recommended candidate because of a donation he declared to her leadership campaign. The preferred candidate also made a donation, which he declared to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, to the Prime Minister’s leadership campaign, but the Prime Minister has not recused himself from any involvement in the decision.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

Thank you, Sir Jeremy. I know the Committee is delighted to hear me continue my speech.

These amendments are on the key issue of trust and of establishing the true independence of any football regulator brought in by this Government. Alongside the other amendments we have tabled, we believe that requiring that the chair of the board is not a member of a political party, or a campaigner for a political party, will help to protect the integrity of the football regulator. As the Bill stands, the Government are allowing appointees to the regulator to hide their political activity from fans and from Parliament, which would undermine the regulator from day one. I urge all Members to accept these amendments with good conscience, or to be prepared to explain to their constituents why they are supporting cronies over clubs and favours over fans.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

We are debating a group of amendments that attempt to better the regulator’s independence. The shadow Minister has set out at great length—made even longer by the interruptions —how these amendments would do that.

I think we all agree that the regulator should be independent. It is perfectly open to Labour Members to say, “Hang on a minute, the Bill already does that,” but their interventions and their scoffing from sedentary positions seem to make the counterargument, “Well, when you were in government, you made political appointments to bodies like the BBC and Ofqual.”

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[Joe Robertson]

Whenever I rise to speak on the Bill, I try to keep the fans uppermost in my mind. We have heard discussion about the potential for increasing costs. That is because the Bill will create a bureaucracy. It is a bureaucracy that some Members support, which is fine, but it is a bureaucracy and has to be paid for. It is being paid for by a levy on clubs. The amendment is not about whether we support a regulator; it is about whether we support the principle of trying to put some parameters around the cost by putting a headcount cap on the regulator and ensuring that this bureaucracy does not grow and grow over time.

In this country we have had a slight tendency, across Governments of different political colours over many decades, to allow bureaucracies to grow. The Bill would be relatively unique but, I think, strengthened if we put in a cap to ensure that this regulator and this bureaucracy cannot grow without restraint. It would therefore ensure that fans will not be overpaying for an organisation that does not need to grow to hundreds, thousands or whatever number anyone wants to suggest.

[Mr French]

My hon. Friend is making a very strong argument. The other point that we are trying to make is that the other established bodies of football are still in place and doing other parts of the job. The regulator is seeking to bring in new responsibilities, but it will not reduce the existing costs on clubs of those other regulatory bodies.

[Joe Robertson]

I take the point, which is well made. We do not want the regulator to grow and start trying to perform the functions of other bodies that exist, just because it has an unrestricted budget. Who knows what the Government of the day will allow to be spent on it? I heard the representations from Government Back Benchers about the methodology to evidence why 50 is the magic number. It is correct to say that it is not the role of MPs to mandate specific headcount, but putting a cap on it would ensure overarching budgetary control. Although it is reasonable to disagree, it is also reasonable to assert that a regulator should be able to function with 50 paid staff members.

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[Joe Robertson]

The cap is not a mandatory number. We are not saying that the regulator must have 50 people delivering a set of regulatory powers. It is about trying to impose some sort of control on the regulator to stop it growing and growing. The hon. Gentleman says that we will leave it to the regulator, but what happens when the regulator comes back and says, “We need 250 people”? What if, further down the line, it thinks that the job is a bit bigger than it thought, so it argues for 300 or 400? We can name a whole list of bureaucracies that have grown and grown; NHS England is one such, although I am prepared to accept that the IFR would not grow to the size of NHS England, at least within this Parliament.

[Mr French]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. My argument, which I believe he is making too, is that hon. Members should have a say in what the regulator looks like, both now and in future. Our overriding point is that once the Bill has passed, there is no power in it that I can see that gives hon. Members any say over what the regulator will look like. We are trying to put a ceiling on it now so that hon. Members can have a say in the size of the regulator.

[Joe Robertson]

The shadow Minister puts it much more succinctly than I have, and I thank him.

The rationale behind the amendment is to keep control over the costs. There will be a levy; it will be football clubs that pay; and ultimately the costs will fall on fans, potentially through higher ticket prices, which we want to avoid. If the Government will not back the amendment, I invite the Minister at least to give some assurances of control over spiralling costs. The headcount of any organisation is one of the key costs.

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[Mr French]

I disagree with the hon. Member’s interpretation. It is quite commonplace for the chief executive to be the highest paid member of staff in most organisations. In my experience, it would be highly unusual for members of staff underneath the chief executive to be paid more than them.

[Joe Robertson]

I am going to stick my neck out here. I have little confidence in the Government curtailing the expenditure of money, but I do have confidence they would not let a football regulator come into existence where every single employee is paid £173,000. I hope that my trust in them is not misplaced.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

No, absolutely not. The hon. Gentleman actually makes the point that I have made already, because we believe that Parliament should have a say on what the regulator looks like in future. We have already made the case that the Bill gives unchecked powers to the Secretary of State. The hypothetical situation that hon. Members have referred to, where we come back with another Act of Parliament, would give Members the opportunity to scrutinise what the regulator has done and scrutinise its costs. It would give Members the opportunity to explain to fans around the country why they are increasing ticket prices and other costs. Members should have the opportunity to keep a sensible check on the regulator in future.

I will get back to my comments, as I appreciate that I am testing your patience again, Sir Jeremy. I am sure that the Minister will understand the serious concerns around not only the cost of the chief executive but, importantly, who determines the pay, which is the second part of the amendment.

I hope that the Minister can also answer my questions about the other issues that my amendment brings to the fore today. On paragraph 8(4), why must a non-executive member of the board of the Government’s regulator notify the Secretary of State when they intend to resign from said board? Why do they not need to inform the chairman, deputy chairman or even the chief executive of the regulator? From my experience, it would be commonplace on most boards for someone to notify the chairman of the board rather than—obviously this is a unique situation—the Secretary of State, so the focus of the Bill seems unusual. Does the Minister understand that, once again, that makes it look like a political regulator? By maintaining the legal ties between the employment of non-executive directors and the Government, it is clear that they are not independent of Government, but reliant on Government. Will she clarify why that is the case?

Paragraph 9(b) states that the Secretary of State can remove a board member if they are satisfied that there is a conflict of interest. Will the Minister tell us what qualifies as a conflict of interest and how the Secretary of State, whoever they may be, will decide what meets those qualifications? Would donating to a political party not in government count—or perhaps donating to a political party that is in government? Would having an interest in related broadcasting companies qualify?

Paragraph 10(1) sets out that the Secretary of State may determine the remuneration of non-executive members of the board. That gives the Secretary of State, whoever that may be, extensive powers over patronage. Can the Minister tell us how many board members does she anticipate will be needed and how many will be appointed? What will the remuneration per board member be, and what is the total cost of the board’s operation?

Does the Minister agree with the spirit of my amendment that the Prime Minister should be paid more than whoever is the chairman or the chief executive, whoever that may be? Those already large salaries may encourage the Prime Minister, perhaps on the advice of the current Secretary of State, to appoint somebody to the role to make sure they get a good return on their investment into Labour leadership bids.

[Joe Robertson]

I will not repeat what the shadow Minister has very ably said, but clearly the amendment goes back to the issue of costs spiralling out of control. Let us remember that the concern is about the pay levels for those appointed. The role has already been advertised, as I understand it, on the Government website at £130,000 for a three day part-time role, which means that pro rata they will be paid more than the Prime Minister. I have a serious problem with that, and I suspect that most fans have a serious problem with this so-called slimline light touch regulator being headed up by somebody who is paid more than the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. That is why my hon. Friend is trying to bring in some level of cap on pay.

We were not successful in bringing in a cap on headcount, but the Minister could not give us any indication of how many people she expects to be employed by the regulator. The Government are prepared to say that 73,000 people should serve in the armed forces, so it is not unprecedented to give an indication of the number of employees in organisations, which is all this amendment is trying to do. If Government Members are happy for the regulator to be paid more pro rata than the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, so be it—they will have to vote in that way. I am not happy, and that is why I support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

My hon. Friend gives an example that I admit I had not thought of. That is a well-made point about transparency and how that works in the City, and about the important role of the Bank of England.

[Joe Robertson]

I offer the shadow Minister another example: on Select Committees, as mentioned by the Minister. There may be no formal record of how minority votes go in Select Committees—although the Minister did seem to know the outcome of the appointment decision—but, as sittings are held in public, people can see how different members of a Select Committee respond to an issue.

[Mr French]

That is an excellent point. I believe that the people who want to sit on these expert panels and help with the future of football—I assume that is what they will be contributing to—should be able to operate transparently for the ultimate fans. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve. I will press the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.